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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

“ROSES REMIND ME OF ALEPPO”: IRONIC HOME, BECKONING STATES, AND
MEMORIES OF SYRIAN ARMENIAN WOMEN IN YEREVAN, ARMENIA
This project contributes to anthropologies of the state, (diasporic return) migration,
belonging, home, and conflict, including genocide and war. It intervenes in the anthropology of
home by focusing on both the social and physical aspects of home, its pain, joys, and ironies, and
it speaks to the anthropology of genocide by showing how a population a century removed from a
genocide uses it to interpret their experience. This dissertation also deals with state constructions
of ideal citizen formation--one of obligation and devotion to the socially constructed ancestral
homeland, where descendants who share an ethnic identity have a role to play to strengthen the
state, as well as the perceived obligation of ancestral states to diasporic populations. I refer to
states who use “pull” dynamics, such as repatriation campaigns, as “beckoning states.”
This dissertation is about a conflict between state discourses of repatriation and collective
memory of the Armenian genocide in the socially and physically constructed homeland, the
Republic of Armenia, and individual memories of a nostalgically constructed home in Syria from
which Syrian Armenian women were forced to flee during the Syrian conflict. My primary
argument is that state constructions of home and belonging which rely on collective memory of
the Armenian genocide, collide with Syrian Armenian women’s individual memories of an
experiential home crafted in Syria over the course of five generations since the Armenian
genocide. Since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011, approximately 20,000 Syrian citizens of
ethnic Armenian descent fled to Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, enticed by the host state with
promises of citizenship. Interested potential citizens must provide “proof” of Armenian ethnicity.
Despite its small population size, compared to other countries to which Syrian refuge-seekers
have fled, Armenia has become one of the highest receiving countries of Syrian refuge-seekers
per capita. However, long-term integration of refuge-seekers by the host Armenian community
raises compelling issues about exclusion and inclusion. Roughly one hundred years after the
Armenian genocide, Syrian Armenian women fleeing Syria traveled similar paths through historic
Western Armenia (now eastern and southeastern Turkey) as their ancestors once had during the
genocide, albeit in reverse (Syria through Turkey to Armenia in 2012-2016; Western
Armenia/present-day Turkey to Syria in 1915-1922). Decisions to select certain legal statuses are
moralized by some members of the host community-- “good” Syrian Armenians are those who
stay and socially, and more importantly economically, contribute to the socially constructed
homeland, the Republic of Armenia. “Good” Syrian Armenians become citizens. “Bad” Syrian
Armenians are moralized as those who leave after a short period in Armenia and are perceived as
taking advantage of Armenia’s benefits for refugees. A secondary home was constructed over

five generations of descendants of Armenian genocide survivors who had fled to Syria. The term
“ironic home” refers to the fact that Syria was simultaneously a site of refuge for genocide
survivors and immense trauma, where many Armenians were forcibly displaced and killed.
The Armenian state’s instrumentalization of memories of the 1915 Armenian genocide to
create new ethnic Armenian citizens through calls for repatriation and nation-building conflicts
with many interlocutors’ nostalgia for Syria. State narratives specifically targeted Syrian
Armenian migrant women in Armenia, depicting them as potential citizens and contributing
members of society through an emphasis on their economic contributions to the state. The theme
of preferential citizens-to-be is further encapsulated by what has been referred to by one
interlocutor as the Syrian Armenian “brand.” This refers to state efforts and humanitarian
marketing referencing Syrian Armenian migrants in Armenia. While not an official legal category
used to refer to refuge-seekers in Armenia, the Syrian Armenian “brand” nonetheless helps to
explain why certain barriers to socioeconomic integration exist for Syrian Armenian migrant
women in Armenia. Gender dynamics, specifically gendered participation in the paid labor force,
have changed significantly among ethnic Armenian women from Syria after migration to
Armenia. Middle to upper class ethnic Armenian women in Syria were generally able to rely on
their spouse’s salary to provide for the family, as well as for entertainment purposes and did not
have to work. Some women ran their own businesses in Syria or occupied high-status jobs, such
as doctors and pharmacists. In Armenia, however, Syrian Armenian women are compelled to
work to help support their families. Many Syrian Armenian migrant women were shocked and
disappointed that it was challenging to find work in Armenia. They were looking forward to
promises of security, which they were mostly granted in Armenia. In Syria, there was the threat
of disruptions to physical security, but there was a sense of socioeconomic protection. In
Armenia, most women I interviewed felt that they were physically safer but were more insecure
financially and did not have a strong social network outside of the Syrian Armenian community
in Yerevan. This dissertation is about collective and individual memories, nostalgia, manipulative
statecraft, and various actors--migrant women, state and non-state employees, Syria and Armenia.
My research focuses on paradoxes, layers (history, actors, data), and the messiness of states and
NGOs as it relates to the integration of migrant women within a host community/socially
constructed homeland.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1

Introduction

“Roses remind me of Aleppo,” said my great-aunt Alidz, sampling the gift of rose-

flavored candies I brought her from Michigan as we sat on her Los Angeles couch in summer
2012. I was in Glendale, a heavily Armenian-populated suburb of Los Angeles, visiting my
Armenian family members and conducting interviews with Armenians from Turkey for my
Master’s thesis. Through this personal and professional trip, I was able to see the importance of
collecting people’s stories, and I realized that their experiences were like those of my own family.
Specifically, I was able to witness firsthand the strength and resilience of women who fled from
multiple conflict zones. The nostalgia in this phrase, “Roses remind me of Aleppo,” echoed
throughout my dissertation fieldwork six years since my conversation with my great-aunt on her
leather couch, in the form of rose-scented body lotions sold by Syrian Armenian women at
underground markets by Yerevan metro stations, varti muraba (rose jam) gifted to me by a newfound friend before I departed Armenia, rose-scented toner, and dried roses picked up from a
friend’s visit to Syria. The phrase also evokes beauty, nostalgia for physical and socially
constructed homes left behind, gardens and property my interlocutors took pride in, and, in my
great-aunt’s case, fond memories of a childhood in Aleppo despite growing up with parents who
survived a genocide two decades prior, and her own experiences of surviving the Lebanese Civil
War and immigration to the United States.

1

Figure 1.1 Farewell gifts from a friend's recent trip to Aleppo. Yerevan, Armenia
My interest in working with Syrian women took root on that leather couch in Glendale and
brought me to Istanbul, Turkey, Berlin, Germany, and Yerevan, Armenia for preliminary
dissertation research, and ultimately settled on Yerevan, the capital city of Armenia. Two
summers and a year of research propelled me into other intimate spaces (i.e., apartments, lingerie
stores, a stool in Halebi Shuka [Aleppo Shopping Center] with Syrian women), noted by other
researchers working with Syrian migrant women (Boswall and al Akash 2015). These
conversations included countless cups of cardamom-spiced Syrian coffee served with lokhma
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(conventionally called Turkish delights) and flaky European and Syrian pastries, homemade
meals showcasing favorite dishes from home (such as mouloukhiya [chicken and greens dish],
rice pilaf, tabbouli, lentil soup, and yalanchi [stuffed grape leaves]). Our conversations were
every sense of bittersweet and included laughter and tears as painful memories were recounted to
me, and requests for hugs and bacheegner (kisses on the cheek). Personal and professional
trajectories again intertwined six years after that initial Los Angeles couch conversation, when I
met relatives from Syria visiting and working in Armenia as I was conducting preliminary
dissertation fieldwork in Yerevan. My exposure to family from Syria at a young age completely
humanized the Syrian refugee crisis even before I applied to doctoral programs. This exposure
drew my attention to women’s experiences of migration from the Middle East, collective memory
and intergenerational trauma, state anxiety and reception of migrants, and changing gender
dynamics.
I thought of the phrase, “roses remind me of Aleppo,” when I spoke with Hasmig, a
Syrian Armenian woman in her mid-30s, in Yerevan during preliminary dissertation research in
summer 2016. Hasmig’s story reminded me of this phrase, because roses also have thorns as well
as fragrance and beauty. Here is an excerpt of her story, explaining why she decided to leave
Syria:
During the war, there was no safety, electricity, or water. I had to move my kids from one
school to another. My husband lost his job and income. We decided to go to Armenia, but
needed money first, so my husband decided to re-start his ice-making factory. One day,
Daesh kidnapped my husband and father-in-law. The factory was in the countryside of
Aleppo and the kidnapping occurred in the summer of 2013. The factory was only open for
1 month when they were kidnapped. A worker at the factory told Daesh that my husband
was Christian. During the kidnapping, Daesh first got my husband as my father-in-law was
visiting a neighbor at the time. My father-in-law saw the kidnapping and said to take him
instead because my husband had a family, but Daesh refused. The story was told to me by
a male Armenian neighbor who witnessed the kidnapping. The neighbor was wearing
female clothes (hijab) to evade detection. One week later, I couldn’t reach my husband by
phone. The neighbor was in town, so I invited him over to give me some information. My
husband was kidnapped for 4 months. After 1 month, a lawyer called me. The lawyer was
in the same cell as my husband. He called at 10pm and said that my husband sent him. The
lawyer was punished and was scared during the phone call. I didn’t believe him until after
the lawyer gave me information about my kids, inside jokes, so I believed him. I offered to
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pay a ransom but was refused. They just wanted to punish me. My husband told the lawyer
they have caller ID and told me to delete this number after the call. 3 months later, on
January 8, 2014, a man called (Tajikh, Armenian derogatory slang for “Muslim”) and said
an Islamic prayer for people who died, while I was surrounded by my kids. I immediately
called my husband’s uncle, and I didn’t delete the lawyer’s number. My husband was
kidnapped in the rebel section and I told the lawyer I would give him money. The lawyer
promised to call me but didn’t. My husband was killed in a horrible way. I wanted to try to
bring back the body. In 4 days, my husband’s friends were trying to go to the rebel areas
to find his body. Red Cross (Garmir Khach) went to rebel areas and took pictures. The Red
Cross office showed pictures to friends for body identification. They recognized his body,
but the Islamic rebels refused to return his body because they didn’t want Christian burials,
only Islamic ones after these incidents. Before the kidnapping, my father died and so now
there was no man there to take care of us. 3 months later, the kidnappers started calling me.
I suspected they were my neighbors and were rebels and passed my number to Daesh (my
neighbors were Muslims). I started contacting the Armenian Prelacy who suggested I
change my number and location. They called me and threatened my kids at school (I have
3 kids, 2 boys, 1 girl). This became the easiest way/decision to leave (June 14, 2016,
Yerevan, Armenia).
Hasmig faced challenges with leaving Syria with her minor children without a male companion-“there was no man to take care of us” and she had to take on that role while strategizing how to
safely leave Syria with her children. She eventually bribed an official to let her out of the country.
Every time I returned to Armenia for fieldwork, I always met with Hasmig, either through setting
up meetings or unintentionally running into her at charity fairs/exhibition sales of Syrian
Armenian products. Over these visits, she seemed more relaxed, settled into life in Armenia, and
just happier, and her story is shared throughout this dissertation.
This dissertation has three foci: ethnic Armenian migrant women from Syria (who fled
the conflict in 2011 and beyond), state and non-state officials in Armenia (whose job it is to help
ethnic Armenian migrant women from Syria), and my own journey as an Armenian American
with patrilineal roots in Syria. While this dissertation has three foci, the lived experiences of
Syrian Armenian women will be privileged. Time is important in this dissertation, as many
interlocutors (including myself) are descended from Armenian genocide survivors. In addition,
collective memory of the 1915 Armenian genocide informs current migration policy and
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socioeconomic integration efforts of ethnic Armenian migrant women from Syria in my primary
field site, the Republic of Armenia, approximately a century after the genocide.
As noted throughout this dissertation, this project contributes to anthropologies of the
state, (diasporic return) migration, belonging, home, and conflict, including genocide and war.
This dissertation also deals with state constructions of ideal citizen formation--one of obligation
and devotion to the socially constructed ancestral homeland, where ethnic descendants (Tsuda
2009) have a role to play to strengthen the state (Skrentny et. al. 2007), as well as the perceived
obligation of ancestral states to diasporic populations (Tsuda 2009; Joppke 2005). As Tsuda
notes, “ethnic descendants are seen by their respective homeland governments as ‘our people’
who therefore have a right to return to their ancestral homeland” (Tsuda 2009, 31), which is
demonstrated by discourse analysis of Armenian state and non-state media. My work also
challenges the “repatriation as homecoming” model favored by international organizations, such
as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as a “durable solution,”
particularly for “post-conflict” societies in which sharing an ethno-religious identity is viewed as
a quick fix. I problematize “belonging” as only indicating a positive short or long-term solution to
a humanitarian crisis and assert that states are as manipulative as they are welcoming. This
project also contributes to the anthropology of migration, specifically diasporic return migration. I
build upon the work of scholars who have focused on diasporic return migration (Tsuda 2009;
Tölölyan 1996; Safran 1991). There are two types of diasporic return migration identified in the
literature--return of first-generation diasporic peoples who move back to their country of birth
(Markowitz and Stefansson 2004) and ethnic return migration, which refers to later-generation
descendants of diasporic peoples who “return” to their countries of ancestral origin after living
outside their ethnic homelands for generations (Tsuda 2009, 1). I view “beckoning” as being
applicable to the ethnic homelands mentioned in both types of diasporic return migration,
although the term “beckoning” is not explicitly used. This dissertation focuses on the second type
of diasporic return, although to many diasporic Armenians, the contemporary Republic of

5

Armenia is viewed as a sliver of their ancestral homeland. Most towns and villages from which
Armenian genocide survivors fled is termed by Armenians as “Western Armenia” are in presentday southeastern and eastern Turkey. One of the factors that influence diasporic ethnic return
migration includes, “efforts of homeland governments to actively encourage their diasporic
descendants living abroad to return ‘home’ through preferential immigration and nationality
policies” (Tsuda, 4-5). In the context of this research project, the state encouraged diasporic
descendants living abroad to come home primarily through accelerated asylum and citizenship
procedures based on documented “"proof"” of ethnicity, and discourse of state officials through
press releases and other media. This translated into perceptions of preferential immigration
policies, according to several local and international NGO employees.
As mentioned earlier, this dissertation is about collective and individual memories,
nostalgia, manipulative statecraft, and various actors--migrant women, state and non-state
employees, Syria and Armenia. My research focuses on paradoxes, layers (history, actors, data),
and the messiness of states and NGOs as it relates to the integration of migrant women within a
host community/socially constructed homeland.

1.2

Case Study Description

Since the start of the Syrian conflict in March 2011, approximately 20,000 Syrian citizens

of ethnic Armenian descent were displaced to Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, a small country in
the southernmost part of the South Caucasus, at the height of the Syrian conflict (defined here as
2012-2014) (UNHCR Armenia 2020). 1 This dissertation examines how Syrian Armenian migrant
women have navigated changing gender dynamics in post-2018 “velvet revolution” (explored in
Chapter 7) Yerevan and struggled to come to terms with new understandings of what “home” in
the “homeland” can mean, their expectations of life in Armenia, and their disjointed placement

1

UNHCR Armenia. www.un.am/en/agency/UNHCR. Accessed February 2, 2021.
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into the Armenian state’s narrative of calling upon diasporan Armenians to “repatriate.” It is
based on 14.5 months of ethnographic research with 72 Syrian Armenian migrant women,
government and non-government staff, and members of the local community in Yerevan, as well
as preliminary summer research trips to Berlin and Istanbul. The Armenian state has vigorously
sought to attract Armenians from other locations to come “home.” For Syrian Armenians, this
means the Armenian state accelerating asylum procedures (i.e., fast-tracking the acquisition of
citizenship), and state messages of belonging and camaraderie.
Gender dynamics significantly changed in the wake of migration and settlement in
Armenia, as women in pre-war Syria were mostly housewives, and now have had to create their
own businesses in Armenia. One may think that sharing an ethno-religious identity with the host
state would more easily facilitate integration, but I argue that this is not the case in Armenia. I argue
that gendered dynamics of migration and settlement, such as through practices that I call “homemaking,” are not always positively impacted by a shared ethno-religious identity with the host state.
Home-making practices do not share the sometimes-rosy picture of repatriation painted by some
diasporan and government institutions and messaging campaigns, particularly in the wake of the
country’s revolution in spring 2018, 2 a few months before the period covered by this dissertation.
State attempts to categorize Syrian Armenian migrant women as “repatriates” rather than as
“refugees” and fit them into ideal Armenian citizens-to-be neglect to listen to Syrian Armenian
women’s experiences of migration and perspectives on settlement. This labeling also shows the
desperation of a post-Soviet country anxious about emigration and hostile borders and hungry for
the construction of new ethnic Armenian citizens. Conversely, Syrian Armenian women’s

2

The “Velvet Revolution” in Armenia, which occurred in spring 2018 approximately 4-5 months before I
went to Armenia for dissertation fieldwork, was led by the current Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol
Pashinyan, a former journalist, to overthrow perceived elements of corruption within the Armenian
government. This revolution was by and large peaceful and included the resignation of the then Prime
Minister, Serj Sargsyan, who ended his presidency on April 9, 2018 and then was elected Prime Minister of
Armenia on April 17, 2018, which was viewed by opposition parties as a power grab to cling onto another
important position in Armenian politics.
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expectations of returning to an ancestral homeland, a place many vacationed to during pre-war
summers (like many diasporan Armenians), were not always met. While their expectations of
seeking refuge in a country they perceived as safe, compared to war zones in Syria, were met, some
also experienced a painful reception and rejection by fellow Armenians in Armenia. Some
examples of this painful reception and rejection included having their children being teased in some
local schools for not having a father (often due to war) or speaking the Western Armenian dialect,
and housing and employment insecurity.
Strong ethno-nationalist sentiments by the Armenian state played into the “return
narrative” of the Republic of Armenia and appealed to descendants of Armenian genocide
survivors living in Syria (Della Gatta 2017). Genocide survivors fled from formerly Ottoman
lands in what is now present day southeastern and eastern Turkey. Ethnic Armenians from this
region refer to these lands as “Western Armenia,” which will be discussed in Chapter 2.
Displacement to the former Soviet Republic of Armenia, referred to by Syrian Armenians as
“Eastern Armenia,” during the Syrian conflict, is viewed by Syrian Armenian women as being
tenuously shared, because an experiential, post-conflict home was already established in Syria in
the century after the Armenian genocide. In addition, Western Armenia is generally viewed as an
ancestral home for many descendants of genocide survivors in Syria. During the Armenian
genocide culminating in 1915, Armenian survivors fled and were deported to Syria where they
sought refuge in cities like Aleppo (Payaslian 2007). Over the course of five generations (one
generation defined here as twenty years [Weiss and Wobst 1979]), Syrian Armenians formed a
strong community, founding neighborhoods, schools, churches, universities, community centers,
and businesses. The present host state of ethnic Armenian migrant women from Syria who fled to
Armenia), Armenia, communicates that it is receiving Syrian Armenians as long-lost relatives and
fellow descendants of genocide survivors (Della Gatta 2017). From the point of view of the
Armenian state, migration to Armenia due to the Syrian conflict is a “return” “home.” From the
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point of view of many displaced Armenian women from Syria, it represents a second
displacement from an experiential home and loss of community.

1.3

Painful Belonging, Collective Memory, the State, and Syrian Armenians in
Armenia

Various scholars in an anthropology (and related fields, such as sociology) on the state
view the state as an idea rather than a unified political entity (Abrams 2006; Aretxaga 2003), such
as the Weberian conceptualization of the state as a unitary political structure that exercised
monopoly over violence in a given territory and the people who inhabit that territory (Weber
2010 [1918]). I employ Begoña Aretxaga’s notion of the state as, “a collective illusion, the
reification of an idea that masks real power relations under the guise of public interest” (Aretxaga
2003, 400). Brooke et. al. departed from Abrams’ concept of the state as an idea, adding that the
state is always redefining itself, “as the constant forming and reforming of power within itself and
in relation to stakeholders in society” (Brooke et. al. 2018, xviii). The state as an idea, with the
constant ebb and flow of its power in relation to stakeholders in society, fits with my
understanding of the Republic of Armenia and its calls to the Armenian diaspora to view it as the
socially constructed homeland. In this dissertation, I provide several examples of discourse
analysis from government websites and press releases beckoning Syrian Armenian migrants
home to Armenia. The Armenian state is viewed as contested and fragile by the Armenian
diaspora, its fragility evidenced by its shifting borders as recent as November 2020 after the
Second Karabakh War with Azerbaijan. One of the manipulations of the state critically examined
in this dissertation is collective memory of traumatic events, in this case collective memory of the
Armenian genocide by the Armenian state, and the pull of the Syrian state as well. In the
Armenian case, ideal potential citizens (ethnic Armenian migrant women from Syria turned
new/potential Armenian citizens) are those of ethnic Armenian descent, who decided to stay in
Armenia, and contribute socially and especially economically to the development of the
Armenian state. The Armenian state’s repatriation campaigns instrumentalize the collective
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memory of the Armenian genocide and promises of an Armenian homeland full of other Christian
Armenians (and largely devoid of Arabs and Muslims) --we lost land and lives, but you can help
us build it back in your own country, Armenia.
The relevance of the state for investigating lived experiences with modes of population
governance related to homemaking and the role of the (Armenian) state in “setting parameters of
cultural and political belonging” is primarily that the state is paradoxically viewed as both
“contested and fragile,” yet also yielding “an illusion of cohesion” (Sharma and Gupta 2006).
This illusion of cohesion is exemplified in Armenia through repatriation campaigns through
organizations such as Repat Armenia and discourse analysis of state officials, such as former
Minister of Diaspora, Hranush Hakobyan. Benedict Anderson’s concept of an “imagined
community” (2006 [1983]) also applies to my case study. Anderson defined the nation as an
“imagined political community…. [that] is imagined because the members of even the smallest
nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the
minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 2006 [1983], 6). In this sense, I
view the Armenian state as drawing upon this concept (“imagined community”) to encourage the
“repatriation” of ethnic Armenians from around the world to Armenia. I provide examples of this
(which I term “beckoning”) through discourse analysis of state bodies, such as the former
Ministry of Diaspora and the present Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs, as
well as ethnographic interviews with Syrian Armenian migrant women, state and non-state
officials, and friends and relatives of Syrian Armenian migrant women.
Utilizing a model of what I term “beckoning states,” I draw upon Louis Althusser’s
notion of interpellation to analyze the illusion of cohesion through repatriation. Althusser notes
that ideology, “acts or functions in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the individuals or
transforms the individuals into subjects by that very precise operation which I have called
interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace
everyday police hailing, ‘Hey, you there!” (Althusser 2006, 105). Interpellation mirrors
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contemporary repatriation campaigns in Armenia in the sense that ideal potential Armenian
citizens/subjects are constructed out of various diasporan Armenian groups settling (or
“returning,” according to the Armenian state) in Armenia. Individuals who do not fit this mold,
particularly ethnic Armenians fleeing conflict zones such as Syria who decide to travel to a third
country like Canada instead of staying in Syria, are moralized and shunned in some ways.
Leaving Armenia, a country many Syrian Armenian women feel is safe (i.e., from war, Arab
Muslim men) is not only viewed as impractical due to the opportunity to gain Armenian
citizenship and protections, but also as a betrayal to the socially constructed ancestral homeland
as well.
I view beckoning states as performative, and my project draws inspiration from political
scientist Lisa Wedeen’s work on rhetoric in Syria, although in a different context. Wedeen’s, “a
politics as if produces guidelines for acceptable speech and behavior and defines and generalizes
a specific type of national membership...it isolates Syrians from one another and it clutters public
space with monotonous slogans and empty gestures, which tire the minds and bodies of producers
and consumers alike” (Wedeen 2015, 6). Regarding what Wedeen describes as the “Asad cult,”
the cult, like advertising, is a “mode of ambivalent interpellation, a way of ‘hailing’ spectators
that is effective even if its claims are not taken literally” (Wedeen 2015, 6). The Asad cult
organizes spectacles that discipline the interlocutors in a Foucauldian sense, and spectacles “serve
to anchor visually and audibly politically significant ideas and self-conceptions that might
otherwise remain fluid and abstract” (Wedeen 2015, 19). In the case study I am examining, I
interpret “spectacles” as Armenian media surrounding charity fairs featuring both Syrian
Armenian women and local women, and press interviews and televised appearances of a select
few Syrian Armenian women entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the “spectacle” reverberates through
the discourse analysis of various Ministers of Diaspora, particularly Hranush Hakobyan. I argue
that there is an ideal type of Armenian citizen molded out of ethnic Armenian migrants in
general, Syrian Armenian women in particular (for this dissertation): those who stay, and those
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who contribute socially and economically to Armenia’s development. All potential citizens are
asked to provide documented “"proof"” of Armenian ethnicity, which is usually recorded through
baptismal records.
“Painful belonging” is a phrase I use to describe the expectations of seamless integration
that ethnic Armenian women from Syria have upon migrating to Armenia. It is based solely on
my observations of the data, not something someone said. Ironically, a constructed return to one’s
socially constructed ancestral homeland is not simply pleasant and comforting, as exemplified by
the repatriation as homecoming model championed by organizations such as the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as a solution to the refugee problem. This model is
based on the assumption that a given population is assumed to have its proper place, and
displacement is viewed as a disruption of the natural order of things (Malkki 1992). In recent
years, other anthropologists have challenged the repatriation as homecoming model (HarrellBond 1989; Stepputat 1994; Hammond 1999), as do I. If Syrian Armenian women were
repatriated to their country of origin, that would mean they were repatriated to Syria, not the
Republic of Armenia, which views itself as the ancestral homeland of Syrian Armenian women,
descendants of Armenian genocide survivors displaced from historic Western Armenia (what is
now southeastern and eastern Turkey).
I build on anthropological literature on migration that problematizes the association of
one group with a particular territory, and add that, as my data suggests, the movement described
as repatriation can be incredibly painful and disorienting as well. I do not think this term
adequately describes the movement of ethnic Armenian women from Syria to Armenia as they
were not originally from Armenia. Armenian American anthropologist, Susan Pattie (2004) also
felt uncomfortable with the descriptor “repatriation” in reference to diasporan Armenians
“returning” to Soviet Armenia. Pattie employed the term “newcomer” to describe diasporan
Armenians from the Middle East who answered Soviet Armenia’s call to return home in the mid1940s, a movement called Nerkaght (discussed in Chapter 3). However, “neither ‘repatriation’
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nor ‘newcomer’ gives an idea of the process of attachment nor of the ways in which personal and
communal narratives develop to accommodate the realities encountered in the new homeland”
(Pattie, 110). Pattie noted how the term “repatriation” does not convey the “complex of emotional
pull and political decisions involved.” My work also focuses on the emotional push/pull factors
through ethnographic data and discourse analysis of state media, such as the former Ministry of
Diaspora and current Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs.
According to my research, the “painful” part occurs sometimes almost immediately upon
arrival, after many women’s expectations of seamless integration are not met in Armenia. This is
shocking in the sense that the Armenian state had promised, since the earliest repatriation
movement in Soviet Armenia in the 1940s, to be home for ethnic Armenian descendants of
genocide survivors dispersed around the world. While many interlocutors expressed gratitude for
being in a safe country like Armenia, several expressed disappointment and pain, particularly
perceptions about their negative treatment by some members of the host community, such as
verbal abuse and discrimination against their children for not having fathers (due to war). Aside
from Armenia, some Syrian Armenian interlocutors told me they also experienced painful
belonging in Syria, as well as positive treatment in Syria. Painful belonging in Syria describes the
liminality experienced by ethnic Armenians living in Syria, beginning with the initial settlement
of Armenian genocide survivors in Syria. This initial settlement of Armenian genocide survivors
in Syria after the genocide was brought about forcefully and painfully, through events such as
death marches, rapes, forced marriages and abductions of Armenian women and children, and
mass executions. Essentially, belonging in Syria literally had a painful foundation for Armenian
genocide survivors and their descendants. Being Armenian in Syria meant, in most cases, that
your ancestors suffered immense pain to seek refuge in Syria. Belonging was not consensual in
many cases, such as forced marriages and kidnappings. In the case of forced marriages,
kidnappings, and rapes, this could mean painful membership in the Syrian state through a rapist
progenitor, who may not have been Armenian. However, Syria also became home for ethnic
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Armenians over the course of five generations since the genocide and was home to some ethnic
Armenians who had already been living in Syria well before the genocide (dating back to the
Crusades and beyond). Over the course of five generations, belonging in Syria for Armenians
came to mean living in intimate, urban areas, primarily in Aleppo and Damascus, mostly confined
to Armenian cultural and religious activities and communities. I understand these intimate
Armenian communities as a byproduct of post-genocide communities (i.e., protection from
outsiders), which comfortably fit into the Syrian state’s sect system in which minorities were
largely kept separate from the dominant groups (Nucho 2016). In Syria, belonging had a painful
inception but was gradually transformed into a positive, intimate ethnic Armenian community
nestled within the confines of the Syrian sect system, and most importantly for this dissertation,
one in which ethnic Armenian women held social capital through community engagement.

1.4

Syrian Armenian Literature

Research on the integration of Syrian Armenians in Armenia proliferated since

the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011 (Calin-Stefan 2014; Della Gatta 2017; Campos 2016;
Klein 2019; Aleksanyan 2014; Davtyan 2017; Baghdassarian and Broidy 2018; Vorobyeva 2019;
Lepejian 2017). Some researchers wrote about the relationships between co-ethnics--local
Armenians and Syrian Armenians in Armenia (Campos 2016; Della Gatta 2017), and whether
Syrian Armenians truly feel at home in Armenia after generations of geographic disconnect due
to the Armenian genocide. Approximately half of the scholars who studied Syrian Armenian
integration in Armenia are of ethnic Armenian descent (local Armenians and diasporan
Armenians), and I felt my experience closely resembled those of other Armenian Americans in
particular (Baghdassarian and Lepejian, for example) in the sense that the three of us self-identify
as descendants of Armenian genocide survivors working with descendants of Armenian ge nocide
survivors. In-depth qualitative research on Syrian Armenian women, whether in Syria or in
Armenia, however, is absent from literature on Syrian Armenian integration in Armenia. Other
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literature about Syrian Armenians in Armenia (Payaslian 2007; Migliorino 2008, 2006) focuses
on the Armenian community of Syria and its history. I contribute to this body of literature with
my ethnographic research on ethnic Armenian migrant women from Syria living in Armenia and
their relationship with state and non-state employees. I also center Syrian Armenian women as
agents in preserving and creating a multi-generational post-genocide community in Syria, instead
of being mere recipients of missionary, colonial, foreign aid, and contemporary NGO
intervention.

1.5

Dissertation Research Sites

The main research site is Yerevan, the capital of Armenia. Preliminary fieldwork was

conducted in Istanbul, Turkey, Berlin, Germany, and Yerevan, Armenia with non-government
organizations (NGOs), women-owned small businesses, Syrian migrant women, and people
affiliated with these groups, such as friends and relatives. Preliminary fieldwork in Berlin,
Istanbul, and Yerevan was conducted during the summers of 2016 and 2017. In Istanbul, I
volunteered with Small Projects Istanbul (SPI), a small NGO that helps Syrian women with
socioeconomic integration. I did not formally volunteer in Yerevan and Berlin but shadowed
social workers in both places and assisted with English editing services when required.
Dissertation fieldwork was conducted in Yerevan from August 2018-August 2019. More
information about the historical overview of the main research site and origins of the Armenian
community in Syria and subsequent impelled migration to Syria will be provided in Chapter 2.
Armenia is a small country in the South Caucasus. It traces its history back thousands of
years and claims to be the first Christian nation (Panossian 2002). The term “ethno-religious
identity” is employed in this dissertation because most ethnic Armenians identify conventionally
as Christians, which they mobilize to elucidate patrilineal claims to Armenian descent required
for settlement by the state. This type of migration has been called “impelled” (Driedger 1973,
specifically used to note that religious ideology is a factor in migration decision-making that
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impelled Menonnites to leave Russia for Manitoba) to refer to both the involuntary and voluntary
migrations experienced by my interlocutors, impelled by forces such as war and economic
instability (Driedger 1973). I utilize Driedger’s definition of impelled migration in this
dissertation, particularly, “a retention of some power to decide whether to leave” (Driedger, 258).
In this dissertation, I generally employ the term “impelled migration” to refer to both the
contemporary voluntary and involuntary migration of Syrian Armenian migrant women from
Syria to Armenia because of the Syrian conflict. Some women fled earlier during the conflict
because they “felt something was different” and were financially able to leave earlier than other
individuals and families. They were “impelled” to leave by changing circumstances or war.
Within contexts referring specifically to the Armenian genocide, I employ “forcibly displaced”
because Armenians in 1915 were fleeing a genocide in the Ottoman Empire or were expelled
based on ethnic and religious persecution and mass killings. In this case, I use UNHCR’s
definition of “forced displacement,” which is “displaced as a result of persecution, conflict,
generalized violence, or human rights violations.” 3
Caucasian history, including Armenia, has been shaped by multiple impelled migrations,
conflicts, and changing power dynamics under foreign rulers (Grant and Yalcin-Heckmann 2007;
Voell and Khutstshvili 2013; and Voell and Kaliszewska 2015). Accordingly, the maintenance of
ethno-religious identity and traditions, both within the Republic of Armenia and the significant
diaspora of ethnic Armenians both in the adjacent area and farther afield such as in the United
States, is considered by many Armenians to be especially important to their personal sense of
identity. Contemporary state borders and boundaries are contested in the Caucasus. I chose to
work in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, as my main research site because most Syrian Armenian
women live there, but also because Yerevan is a hub for NGOs, international NGOs, government

3

“UNHCR Global Trends--Forced Displacement in 2014.” June 18, 2015.
https://unhcr.org/556725e69.html. Accessed February 3, 2021
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agencies, family members and friends of Syrian Armenian women, and local community
members who have interacted with Syrian Armenian women. Additionally, many Syrian
Armenians have settled in Yerevan and established businesses and restaurants.

1.6

Researcher Positionality

I am Armenian American, and I am descended patrilineally from Armenian genocide

survivors who fled from Western Armenia to Syria. I grew up in a multicultural household
(Armenian, Scottish, Polish, Dutch), but the culture I have the most familiarity with is my
Armenian ancestry. I asked my mother why this was the case in college, and she replied, “Well,
the Armenians needed more help,” referring to the Armenian genocide. My first visit to Armenia
was in 2007 to a town called Spitak, which was still reeling from the 1988 earthquake. After this
initial trip, I returned to Armenia as a Birthright Armenia volunteer in 2009, volunteering for two
months in Gyumri, which is in the same region as Spitak and was also reeling from the 1988
earthquake. In Gyumri, I volunteered as a museum assistant at Shirak Regional Archaeology
Museum, helping with excavations and learning how to identify the sex and age of Middle
Bronze Age human remains. I also volunteered as an English teacher at a local Catholic
orphanage staffed by nuns hailing from Syria. My next trips to Armenia were mostly for
professional purposes, namely collecting data for my dissertation. In addition to working with
other ethnic Armenians in Armenia, I also conducted ethnographic fieldwork with Armenians
from Istanbul living in Los Angeles for my Master’s degree. In both of those ethnographic
fieldwork experiences, I had assumed that my Armenian heritage would give me leverage for
collecting data.
During fieldwork in Yerevan, I was able to make new connections with old family
friends from Aleppo. Even though I was thousands of miles and an ocean away from where I
grew up, people still recognized the names of my relatives in Aleppo, as the names had social
currency. I experienced both advantages and disadvantages of identifying as Armenian American.
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My Armenian name and connections to family in Syria fast-tracked my access to valuable
professional contacts and networking. I was “placed” (Kingsolver 2011 regarding fieldwork in
Appalachia) not just through my U.S. citizenship or roots in Syria, but through my deeper roots in
Western Armenia. According to Ann Kingsolver, “we identify ourselves in relation to place in
terms that we think the listener might understand, depending on how well he or she knows the
regional and social landscapes” (Kingsolver 2011, 13). As the anthropologist, Kingsolver added
that she also shifted the ways she identified according to the context. For example, at Syrian
Armenian social events in Yerevan, I was asked where I was from (emphasis added), meaning
where my ancestors came from before they were forcibly displaced during the genocide. As one
anonymous diasporan Armenian saying goes, “‘where are you from?’ means ‘where was your
family killed?’” in Western Armenia. Like Kingsolver, I also shifted the way I identified
according to the context: U.S. university student, Fulbright researcher, and Armenian American
descendant of genocide survivors from Western Armenia. My familiarity with Syrian Armenian
cuisine was also gleefully commented upon, compounded by taking an interest in cooking classes
and traditional embroidery classes, both of which served as a means for Syrian Armenian women
to earn an income in Yerevan. I felt welcomed by the Syrian Armenian community in Yerevan
but was also held at arm’s length in certain instances because I am an American researcher, and
some individuals were distrustful of Americans due to U.S. involvement in the Syrian conflict.

1.7

Methods and Data Analysis

This dissertation is based on interviews and encounters with two main populations:

Syrian migrant women and state (i.e., Armenian state bodies and U.S. Embassy in Armenia) and
non-state officials (categorized here as non-government organizations and United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees). I interviewed a total of 72 interlocutors for this project. I did
follow-up interviews with approximately half of them. I spoke with 32 ethnic Armenian women
from Syria. Of the 32 ethnic Armenian women from Syria, 29 were from Aleppo, 4 were from
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Damascus. Of the 29 women from Aleppo, 2 were born in different cities (Raqqa and Tel-Abyad,
respectively), but raised in Aleppo. The age range of Syrian Armenian women from Syria whom I
interviewed ranged from 20s to 60s: 1 woman in her 20s, 10 women in their 30s, 10 women in
their 40s, 9 women in their 50s, and 2 women in their 60s. While I interviewed non-Armenian
women from Syria and 3 Syrian men, this dissertation will largely focus on the lived experiences
of ethnic Armenian women from Syria. I also interviewed 30 state and non-state officials, 3 of
whom were also Syrian Armenian migrant women. Of the 30 state and non-state officials, I
interviewed 2 U.S. Embassy employees, 3 Armenian state officials, 22 non-government
organization (NGO) employees, and 3 UNHCR employees (categorized here as non-state
officials, but also non-NGO employees). Overall, I interviewed almost an equal number of Syrian
Armenian migrant women (32) and state and non-state officials in Armenia (30), but this
dissertation will center on the lived experiences of ethnic Armenian migrant women from Syria
and their relationships with state and non-state officials.
It took quite some time to establish rapport and I was only able to do so through snowball
sampling, meeting people introduced to me by others who came to trust me (Bernard 2011).
“Knowing someone who knows someone” enabled anthropologist Kristin Monroe to gain access
to professionals such as representatives of NGOs and government officials in Beirut (Monroe
2016, 4). This strategy allowed me to connect with several government officials and NGO
representatives in Yerevan, such as the Ministry of Diaspora, through my familiarity with other
key figures from organizations serving Syrian Armenians in Armenia, such as UNHCR and
Aleppo NGO. NGOs, and my affiliation with UNHCR as a Fulbright researcher, were
“gatekeepers to the field” (Sampson 2017,8). Sometimes I was introduced to migrant women
through social worker friends, but most of the time it was through other migrant women I
befriended. Participant observation was another primary method used (Bernard 2011, Schensul,
Schensul, and LeCompte 2013), and it involves “immersing yourself in a culture and learning
how to remove yourself every day from that immersion so you can intellectualize what you’ve
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seen and heard” (Bernard 2011, 258). I took Western Armenian embroidery classes, art classes
through Syrian Armenian NGOs, was invited to attend vocational training workshops and socialpsychological meetings, charity exhibition sales of Syrian Armenian women entrepreneurs’
products, and Syrian Armenian social events. In addition, I frequented Syrian Armenian-owned
businesses and restaurants nearly every week, including Halebi Shuka (Aleppo Shopping Center).
I volunteered as an English language editor for Aleppo NGO’s newsletter and brief press releases,
wrote a blog for Repat Armenia about bringing my small dog, Manti, to Yerevan, and gave 2
public lectures about preliminary research findings for UNHCR and the American Research
Institute of the South Caucasus (ARISC). Semi-structured interviews with migrant women, NGO
workers and government officials, and family members and friends of Syrian Armenian migrant
women have shed light on changing gender dynamics, women’s perceptions of ethno-religious
identity, cultural practices of homemaking, and how state and non-governmental services and
programs are utilized by women. These interviews took place primarily in women’s homes, and
at cultural events where messages about “Armenianness'' are communicated. Semi-structured
interviews had a small list of 5-7 questions and were conducted in English and Armenian (Eastern
and Western Armenian dialects) with me, and with an Arabic translator with 4 individuals.
Participant observation provided data about home-making practices in the Republic of Armenia.
Discourse analysis (Gee 2014) of state media materials was also conducted to analyze how the
state communicates messages about Armenian ethno-religious identity and belonging.
Data analysis occurred after data collection and fieldwork. My dissertation research is
protected by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) Non-Medical study from the University of
Kentucky. Data analysis was conducted through a grounded theory approach, which identifies
key symbols and categories from transcribed text, linking themes into theoretical models, and
displaying and validating the models (Bernard 2011, 435). I used the qualitative data analysis
software, MAXQDA to code my data, finding key themes and phrases. Transcribed documents
were coded for themes such as home/nostalgia, life before the war, life during the war, life after
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the war (in Armenia, Turkey, or Germany), economic challenges, issues with integration, NGO
workers’ perspectives, and family history of the Armenian genocide, among other categories. I
translated and transcribed field notes and interview notes by hand, sometimes during interviews
while keeping important phrases in Western Armenian in its original form, for added emphasis.

1.8

Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation is about a conflict between state discourses of repatriation and collective

memory of the Armenian genocide in the socially and physically constructed homeland, the
Republic of Armenia, and individual memories of a nostalgically constructed home in Syria from
which Syrian Armenian women were forced to flee during the Syrian conflict. My primary
argument is that state constructions of home and belonging (informed by state discourses of
repatriation), which rely on collective memory of the Armenian genocide, collide with Syrian
Armenian women’s individual memories of an experiential home crafted in Syria over the course
of five generations since the Armenian genocide. In turn, this collision impacts NGO
socioeconomic integration efforts of Syrian Armenian migrant women in the host community, the
Republic of Armenia. The Armenian state’s instrumentalization of memories of the 1915
Armenian genocide to create new ethnic Armenian citizens through calls for repatriation and
nation-building conflicts with individual Syrian Armenian women’s fond memories of a social,
physical, and political home constructed in Syria. This secondary home was constructed over five
generations of descendants of Armenian genocide survivors who had fled to Syria. This conflict,
between socially and physically (through the geopolitical borders of the post-Soviet Republic of
Armenia) constructed homeland in Armenia and socially and physically (defined here as physical
houses, citizenship, and community life in Syria), is further complicated by the fact that
descendants of Armenian genocide survivors in Syria had to hyper-emphasize their Armenian
identity in order to survive in ethno-sectarian Syria, whereas in Soviet Armenia, religious identity
was muted (Comrie 1981). Chapter 2 will provide a brief historical background of the
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ethnographic setting, explaining the migration of Armenian genocide survivors and their
descendants from Western Armenia (what is now eastern and southeastern Turkey) to Syria, and
eventually to Armenia. My primary argument is buttressed by three secondary arguments,
discussed in the chapter summaries below.
Chapter 3 Hayrenatartzutyun [Repatriation]: Repatriates, not Refugees, provides a brief
background of legal categories and gendered preferences for one of the three legal options open
to Syrian Armenians in Armenia today. It begins with a brief overview of a previous repatriation
movement of diasporan Armenians to Soviet Armenia in the mid-1940s (called Nerkaght).
Throughout the Syrian conflict, the Armenian government accelerated asylum processes for
Syrian migrants of ethnic Armenian descent and made applying for Armenian citizenship easier
for them as well, allowing Syrian Armenians to choose between 3 different legal statuses upon
fleeing to Armenia: citizenship, temporary residence permit, or refugee status. In this chapter, I
demonstrate ethnographically how Syrian Armenian women resist the labels imposed upon them
by the Armenian state, as well as how choosing certain legal statuses is moralized by members of
the host community. For example, “good” Syrian Armenians are viewed by some NGO workers
as those who choose to stay in Armenia, apply for citizenship, contribute economically to
Armenia, and resist moving to a third country. The chapter starts with a description of criteria for
belonging to the Armenian state as outlined by the government, and pros and cons of obtaining
citizenship (“You Can’t Eat A Passport”), including findings for gendered preferences for
citizenship vs. residency. This chapter includes my first secondary argument of three, which is
that migration and choosing certain legal statuses is moralized by members of the host
community, influenced by state anxieties over hostile borders and youth “brain drain.”
Chapter 4 Where is Home? compares social and physical homes constructed by Syrian
Armenian women in post-genocide Armenian settlements in Syria and migrant communities in
Armenia. It begins with a discussion of how a secondary “home” was created in Syria over the
course of five generations by Syrian Armenians, and how this “home” is ironic because Syria was
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simultaneously the site of forced deportations and mass killing sites as well as “home” to a
vibrant community of genocide survivors and their descendants. In this chapter, I show through
ethnographic narratives how this social home was transplanted to Armenia specifically by Syrian
Armenian women, largely through most women’s affiliations with certain NGOs in Yerevan. The
final section of this chapter demonstrates the importance of physical homes to Syrian Armenian
women, from the destruction of their physical houses and livelihoods (i.e., businesses, clinics), to
their frustrations with being compelled to rent apartments in Armenia and preferences for living
in urban areas, such as Yerevan. The chapter ends with a discussion of NGO employees’
impatience with Syrian Armenian women’s frustrations with housing in Armenia. This chapter
will address the second secondary argument, which is that even though many Syrian Armenian
women said they were happy to be in Armenia and felt safe from war (until September 2020, a
year after I completed fieldwork) and were happy to be surrounded by other Armenians and
Christians, I argue that they still experienced “painful belonging.” This term refers to
expectations of Syrian Armenian women not being met in Armenia, such as employment
opportunities, renting an apartment vs. owning their own homes, memories of destroyed homes in
Syria and social lives lost, and sometimes rejection by local Armenians. Syrian Armenians in
general also experienced painful belonging in Syria, for generations, from initial displacements
and massacres to being members of a minority ethno-religious group.
Chapter 5 Beckoned by, and Belonging to, the State examines how Syrian Armenian
migrant women are pushed and pulled by two states, Syria and Armenia--pushed out of Syria,
pulled to Armenia, and now tugged between Syria and Armenia. I refer to these two states as
“beckoning states,” a term which will be discussed in this chapter. This chapter will reiterate the
strong pull of the Armenian state and performative allegiance demanded of those wishing to
belong. Using discourse analysis from offices such as the Ministry of Diaspora website and press
releases, I unpack state and non-state messages about belonging, couched as “repatriation,” but I
argue that the impact is more focused on citizenship-making and nation-building than a simple
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socially constructed “return home” generations after genocide displacement. This chapter
includes ethnographic narratives from Syrian Armenian women about their desire to “return
home” to Armenia and nostalgia for Syria.
Chapter 6 The Syrian Armenian “Brand” examines vocational training and state support
offered by the Armenian government and various key non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
including many exhibitions and expositions (tsutsahantesner-vajark) all over central Yerevan.
The section on NGOs (Part II) will also analyze perceptions and complaints from Syrian
Armenian women, NGO and government staff, and locals in Yerevan, and ends with
ethnographic examples of women-owned small businesses.
Chapter 7 “Women are in the driver’s seat now” -- Changing Gender Dynamics from
Syria to Armenia, examines strategies employed by Syrian women after migration and how
gender dynamics have shifted during migration. Syrian Armenian women are not just “bored
housewives'' (my terminology) in Syria and in Armenia. They were agentive in the sense that
some Syrian Armenian women entered the paid labor force in Yerevan, as well as created a new
social and physical home through establishing social communities centered around charitable life.
These charitable activities were inspired by Syrian Armenian women’s involvement in Syria’s
post-genocide Armenian community. Armenian women’s contributions to creating and preserving
Armenian identity in post-genocide communities has been largely omitted from relevant
literature. More attention has been paid to Armenian male community leaders or Western
missionaries’ and Western NGO workers’ contributions to helping Armenian women enter the
paid labor force than Syrian Armenian women’s actual contributions. In Syria, many Syrian
Armenian women did not work but were active in charitable life, and in Armenia, dual-income
households are required. Due to many Syrian Armenian women having to work in Armenia, some
Syrian Armenian men felt ashamed that their wives had to work in Armenia compared to life in
Syria. Additionally, local Armenian women, such as some NGO workers, feel resentful of some
Syrian Armenian women because local Armenian women always needed to work in Armenia.
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Chapter 8 “I can work, I can get on my feet” Syrian Armenian Women-Owned Small
Businesses, examines economic challenges faced by some Syrian Armenian women entering the
paid labor force in Armenia, particularly as small-business entrepreneurs. It then provides a
cursory overview of the two main Syrian Armenian women-owned businesses in Yerevan
(embroidery and Middle Eastern cuisine), with “other” listed as a third, less prominent category
(including dietitians, tourism agency, and handmade soaps). This chapter includes a section on
the brief history of Western Armenian embroidery and how it was introduced to Soviet Armenia
by genocide survivors, and a century later, again, by descendants of genocide survivors from
Syria. I share participant observation experiences from participating in two embroidery classes
hosted by two different Syrian Armenian organizations in Yerevan. Chapter 8 closes this
dissertation with a sampling of Syrian Armenian women-owned small businesses in Yerevan, as
well as women entrepreneurs’ hopes for the future. Entrepreneurship was an emerging theme in
this dissertation, revealed throughout fieldwork.
Chapter 9 is the conclusion and epilogue, discussing what has come to be called the
Second Nagorno Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Artsakh, the Armenian
term for Nagorno Karabakh Republic. This war broke out in September 2020, 1 year and 1 month
after I returned from dissertation fieldwork. It bears mention in this dissertation because Syrian
Armenian women, some of whom I interviewed, sprang to action providing humanitarian support
to displaced Artsakhsis, in the absence of international humanitarian aid and Armenian state
cohesion.
Throughout the dissertation, I will also include phrases in the original Western Armenian
as spoken by Syrian Armenian women, or in Eastern Armenian as spoken by local nongovernment organization (NGO) workers. I feel the original phrasing adds depth to the meaning
of the interviews.
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The next chapter will provide a brief historical overview of the ethnographic setting, from
Western Armenia, displacement to Syria, and secondary displacement to the Republic of
Armenia.
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CHAPTER 2. “I FELT THE SURROUNDINGS WERE DIFFERENT...I DIDN’T DECIDE TO LEAVE
ALEPPO”: ETHNOGRAPHIC SETTING
Roughly one hundred years after the Armenian genocide, Syrian Armenian women

fleeing Syria traveled similar paths through historic Western Armenia (now eastern and
southeastern Turkey) as their ancestors once had during the genocide, albeit in reverse (Syria
through Turkey to Armenia in 2012-2016; Western Armenia/present-day Turkey to Syria in
1915-1922). Siranoush, 4 a Syrian Armenian woman in her late 40s/early 50s, discussed how she
traveled by car from Syria to Armenia, passing through Western Armenia (now eastern and
southeastern Turkey). She said, “There were bearded men with bandannas at the border. I was
worried about Daesh, 5 but they didn’t show up. We were very afraid at the border, around 2-3am,
worried about our daughters. We passed through Urfa [a town in historic Western Armenia].”
Karine, a woman in her late 30s, also traveled through Western Armenia by car from Syria. This
journey took 2 days with her family, through cities with historic Armenian populations (now
depleted), such as Erzurum, Kilis, and Urfa. Unlike Siranoush, Karine and her father did
encounter Daesh militants along the journey, “they would look through our belongings and
passports. There was pressure from them. Daesh told us, ‘if you’re Armenian, don’t come back to
Syria.’” Fortunately, Karine’s husband was from a Muslim-majority town and one of the Daesh
militants was from her husband’s hometown, recognized them at a checkpoint, and helped them
escape. Karine was concerned about herself and her daughters, “I was worried about being killed
during the journey, [and Daesh] separating the boys and the girls. I was definitely worried about
getting raped and my daughters getting raped, too.” Fears of gender-based violence, and crimes
against their children, seemed to be the primary motivating factors for fleeing rather than
deciding to come to Armenia based on state messaging campaigns on repatriation. The eeriness of

4

With the exception of publicly identifiable figures such as government officials, all names of interlocutors
in this dissertation have been pseudonymized to protect their identities

5

Arabic acronym used colloquially by interlocutors to refer to the terrorist group, the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria
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passing through hallowed ancestral villages, towns, and cities in Western Armenia, along the
Syrian/Turkish border and route to safety in Armenia via Georgia (due to the closed
Turkish/Armenian border), escaping war and bandannaed terrorists just as their ancestors had
done during the genocide is unfathomable. But part of this journey was relatable to me, although
disparate in time and region, as my paternal ancestors also survived the Armenian genocide and
displacement from their homeland in Western Armenia.
Summers of my childhood were usually spent visiting Garo medzbaba, my paternal
grandfather in Bethesda, Maryland, an Armenian physician who was displaced from his
hometown in Western Armenia (now known as eastern and southeastern Turkey), Aintab (now
known as Gaziantep), as an infant in 1922. When my younger siblings were asleep, I would stay
up late on humid Maryland nights, immersed in Armenian folk tales that usually always began
with, “Once there was and was not in ancient Armenia…” after a full day of more enchantment
with the Smithsonian and Museum of Natural History. Sometimes, my medzbaba (grandpa)
would make sahlab, a Middle Eastern porridge scented with cinnamon and rose water, which
would lull me to sleep with its scent and molasses-like quality. On special evenings after the
sahlab and tea ritual, I stayed at the dining table and asked my grandfather about his life prior to
immigrating to the United States. He would then launch into stories about the lands stolen from
our ancestors in Western Armenia and repurposed as Turkish, traces of Armenian cultural
heritage quietly and cruelly erased from global memory, family members’ stories of survival and
dispersal, and how we are descended from an Armenian kingdom, Cilicia, that seemed to his
Armenian American granddaughter as fantastical as it seemed impossible. It seemed impossible
because he was describing lands so foreign to my peers, but so intimate to my family, and later,
interlocutors. We were part of something more, and he wanted us to be proud of our heritage.
Garo medzbaba (grandpa) would tell me these stories as a way of affirming that we did not just
come from a small, unknown part of the world. Although the ancient Armenian kingdom of
Cilicia has not been in existence for centuries, my grandfather still had “Cilicia” inscribed on his
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khatchkar (tombstone) in Michigan, death certificate, and never identified Turkey (nor the former
Soviet Republic of Armenia) as his birthplace. After these ethereal summer road trips to
Maryland/D.C., my family would come back to earth (Michigan) and I would tell my nonArmenian classmates about Cilicia. They politely listened, but it was not the same as those humid
summer evenings at the dining table with my grandfather. Most could not relate to my diasporan
angst and excitement, learning that I was part of a different world outside of so much pain and
displacement.
In this dissertation, history is integral to my interlocutors and regions of study, the South
Caucasus and the Levant/Middle East. History, particularly of Western/Eastern Armenia and the
Armenian genocide, informs the ethnic identity construction of my interlocutors concretized
through state messages of repatriation and renders borders fluid up to the present in the South
Caucasus. In some cases, I cite historical sources, but I want the reader to be aware that this
ethno-historical context is what people are still arguing about to this day, in their heteroglossic
ethnicity. The lands of Western Armenia are perceived by Armenians as being under unjust
colonial occupation (present-day eastern and southeastern Turkey). However, the symbolism of
Western Armenia is not any less important to its descendants, including my interlocutors and
myself. The Republic of Armenia relies upon a trope of an ideal Armenian citizen, one who stays
in Armenia and contributes socially and economically to its development, but people construct
their own identities in a different way. My interlocutors’ accounts show how flexible and
performative ethnicity truly is, particularly in conflict and post-conflict environments. In short,
there is not just one way of being Armenian, nor the dialect one speaks or where one’s ancestors
fled and settled. Additionally, in the South Caucasus, where most of my fieldwork took place,
history is part of everyday life and often fierce collisions about ethnicity and territory. In both the
Levant and the South Caucasus, ethnography must be left entangled with history when adequately
describing sociopolitical contexts. This chapter is essential to my project because it illustrates the
rift between Eastern and Western Armenian cultural identities and helps to explain why many
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Syrian Armenian interlocutors did not quite feel “at home” in Armenia. Later in this dissertation,
I focus on state narratives which helps us build an anthropology of the state that contributes to
repatriation campaigns and constructions of “home.” In order to make my case, I need to show
this brief history. It is also essential to cover the Armenian genocide as forced displacement and
mass violence, including subsequent colonialism, imperialism, and carving up of borderlands
helped create Eastern and Western Armenian cultural identities.

2.1

Introduction

This dissertation focuses on two major regions: the Levant/Middle East (where most of

my interlocutors fled from) and the South Caucasus (where most of my interlocutors have
settled). Ethnic Armenians have been part of the Syrian community for thousands of years, well
before the Armenian genocide in the early 20th century. However, the vast majority of ethnic
Armenians hailing from Syria trace their roots to seeking refuge in Syria during the genocide.
This chapter consists of 3 parts. Part I begins with a discussion of the distinctions between what is
referred to by many ethnic Armenians around the world as “Western Armenia” and “Eastern
Armenia.” It is important to provide this distinction (between Western and Eastern Armenia) to
explain to the reader that the state (located in present-day Republic of Armenia) is drawing upon
ethno-historical constructions of the ancient Armenian “homeland” (encompassing land from
present-day eastern and southeastern Turkey to the current Republic of Armenia) to attract new
Armenian citizens-to-be from the diaspora. However, present-day Armenia represents only a
small segment of the historical Armenian homeland, meaning that Syrian Armenians came from
areas of historical Armenia (Western Armenia) outside of Eastern Armenia. In short, “coming
home” to Armenia is not generally perceived by interlocutors as coming home to the historically
constructed homeland, which to them would be Western Armenia (present-day eastern and
southeastern Turkey).
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Part II provides a cursory examination of ethnic Armenians in Syria before the Ottoman
Empire, during the Ottoman Empire, forced (involuntary) migration to the land now recognized
as Syria during the Armenian genocide, and post-genocide dispersal from Western Armenia to
Syria. Part II will include several brief accounts of a few interlocutors’ family stories about the
genocide and flight from Western Armenia to Syria--in short, their ancestors’ initial displacement
from their ancestral homeland.
Part III focuses on the post-genocide Armenian community of Syria, particularly in the
city of Aleppo, culminating in the Syrian conflict beginning in March 2011. The final part of the
chapter will provide an overview of the 2011 Syrian conflict and Syrian Armenian migration to
Armenia, including ethnographic narratives of flight from Syria to Armenia.

2.2

Part I “Western Armenia” vs. “Eastern Armenia”

Local high schools in Armenia, such as Anania Shirakatsi in Yerevan, have Armenian

history textbooks addressing ancient Armenia and its respective territory. In one history textbook
from Anania Shirakatsi for sixth graders (see figure below), there is a map of Մեծ Հայք, which
translates to “Greater Armenia.” This image reminded me of the humid Maryland nights spent at
my grandfather’s dining table as he told me about a seemingly majestic land we could claim as
ours, one larger than the present day post-Soviet Republic of Armenia.
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Figure 2.1 Screenshot of online Armenian high school history textbook from Anania
Shirakatsi school in Yerevan, page 9. Map of historical Armenia is on the right.
https://online.fliphtml5.com/fumf/frxe/?fbclid=IwAR2j1-3mrtvwkZrzMI0UnWAFbTvQnkM38fqnshsaFqyCIUI89-eIEz3-BY#p=8. Accessed January 28, 2021.
Many Armenians recognize present-day eastern and southeastern Turkey as their
ancestral homeland This is referred to as “Western Armenia” or Արևմտեան Հայաստան
[Arevmdyan Hayasdan) by many Armenians (pictured below). The etymology of the Armenian
name for Armenia, Hayasdan is traced to the original Armenian name for this land, translated to
“the land of Hayk.” “Hayk” (Հայք) was the name of a legendary male ruler of Armenia, and
Armenian folklore holds that Hayk fought against Bel, another neighboring deity-ruler (Kurkjian
1968). Since Hayk won the battle, the land and the people living there were named after him. The
Armenian word for its ethnonym is Hay. Armenian patrilineal traditions and land claims persist
into the present. Patriliny, a kinship system in which biological relationships through males are
regarded as having special significance over other kin relationships, is “connected to claims of
origin in specific places” (King 2014, 68), as evidenced by Western Armenia. Some Armenian
political parties, such as the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun in Armenian)
have even called for parcels of land in what is now eastern and southeastern Turkey to be given
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back to Armenians descended from survivors of the 1915 genocide as well as reparations for
property and cultural heritage lost.
The term “Western Armenian” is now used to refer to descendants of Armenian genocide
survivors who have settled in the Middle East and the Armenian diaspora except for diasporan
Armenians who have settled in post-Soviet countries and Iran. “Western Armenian” refers to the
above category of people and the dialect of Armenian spoken by descendants of Armenian
genocide survivors who have settled in the Middle East and the Armenian diaspora, except for
post-Soviet countries and Iran. “Eastern Armenian” refers to the dialect of Armenian spoken by
descendants of genocide survivors who had settled in post-Soviet countries and Iran. In this
dissertation, “Western Armenia” is used to refer to historical land claims to what is now
recognized as eastern and southeastern Turkey; “Western Armenian” is used to refer to the dialect
of Armenian and descendants of genocide survivors who had settled in the Middle East (in this
research context, Syria); and “Eastern Armenia” and “Eastern Armenian” refers to post-Soviet
Armenia and descendants of genocide survivors who had settled there and speak the Eastern
Armenian dialect. This dissertation focuses on ethnic Armenian women from Syria (“Western
Armenians”) who have settled in the post-Soviet Republic of Armenia (“Eastern Armenia”).
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Figure 2.2 Western Armenia map. Source: “On demarcation of the border between the
State of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan.” https://miaban.ru/info/armenia/wa_78-2019_eng/. Accessed January 28, 2021.
The term “Western Armenia” is still used contemporarily by many Armenians, including
many tour agencies based in Armenia advertising trips to “Western Armenia.” These tour
agencies have proliferated in the last decade, such as Armenian Trip, Hamshen Tour, Ani Tour,
and Magic Tour. 6 These agencies and trips are primarily marketed to diasporan Armenian
descendants of genocide survivors who are curious about traveling to the cities and villages in
eastern and southeastern Turkey from which they descend.

2.3

Part II: Before, During, and After the Armenian Genocide

2.3.1 History of Armenians in Syria [pre-Ottoman Empire]
Portions of historic Western Armenia were reconfigured into subsequent empires and

states over centuries, such as northern Syria, where many Armenians currently reside. Armenians

6

Ani Tour. “Tour to Western Armenia.” AniTour.am. Western Armenia (Historical Armenia) 6-day tour
(anitour.am). Accessed January 27, 2021.

34

have occupied the land now known as Syria well before the Armenian genocide in the early
twentieth century. It is difficult to determine exactly when Armenians settled in the land now
known as Syria, but Armenians consider themselves indigenous to Western Armenia and
surrounding regions, including northern Syria, even though most Armenians from Syria are
descended from Armenian genocide survivors who fled to present-day Syria. This is important for
Syrian Armenian migrant women living in the Republic of Armenia today, because most perceive
their homeland as being in Western Armenia instead of the Republic of Armenia/Eastern
Armenia, which is vigorously communicated to them by the Armenian state. Additionally, Syria
has also undergone its own transformations over millennia--- from belonging to different empires
to being carved into a state due to colonialism and Arab nationalism, which also impacts how
Armenian women in Syria perceive their own identities.
2.3.2 Pre-Genocide Armenian Community of Syria [Ottoman Empire]
At the beginning of the Ottoman period (1299-1923), there was a relatively small
Armenian presence in northern Syria due to military conflicts in the region. However, there was a
larger community of ethnic Armenians living in the eastern part of the Ottoman Empire, called
Anatolia in present-day eastern Turkey, as well as in Constantinople (present-day Istanbul).
Approximately three million Armenians lived in the Ottoman Empire prior to the genocide in
1915 (Hovannisian 2004). Most Armenians lived in the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire.
Subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire were reduced to the status of rayas (“protected flocks”)
and exploited by the Sultan and government officials (Sanjian 1965). A raya referred to a
member of the tax-paying lower class of Ottoman society, in contrast to the askeri (upper class)
and kul (slaves). The raya comprised over 90% of the general population and millet communities.
Members of the raya class (including Christians, Muslims, and Jews) had to pay the jizya tax to
support the state and the associated “professional Ottoman class” (Sugar 1983). The term dhimmi
also referred to non-Muslims living in an Islamic state with legal protections. The Ottoman
administrative millet (the word millet comes from the Arabic word for “nation,” or millah) system
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was used to govern non-Muslim minorities of the Ottoman Empire, minorities labeled as “Peoples
of the Book” (Christians and Jews). Ethno-religious minority groups were tolerated and afforded
official protection, and could follow their own traditional laws, customs, and way of life only if
they did not disobey Ottoman regulations. Minority groups were not allowed to participate in the
military and civil service. Religious identity was prioritized over ethnic identity during the
Ottoman Empire. Community heads of each millet, referred to as millet bashi, enforced the laws
of that particular millet community and reported to the Sultan. Effectively, this system called for a
“duality of loyalty, one to the Sultan and the other to the religious community to which the
individual belonged” (Sanjian 1965, 32).
The Ottoman Armenian community was comprised of three religious denominations:
Armenian Catholic, Armenian Protestant, and Armenian Apostolic. Regardless of which branch
of Christianity an Armenian individual belonged to, all Armenians were represented by a single
Armenian millet, governed by the Armenian Patriarch in what was then called Constantinople
(present-day Istanbul). According to Avedis Sanjian, the Armenian Patriarchate was a creation of
Ottoman political authorities instead of the Armenian church itself (Sanjian 1965, 32). The
Patriarch, in turn, reported to the Sultan, and was held responsible for his community’s good
conduct (Sanjian, 33).
Armenian migrants arrived in Aleppo in the second half of the sixteenth century, hailing
mainly from Cilicia, especially from cities like Marash and Zeytun (Sanjian 1965). In the
sixteenth century, Armenian traders from Julfa in present-day Iran came to Aleppo, sparked in
part by the 1605 forced relocation by Shah Abbas the Great of Persia, of Julfa’s mainly
mercantile Armenian community. Sanjian notes that the period from the sixteenth to the
eighteenth centuries was the most prosperous era in the history of Armenians in Aleppo due to
their economic prowess and religious institutions that were established during that time. The
economic prowess of Armenians in Aleppo during the Ottoman Empire was due to the high
number of Armenians participating in international trade, and Aleppo’s emergence as a center of
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intense Christian missionary activity. Aleppo became an important international commercial
center because it was strategically located between Mesopotamia, Anatolian provinces, and the
Mediterranean Sea. Merchants in Aleppo imported European manufactured goods and exported
Near Eastern raw materials and spices (Sanjian 1965). Many Armenians settled in the Aleppo
neighborhood called Jidayda during this time and established many khans (inns) and
caravanserais to accommodate commerce in Aleppo. Aside from commerce, Armenians in
Aleppo also established small workshops featuring traditional arts, crafts, and trades. These small
workshops and trades were predominantly hereditary family occupations, such as rug-weaving
and goldsmithing (Sanjian 1965), and these hereditary family occupations persist to this day in
Aleppo and in the Syrian Armenian diaspora in Yerevan, Armenia.
Armenian commercial success in Aleppo declined in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries due to several factors: the instability of the Mediterranean due to Napoleonic
campaigns; poor governance by the Ottoman administration; and earthquakes and outbreaks of
cholera and the plague (Sanjian 1965). During the Ottoman Empire, the vilayet of Aleppo was
fully organized by 1866 and disestablished by 1918. The boundaries of the vilayet stretched to
include largely Turkish-speaking cities such as Marash, Antep (or “Aintab”) and Urfa, as well as
a large Armenian-speaking minority (Masters 2013). These cities were part of six major sanjaks
(districts) of the Aleppo vilayet: Aleppo Sanjak, Aintab Sanjak, Cebelisemaan Sanjak, Marash
Sanjak, Urfa Sanjak, and Zor Sanjak (see figure below).
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Figure 2.3 Sanjaks of Aleppo. Source: “Sanjaks of Aleppo.”
https://www.houshamadyan.org/mapottomanempire/vilayetaleppo/sandjak-ofaleppo.html. Accessed January 28, 2021.

According to Sanjian, beginning in the 1880s, the commercial activities of the leading

Armenian merchants in Aleppo were confined to the roles of middlemen or commission agents,
and to small-scale banking, particularly with Constantinople (Sanjian 1965, 51). My research has
found a continuity of occupations, such as small business owners and artisans, among the Syrian
Armenian women entrepreneurs I interviewed, particularly women from Aleppo. Syrian
Armenians’ prestige for artisanry (jewelry design, such as silver) and business savvy was
transplanted to Armenia as many people fled from the Syrian conflict. This prestige is now
labeled the “Syrian Armenian brand” in Armenia by at least one international organization
employee (an ethnic Armenian woman) and will be discussed in Chapter 6.

2.3.3 Hamidian Massacres and Before the Armenian Genocide
In 1890, Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II established a paramilitary group called the
Hamidiye, composed mainly of Kurdish irregular soldiers who were instructed to do whatever
they wished with the Armenians in the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire (Balakian 2003).
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Ottoman officials provoked rebellions, mainly due to over-taxation in Armenian-populated towns,
and rebellions were violently suppressed, such as in Sasun in 1894 and Zeytun in 1895-1896. The
“Hamidian massacres” of Armenians broke out in Constantinople as well as Armenian-populated
provinces in Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Erzurum, Harput, Sivas, Trabzon, and Van. Approximately
100,000-300,000 Armenians were killed during the Hamidian massacres of 1894-1896 (Balakian
2003).
About 10 years later, on July 24, 1908, a coup d’état in the Ottoman Empire led by
officer members of the Young Turk Party removed Sultan Abdul Hamid II from power and
restored the Ottoman Empire to a constitutional monarchy and revitalized Westernization
(Balakian 2003). A countercoup took place in Adana, another Armenian-populated town in the
Ottoman Empire (historical Western Armenia) in 1909 led by reactionary Ottoman military
elements eager to return the empire’s rule to the Sultan and Islamic law. The movement initially
targeted the Young Turks, but it culminated in massacres of Armenians who were viewed as
supporting the restoration of the Ottoman constitution. Approximate numbers of Armenians killed
in Adana in 1909 range between 15,000 and 30,000 people (Akçam 2006).

2.3.4 During the Genocide
In early 1915, Ottoman Minister of War, Enver Pasha, issued a directive to all Ottoman
military units calling for “increased security and precautions” to remove all ethnic Armenians
serving in the Ottoman forces from their posts. Ethnic Armenians were reassigned to unarmed
labor battalions (amele taburlari). Demobilization of able-bodied non-Muslim soldiers was one of
the first steps to genocide, as well as the killing of these now unarmed men. On April 24, 1915,
approximately 250 Armenian intellectuals and community leaders were rounded up by Ottoman
authorities in Constantinople (present-day Istanbul). Eventually, all of them, except for a few,
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were deported and subsequently assassinated. To this day, April 24th is annually commemorated
as Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day in Armenia as well as in the diaspora (Akçam 2006).

Figure 2.4 Deportation routes and massacre sites during the Armenian genocide. Source:
Derived from map 224 of Hewsen, Robert H. and Salvatico, Christopher C. (2001)
Armenia: A Historical Atlas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
On May 29, 1915, the Young Turks passed the “Tehcir Law,” the Temporary Law of
Deportation, which gave the Ottoman government and military authorization to deport anyone it
“sensed” as a threat to national security (Balakian 2003). Tehcir Law also brought with it the
confiscation of Armenian property and slaughter of Armenians. Ottoman officials, particularly
Minister of War Enver Pasha, Minister of the Interior Talat Pasha, and Minister of Defense (and
Governor of Syria in 1915) Jemal Pasha, were aware of the massacres taking place and were
behind the orders (Akçam 2006). Throughout the Ottoman Empire, able-bodied men were
generally driven out of villages and towns and systematically shot en masse. Following this,
women, children, and the elderly were forced to go on “death marches” to main killing sites in
present-day Deir-el-Zor, Syria. Along the death march routes, Armenians were raped, killed, and
died from disease and starvation. The Ottoman government deliberately ensured that Deir-el-Zor
was not equipped for the large numbers of Armenians entering the town (Danieli 1998). Other
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killing methods included rounding up villagers and burning them (symbolically often in
Armenian churches), drownings on the Black Sea Coast, and killings by physicians in the form of
lethal human experiments (Dadrian 2003).
Often, many women and children were kidnapped, enslaved, forcibly married and
converted, or were informally adopted into and rescued by marrying Kurdish and Arab families
who lived by the death march routes. Aleppo became a major detour and place of refuge for many
Armenians deported to the Syrian desert. Additionally, Western missionaries (particularly
American Protestants) intervened to help rescue Armenian genocide survivors, especially
children. Western newspapers, such as the New York Times, reported almost daily on the
Armenian massacres, and Western diplomats, ambassadors, and other officials in the Ottoman
Empire witnessed deportations and massacres (i.e., U.S. Ambassador Henry Morgenthau to the
Ottoman Empire during World War I). Sources vary for the total number of Armenians killed, but
approximately 800,000 to 1.5 million out of a total pre-genocide population of 3 million
Armenians in the Ottoman Empire were killed (Bijak and Lubman 2016). Massacres continued
until the early 1920s, as will be discussed in the following section.
2.3.5 Quick Note on the First Armenian Republic (1918-1920)
The Mudros Armistice, signed on October 30, 1918, effectively sealed the Ottoman
defeat. At the same time, the First Republic of Armenia was established in May 1918 and fell to
the nascent Soviet Union in 1920. The republic was established in the Armenian-majority
provinces of the disintegrated Russian Empire (known to Armenians as Eastern Armenia).
Government leaders hailed from the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), also known as
the Dashnaktsutyun Armenian political party. This republic, although significant because it was
the first modern Armenian state since the loss of Armenian statehood in the Middle Ages, was
doomed from the start. It had to confront a massive humanitarian crisis due to the aftermath of the
genocide and faced territorial disputes. Eventually, it fell to the Soviet Red Army in late 1920.
From 1920-1922, it was a member state of the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet
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Republic (TSFSR), which also consisted of the Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan. The goal of
this entity was to consolidate the economic situation of the Caucasus Mountain Range. Armenia
left and formally joined the Soviet Union in 1922 until independence in 1991 (Libaridian 2004).

2.3.6 Sexual Violence and Restructuring of Armenian Patrilineal Identity
Ottoman military commanders told their men to “do to [the women] whatever you wish”
(Von Joeden-Fogey 2010). Armenian female deportees in Damascus were displayed naked and
sold as sex slaves in Mosul, for example, according to a German consul there, which was an
important source of income for Ottoman soldiers (Akçam 2012). Armenian women who were
viewed as “beautiful enough” were raped on death marches or forcibly married off to Ottoman
soldiers. Although Christian Armenian and Muslim Turkish communities were traditionally
patrilineal (where offspring belong to the father’s group), Turkish-Armenian historian, Lerna
Ekmekçioğlu, found that Armenian relief workers referred to babies of Muslim paternity as mer
vorpere (“our orphans”) even though most of the offspring were conceived via rape
(Ekmekçioğlu 2013). In the immediate aftermath of the genocide, the Great Powers convened in
Paris to redraw the world map and Armenians and Turks were both laying claim to one section of
the map, in which territorial claims were linked to demographics. This sparked a post-genocide
Armenian relief effort to rescue abducted Armenian women who were raped and impregnated
with babies of Muslim paternity. Traditionally, these babies would belong to Muslim fathers. But
Armenian relief efforts were desperate to welcome these babies into the Armenian collectivity
and reclaim territorial and demographic losses (Ekmekçioğlu 2013, 524). However, this inversion
of traditional patrilineal reckoning did not indicate women’s agency in determining group
belonging, as relief efforts did not provide Armenian women with options for controlling their
own lives and bodies and relief efforts reproduced patriarchal hierarchies instead of erasing them.
Ekmekçioğlu added that the Ottoman state’s campaign to commit genocide was sex-selective and
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age-sensitive, because it targeted the killing “of every human being who had or carried the
capacity to transmit Armenianness” (Ekmekçioğlu 2013, 525).
The first stage involved killing adult men. Groups incapable of passing on an Armenian
ethno-religious identity (such as small children of both sexes and women) could be spared death
and put to “good use,” such as sexual violence and enslavement for labor purposes (Ekmekçioğlu
2013, 526). Over time, females and minors were “remade” into proper Ottoman Muslims and
ceased to threaten the Young Turks’ ambitions of achieving population homogeneity. According
to Carol Delaney, women’s wombs were viewed as an empty vessel (a field) that takes the shape
and form of whatever fluid fills it (seed, semen) (Delaney 1986). Diane King’s work adds that,
“members of a patrilineage may be male or female, but one key difference is that male members
pass on lineage membership, while females do not” (King 2018, 306). Raping Armenian women
and producing children with Armenian blood was viewed as inconsequential, since according to
patrilineal and patrilocal logic shared by both Christian and Muslim Ottomans, any child a
woman bore automatically belonged to the father’s community (Ekmekçioğlu 2013, 530; Delaney
1986).
2.3.7 After the Armenian Genocide
The post-genocide relief effort included rescuing and reintegrating Armenian women and
children into the surviving Armenian community. One such effort in Constantinople, referred to
as vorpahavak or “the gathering of orphans” in Armenian, involved gathering not only children
without one or both parents, but “orphan” (vorp in Armenian) also referred to women who lacked
a surviving male family member (Ekmekçioğlu 2013, 534). “Orphanhood” indicated the absence
of a dependable male relative. According to the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople, by the
end of 1922, approximately 3,000 of the 5,000 kidnapped Armenians were rescued (Ekmekçioğlu
2013, 535). The Treaty of Sevres, signed on August 10, 1920, annulled all forced conversions to
Islam between 1914-1918 and required the Ottoman Turkish government to help all surviving and
captured Armenians to return to their original communities (Watenpaugh 2010). Not every
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rescued Armenian was happy to return to their original communities. Armenian women who were
abducted were ashamed of their sexual violations and fearful of stigmatization in their original
communities, as well as whether their “Muslim” children would be accepted and the fact that
many, voluntarily or not, were converted to Islam. Resistance to being rescued was also colored
in some cases by people who were rescued by peaceful Muslims who gave them a relatively
tolerable life, and many captured Armenians had no family to return to since they were all killed.
The Paris Peace Conference in 1919 followed U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s
policies of resolving contested territorial land claims in a “self-determining” manner. Namely, the
nationality of the region that came to be known as the Republic of Armenia was to devolve to that
community that made up much of the population (Weitz 2008). Ekmekçioğlu observed that
Armenians had to quickly come up with these numbers to concretize Armenian land claims, and
one way the Armenian Patriarchate in Constantinople rushed to do this was through rescuing
abducted Armenian genocide survivors, mainly women and children (Ekmekçioğlu 2013, 543).
She asserted that, “facing a perceived existential crisis, Armenian authorities changed the criteria
for inclusion in the national collectivity by making room for one group that would otherwise have
been excluded--babies of Muslim fatherhood” (Ekmekçioğlu, 544). This action subverted
traditional patrilineal descent reckoning among the Armenian community and viewed women as
having an active role in procreation, instead of simply passively contributing to it. Armenian men
were encouraged to marry rescued women and to not hold their violations against them. Many
Armenian men had seen their female relatives and wives raped and killed by Turkish soldiers, so
the Armenian Patriarchate proclaimed that it was not the women’s fault that they were raped and
that they were still marriageable. Many rescued women were sent to marry Armenian male
genocide survivors who had settled in North America, and their future grooms were told by the
larger Armenian community that this was one way of saving the Armenian nation/race (tsegh in
Armenian; tseghasbanutyun means genocide or “killing a nation/race”) (Ekmekçioğlu, 550).
Some abducted women were also tattooed by Arab and Kurdish families that captured them, and
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upon rescue, viewed their tattoos as unmarriageable and shameful (Attarian 2009). Ekmekçioğlu
concluded that Armenian women were valuable assets during the war (for the perpetrator group)
and afterwards for survivors, and that “wombs reproduced the group physically, while their
holders reproduced it socially” (Ekmekçioğlu 2013, 552). This indicates that, during times of
crisis, criteria for social belonging expanded, and there is precedent for my case study, although
in a different context. Children produced from Armenian women who were raped by Muslim
progenitors during the genocide were provided with a social and religious movement for
inclusion in the Armenian community. The Armenian state currently only requires documented
"proof" of Armenian ethnicity, which can be difficult to provide if one is running for their life
from a conflict zone and may not have time to pack important documents, as has been recounted
to me secondhand by a Syrian Armenian social worker friend. In both cases, during the genocide
and about a century later during the Syrian conflict, the Armenian community (post-genocide in
the waning years of the Ottoman Empire/early years of the Turkish Republic) and state expanded
criteria for social inclusion as a response to conflict and real fears of obliteration (genocide then,
hostile borders and repatriation now). The state and community ultimately needed, and needs,
more legible members (Scott 1998).
2.3.8 Interlocutors’ Family Stories about the Genocide
Most Syrian Armenian interlocutors (22) told me they were born in Syria, but their
grandparents fled to Syria from Western Armenia during the genocide, and most of these
respondents were in their 40s-60s. I suspect more Syrian Armenian interlocutors had similar
origins, but this was not overtly expressed during interviews. The interlocutors whose
grandparents fled or were forcibly displaced (via death marches to killing fields in the deserts,
like Deir-el-Zor) to Syria during the Armenian genocide came from heavily Armenian-populated
towns and villages in Western Armenia, like Aintab, Marash, Zeytun, Bursa, and Sasoun. Syria
was indeed a place of refuge (Chatty 2018), but I assert it needs to be recognized that it was and
is also a site of intense pain and trauma, an ironic home, to be reiterated in Chapter 4. I was able
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to establish rapport more easily with several interlocutors because they were able to place me as a
diasporan Armenian with Syrian and Western Armenian roots (Aintab), just like several of my
interlocutors. My Aintabsi heritage fast-tracked my entrée into intimate conversations about
embroidery, craftsmanship, and passing on these traditions, mother to daughter (discussed further
in Chapter 8). These conversations were grounded in a research project but were nothing short of
personal for me as well. Whenever I heard someone was Aintabsi as well, and I disclosed my
roots, I noticed they would also light up, smile, and one woman, Knar, joked that Aintabsis are
“manipulative and clever,” lore that I also heard from my father growing up.
While most interlocutors only told me where their ancestors came from in Western
Armenia, several shared family stories about the genocide. This is something that many diasporan
Armenians are familiar with and are exposed to at a young age--swapping one’s family’s
genocide stories, finding commonality and horror which had previously seemed insurmountable.
It comes to the point where it is hard to imagine someone without a genocide story, which is
alienating when you are raised in a predominantly non-Armenian community and realize not
everyone is an unfortunate member of what feels like an insiders’club. Several interlocutors, like
Hermine, proudly told me their family had lived in Aleppo for as much as three generations since
the genocide, and they only left Aleppo due to the war. With a clinic and a house in Aleppo,
Hermine indicated she wanted to stay. Gayane, a woman in her 60s, said that one set of her
grandparents were from the same village in the larger town of Marash, and they fled to Syria. Her
grandfather was 5 years-old during the genocide (approximately 1915), left and went back to
Western Armenia during the French Mandate (when Armenians thought it was safe to return; he
remembered the horses’ hooves of the French soldiers). Nuritsa also recounted her grandparents’
memories of the genocide. Displaced from Aintab in 1915, “they saw the killing fields [Deir-elZor] and went to Aleppo. My grandparents saw children attacked by knives during the genocide,
and pregnant women’s bellies sliced open [by the Turks].” As gruesome as this story was, and I
will never forget the pained look in Nuritsa’s eyes as she shared this family story with me in her
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shop in Halebi Shuka (an underground shopping center by a metro station in central Yerevan,
called “Aleppo Shopping Center”), I was not surprised by this account, but it never stops being
upsetting. Parantsem, one of the founders of Aleppo NGO, recounted to me how her mother’s
father helped other Armenians escape, “He worked for a German general and was a teacher and
head of a school. He helped other Armenians escape by hiding their names, and eventually settled
in Aleppo. My mother told me these stories and was always scared the Turks would come to
Syria. Syria was safe, but she still had that fear.” This last quote, “Syria was safe, but she still had
that fear,” raises several compelling points. Syria was viewed as a refuge by genocide survivors
and their descendants. While it was a site of killing fields and immense trauma during the
Armenian genocide (as part of the Ottoman Empire), Syria, particularly Aleppo, also provided a
space to start anew. Another woman shared her family’s story with me. Amina’s ancestry is both
Arab and Armenian, but she applied for and received Armenian citizenship, as did her daughter
(whose father is a Syrian Arab man). She said, “My mom’s side is from Marash. My grandfather
was fighting during the genocide and then moved to Syria. My grandfather had a family in
Marash, then married a Christian woman in Syria because he was told his family was killed in
Marash. But he found out that one of his daughters survived.” This was common during the
genocide, unfortunately--marrying a new spouse and creating a new family because one’s first
family was killed. Overall, most of my Syrian Armenian interlocutors were descended from
Armenian genocide survivors who either fled to or were forcibly displaced to Syria during the
genocide, and several of them chose to share their oral history with me concerning genocide
memories.

2.4

Part III: Armenian Community in Syria

2.4.1 Post-Ottoman, Post-Genocide Syria: A Place of Massacre Sites and Refuge
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1923 and ghastly aftermath of the Armenian

genocide, thousands of genocide survivors sought refuge in Syrian cities, particularly Aleppo.
Ironically, Syria served as both a site of concentration camps, death marches, massacres, and
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enslavement in Syrian deserts (mainly Deir-el-Zor) and a place of refuge for genocide survivors
who were either able to escape from death march caravans from the eastern provinces of the
Ottoman Empire to the Syrian desert to be killed, or were abducted, enslaved, and raped by a
number of Turkish, Kurdish, and Arab families and individuals. Syria was simultaneously a
source of massive trauma for Armenians during the genocide and a place where genocide
survivors and their descendants could regroup, find each other, and build anew the Armenian
community that was decimated during the genocide. In short, Syria was an ironic home for
Armenian genocide survivors and their descendants.
During the waning years of the Ottoman Empire, in 1920, the independent Kingdom of
Syria was established under King Faisal I of the Hashemite family. His rule ended a few months
later, and French troops occupied Syria later that year and he was proclaimed King of Iraq from
1921 to 1933 by the British Mandate (Barr 2011). Although King Faisal I only ruled for a short
time, he encouraged pan-Arabism by fostering unity between Sunni and Shia Muslims with the
intention of creating an Arab state that would include Iraq, Syria, and the rest of the Fertile
Crescent (Masalha 1991). He tried to diversify his administration by including different ethnic
and religious groups in offices, but his pan-Arab nationalism had already isolated ethno-religious
minority groups in Syria and Iraq. For Armenian genocide survivors who settled in Syria, this
pan-Arab nationalism may have been an alarming flashback to the dying Ottoman Empire’s panOttomanism and Kemalism’s Turkish nationalism.
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Figure 2.5 French Mandate for Syria and Lebanon. Source: Philip Shukry Khoury: Syria
and the French Mandate, The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945. Princeton
University Press, 1987.
Armenians were still being deported to Syria from historic Western Armenian hometowns in the
late Ottoman Empire, a couple years before the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. For
example, the Siege of Aintab (now Gaziantep) took place during the Franco-Turkish War, from
April 1, 1920 to February 8, 1921. The fight took place between Turkish National Forces
(irregular Ottoman Turkish militia forces) and the French Army of the Levant occupying the city
of Aintab and was intended to help determine the outcome of the transition from a sultanate to a
republic. Recent memories of the genocide re-traumatized Armenian survivors, many of whom
had returned to their hometown of Aintab after escaping from death march caravans and seeking
refuge in Aleppo only a few years earlier. Several interlocutors had ancestors who were involved
in the massacres and population transfers in this region, as well as my own grandfather (born in
Aintab in 1921 to parents who sought refuge in Aleppo after the genocide, and then had to leave
after the Siege of Aintab). At the end of 1921, France renounced control of formerly Armenian
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lands referred to as the Kingdom of Cilicia or simply as “Cilicia” and signed the Accord of
Ankara on October 20, 1921 (Migliorino 2008, 31). This treaty stated that Turkey would reoccupy Cilicia (a threat to returning Armenian genocide survivors), and Turkey recognized
French imperial sovereignty over the French Mandate of Syria (1920-1922). Accordingly, an
estimated 80,000 Armenians left Cilicia (after temporarily returning post-genocide) for Lebanon
and Syria (Sanjian 2001). Approximately, 100,000 Armenian refuge-seekers and orphans settled
in Syria. Many Armenian genocide survivors consequently viewed the French Army’s withdrawal
from Cilicia as a betrayal. Historian Nicola Migliorino notes that although there was a sizable
Armenian community in Aleppo before the genocide, the inflow of Armenian genocide survivors
to Syria (and Lebanon) directly contributed to the growth of the Armenian communities there
(Migliorino 2008, 34).

2.4.2

Armenian Genocide Survivors, Missionaries, and Relief Efforts in Early 20th Century
Syria
In the early 1920s, the Armenian community of the former Ottoman Empire was in

shambles and desperately trying to resuscitate itself, demographically and socially. French
administrators in Syria and Lebanon utilized Armenian genocide survivors and refuge-seekers to
re-populate areas of the Middle East with Christian subjects (Watenpaugh 2015). For example,
building Armenian neighborhoods in the Bourj Hammoud district of Beirut, Lebanon and in areas
of Aleppo “was part of a project of moving the refugees into modern urban society as members of
what French policy makers identified as the respectable lower-middle class” (Watenpaugh 2015,
619). Furthermore, French Mandate refugee policy (in what would later become Syria and
Lebanon) focused on providing Armenians with skilled apprenticeships, sources of credit for
private enterprises, and property to settle Armenians there permanently while maintaining their
connections with the French state (Watenpaugh 2004). Anthropologist Joanne Nucho observed
that Armenian genocide survivor/refuge-seeking communities in Lebanon were faced with a
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diversity of intercultural obstacles, such as linguistic and religious diversity within Armenian
communities. In the post-genocide years, many Armenians spoke Turkish or village dialects, not
Western Armenian which is the standard dialect taught in Armenian schools in Lebanon today
(Nucho 2016, 16). Background differences in terms of religious groups (Armenian Protestants,
Armenian Catholics, and Armenian Apostolic/Orthodox) also presented an obstacle. According to
Nucho, despite attempts to consolidate an Armenian national consciousness and promote an
ethnic identity, many Armenians in Lebanon continued to organize themselves according to
village and regional ties (Nucho 2016, 16). Not even the church apparatus or Armenian political
parties were able to unify the post-genocide Armenian community in Lebanon. Migliorino added
that refuge-seekers also loosely rallied around regional patriotic unions, spontaneously created by
Armenians from different political backgrounds who came from the same hometown in the
Ottoman Empire (like Marash, Adana, Aintab, etc.). These regional patriotic unions helped to
organize self-help activities in refugee camps and build shelters, schools, and churches
(Migliorino 2008, 57).
In Syria, similar problems faced Armenian survivors who settled there, primarily in
Aleppo (along the main deportation routes). Nicola Migliorino noted that the genocide produced a
gender-imbalanced community of broken families—-survivors were missing parents, spouses,
children, relatives, and many adult men were missing or killed (Migliorino 2008, 45). Orphaned
children were placed in many orphanages across the Levant and on the Lebanese coast. Beyond
broken families, traditional networks of relations were also destroyed--employment and physical
working places, hometown neighborhoods, and local or regional spaces of life and identification
were lost (Migliorino 2008). Like Nucho, he noted that these new conditions forced Armenian
refugees to mix from different classes, cultural and regional backgrounds, although all shared a
common ethnicity, not necessarily the same religious identity as well, due to intense missionary
activity in the region at the end of the Ottoman Empire. Other facets of traditional Armenian life
were also destroyed, such as churches, schools, charities, cultural and political associations.
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Armenian genocide survivors who fled to Syria (and Lebanon) initially established
refugee camps made of canvas tents on the outskirts of main towns. The reception of Armenian
newcomers by local Arab communities in Syria during this period was mixed--one of
“conviviality” (Chatty 2018, 107) and negatively (Migliorino 2008, 53). Migliorino suggested
that this tension was due in part to the severe economic and humanitarian crisis in the region at
the time and the fact that Armenians had a status as “foreigners” and “refuge-seekers.” In Aleppo
alone, approximately 35,000 people died of typhus between August 1916 and August 1917 (LustOkar 1996). Armenians were often scapegoated for the problems of the period--high
unemployment, the spread of diseases, and the increase in robberies (Lust-Okar 1996, 57-58).
Simultaneously, Armenians were also viewed as being benefactors of the French Mandate by
Arab nationalists, echoing accusations centuries earlier of close alliances with European
Crusaders. The relationship that many Armenians had with French administrators during this
period was also mixed— many viewed the French as saving Armenians from the Turks during the
genocide through military intervention, and betrayal for leaving Armenians to essentially be
finished off by the Turks (Migliorino 2008, 53). French administrators did provide early
humanitarian support for Armenian refuge-seekers in Syria and established food programs and
resettlement opportunities (Lust-Okar 1996, 60), and recruited Armenians and other minority
peoples in the public services and military “with the intention of creating a separation between
these bodies and Arab national politics” (Khoury 1987, 77).
In the 1920s and early 1930s, refuge-seekers were able to move out of refugee camps
and start to build Armenian quarters. Churches were the first cultural institution to be built after
living quarters (Migliorino 2008, 47). Re-establishing communities in Syria (and Lebanon) under
the French Mandate meant that these communities were no longer subject to Islam as the official
state religion and the Ottoman millet system was no longer dominant. Furthermore, in 1924-1925,
Armenians were offered Syrian citizenship by the French administrators, “creating the condition
for their inclusion among the confessional ‘families’ of the new Lebanese and Syrian political
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systems” (Migliorino 2008, 54). The Treaty of Lausanne, signed in July 1923, the final peace
agreement between Turkey and the states deemed as World War I victors, addressed the question
of the nationality of people who were formerly Ottoman citizens, including Armenians.
According to Article 30, former Ottoman citizens residing in territory which has been detached
from Turkey will become nationals of the aforementioned state. The Syrian constitution in 1930
formalized political confessionalism (like the millet system) and stated that the electoral law must
ensure representation for “religious minorities.”
2.4.3 Armenian Community of Syria, Pre-2011
The Armenian community in Syria, before the 2011 conflict and after, maintained the
Western Armenian dialect, communal institutions, such as schools, cultural clubs, welfare and
recreational organizations, and churches, and maintained links with the Armenian diaspora
worldwide and with the Republic of Armenia (Migliorino 2012, 2-3). Thousands of Armenians
fled or were forcibly displaced to Syria during the genocide. By 1922, after the genocide, 20,000
Armenians had settled in Aleppo alone (Ayntabi and Othman 1994, 26). More Armenians fled or
were displaced to Syria after French troops withdrew from Cilicia in 1923, bringing 40,000
Armenians to Aleppo, or 25% of the city’s population, between 1923-1925 (Hovannisian 2004,
425). Syrian cities with significant populations of Armenians to this day include Aleppo,
Damascus, Qamishli, Latakia, Al Hasakah, and the village Kessab, to name a few.
Most of the Armenian organizations are based in Aleppo, and include: ten (10) cultural
associations such as Hamazkayin Cultural and Educational Association (established in 1930) and
Tekeyan Armenian Cultural Association (established in 1955); seven (7) charitable associations,
such as Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU, established in 1910), the Armenian Syrian
Red Cross Association (established in 1919), an old age home established in 1923, and Jinishian
Memorial Program (founded in 1966); sports associations such as Homenetmen sports established
in 1921; and students’ associations, such as Karen Jeppe College Graduates Union (established in
1947). Eleven (11) compatriotic unions have also survived, originally founded by refugees from
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various regions of the Ottoman Empire, such as Marash, Aintab, Kilis, Urfa, and Zeitun, founded
during the 1920s (Migliorino 2012). There are also many surviving Armenian churches in Syria,
such as Forty Martyrs Cathedral in Aleppo (established in 1491). Throughout the course of the
war, Armenian churches were also targeted by various groups, including the heartbreaking
destruction of the Armenian Genocide Martyrs’ Memorial Church-Complex in Deir el-Zor, where
many Armenians were deported to be killed and buried en masse during the genocide. Most
Armenians in Syria identify as Armenian Apostolic Christians (simply called Armenian
Orthodox), but smaller numbers also identify as members of the Armenian Catholic Church and
the Armenian Evangelical community (due to the voracious efforts of Protestant missionaries
during the Ottoman Empire). There are a total of nine (9) schools still operating in Aleppo,
including four (4) high schools, most notably Karen Jeppe Armenian High School (opened in
1947) and AGBU Lazar Najarian-Calouste Gulbenkian Armenian Central High School (founded
in 1954). Another organization many Syrian Armenian women were active in in Syria prior to
migrating is the Armenian Relief Society (ARS), referred to by the Armenian transliterated
acronym, “H.O.M.” As with AGBU, this Armenian organization operates worldwide. I grew up
attending Western Armenian language classes in the Detroit area through the ARS Zavarian
(Eastern Region of the U.S.) chapter.
After the growth of the Armenian community in Syria in the 1950s and re-establishment
of cultural and religious institutions destroyed during the genocide, Armenians in Syria
essentially had a world of their own. They were permitted to observe their own traditions and
keep their social institutions, but this was done separately from engaging with the larger Syrian
society. As mentioned earlier, Armenians have been active politically in Syria, but to a smaller
extent than other groups living in Syria, from 1928 onwards. As of April 2016, two (2)
Armenians were elected to the Syrian Parliament, Jirayr Reyissian and Nora Arissian, and the
current Cabinet of Syria has one Armenian member, Nazira Farah Sarkis, named as State Minister
for Environment Affairs in June 2012 (Syrian e-government portal).
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2.4.4 Syrian Conflict (March 2011) and Mass Displacement
The Syrian conflict started in March 2011 due to anti-government protests by Syrian
youth in Dera’a, Syria, partially influenced by the simultaneously occurring Arab Spring. Protests
calling for the Assad family’s removal from power led to repression by the Assad government,
with most of the conflict beginning in Damascus and Aleppo.The conflict is still ongoing and
includes many different factions, chief among whom include the pro-government Syrian Armed
Forces and their international allies, mostly Sunni opposition groups such as the Free Syrian
Army, the Salafi jihadist al-Nusra Front, and mixed Kurdish and Arab Syrian Democratic Forces.
Other factions involved include the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS),
referred to by interlocutors as Daesh. Several countries, including the United States, Russia, Iran,
and Turkey have provided support to one or more of the above factions. Iran and Russia provided
support to pro-government forces, whereas the United States led an international coalition against
ISIS in 2014 and has also conducted airstrikes against pro-government targets. It is important to
acknowledge the alliances underneath the murkiness of the Syrian conflict as these alliances were
mentioned by many interlocutors. Many interlocutors identified as ethnic Armenians from Syria,
a minority group that generally supports the Assad government. However, a few interlocutors
(Armenian and Arab) told me about state repression by the Assad government, including
imprisonment and torture. ISIS was also directly involved in displacing many interlocutors,
including the kidnapping and murder of one woman’s husband. My identity as an Armenian
American researcher did cause a small degree of wariness among some interlocutors. I noticed
that none seemed to hold back from telling me how upset they were by U.S. intervention in Syria
and treated me as a messenger to a larger American audience. Furthermore, the seemingly neverending Syrian conflict led to the displacement of millions of Syrian citizens all over the world,
mostly to Turkey, Europe, Canada, as well as the small post-Soviet Republic of Armenia.
2.4.5 Stories of Flight from Syria to Armenia
While there were many harrowing stories of flight recounted to me through fieldwork by
Syrian women (Armenian and non-Armenian), I will only share a few here and a longer story
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from Hasmig. Seven Syrian Armenian women noted that before the conflict, they would
generally visit Armenia for leisurely purposes, particularly during the summer months (Amina,
Nanor, Shushan, Seda, Shaghig, Berjouhi, Talin). Even during summer 2012, many Syrian
Armenians only brought enough clothing for a few months as they thought the conflict would
quickly diffuse (Karine, Talin, Shushan, Seda). For example, sisters Shushan and Seda came to
Armenia in October 2012 intending to get an Armenian passport and return to Syria after one
month. According to Seda, “We weren’t ready to go to Armenia permanently. We only brought
$1,000 with us. We didn’t bring anything with us.” The Syrian conflict, in short, ended up lasting
far longer than many Syrian Armenian women anticipated. Shaghig, a Syrian Armenian woman
in her early 20s, came to Armenia roughly 8-9 times over summer vacations, and eventually came
to Armenia as a Birthright Armenia volunteer. Talin, a woman in her 50s, came to Armenia in
2015 for a summer vacation, “we stayed for 15 days and just kept staying, we didn’t leave.”
In Syria at the height of the war, decisions were rapidly made, particularly by mothers. A
desire to protect their children and take them out of harm’s way easily overrode any desire to stay
in Syria for the duration of the war (Katherine, Sona, Berjouhi, Siranoush, Santoukhd, Hripsime).
Noted Katherine, a Syrian Armenian woman in her late 30s and mother of 2 children, “I was
watching al Jazeera news and made a quick decision to leave. Things were happening quickly. It
was safer to leave with my one-month-old child--my second child was born in April 2011. Our
family left before anything really happened in Syria.” Katherine’s family went to Qatar and
Lebanon first prior to coming to Armenia permanently in 2015, after she saw, “it was
comfortable.” Some Syrian Armenian women came to Armenia directly (usually via a layover in
Lebanon) from Syria in 2012 (Berjouhi, Knar). Most of these women were also worried about
sending their children to school, particularly after bombs started falling in Aleppo in 2012
(Berjouhi, Siranoush, Katherine).
Most interlocutors that I spoke with did not come to Armenia due to nationalistic
motivations. Often, Armenia was viewed as family-friendly, less expensive than living in
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Lebanon for example, safe compared to Syria, and offered a pathway to Armenian citizenship.
Sona, a Syrian Armenian woman in her mid-30s and mother of two young children, said, “we
were forced to come here, by war and not by choice. Zorov sdibvadz [forced to come to
Armenia].” Like Sona, Hermine sensed a change in Aleppo and was worried about her children,
“I didn’t feel...I felt the surroundings were different. I didn’t decide to leave Aleppo.” Gayane, a
Syrian Armenian woman in her 60s, also noted that, “I felt like something was changing, that
something was wrong” in Aleppo. Both Sona and Hermine felt they lacked agency in the choice
to come to Armenia or stay in Syria--this difficult decision was simply made for them because
they felt it was not safe for their children and did not see any other place as a viable place to go.
Armenia was a practical option more often than a patriotic one. It offered a pathway to citizenship
and, ostensibly, national inclusion. Armenia was easier to get to than Europe, and it was viewed
as safe by many interlocutors.

Figure 2.6 Map of the South Caucasus. Source: Australian Institute of International
Affairs. Conflict in the Caucasus - Australian Institute of International Affairs Australian Institute of International Affairs. Accessed April 30, 2021.
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Many interlocutors fled via plane to Lebanon then Armenia, but some also made the
dangerous journey by bus or car from Syria to Lebanon or Armenia. One non-Armenian
interlocutor interviewed in Berlin, Najwa, described her flight by raft through the Aegean Sea
from Syria to safety in Europe. Fleeing from Syria also involved encountering different political
obstacles depending on one’s relationship with the Assad family in Syria, and various militia
groups, like Jabhat al-Nusra and Daesh, as shown by Hasmig’s story shared at the beginning of
this dissertation. Hasmig’s husband was kidnapped by Daesh militants in Syria and detailed the
difficulties facing widowed women traveling without male companions and crossing the Syrian
border.
2.4.6 Demographics of Syrian Armenians in Armenia (Class, Arrival, Adjustments)
People who were able to flee from Syria first after the outbreak of the Syrian conflict
generally belonged to the middle and upper classes. Many interlocutors belonged to middle- and
upper-class families. Most of the women I interviewed were in their mid-30s to middle-aged (40s
to 60s), were housewives in Syria (primarily Aleppo), and were active in various cultural and
charitable associations mentioned earlier (such as Armenian General Benevolent Union).
Throughout the course of my research, I found that many Syrian Armenian women transplanted
these social networks and activities to building a new life in Yerevan, initially on a temporary
basis. I also found that there were two main waves of Syrian Armenians fleeing to Armenia: in
the summer of 2012 due to unrest in Aleppo, and 2014 due to incursions by Daesh (the Arabic
acronym for the terrorist group called the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). At the height of the
conflict, from 2012-2014, approximately 20,000 Syrian Armenians fled to Yerevan. Currently,
approximately 14,000 Syrian Armenians have remained in Armenia, as earlier migrants fled to a
third country, predominantly Canada (UNHCR Armenia January 2020). 7

7

UNHCR Armenia. www.un.am/en/agency/UNHCR. Accessed February 2, 2021.
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2.4.7 Halebi Shuka: Syrian Armenian Women in Public Spaces in Yerevan
I went to Halebi Shuka a few times a month, if not once per week, when I was living in Yerevan
from August 2018-August 2019. My first visit to Halebi Shuka was in July 2017, after an
interview with Anna, who took me to meet her friends at Halebi Shuka, and my first formal solo
trip to Halebi Shuka was in September 2018. I always stopped by Nuritsa’s shop every time I
visited Halebi Shuka, and picked up homemade hummus, muhammarra (a roasted red pepper dip
with walnuts and pomegranate molasses), menneish (flat bread topped with za’atar spice), and
sarma (stuffed grape leaves) and greeted the store worker, a local Armenian woman named Syuzi.
Nuritsa was rarely in the shop as she was busy opening a second store in another part of Yerevan,
closer to Syrian Armenians’ Union. During this first solo trip to Halebi Shuka, I also stopped by a
small jewelry store and a large Syrian spices shop, where I picked up some sumac and Arabic
coffee.
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Figure 2.7 Entrance to Halebi Shuka in Yerevan by a central metro station. Photo by
author.

Over the course of 2018-2019, I brought a few friends and relatives to visit Halebi Shuka, such as
friends from Fulbright and my parents and sister when they were visiting Armenia. There were
about 7 small shops in Halebi Shuka, and I consistently visited at least 3 of them: a lingerie shop
owned by Seda, Nuritsa’s shop and the large spice shop owned by two Syrian Armenian women I
did not interview. Most of the shops in Halebi Shuka were owned by Syrian Armenian women,
but a few were owned by Syrian Armenian men--a sports clothing store and a shawarma/falafel
stand called “Spitak,” named after a city in northwestern Armenia that had been devastated by the
1988 earthquake. Of the 3 shops I frequently visited, I spent the most time at Nuritsa’s store and
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socializing with Shushan and Seda at Seda’s shop. Nuritsa’s store was small, and she was not
usually there, but I did see her at exhibition sales and visited her second shop. While I initially
sought interviews, frequent visits and socialization naturally led to friendships and the
opportunity to practice my Western Armenian. A typical visit to Seda and Shushan’s shop
included sitting on a small stool and leaning against a wall of bras as Shushan would offer me one
of her famous pastries and Seda would put on an electric kettle for instant coffee. I would visit
during business hours, and they would still invite me in to sit and socialize as customers
occasionally stopped in. Seda would pause our conversation, answer customer questions and
complete the transaction, and then continue our conversation. Eventually, I started bringing my
dog, Manti, on visits to their shop in Halebi Shuka, as the sisters loved him and said he reminded
them of their dog in Syria.
2.4.8

Key Syrian Armenian Organizations in Armenia

Syrian Armenians in Armenia, particularly women, are active in several key nongovernment organizations (NGOs) working with Syrian Armenians in Yerevan. These NGOs
include Aleppo NGO, Center for the Coordination of Syrian Armenian Issues (CCSAI), Mission
Armenia, Caritas, Armenian Round Table Foundation, GIZ, KASA, and Red Cross Armenia,
among many others. I shadowed events, vocational trainings, workshops, and embroidery classes
at Aleppo NGO, Syrian Armenians’ Union (SAU), and the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) Armenia branch during my Fulbright fellowship (August 2018-May
2019). Organizations such as H.O.M., AGBU, and Aleppo NGO particularly served as transplant
sites for social networks that Syrian Armenian migrant women carried with them from Aleppo to
Yerevan. These organizations were instrumental in assessing Syrian Armenian needs, collecting
donations, and providing art therapy and embroidery classes for people seeking to create a new
community in Yerevan, based directly on their former lives in places such as Aleppo.
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2.5

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have provided an historical overview to demonstrate how historical and
ethnographic details and narratives must be presented as intertwined in Armenian diasporic
nationalist thinking to grasp the current sociocultural condition of the Armenians in diaspora and
Armenians in the Republic of Armenia and the way they imagine and construct their nationality.
Precisely how this history was imagined and constructed by Armenians can be seen in present
day textbooks by noting how the territory of Western Armenia was historically more expansive
than the present borders of the post-Soviet Republic of Armenia. I included this chapter so the
reader could understand how identities are socially constructed and territorialized—in other
words, why some descendants of Western Armenian genocide survivors who fled to Syria may
not feel quite “at home” in (Eastern) Armenia. This chapter also provided an overview of the
distinctions between Eastern Armenia(n) and Western Armenia(n) and relevance to the research
population, Syrian Armenian women in Armenia; the 1894-96 Hamidian massacres and 1915
Armenian genocide; post-genocide displacement to Syria and the development of the Syrian Arab
Republic; Armenians’ history in Syria prior to, during, and after the massacres; and the 2011
Syrian conflict and subsequent migration of Syrian Armenians to Armenia. In the next chapter, I
will turn away from the cultural and historical context provided by the Syrian Armenian
community’s recognition and reconstruction of their multiple collective traumas to the issue of
nomenclature. That is, I will discuss legal terminology used to refer to the research population by
myself, the Armenian state, and NGOs serving Syrian Armenians in Armenia. The main goal of
Chapter 3 is to introduce to the reader the context behind the Armenian state’s nomenclature of
Syrian Armenian migrants as hayrenagitsner [“compatriots”] and how this recalls similar Sovietera terminology and previous issues with integration into the Armenian state (either during the
Soviet period or independence).
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CHAPTER 3. HAYRENATARZUTYUN [REPATRIATION]: “REPATRIATES, NOT REFUGEES”
“I’m tired of being singled out as Syrian-Armenian. We are all Armenians!”
- Karun, late 20s/early 30s
This quote is from an interview conducted with Karun, a young woman whose family
owns a local Syrian restaurant in Yerevan, expressing frustration with the label “Syrian
Armenian.” A friend of a friend, Karun graciously met me by Yerevan’s famous Cascade, an
architectural monument/giant staircase buttressed by Yerevan’s iconic outdoor cafes. Our
discussion centered around her feelings of integration in Yerevan:
Anahid: Why did you decide to come to Armenia?
Karun: I used to love Armenia. Why come to Armenia? It is the best move for every
Armenian, and the Syrian passport is hard to use. Now I have an Armenian passport that I
got in Syria. Every Armenian can get Syrian citizenship.
Anahid: What is your relationship like with other Syrian Armenians?
Karun: I don’t like Syrian organizations because I don’t want to separate between
Armenians and Syrian Armenians. A lot of people [Syrian Armenians] don’t want
refugee status.
Anahid: Okay, what is your relationship like with the local community.
Karun: I feel like I am treated very well by the local community. I have local friends.
Otherwise, people are very close-minded. After opening the restaurant, 80% of customers
are locals. I am active in AGBU [Armenian General Benevolent Union], where it is not
just Syrian Armenians but a mix.
Anahid: How does Yerevan differ from Aleppo?
Karun: I haven’t been back to Syria in 7 years. Yerevan is very different from Aleppo-large history, Aleppo is older for sure. I’m sad I didn’t stay in Aleppo longer. From ages
17-20, I didn’t know about Aleppo’s history, now I know it’s important and I love both
places. Yerevan is cleaner. Older buildings are destroyed in Yerevan, but the streets are
better here. People are similar, very hospitable in both places. I miss the house, friends,
streets, everything, family still has family there--aunts and grandma there. They can come
and go to Armenia, but I’m afraid of feelings going back to Aleppo.
Anahid: What are some of the challenges you faced as a Syrian Armenian?
Karun: I am tired of being singled out as Syrian Armenian. We are all Armenians! The
government [Armenian] helped Syrian Armenian students with education and tuition.
The government helped out every year and money are coming from the outside, like
Aleppo NGO [donors]. But some Syrian Armenians are critical of government help.
What this fragment of a conversation encapsulates is Karun’s sensitivity to certain labels, such as
“Syrian Armenian” and her desire to integrate into Yerevan society. It also illustrates Karun’s
nostalgia for Syria and appreciation for a new “home” in Armenia. Labels matter to Syrian
Armenian migrant women and impact lived experiences of socioeconomic integration in
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Armenia. Sensitivity to labels extends to preferences for certain legal statuses over others, such as
“citizen,” “refugee,” and “repatriate.” Decisions to select certain legal statuses are also moralized
by some members of the host community-- “good” Syrian Armenians are those who stay and
socially, and more importantly economically, contribute to the socially constructed homeland, the
Republic of Armenia. “Good” Syrian Armenians become citizens. “Bad” Syrian Armenians are
moralized as those who leave after a short period in Armenia and are perceived as taking
advantage of Armenia’s benefits for refugees. Collective memory of the Armenian genocide is
also instrumentalized by the Armenian state to beckon diasporan Armenians, including Syrian
Armenians, home to the Republic of Armenia. This same approach was used 70 years ago during
the Soviet Union, through a movement called Nerkaght 8 in Armenian. The title of this chapter,
հայրենադարձութիւն or hayrenatartzutyun, refers to “repatriation,”as it directly translates to
“return to the [Armenian] fatherland.” I would like the reader to pay particular attention to the
similarities between the language used during the Nerkaght movement in Soviet Armenia in the
1940s and the language used today to beckon diasporan Armenian’s “home” to Armenia,
including Syrian Armenian migrant women.

8

Nerkaght (Ներգաղթ) is roughly translated as “in-migration”; Ners or ներս means “in” or “inside,” and
kaghtel or գաղթել means “to migrate.” Laycock, Joanne. “Belongings: People and Possessions in the
Armenian Repatriations 1945-49.” Kritika : Exploration in Russian and Eurasian History, 18, no. 3 (2017):
511-537.
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Figure 3.1 Repatriate bar in Yerevan. Photo by author. Image from a repatriate bar in
Yerevan, bak75, that hosted a repatriate happy hour. Background:
Հայրենադարձութիւն, “Repatriation.” Repatriation shapes organization/social structure
here. Repatriates get together with other repatriates to learn about how they adapted to
life in Armenia.
The second half of the chapter title, “repatriates, not refugees,” refers to an informal
conversation held with a Canadian Armenian friend named Raffi, as we attempted to escape from
the sweltering Armenian heat and cool down over a glass of Apricot Ale at Armenia’s new
premier craft brewery, Dargett, to discuss our mutual work with Syrian Armenian migrants in
Armenia. During our informal conversation, Raffi explained that, “the Armenian government
views Syrian Armenians as repatriates, not refugees.” The repatriation narrative implies a
“birthright” experience--namely, if your ancestors had not been displaced from this territory, you
would have been an Armenian citizen and contributing member of society. As Raffi observed in a
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2016 article, 9 the Armenian state “branded” Syrian Armenian migrants as repatriates. This
branding, I argue, is part of the Armenian state’s effort, through wielding memories of the
Armenian genocide, to beckon other diasporan Armenians, including Syrian Armenians, to come
home to Armenia. The collision-- between memories of the Armenian genocide and state efforts
to beckon diasporan Armenians home to Armenia, and memories of a secondary socially
constructed home in Syria over the course of five generations-- impacts home-making practices
of Syrian Armenian migrant women in Armenia as well as socioeconomic integration efforts
spearheaded by local state and non-state organizations. Further branding of Syrian Armenian
migrant women living in Armenia occurs through these socioeconomic integration efforts
focusing on Syrian Armenian women entrepreneurs, such as exhibition sales (Chapter 6). In this
chapter, I problematize “belonging” in the context of a shared ethno-religious identity as
providing a short or long-term solution to a humanitarian crisis. I build upon contributions to the
anthropology of belonging, in the sense that socially constructed homecomings can also result in
rejection and disillusionment (Constable 1999; Shami 1998; Laycock 2012, 2016). Earlier
repatriation movements of diasporan Armenians to the Soviet Republic of Armenia, for example,
were full of painful belonging.

3.1

Introduction

This chapter deals with the context behind the Armenian state’s nomenclature of Syrian

Armenian migrants as հայրենակիցներ, hayrenagitsner [“compatriots”] and how this recalls
similar Soviet-era terminology and previous issues with integration into the Armenian state
(either during the Soviet period or independence). It is important to understand the historical
context to grasp the overlapping and sometimes contradictory goals and aims of current
stakeholders (i.e., Syrian Armenians, NGOs, Syrian and Armenian governments). Additionally,

9

Elliott, Raffi. “Syrian Revival in Armenia.” Mirror Spectator, March 3, 2016.
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this chapter problematizes state and international attempts to “repatriate” Armenian genocide
survivors and their descendants who have settled in Syria, to the current Republic of Armenia.
The core argument of this chapter is that “repatriates” is a term imbued with deep layers of
meaning for the state and constituents of that state, but it is not what Syrian Armenian migrant
women would use to describe themselves--it is a term that is imposed upon them by the state. In
other words, constructions of home and belonging are shaped by discourses coming out of state
citizenship regimes and NGO efforts to encourage repatriation. Broadly, there are three actors
involved in this discourse--the state, the local community, and Syrian Armenian migrant women.
The decisions made by Syrian Armenian migrant women about which legal status to choose are
also moralized by some members of the local community, including several NGO and UN
employees. For example, the social construction gleaned from many state and non-state
employees [mostly local Armenian women] that “good” Syrian Armenians are those who stay
and choose citizenship status. “Bad” Syrian Armenians are those who leave and choose
temporary residence status or refugee status, another social construction, not my personal beliefs.
Belonging to the Armenian state has also expanded, from a reliance on patrilineal membership to
claim citizenship, to the liberalization of eligibility for citizenship--anyone can be Armenian if
they can prove it on official documentation. It does not matter if one’s mother or father is
ethnically Armenian, if one can provide "proof" of Armenian ethnicity (patrilineal surnames) or
baptismal records from church institutions “bearing a note of ethnicity.”
While the Armenian state and non-government organizations (NGOs) classify and
identify Syrian Armenians as “repatriates” due to the state’s current geopolitical situation (i.e.,
emigration from Armenia and need for more ethnic Armenian citizens), Syrian Armenians largely
reject this label because they could never repatriate to a land they were never initially displaced
from (i.e., the current Republic of Armenia). Syrian Armenians also generally do not like the term
“refugee” as it undermines their potential for ethnic Armenian citizenship and wish to be called
“Armenians” based on possessing Armenian passports and residing in their perceived ancestral
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homeland, as constructed by the Armenian state and expressed in the opening quote. Furthermore,
strategizing which legal status to use determines how Syrian Armenian migrants in general, in
this case, women, are moralized by the Armenian state, NGOs, and local community.
As mentioned earlier, I observed that there is a social construction, more of a
moralization, by many local Armenian state and non-state employees about which legal status
Syrian Armenian migrant women choose: “good” Syrian Armenians are those who stay in
Armenia, seek citizenship, and financially contribute to the socially constructed homeland; “bad”
or “spoiled” Syrian Armenians are those who are viewed as seeking temporary residence status
or refugee status and mooch off Armenia’s meager resources. “Good” Syrian Armenians are
those who become full-fledged Armenian citizens, numerically and financially contributing to
Armenia’s vastly depopulating demographic. In short, “good” Syrian Armenians are those who
stay. “Bad” Syrian Armenians are those who either take Armenian citizenship or residence status
and move to a third country, usually somewhere in Europe or Canada.
Moralizations concerning the migration of “good” vs. “bad” Syrian Armenians are
evident in the following conversation I had with a local Armenian acquaintance whose parent is
Syrian Armenian. We had sat down for a Syrian dinner (this quickly became my excuse for
research--visiting Syrian restaurants). We ate manti or small dumplings drenched in yogurt and
spices like sumac and mint, a dish so delicious, I named my Malchi puppy after it. I asked her to
share with me her perspectives of Syrian Armenians in Armenia, particularly those who had
migrated to Armenia and left for a third country. In this conversation, Sirvart references both the
“good ones” [Syrian Armenians who stay] and those who leave (hereafter referred to as “bad
Syrian Armenians”). This was her reply:
Anahid: You mentioned those Syrian Armenians who came to Armenia and left for a
third country?
Sirvart: Yes. The Armenian government was helping them, but they still left!
Anahid: I see.
Sirvart: Yes, they are also complaining about being resettled in Ashtarak [a town close
to Yerevan] rather than in Kentron [the city center of Yerevan]. Syrian Armenians go to
Europe and Canada, they are the ones who abuse getting little to free tuition compared to
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poor people living in the marzer [provinces/regions, basically anywhere outside Yerevan]
who will stay and contribute to the economy.
Anahid: Isn’t your family Syrian Armenian, too?
Sirvart: Yes, but one side came during Soviet times [the Nerkaght movement described
later in this chapter]. The Syrian Armenians who stayed are the “good ones.”
Anahid: Okay. Can you tell me about your relationship with other Syrian Armenian
women?
Sirvart: They [Syrian Armenian women] only want: 1) keys to house; 2) keys to shop;
and 3) keys to car before keys to heart. Syrian women didn’t work. They were poorly
educated, but it’s the opposite here.
This conversation shows how Syrian Armenian women are moralized not only by some members
of the local community, but also by some who claim Syrian Armenian parentage, although the
“good ones'' who came during the Nerkaght movement during the Soviet Union. Sirvart also felt
that Syrian Armenian women are generally uneducated and only married their husbands for
money rather than for romance. I did not observe this at all during fieldwork from 2016-2019.
While some couples were upper class or comfortably middle class, financial security did not seem
to be the motivating factor for marriage. Additionally, most of the Syrian Armenian women I
interviewed were educated.
Syrian Armenians in Armenia thus occupy a complicated position, as not every Syrian
Armenian is legally classified as a refugee according to the United Nations definition, nor would
many consider themselves to be repatriates as their ancestors came from Western Armenia. The
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) office in Yerevan refers to Syrian
Armenians in Armenia as living in “refugee-like conditions.” For example, Maro from Caritas, an
NGO worker, described Syrian Armenians as being “Syrian de facto refugees...with Armenian
passports.” This categorization appears to be contradictory, as having an Armenian passport
precludes eligibility for refugee status in Armenia, as will be demonstrated later in this chapter.
Saro from the former Ministry of Diaspora also described Syrian Armenians as “de facto
refugees.” However, the Armenian state vigorously seeks to attract Armenians from the diaspora
to “come home” or “repatriate” to Armenia. In this dissertation, I will refer to the main research
population, Syrian Armenian women in Armenia as “migrants” instead of the more politicized
term “asylum seeker.” Not every Syrian Armenian woman I interviewed came to Armenia
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directly due to the war, although most did. Some went to other countries first and voluntarily
migrated to Armenia. I will utilize the label “Syrian Armenian” to help clarify distinctions
between different categories of interlocutors.
3.1.1 Organization of the Chapter
This chapter will continue in two parts. Part I will discuss past repatriation efforts
targeting diasporan Armenians in Soviet Armenia, termed the Nerkaght movement,
demonstrating how past state repatriation efforts were unsuccessful. Following this is a discussion
of why repatriation efforts are not only misleading in the context of Syrian Armenians--they can
also be painful. A core argument of this dissertation is that homecoming and belonging is just as
painful as its joyous depictions in state media and messaging campaigns, from Nerkaght in 1940s
Soviet Armenia, to present-day Yerevan with Syrian Armenian migrant women. Conversely,
sometimes it is just as painful to belong in Syria for Syrian Armenian women as it is to belong in
Armenia. Part I provides ethnographic narratives showing this disjointed sense of belonging, like
a puzzle piece not quite fitting in a jigsaw puzzle.
Part II will discuss major legal terms and statuses related to refuge-seeking, namely
“citizenship” and “residence status.” The other terms are refugee status and “repatriate.” Part II
will include ethnographic data from my research about how citizenship in modern-day Armenia is
determined, particularly for Syrian Armenian migrants. In the ethnographic data section, I will
discuss pros and cons of Syrian Armenians seeking citizenship in Armenia, with an emphasis on
sex-selective citizenship preferences and alternatives for these preferences (such as residence
permits), as well as ethnographic examples illustrating pros and cons of Syrian Armenian
decisions to apply for refugee status in Armenia today. Pros and cons of citizenship selection are
articulated by Syrian Armenian migrant women and state and non-state employees. Syrian
Armenian migrant women make conscious decisions, even strategize, about which type of legal
status they wish to pursue in Armenia. In return, they are moralized by members of the local
community, including state and non-state employees, for the status that they chose. According to
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two NGO staff members (Natasha and Tsoghig), Syrian Armenians are eligible for three different
legal statuses: citizenship, residence status, and refugee status. Throughout this section, I will
explain how Syrian Armenian strategies towards deciding which legal status they wish to apply
for in Armenia (citizenship, residence status, and refugee status) determines how they are
moralized by local populations, and pros and cons of citizenship and refugee status, respectively,
as articulated by Syrian Armenian migrant women and state and non-state employees.

3.2

Part I: Repatriation Movements and Painful Belonging in the Socially
Constructed Homeland

3.2.1 Nerkaght Movement (1945-1947)
The Nerkaght movement officially began on November 21, 1945 when the Soviet
government invited diasporan Armenians to immigrate to Soviet Armenia (Matossian 1962, 166).
According to Maike Lehmann, the Soviet government also invited other diasporan ethnic groups
to immigrate to the Soviet Union (Lehmann 2012). In this dissertation, however, I will only be
talking about Soviet Armenian “repatriation” and how Soviet propaganda from that era relates to
contemporary Armenian state and non-state messages. Mary Matossian 10 suggested that the
reasons behind the Nerkaght movement were manifold: 1) the need to replenish the manpower of
the USSR lost in World War II; 2) the desire of the Soviets to win the goodwill of the Armenian
diaspora; and 3) the desire to put additional pressure on Turkey (Matossian, 167). The last point,
bodies on land, was due to Soviet claims vis-a-vis Turkey to return territories in Eastern Anatolia
in 1945, which did not materialize (Lehmann, 185). Essentially, “the official propaganda of the
‘return’ to a Soviet homeland resonated with the perceptions of those who wanted to move”
(Western Armenian genocide survivors and their descendants) (Lehmann, 182). Approximately
90,000-100,000 diasporan Armenians “repatriated” to Soviet Armenia during this time (Lehmann
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Mary K. Matossian, a historian who specialized in researching Soviet Armenian policies and changing
gender dynamics among genocide survivors and their descendants in the Soviet period, is my paternal
grandmother.
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2012). However, as several scholars have noted, diasporan Armenian “repatriates” had serious
issues upon arriving in Soviet Armenia (Matossian 1962; Lehmann 2012; Laycock 2016). The
arrival of repatriates worsened already strenuous housing conditions by increased crowding,
which created resentment from the local population and repatriates were told by many locals that
they were not asked to come to Soviet Armenia by the local population (Matossian, 176). As
mentioned earlier, repatriates were viewed as suspects by the Soviet government because of their
longtime association with “bourgeois influences” of capitalist countries (also echoed by Lehmann
2012). Most also did not speak Russian which handicapped their ability to communicate with
Soviet officials and to survive as university students (Matossian, 177). Historian Jo Laycock’s
reviews of repatriate memoirs, hailing from France, Lebanon, and the United States, found that
they were “intentionally isolated and disproportionately persecuted by the Soviet authorities''
(Laycock, 128) and that the Nerkaght movement did not live up to the expectations of Soviet
authorities nor diasporan Armenians.
The repatriation campaign itself was also organized largely by the Soviet Armenian
Society for Cultural Ties Abroad (AOKS) with the support of the Armenian church and several
diaspora organizations, such as the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU) (Lehmann,
185). AOKS delegates, who were sent abroad to find potential repatriates, looked for repatriates
with a profession and the ability to work due to post-war economic concerns in the Soviet Union.
As will be explained in the next chapter, there are currently contemporary repatriation campaigns
in the Republic of Armenia that focus on drawing professional diasporan Armenians “home” to
Armenia and financially contributing to their “homeland,” initiatives that drastically increased
after the 2018 Velvet Revolution. Maike Lehmann added that the term “repatriates” was
intentionally used by Soviet Armenian authorities as diasporan Armenians who migrated to
Soviet Armenia were not descended from genocide survivors who had lived in the territory that
was now (then) Soviet Armenia. Lehmann argues that they were labeled as “repatriates” “to
underscore the unity of a nation to be established on Soviet soil” (Lehmann, 172). Repatriates
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were mocked as akhpars (ախբար, akhpar is short for “brother,” formal term is եղբայր or
yeghpayr), which is, “a derogatory term signifying both the claim and the negation of national
unity” (Lehmann 2012, 172). Akhpar (ախբար) is even more insulting as it is based on the
Western Armenian word for “brother” (Western Armenian is the dialect of Armenian largely
spoken by genocide survivors and their descendants) and was used to mock diasporan Armenians
for their pronunciation (Lehmann, 200). This was not a friendly, kinship-based term--it was
alienating and hostile.
Approximately half of the diasporan Armenian repatriates in 1947-1949 became the main
target group for deportations of “potentially disloyal nationals” to Central Asia and Siberia
(Lehmann, 173). Included among this group were genocide survivors, as the genocide occurred
only thirty years prior. Soviet propaganda intended to draw attention away from the 1.5 million
genocide victims to the future: Soviet Armenia as a phoenix rising from the ashes of World War
II, where 170,000 victims were lost (Lehmann, 186). However, as Jo Laycock observes, “The
perceived betrayal of the Armenian repatriates at the hands of the Soviet authorities easily fits a
narrative of national suffering and survival” (Laycock 2016, 238). This shows that earlier
repatriation schemes led by the state government were unsuccessful. What remains to be seen in
the case of Syrian Armenians is whether this new scheme will have more success, or if it also
echoes tension with the local community, as my research suggests.
3.2.2

Painful Belonging of Syrian Armenian Women in Armenia, 70 years after Nerkaght
Approximately 70 years after the Nerkaght movement, ethnic Armenian women from

Syria living in Armenia still experience what I term, “painful belonging.” This term, “painful
belonging,” refers to the expectations of seamless integration that ethnic Armenian women from
Syria have upon migrating to Armenia. It is based solely on my observations of the data, not
something someone said. Ironically, a constructed “return” to one’s socially constructed ancestral
“homeland” is not simply pleasant and comforting. It can be incredibly painful and disorienting
as well, as my data suggests. The “painful” part occurs sometimes almost immediately upon
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arrival, after many women’s expectations of seamless integration are not met in Armenia. This is
shocking in the sense that the Armenian state had promised, since the 1940s, to be “home” for
ethnic Armenian descendants of genocide survivors dispersed all over the world. While most
interlocutors expressed gratitude for being in a safe country like Armenia, several expressed
disappointment and pain, particularly perceptions about their negative treatment by some
members of the host community, such as verbal abuse and discrimination against their children
for not having fathers (due to war). Aside from Armenia, some Syrian Armenian interlocutors
told me they also experienced “painful belonging” in Syria, as well as positive treatment in Syria.
“Painful belonging” in Syria describes the liminality experienced by ethnic Armenians living in
Syria, beginning with the initial settlement of Armenian genocide survivors in Syria. This initial
settlement of Armenian genocide survivors in Syria after the genocide was brought about
forcefully and painfully, through events such as death marches, rapes, forced marriages and
abductions of Armenian women and children, and mass executions. Essentially, “belonging” in
Syria literally had a painful foundation for Armenian genocide survivors and their descendants.
However, Syria also became “home” for ethnic Armenians over the course of five generations
since the genocide and was home to some ethnic Armenians who had already been living in Syria
well before the genocide. The majority of Armenians in Syria descend from genocide survivors
(see Chapter 2 for discussion of this period in history). Belonging in Syria for Armenians meant
living in intimate, urban areas, primarily in Aleppo and Damascus, mostly confined to Armenian
cultural and religious activities and communities. I understand these intimate Armenian
communities as a byproduct of post-genocide communities (i.e., protection from outsiders),
which comfortably fit into the Syrian state’s sect system--minorities are largely kept separate
(Migliorino 2008). For example, as will be discussed in this section, several interlocutors
remarked they were happy there were “no Arabs or Muslims” [paraphrased from interviews] in
Armenia and felt more comfortable living in a predominantly Christian, ethnically Armenian
country. This second section of the chapter will address perceptions of painful belonging (i.e.,
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negative treatment by some members of the host community) in Armenia, contrasted with
positive experiences in Armenia, and painful belonging in Syria. This section will also include
narratives of comparisons between life in both countries.
3.2.3 Painful Belonging in Syria
Painful belonging in Syria meant, for many interlocutors, having to mute their Armenian
identity and negotiating their relationships with majority Arab and Muslim populations.
Belonging is painful in Syria in the sense that many Armenians felt they had to assert their
Armenian identity and carve out physical landscapes in urban areas to feel “at home.” It appears
to be less painful to belong in Syria than it is in Armenia, due to the high expectations of living in
Armenia among fellow ethnic Armenians. As Katherine, a Syrian Armenian woman in her 30s,
notes, “Syrian society is not of one color,” referring to the multi-ethnic, multi-religious fabric of
Syrian society. A young Syrian Armenian woman who volunteered for Birthright Armenia,
Shaghig, added that, “It feels more open in Armenia. I was friends with Arabs in 12th grade, and
had minimal contact with Arabs until later, but my parents were open-minded. I was friends with
Muslims, I wasn’t forbidden, but I also didn’t have the chance.” Shaghig indicated she was able
to be friends with Muslims in Syria, but it was not strongly encouraged or discouraged by her
parents. Syrian society has been described by interlocutors as diverse, but predominantly Muslim
and Arab. The insularity of the Armenian community in Syria also appears to have been a sort of
defense mechanism against assimilation, as was stated in Shaghig’s case with her parents. Her
parents encouraged her to have Armenian friends, especially in Syria. Shaghig explained that
Armenia feels more “open” in the sense of expressing her Armenian identity everywhere, not just
in Armenian circles, and she can have Armenian friends everywhere. In contrast to Syria,
Armenia is predominantly ethnic Armenian (98.1% as of 2011) 11 and Christian. “Arpi,” a young
Syrian Armenian woman, adds that:

11

Ministry of Culture in Armenia. 2011. “The ethnic minorities in Armenia, Brief Information,” 2011. Per
the most recent census in Armenia (2011). Archived via the Wayback Machine.
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I always wanted to keep my Armenian identity alive because I was in a foreign country
(everyday) in Syria. I don’t have to in Armenia because I’m busier with work and family.
I miss the closeness of people in Syria [visiting friends every few days], but I don’t miss
anything other than that. I am very hopeful for the future. I never want to go back to
Syria.
In this interview segment, Arpi said she felt compelled to keep her Armenian identity alive in
Syria and was active in Armenian cultural life in Aleppo, whereas in Armenia, she does not feel
she has to participate in Armenian cultural life. Arpi does not feel like she must participate in the
Syrian Armenian community in Yerevan, for example, because she is already surrounded by
other Armenians. She also noted that she is busy running a tourism agency with her husband (to
be discussed in Chapter 8) and raising 2 small children. However, Arpi misses the sociality in
Aleppo and intimacy of visiting people every few days. This was commented upon by other
interlocutors as well. Arpi ends by stating that she does not want to return to Syria and is excited
for her young family’s future in Armenia. Amina, who also has a young family in Armenia,
agreed and said she does not feel home in Syria either, “Syria is not home, but I’m not sure where
home is, though.” Amina stated that she does not feel at home in Armenia as well.
3.2.4 Painful Belonging in Armenia (Negative treatment)
“Belonging” in Armenia was also sometimes perceived as “painful” by Syrian Armenian
migrant women. Comparisons were even made with the devastating historical experience of
diasporan Armenians in Soviet Armenia during Nerkaght, the repatriation movement of diasporan
Armenians to Soviet Armenia in the mid-1940s. Katherine stated that, “Locals act as if they are
harsh. There was Nerkaght in 1945. But the perspective is better here than in Lebanon.” There are
several important elements to draw attention to in this quote. First, Katherine compares the
perceived “harshness” of local Armenians towards contemporary Syrian Armenians in Armenia
to the perceived “harshness” of local Armenians in 1940s Soviet Armenia towards diasporan
Armenian repatriates, primarily coming from the United States and Middle Eastern countries,
such as Lebanon. Second, she contrasts the experiences of Syrian Armenians in Armenia as being
more positive than the experiences some of them may have faced in Lebanon, a country in which
many Syrian migrants had settled or temporarily stayed in prior to migrating to Armenia.

76

Siranoush also comments upon her perceptions of local Armenians’ [called deghatsiner, or
“locals''] personalities in the sense that, “Deghatsinere [The locals] are narrow-minded, but I
don’t have a problem with them. But the Arabs don’t eat out of trash like here.” The second half
of this quote, “Arabs didn’t eat out of trash like here,” shows how the expectations of many
Syrian Armenian women were not met regarding settlement in Armenia. To Siranoush, not even
Arabs ate out of the trash [in Syria] like some locals do in Yerevan, in her perspective. In other
words, Armenia was more impoverished than many Syrian Armenian migrant women anticipated.
Painful belonging in this sense not only refers to the negative treatment by local Armenians of
Syrian Armenian migrants, but also refers to the expectations not being met by Syrian Armenian
migrant women about what life would be like in Armenia, their socially constructed homeland. In
a sense, some Syrian Armenian migrant women rejected settlement in the Armenian host
community, and vice versa, the Armenian state and some of its local members also rejected
Syrian Armenian migrant women.
Life in Armenia is undoubtedly safer than it is in Syria, as will be discussed below, but it
does not mean life is comfortable in Armenia. According to Sona:
Life is more protected in Armenia, but it feels lonelier here [in Armenia]. We had a
house, a normal life in Syria. You were forced to come here [Armenia], zorov sdibvadz
[you were forced]. Forced to come here because of war, not by choice...I didn’t want my
daughter to see my emotions, my discomfort here. I want to go back to Syria, but I can’t.
Local Armenians make us feel like refugees, not in a good way. Like, “you’re Syrian and
different.” But we don’t want to feel like refugees (Sona, January 2, 2019).
The above quote emphasizes the loneliness that Sona is experiencing in Armenia, even with her
immediate family living with her. In this context, the “you” she is referring to is herself--she was
impelled to come to Armenia by force. I included the original Western Armenian phrase just as
she expressed it, zorov sdibvadz, “by force.” She mourns the loss of her physical home and
“normal” social life in Syria. Repeatedly, Sona expresses how she feels she was “forced” to come
to Armenia, without any choice in the matter. She does not feel like she belongs in Armenia
because she feels local Armenians treat her and other Syrian Armenians like “refugees, not in a
good way.” She feels different, instead of feeling like she belongs and shares an ethnicity with the
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host state. Sona does not want her daughter to pick up on Sona’s discomfort and experience
painful belonging herself. Like Sona, another Syrian Armenian woman, Hermine, does not want
to feel like a refugee. A month after my interview with Sona, Hermine told me about her own
hopes for the future. She said, “I hope all my kids get together in Yerevan, that they live here. I
don’t want to be a refugee.” Hermine, a physician in Aleppo and active member of Aleppo NGO
(an organization based in Yerevan that assists Syrian Armenians, particularly women), said she
also feels alienated by some local Armenians because she is depicted as a “refugee,” not an
Armenian citizen, and does not want to be treated like a refugee. She hopes her kids can all live in
Yerevan one day and works part-time as a physician in Yerevan.
Aside from being treated “harshly” by some local Armenians for being “refugees,” a
category which many Syrian Armenian women feel does not apply to them, Syrian Armenian
women also face sociolinguistic discrimination. This discrimination is against their Western
Armenian dialect (spoken by descendants of genocide survivors in the Middle East, and
immigrants from the Middle East to western countries such as the U.S. and Canada) and lack of
Russian language skills. Shaghig, a young Syrian Armenian woman in her 20s and a Birthright
Armenia volunteer, said her treatment by locals is both good and bad, “One old lady got mad
because I didn’t speak Russian. There are not many issues, especially because people from the
Diaspora are coming. I don’t have a lot of deghatsi [local] friends.” Shaghig seems to have a
neutral impression of local Armenians but said her lack of Russian language skills upset one
elderly local Armenian woman. Shaghig has no problem speaking Armenian and can speak both
Eastern and Western Armenian dialects (Eastern=spoken in the current Republic of Armenia), but
she is sometimes berated for not speaking Russian, the dominant language spoken during the
Soviet Union. Zabel, a Syrian Armenian woman in her late 20s and mother of a young child, also
had complaints about sociolinguistic discrimination in Armenia. She said, “We started in
Armenia with zero, we didn’t understand the dialect. I was treated very badly by the local
community in the beginning. They would ask me what language I’m speaking when I’m speaking
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[Western] Armenian.” Questioning Syrian Armenians’ Armenianness through the Western
Armenian dialect that they speak, which is an endangered language according to UNESCO, is
arguably violent and alienating as well. It is violent because it discourages use of an endangered
dialect with native speakers (genocide survivors and their descendants) passing away every year.
Nanor described similar discrimination. Like Zabel, she said the initial reception by the local
community was not positive. Nanor said, “I am still asked if I can read or write in Armenian.
Now, they accept me. After 3 years in Armenia, Yerevansis [people from Yerevan] accepted that
it [Armenia] is Syrian Armenians’ hayrenik [homeland, literally fatherland] as well.” In this
quote, Nanor said she has finally found a semblance of acceptance and belonging in Armenia
after 3 years in Yerevan. To this day, she is still asked if she is literate in Armenian, despite
decades of being a native speaker of Armenian and educated in Armenian schools.
Painful belonging experienced by Syrian Armenian migrant women in Armenia is
brought about by relationships with local Armenians, as discussed above, and other Syrian
Armenians living in Armenia. Hasmig, a widowed Syrian Armenian woman living in Armenia,
said:
I don’t have much connection here [in Armenia] with other Syrian Armenians. I don’t
want anyone’s pity. I don’t want to be involved with other Syrian Armenians. Their
problems are not the same as mine. My children’s teachers don’t see any discrimination
in school, but I think there is. It’s not easy in Armenia, but it is safer. First, I came here
and fought for my kids. My kids were teased for not having a father [nobody has your
back]. The principal of the school talked to the kids. When they go out, the older son
defends his family. Nobody has to hear they are fatherless. I told my son I am both
mother and father now. I have no support system in Armenia. I didn’t tell my kids about
their father. They found out about their father when they put his picture in the church
bulletin [death announcement] and my older son was told about this from a friend. I know
I have trauma, but I don’t want to deal with it now. My kids are first (Hasmig, June 14,
2016).
Hasmig’s husband was brutally killed by ISIS [called Daesh by some Syrian women], and she
had to flee to Armenia because the killers were going after her children and calling their schools.
In Armenia, her sole focus seemed to be on her children. She even admitted that she was delaying
seeking psychological treatment for her trauma, because she is prioritizing her children’s mental
health. The painful belonging she described pertains mostly to her children’s lack of acceptance
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in school. She tried to protect her children in Armenia by hiding details of the true story behind
their father’s death, but they found out about it anyway in church by reading the death
announcements in the church bulletin. It is also important to keep in mind that Armenia is a
patriarchal society, so fatherless children are viewed as more vulnerable. My interpretation of
Hasmig’s interview segment is that she feels “nobody has your back” (my interpretation, not her
words), with “your” referring to her children who no longer have a father to protect them.
Accordingly, she feels she has had to take on the roles of both mother and father to her children.
Hasmig does not feel like she has support in Armenia, and that other Syrian Armenians cannot
understand her problems as not every Syrian Armenian woman has suffered the brutal murder of
their husband as she has experienced. Another Syrian Armenian woman, Nazani, also discussed
the negative treatment she experienced in Yerevan:
I came to Yerevan and wanted to go to Dubai. Yerevan wasn’t what I dreamed about.
Yerevan wasn’t my dream. There is no knowledge about diet/health in Yerevan, major
challenge as a dietitian. People won’t change their smoking habits or won’t accept what
you say. Everybody is right in Armenia; I hate that about Armenia. I face discrimination
on the bus, in shops. Good people, in a Soviet lifestyle. The new generation in their 30s
has Soviet influence (Nazani, February 25, 2019).
Nazani said that Yerevan is not what she dreamed about because it did not match her
expectations. As a registered dietitian, she felt a major challenge was getting people to change
their smoking habits and did not feel she was being listened to as a dietitian. She seemed
surprised by smoking habits in Yerevan, primarily among men, and was uncomfortable with
cultural differences in Armenia-- “everybody is right in Armenia,” which she dislikes. She
experienced discrimination on the bus and shops but did not provide specific examples. She felt a
major reason for the distance between local and Syrian Armenians is attributable to the “Soviet
lifestyle,” which persists into the generation of young adults in their 30s. Syrian Armenians thus
experience negative treatment in relation to their dialect (Western Armenian), cultural
differences, and treatment as refugees, even though most Syrian Armenian women do not identify
as being refugees.
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3.2.5 Positive Treatment in Armenia
Overall, I think most interlocutors experienced positive treatment in Armenia, but this
positive treatment was not always immediate, and it is crucial to note that belonging is not always
joyous and positive--it is painful as well. Regardless of class or social background, most Syrian
Armenian women I interviewed expressed facing difficulties upon first arriving in Armenia, a
general downward shift in socioeconomic mobility. I observed that generally, wealthier Syrian
Armenian women were able to integrate more easily in terms of having more free time to
socialize (albeit mostly with other Syrian Armenian women, not so much local Armenians).
Syrian Armenian women in their late 20s and 30s mostly worked in Armenia and reported more
challenges with integration (with Syrian Armenians and local Armenians). Middle-aged Syrian
Armenian women (40s-50s) generally were able to transplant social networks established in
Armenian communities in Syria to Syrian Armenian communities in Yerevan, as evidenced by
Aleppo NGO’s numerous social activities. Women in their late 20s or 30s were generally
working or single mothers who did not have as extensive social networks as wealthier Syrian
Armenian women in their 40s and 50s. Of course, there are exceptions to these generalizations, as
discussed throughout this dissertation. For example, Hermine, a physician in her 50s, said she was
upset to be treated like a refugee in Armenia, and Siranoush, a woman in her 40s, commented on
the fact that “not even Arabs eat trash like they do here.” I interpret these statements as reflecting
a perceived step-down in dignity and status from life in Syria to life in Armenia. Hermine
occupied a high-status position as a physician in Aleppo; she was not a refugee in Syria. Nanor
had a comfortable life in Aleppo and did not need to work. She was active in charitable and
religious organizations. She did not eat trash in Syria, but she told me she sees people eating trash
in Armenia. Both Hermine and Nanor experienced negative treatment in Armenia, but neither are
in their 20s or 30s.
However, not all experiences were negative, as some Syrian Armenian women spoke
about the positive treatment they have received from local friends and customers. Karun stated, “I
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was treated very well by the local community. Otherwise, people are very close-minded. After
opening the [family] restaurant, 80% of customers are locals and I believe the customers.” It
seems that Karun’s appreciation of the local customer base that frequents her family’s restaurant
in Yerevan also contributes to her perception of positive treatment by members of the local
community. She also commented upon the “close-mindedness” of some locals and discrimination
against her as a Syrian Armenian but did not provide specific examples. Katherine noted that the
“ideals for children are similar with Syrian Armenians and local Armenians,” noting the cultural
similarities between local and Syrian Armenians. According to Katherine, this helps make
integration in school systems easier, but not entirely problem-free. Siranoush said that, like
Hasmig in the last section, she has an ambivalent relationship with local Armenians: “Some
people think Armenia is yergrort hayrenik [the second homeland, the first one being Syria], and I
have good relations with deghatsinere [local Armenians]. You decide who you want to be around.
Everything is okay.” The designation of Armenia as a “second homeland,” not the “first
homeland,” shows the nostalgia and attachment to Syria that many Syrian Armenians living in
Armenia have: implying that Syria is the “first homeland” and Armenia is the “second.” Knar
also mentioned the positive treatment and respect that local Armenians have for Syrian
Armenians. She said:
People are different. People respect you for being Syrian Armenian and know that their
work is good...Mezi aveli ge harken [they respect us more]. Not all deghatsiner [locals]
are goshd/gobid [rude, harsh]. I have positive views towards local friends. I have darper
[different] groups of friends (Knar, February 1, 2019).
This interview fragment shows the high esteem within which Syrian Armenian artisans are held.
Knar notes that she has received largely positive, respectful treatment from local Armenians and
has positive views towards local friends.
Local NGO employees, both of whom mentioned here are ethnic Armenian, working
with Syrian Armenians hold slightly different views about the treatment of Syrian Armenians by
local Armenians, in contrast to the perspectives of Syrian Armenian migrant women living in
Armenia. Both employees’ perspectives also reflect the goals of their respective organizations--
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supporting the integration of Syrian Armenians in Armenia. Zvart, an NGO employee, asked
rhetorically, “How are locals responding? 98% of Armenia is happy having Syrian Armenians.
2% are jealous about jobs, a small percentage.” Ovsanna, an employee at GIZ, a German NGO
with a branch in Yerevan focusing on the economic integration of refugees, added that, “Locals
are open and appreciate Syrian Armenians. We always notice foreigners. Syrian Armenians were
accepted with open arms. We don’t mind that Syrian Armenians are here, they brought a new
culture.” To Ovsanna, a local Armenian, Syrian Armenians add a new culture to Yerevan, and
that they were warmly accepted by local Armenians.
Several Syrian Armenian women noted the cultural differences between Armenians from
Syria and Armenia, yet still commented upon the positive treatment they received in Yerevan.
These cultural differences included assumptions by Syrian Armenians such as: Syrian Armenians
are generally more friendly than local Armenians, smile more, have food that is more seasoned
with Middle Eastern spices, use a different dialect (Western Armenian), and will generally offer
food to guests instead of coffee and candy like many local Armenians. Hermine said, “I lived here
for 10 years, no difficulties here. They [locals] didn’t think like us [Syrian Armenians]. Their life
is more European way of life.” She observed that although there were differences between local
Armenians and Syrian Armenians, she still did not experience any major difficulties after 10
years living in Yerevan. Amina, a Syrian Armenian woman in her 30s, stated:
Life in Yerevan, I have friends of friends, a few are nice, others are negative. It’s not easy
to come to Armenia and start a new life. You need someone to push you forward.
Meeting local Armenians makes me feel less like a stranger than meeting Syrian
Armenians. I met a few couples at a dog park. It’s not hard to make friends here. The
younger generation is curious about different people (Amina, August 4, 2019).
Like other Syrian Armenian women, Amina feels ambivalent about the relationship between local
and Syrian Armenians. As a young small business owner (to be discussed in Chapter 8), she
remarks upon the challenges of coming to Armenia and starting a new life but did not mention
who helped to push her forward. However, she was able to meet a few couples at a dog park and
said that meeting local Armenians makes her feel more welcome and “less like a stranger” than
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meeting Syrian Armenians. Lastly, like Ovsanna, Amina observed that the younger generation of
local Armenians is curious about different people, particularly foreigners. Overall, Syrian
Armenian women experienced more positive treatment than negative treatment in Armenia.
Positive treatment did not occur immediately upon the arrival of Syrian Armenian women in
Armenia--it certainly took time and most women I interviewed reported facing difficulties,
particularly at the beginning of their time in Armenia. It’s also important to note that several of
the narratives recounted in this section were from local NGO workers, expressing how happy
they were, like many local Armenians (in their view) to have Syrian Armenians come to
Armenia. The consensus seemed to be, among both local NGO workers and Syrian Armenian
women, that Syrian Armenians were culturally different from local Armenians. Sometimes, these
differences led to tension, discomfort, and at times, painful belonging, as described in earlier
sections.
3.2.6 Comparison between Syria and Armenia
I assert that contemporary repatriation campaigns targeting Syrian Armenians (such as
through the former Ministry of Diaspora, discussed in Chapter 5) are not overwhelmingly
successful, because the term “repatriate” is imbued with layers of meanings and applied to Syrian
Armenians by the Armenian state, and many Syrian Armenian women are nostalgic for life in
Syria. Moreover, the fact that the Republic of Armenia is portrayed as the ancestral homeland of
Syrian Armenian women is not the sole motivating factor behind women’s decisions to flee to
Armenia. Armenia was safer than Syria, most people in Armenia spoke the same language (just a
different dialect) and shared the same religion, and Armenia was child friendly. I asked
interlocutors to compare their lives in Syria and Armenia, such as the physical and social
differences. Several interlocutors described the multiculturalism of Aleppo and its reputation as
an international community, or a hub. Diana, my main contact at UNHCR and a local Armenian
woman, said that, “Men were confident [in Syria], women were busy and happy, children were
happy. There was an international community in Syria. In Syria, you could travel wherever you
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wanted.” Salpi, a Syrian Armenian woman in her 40s, added, “Aleppo was very busy. Now it’s a
hub in Yerevan. Before the war, I had many plans for the future. Now, I’m living every day, all
my plans stayed in Aleppo. I didn’t have any kids to worry about.” The above quotes, one by a
local NGO employee named Diana, the other by a Syrian Armenian woman named Salpi, show
the multiculturalism of Aleppo before the war. Diana observed the confidence levels of Syrian
Armenian men were higher in Syria than in Armenia, and women had their own social lives in
Syria. Salpi commented on the disruption of her social life in Syria (“I had many plans for the
future”), and now she is living day to day in Yerevan. Additionally, she does not have any kids to
worry about, and her main social life revolved around her American husband in Yerevan. She did
not appear to want kids and mentioned not having kids as a way of explaining she has less to
worry about (in terms of children) than Syrian Armenian women who do have children to worry
about. As of this writing, her husband had sadly passed away after our interview.
Some women described the physical and temperamental differences between Armenia
and Syria, particularly between Aleppo and Yerevan. Hermine noted, “Aveli negh er Haleb
[Aleppo was narrower--the streets were narrower]. Life is more hantard [quiet, tranquil],
shpatsadz [spoiled] in Aleppo. There were intellectual activities and after school. Aveli letsoun e
gyanke [it was fuller of life in Aleppo].” Hermine paints a pleasant picture of Aleppo before the
war, one in which life was calmer and slower, and the Armenian community was full of
intellectual and after-school activities. Shakeh agreed that Yerevan is quite different from Syria
temperamentally and physically:
Yerevan is very different. In Syria, there was work, it’s an old-fashioned country,
beautiful, cheap country. Everyone had their own houses in Syria. I like Armenia better. I
first came here at 18 [for school] and lived longer in Armenia than in Syria. I miss my
family; they are all in Aleppo. Syria is a cheap country. We had everything in Syria.
Armenia is clean and you can have a free life here. I was free in Syria but am more free
here. There are no Muslims [in Armenia], it’s safer for everyone, especially for kids.
Pregnant women always go first here. This is a Christian country. I studied more here, it’s
more educated and intelligent [in Armenia], but my birthplace is in Syria (Shakeh, March
25, 2019).
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In this interview fragment, Shakeh talks about how she studied in Yerevan and had experience
living in Armenia before the war. She noted how Armenia is a Christian country and feels
pregnant women are treated better in Armenia than they are in Syria. Syria is a “cheap country”,
and her family had their own house in Syria compared to having to rent apartments in Armenia.
However, Shakeh feels more free and secure in Armenia, which will be discussed in the next
section. She also seems to prefer life in Armenia and does not wish to return [to Syria] but notes
that her birthplace is in Syria. Many Syrian Armenian women interviewed reported they wished
to stay in Armenia. Some said they would like to visit Syria and miss it, and a few said they
would like to return to Syria as soon as possible (this will be discussed later in this chapter). Arpi
explained that, “Armenia is the middle between extremes in Syria and Europe. I wanted to build a
close family unit in Armenia, this is our country. Yerevan is a beautiful city.” She feels that
Armenia reminds her of both Europe and Syria, and reclaimed Armenia as her homeland and
country.
3.2.7 Safety in Armenia
One of the more compelling reasons why Armenia was chosen as a destination to flee to
from Syria was that it was safe according to several Syrian Armenian women. Safety was viewed
on different levels and in different contexts--intergenerational safety in Syria from the Turks;
perceived safety in Armenia from sexual harassment; and safety in Armenia from the Syrian war.
The first type of safety discussed by some interlocutors was the perception of safety in Syria from
the Turks over the course of five generations. Most of the ethnic Armenian population in Syria
was comprised of Armenian genocide survivors who were forcibly displaced to, survived death
marches and massacres in, were abducted, or sought refuge in post-1915 Syria. Parantsem, a
Syrian Armenian woman and employee of Aleppo NGO, remarked upon her life in Syria, “I
heard stories from my mother, she thought the Turks would come [to Syria]. Syria was safe, but
we had that fear.” Her mother was an Armenian genocide survivor, and still held the fear that the
perpetrators of the genocide would come to Syria and finish killing survivors. However,
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Parantsem’s mother and her descendants felt safe enough in Syria to live there for several
generations after the Armenian genocide.
Perceived safety from sexual harassment (second type of safety) was viewed as a positive
attribute of living in Armenia. Shaghig, a Birthright Armenia volunteer, said, “Syria is different
from Armenia. The best years of my life were spent there [Syria]. I was too young to go out in
Syria, so you can’t really compare. I can walk home late in Armenia.” Like other women,
Shaghig said she feels safer walking at night in Armenia compared to Syria. Knar noted that,
“Nature is different [in Armenia]. Streets are cleaner in Yerevan. We can sit comfortably on
transport here, but not there in Syria. Walking at night feels safer, you can’t walk out past 8pm in
Syria. In Syria, you’re always in a taxi, always wary.” The sense of security that both women
describe is not causally related to the war, in these instances--it is related to their sense of security
as women living in an environment where they feel safer from sexual harassment.
3.2.8 Painful Belonging: Sexual Violence in the Field
I did not have the same experience as my interlocutors in Armenia, as I was sexually
assaulted in the field. Although I shared an ethno-religious background with my perpetrator, I was
not protected by those categories alone. In contrast to Syrian Armenian women I interviewed who
recounted their fears of Muslim men, I experienced physical violence by a Christian, Armenian
man. After my assault, I felt betrayed by Armenia and betrayed by the Armenian diaspora’s
happy depictions of it, betrayed by my acquaintance-perpetrator, and misled by Fulbright
orientations on safety in Armenia (“nothing bad happens here”). I was heartbroken that I
experienced violence in a country I grew up admiring, a country with which I share a kinship. I
am a U.S. citizen, but my ethnic Armenian identity socially overrode my American citizenship at
that moment. I felt I was put through an emotional gauntlet, led by individuals and the Armenian
state via the police. Fortunately, I was able to reconcile my emotions and appreciate the
community I built in Armenia through fieldwork and years of visiting Armenia. I was able to
reclaim my identity and appreciate the community of female survivors I had come to know in
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Armenia. I understood my identity as a cis-heterosexual woman with patrilineal Armenian
descent differently--I was American only in the sense that I could rely on tangible security and
mental health resources, for which I am immensely grateful. But culturally, I was bound by
Armenian social norms and expectations of how women should behave. In a way, I experienced
my own painful belonging in Armenia, my own socially constructed homeland. This experience
created resentment and alienation, not only towards my field site but also a sense of betrayal by
my socially constructed homeland and ethnic background, an anger which persists to this day,
tempered by time, therapy, and a strong community of allies (nearly all women) constructed in
Armenia over the years. After my assault, I voraciously embarked upon a new fieldwork ritual of
therapy and taking traditional Western Armenian embroidery classes (Chapter 8), which is an
indigenous craft recycled during the Armenian genocide to help female survivors earn a living.
Western missionaries helped female Armenian genocide survivors produce and sell these crafts in
Europe and North America, as many male breadwinners were targeted first and killed during the
genocide. Knowing this history, my history, and my interlocutors’ history was strangely
comforting during this painful time of fieldwork and felt cathartic.
At the time of my assault, I felt I was able to channel my anger into my fieldwork and
only focus on research, but my trauma did not stop in the field. Luisa Schneider’s brave
recounting of her sexual assault during fieldwork in Sierra Leone (2016-2017) by a gatekeeper (a
key interlocutor) revealed that she, too, felt that speaking out in scholarly spaces would, “label me
forever as the woman, the unprofessional, the victim, the failure, the risk prone. I feared that
research would be restricted and that I would make myself unemployable” (Schneider 2020, 176).
I had the same fear in the immediate aftermath of my assault--that what I “did” was
unprofessional. What was done to me was violent and had nothing to do with professionalism. I
recorded details of my assault in my field notes, as painful as it was, because it was a form of
testimony and justice I never got. I threw myself even more intensely into fieldwork, tunnelvision more than ever. The day after my assault, I still needed to send the Institutional Review
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Board additional documents and focus on bureaucratic efforts rather than my own healing.
Furthermore, I was working directly with women survivors of violence (conflict, murder of a
spouse by terrorists, gender-based violence occasionally, destruction of physical homes, concerns
about daughters experiencing gender-based violence on escape routes), and felt my experience
paled in comparison (secondary trauma). Additionally, most of my interlocutors of ethnic
Armenian descent and I also shared a painful intergenerational trauma of the Armenian genocide,
in which Armenian women were repeatedly assaulted and held hostage. We carry those bodily
memories as well, however unnoticeable (Mangassarian 2016; Gasparyan and Saroyan 2019).
The fact that my assault occurred in my ancestral socially constructed homeland was a form of
betrayal in and of itself.
I did not share details about my assault with interlocutors, although I am friends with
many of them. A few interlocutors/friends could tell something was wrong, but I felt it would be
“unprofessional” to burden them with my trauma. I considered sharing or not sharing my
experience in this dissertation, and I hesitated because this dissertation is not about me, or at least,
my priority for this project is not autoethnography. As Schneider noted, writing “only from
emotional or personal standpoints runs the risk of dominating over and silencing research
collaborators’ life-worlds. We are important, but so are they and our writing should aim to do
justice to the stories they shared with us” (Schneider, 184). I follow Schneider’s perspective of
including embodied experiences and intersectional positionalities in data analysis and write-up.
Not including ethnographers’ own stories of assault in the field leads to a damaging “culture of
silence” and “upholds an unhealthy idea of detached and unaffected researchers, disconnects
material from its production and hinders researchers from learning from each other” (Schneider,
184). Unlike Schneider, who did not share an ethnicity with her perpetrator or interlocutors, I do.
My assault, interlocutors’ experiences with survival and flight, our shared collective memories of
the Armenian genocide and violence (and survival strategies such as embroidery), and state
messages about homecoming, all collided. Like my interlocutors, I, too, felt that Armenia was

89

safe for diasporan Armenian women, because that’s what we were usually told by organizations
such as Birthright Armenia. This messaging itself leads to a “culture of silence” among female
diasporan Armenian volunteers (not discussed in this dissertation, but worthy of future research)
experiencing sexual assault and harassment in Armenia, as well as domestic violence among local
Armenian couples. What my interlocutors and I had in common, aside from a shared experience
of being descendants of Armenian genocide survivors, was our expectations. I was not only
physically violated, but I also felt betrayed by the state, a country I care deeply about. Equally, in
many cases, interlocutors’ expectations of life in Armenia were not always met. I also draw
inspiration from Ruth Behar’s fieldwork among Cuban Jews, interlocutors with whom she also
shared an identity (Behar 1996), because I do not believe it is possible to be detached from
fieldwork and interlocutors. I spent months and years working to establish rapport with women
who were in vulnerable positions, and I think it is fair for me to be vulnerable as well.
As mentioned earlier, the first type of safety experienced by Syrian Armenian migrant
women was intergenerational safety in Syria from the Turks, the second type was safety from
sexual assault or harassment in Armenia, and the third type is safety from the Syrian conflict. To
many women, life simply does not exist in Aleppo anymore and it does not feel the same as it had
before. Salpi said:
There is nothing left there [Syria], it wasn’t safe. We are living in our country [Armenia]
now. It won’t be back to the same Aleppo. It’s not the same Aleppo that I left. A girl
living alone can’t survive alone in Aleppo. I came back to Armenia after going to Syria
for a few months in 2014. There’s no life there, in Syria. My sister is in Armenia. Only
my property is left behind and my parents’ graves. My life has been turned upside down.
I can go back, before I got engaged. After I got engaged, I went back to stay in Armenia
(Salpi, February 7, 2019).
Salpi said she tried to remain in Syria, even for a few months in 2014, but it was not possible
because “a girl living alone can’t survive alone in Aleppo,” and I interpret this statement to mean
in terms of security and social support, especially in Aleppo in 2014. Even though Salpi is a
woman in her 40s, she described herself as a vulnerable girl without much support left in Aleppo.
Salpi was able to go back to Syria as a single woman, before she got engaged, which she tried to
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do in 2014 for a few months. After realizing it was hard living in a conflict zone as a single
woman, she returned to Armenia where she got engaged to an American man who was working
in Armenia. She concluded that “there’s no life there, in Syria,” and the only things left in Syria
are her property and her parents’ graves. Salpi couldn’t survive as a single woman, in terms of
security and perhaps financially, in Aleppo and did not feel safe, so she came to Armenia, where
her sister had been living. Nanor added that she also thought, “Life doesn’t exist anymore in
Syria.” Zabel said she could visit Aleppo, “but I don’t want to because there’s nothing left.” I
interpret this phrase, “there’s nothing left,” to refer to physical destruction of homes and
communities, as well as social lives and connections vanishing. Some social networks of Syrian
Armenian women (mostly middle to upper class) were transplanted to Armenia during migration,
but not all networks survived the war.
Zvart, a local Armenian employee at Aleppo NGO, explained that although the war is
generally “dying down” in Syria, it is still a dangerous environment. She said, “The war in Syria
is ending, but it is still not very safe. People who went to Syria were doctors [Armenian doctors
who went back with their families because salaries are higher].” This shows the dire economic
situation in Armenia, as highly skilled individuals, such as some Syrian Armenian medical
doctors, are returning to Syria, temporarily, with their families. These highly skilled individuals,
such as medical doctors, are going to help the Armenian community in Syria and earn higher
salaries to support their families, despite the geopolitical turmoil in Syria. Lilit commented that,
“The only good thing in Armenia is safety and my parents are safe. Life is hard here [Armenia]. I
have no connections with deghatsiner [local Armenians]. By some chance, if Haleb [Aleppo]
calms down, I will return.” My conversation with Lilit revealed the painful belonging she is still
experiencing in Armenia (“I have no connections with locals”). Armenia’s only redeeming
quality, in her view, is its relative safety for her and her parents.
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3.3

Part II: “You Can’t Eat a Passport”: Moralizing Legal Status Decision-Making
in Armenia

One of my UNHCR colleagues, Karolina, had invited me to join her for a Western-style
breakfast at one of Yerevan’s many cafes, Gastropolis, on a warm September morning. Eager to

ask questions about Armenia’s legal options for refuge-seekers and indulge in pancakes, I happily
accepted. Below is a fragment of our conversation pertaining to citizenship pros and cons:
Anahid: Does it matter if a child’s father or mother is Armenian when it comes to
applying for citizenship, if that child was born in Syria?
Karolina: No, it doesn’t really matter, unless you can prove on paper ethnic Armenian
descent. But the process does take longer if you have mixed parentage.
Anahid: How long does it typically take to get a passport and what are the benefits of
citizenship?
Karolina: Well, you can’t eat a passport. Just because Syrian Armenians have a path to
citizenship doesn’t necessarily mean they want to stay in Armenia for economic reasons.
Syrian Armenians have helped contribute to Armenia’s economy and service industry.
Anahid: Okay, what about non-Armenian migrants coming to Armenia?
Karolina: Well, for example, Armenia is biased against Muslim migrants, as it is in other
countries, blaming it on national security and closed borders on two sides.
Anahid: I get what you mean. The U.S., unfortunately, is also dismal when it comes to
Islamophobia. 12
What this conversation reveals are that, despite the accelerated asylum and citizenship processes
offered to ethnic Armenians from Syria, they are still subjected to the same socioeconomic
environment as local Armenians. Holding an Armenian passport, or dual citizenship for that
matter, does not mean you are able to earn an income or put food on the table for your family. In
all three ethnographic interview excerpts listed thus far in this chapter, the Armenian economy
was a major concern. Syrian Armenians are viewed as positively contributing to the Armenian
economy, but only if they stay and acquire citizenship. “Bad” Syrian Armenians are those who
choose to not positively contribute to the economy of their constructed homeland, the Republic of
Armenia, acquire citizenship and then leave for a third country. The other legal status options and
strategies for choosing them will be discussed in the following sections.

12

This interview was conducted in September 2018, and I was referencing the Trump Administration’s
immigration policies for several Muslim-majority count, known colloquially as the “Muslim Ban”
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According to ethnographic interviews with 3 NGO and UNHCR workers and both the
Law of the Republic of Armenia on Foreigners (Adopted December 2006) and Law of the
Republic of Armenia on the Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia, there are three options
available for the legalization of residence in Armenia: 1) acquisition of citizenship of the
Republic of Armenia; 2) acquisition of refugee status; and 3) acquisition of residence status.
These options, according to a then Ministry of Diaspora employee, Saro, are flexible. This section
of Part I will focus on how citizenship is given to ethnic Armenians from Syria who have settled
in Armenia, as well as pros and cons that come with the acquisition of Armenian citizenship and
the reasons why some Syrian Armenians choose residence status over Armenian citizenship.
3.3.1 Citizenship
The (national) Law of the Republic of Armenia on Citizenship stipulates that to become a
citizen, if one is not ethnically Armenian, one must: lawfully reside in Armenia for the preceding
three years; be able to explain themself in the Armenian language; and be familiar with the
Constitution of the Republic of Armenia. The same Law adds that persons identifying as ethnic
Armenians may acquire citizenship through a simplified procedure, meaning the three conditions
listed above are not mandatory for ethnic Armenians seeking Armenian citizenship. 13 In a
departure from local Armenian patrilineal reckonings throughout history, I observed through
ethnographic interviews with some state and non-state employees that it does not matter whether
one’s father or mother is Armenian and whether that determines how citizenship is passed down,
as long as one can provide "proof" of Armenian ethnicity, as shown in the conversation with
Karolina above.
According to the Law on Citizenship mentioned earlier, documents used to certify
"proof" of Armenian origin include: a passport bearing a note about being of Armenian

13

The Law of the Republic of Armenia on the Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia, Chapter 2: The
acquisition of citizenship of the Republic of Armenia-1995.
https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/51b770884.pdf. Accessed February 14, 2021.
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nationality; a birth certificate bearing a note about being of Armenian nationality; residence
certificate of a stateless person, travel document, document certifying the residence status in the
Republic of Armenia, bearing a note about being of Armenian ethnicity; document on baptism
issued by church institutions bearing a note about the baptized person or their parent being of
Armenian ethnicity; 14 document on being of Armenian ethnicity issued by authorized bodies in a
foreign country and approved with an apostil or consular validation; other documents
substantiating the circumstance of being of Armenian origin, approved by a Republic of Armenia
diplomatic representative or a consular body in foreign countries; or the birth certificate of a
parent (or grandfather, grandmother, sister or brother) or other identification document bearing a
note about being of Armenian ethnicity. Furthermore, the Law states that you may also submit the
birth certificate (or another document certifying ethnicity) of your brother or sister from your
mother’s or father’s side if your consanguineous (blood relative) parent is ethnic Armenian.
The procedure for applying for citizenship takes about six months to a year, sometimes
more. Syrian Armenians who choose the citizenship option acquire the right to free of charge
higher education, the ability to acquire land as private property, and the right to vote, among other
benefits. Syrian Armenians who acquire RA citizenship do not lose Syrian citizenship. Syrian
Armenians are also exempt from paying fees for passports as they fled from a foreign country
where an emergency has threatened the life and health of its citizens.
As mentioned above, there are benefits (pros) to acquiring Armenian citizenship.
According to one migrant woman, Sona, there are 3 options fleeing from Syria for Syrian
Armenians: Armenia, Lebanon, or Turkey, with a Syrian passport. Many people initially fled to
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According to Annex 4 of the RA Government decree No. 1390-N (adopted on November 23, 2007) and
approved by a Republic of Armenia diplomatic representation or a consular body in foreign countries. In
Syria, these are the following church institutions: Mayr Ator Surp Echmiadzin, Damascus Tem, Metsi
Tansi Kilikio Katoghikosutyun, Halebi Tem, Jezirei Tem (Aleppo), Hay Katoghike Yegeghetsi, Berio Tem
(Aleppo), and Qamishli Tem. For this and church institutions in other countries see Decree of the
Government of Armenia No. 1390-N available at http://www.arlis.am/DocumentView.aspx?DocID-88586.
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Lebanon by car and either stayed there for a while (Shaghig) or flew from Beirut to Yerevan.
However, in Lebanon, several interlocutors reported facing difficulties related to having a Syrian
passport, so they chose to acquire Armenian passports/citizenship because “it is easier”
(Hermine), and quite simply, “Every Armenian can get Armenian citizenship.” According to one
of my main contacts at UNHCR, Diana, and an International Organization for Migration (IOM)
employee, Megheti, acquiring citizenship means full integration in Armenia. A local officer
working at the U.S. Embassy, Heghine, noted that Syrian Armenians are offered scholarship
opportunities as part of the benefits that accompany citizenship.
Saro, the Ministry of Diaspora employee, said as of September 2018, only about 2,000
Syrian Armenians had obtained Armenian citizenship. According to the UNHCR Armenia Fact
Sheet (September 2019), 15 14,718 refugees, asylum seekers, and persons in refugee-like
conditions from Syria are now in Armenia. This statistic does not include a description of
citizenship applications. Maro from Caritas said the government relaxed asylum and citizenship
procedures in 2012, and from 2012-2017, about 19,000 Armenian passports were issued to Syrian
Armenians, but approximately 5,000 Syrian Armenians fled to a third country. 16 In other words,
Syrian Armenians fled to Armenia, acquired Armenian passports, and then went to Gulf states,
Canada, the U.S., and Europe. Maro also said the Armenian president can deny citizenship
applications. Additionally, many Syrian Armenian interlocutors have told me they were able to
apply for Armenian passports while they were still in Syria, as echoed by Nerses, Shaghig,
Kayane, and Adriana, in some cases before the war. Syrian Armenians also have the option of
having dual citizenship for Syria and Armenia (according to Diana). As a matter of fact,
according to Dzovinar, a KASA Swiss Humanitarian Foundation employee (KASA for short, an
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UNHCR Armenia Fact Sheet, September 2019. https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/51b770884.pdf.
Accessed February 14, 2021.
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Grigoryan, Marianna. May 14, 2014. “Armenia: Some Syrian Refugees Want to Leave.” Eurasianet.
Refworld | Armenia: Some Syrian Refugees Want to Leave. Accessed February 14, 2021.
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NGO), the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU) organization in Syria tries to identify
Syrian Armenian families with proper documentation [to apply for Armenian citizenship] while
families are still in Syria, and then sends them to Armenia.
Another UNHCR political officer, Natasha, told me that it is up to Syrian Armenians to
decide which status they want, but that citizenship is the strongest option because it provides
several advantages. These advantages include having “full rights on the [Armenian] territory,
social protections, and retirement.” However, one of the drawbacks to citizenship, according to
Natasha, is that social protections are not highly effective, and the Armenian government is only
able to provide minimal assistance. For example, retirement for Armenian citizens enrolled in the
social system garners approximately 36,000 Armenian Drams (AMD) per month, equivalent to
roughly $75. Other advantages to acquiring Armenian citizenship include reduced tuition fees,
which cost approximately $800-1000 per year for Armenian citizens, according to a local U.S.
Embassy employee, Syuzanna. She added that effectively, all Syrian Armenians are regarded as
Armenian citizens (once they have undergone the citizenship procedure) and are therefore eligible
to pay local fees for tuition instead of international fees.
However, there are also significant international legal drawbacks to the Armenian
government’s efforts to fast-track citizenship for all ethnic Armenians who can provide "proof" of
Armenian ethnicity, not just Syrian Armenians. By providing fast-track citizenship for Syrian
Armenians, Armenia is effectively creating inchoate citizenship for Syrian Armenians, or
citizenship that, while not held right now, could be gained through reasonable efforts. 17
Aside from the potential for deportation from third countries, there are other perceived
“cons” to acquiring Armenian citizenship. One high-level NGO employee, and a Syrian
Armenian woman, Parantsem, noted that the Armenian government “did not help beyond giving
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Goodyear, Michael. May 30, 2019. “Syrian-Armenians and the Legal Snares of Armenian Citizenship.”
Armenian Weekly. Syrian-Armenians and the Legal Snares of Armenian Citizenship
(armenianweekly.com). Accessed February 14, 2021.
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[away] Armenian passports.” As mentioned earlier in this chapter, my conversation with an
UNHCR employee noted that “you can’t eat a passport,” indicating that acquiring Armenian
citizenship does not mean one is free from the dire economic situation in Armenia and does not
solve all one’s problems. Despite the benefits of Armenian citizenship, Syrian Armenians may
not have been prepared for the economic reality in Armenia after becoming a citizen.
3.3.2

Hasmig’s Story: Ցաւս Սորվեցայ, “Tsaves Sorvetsa” [“I Learned My Pain”] and the
Pain of Armenian Citizenship
I was re-interviewing a Syrian Armenian woman, Hasmig, who escaped from Syria after

her husband was killed by ISIS (referred to by interlocutors as “Daesh”). 18 I had met with her
once in 2016 during preliminary fieldwork in Yerevan, and coincidentally met with her again in
summer 2017 back in Yerevan. A friend of a friend had suggested we meet, and I recognized her
voice over the phone as we were scheduling an interview. Hasmig invited me over to her
apartment by the Mayr Hayasdan (“Mother Armenia”) statue and seemed to be in a happier mood
than we last met in 2016. Instead of wearing all black, she was dressed more colorfully, had
Syrian pillows embroidered with gold thread in her apartment, and just seemed happier. She
warmly hugged me, we kissed each other’s cheeks, and I handed her a box of Polish chocolates
and she offered me local citrus candy, which I accepted, before our follow-up interview. Below is
a fragment of our conversation pertaining to the unexpected pains of acquiring Armenian
citizenship and integration in Armenia:
Anahid: Hasmig! You look so much happier, and more colorful! It is so nice to see you
again.
Hasmig: Tsaves sorvetsa [shrugging and smiling, “I learned my pain”]. My daughter is
learning English! [Calls to daughter]. Practice English with Anahid!
Daughter: [shyly] Hello, how are you?
Anahid: I am fine, thank you. How are you?
Daughter: Good!
Anahid: Hasmig, her English is really good!
In this fragment, from her shrug to beaming at her daughter’s English language skills, Hasmig
said she “learned” her pain, meaning she adjusted to life as a widow in Armenia, a patriarchal
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Arabic acronym for the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
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environment where it can be challenging to raise children without a male partner, but experienced
painful belonging due to her status as a widow. The last time we met, in 2016, she mostly talked
about the circumstances behind her husband’s brutal murder by Daesh, challenges with traveling
as a widow with young children (since Syrian women cannot travel with minor children without a
spouse and she could not prove to Syrian authorities that her husband was dead since Daesh does
not offer death certificates after they kill someone) and struggles with adapting to life in Armenia
as a single parent in a very patriarchal environment. This visit, in 2017, she felt more comfortable
with me and showed me her Syrian and Armenian passports as well as a video of the Red
Crescent 19 in Syria trying to show me her husband’s body. Initially, I felt uncomfortable with this
gesture and wondered how I should proceed without offending her. Eventually, I decided this was
important for her to show me and braced myself for the video. I moved next to her on the couch
and looked at the video on her cell phone. I could not distinguish between the dead bodies
pictured on the screen, as I had never met her husband before. She pointed out his body to me,
matter-of-factly, as if she had seen this video countless times before.
After the video, she pulled out both her Syrian and Armenian passports. Hasmig pointed
out the “nationality” tabs on both the Syrian and Armenian passports. 20 In the Armenian passport,
the nationality tab described her as “Syrian Arab” (she told me, to her knowledge, she has no
Arab heritage), whereas the Syrian passport’s nationality tab did not list her as “Syrian Arab.”
She then shrugged, turned to me, bewildered, and asked rhetorically, “Well, what does hayrenik
[“homeland,” literally “fatherland”] mean?” Hasmig explained she does not feel she is truly in her
homeland but is relieved that her kids feel safe here. In this sense, she experienced additional
painful belonging through documentation. Even though she is ethnic Armenian, she was rendered
legible (Scott 1998) by the Armenian state as Syrian “Arab” in her Armenian passport, a
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Muslim-majority countries’ version of the Red Cross
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Given the sensitivity and intimacy of this conversation, I did not ask to take a picture of her passport.

98

contradiction that is both perplexing and painful to Hasmig. This sentiment has also been
expressed by other Syrian Armenian women I interviewed in Yerevan--gratitude for their
children’s safety:
Hasmig: I don’t quite feel like Armenia is my country, but I know my kids are safe in
Armenia. In Syria, I didn’t want my kids, especially my daughter, around Arabs and
Muslims because they would kidnap and rape her. I feel safe in Armenia. I still have a
fear of Muslims, but Arabs and Muslims in Syria, aside from Daesh, generally had a
good impression of Armenians.
Anahid: How are you adjusting to life in Armenia since we last spoke?
Hasmig: I am making more friends in Armenia, but mostly Syrian and Lebanese
Armenian friends, not local Armenian friends, because I feel closer to Syrian and
Lebanese culture than to local Armenian culture.
Anahid: Would you like to go back to Syria one day?
Hasmig: Not now. I have heard of a few families who went back [to Syria], but I am not
sure why.
Anahid: Yeah, my relatives have not left Aleppo.
Hasmig: Yes, many people returned. But many Syrian Armenians have also come to
Yerevan and it makes me feel more comfortable--restaurants, jewelry shops, etc.
I interpret Hasmig’s bittersweet initial quote, “Tsaves sorvetsa,” [“I learned my pain”] to not only
refer to an adjustment to life as a widow and single parent in Armenia, but also a sort of
resignation to never truly being able to fit into the local Armenian community, despite sharing an
ethnicity. This pain refers both to widowhood at a young age (late 30s) and rejection by the
Armenian state for not including her ethnicity in the Armenian passport compared to the Syrian
passport. Hasmig rejected the state’s discourse of Syrian Armenians “repatriating to their
homeland” but appreciated the safety of Yerevan. For her, Syria felt more like home than
Yerevan, albeit a home haunted by her husband’s brutal murder.
After the interview, she offered to introduce me to other Syrian Armenian friends of hers
and go shopping for Syrian Armenian-made jewelry and handicrafts and I ran into her again a
year later, at a Syrian Armenian business exhibition (tsutsahantes, or “exposition”), helping to
run a jewelry stand.
3.3.3 Residence Status and Sex-Selective Preferences
After discussing pros and cons of citizenship, this section discusses residence status,
especially in relation to sex-selective preferences. According to Chapter 3 of the Law on
Foreigners, the benefits of acquiring residence status in the Republic of Armenia include the right
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to: work; have basic general education; seek medical care; social protection; and be engaged in
entrepreneurship. However, according to assertions based on 2 interviews with U.S. Embassy and
UNHCR employees and 2 Syrian Armenian women, one will not be allowed to serve in the
Armenian Army with residence status (this could be a benefit depending on one’s perspective);
able to acquire land as your private property; or take part in national elections. There are three
types of residence statuses in Armenia: 1) temporary (up to one year with a possibility of
extension for up to one year); 2) permanent (issued for a period of up to 5 years with a possibility
of multiple extensions of the same time); and 3) special (issued for a term of 10 years; it can be
issued more than once). For the third type of residence status, the special residence status,
according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, this status is available to survivors of the
Armenian genocide and other individuals (of Armenian ancestry or not) who have provided
“significant services to the Armenian state and nation and/or are engaged in economic and
cultural activities in Armenia.” 21 For example, my paternal grandfather, an Armenian genocide
survivor displaced from Western Armenia as an infant in 1922, received this special residence
status because he was a genocide survivor. I only came across this document after he passed away
in 2004.
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia website on
“Special Residency Status, temporary residence permits are granted if a foreigner can provide
"proof" of an available work permit; being the spouse, parent, or child of a foreigner having
temporary or special residence status in RA; "proof" of undertaking entrepreneurial activity; or
being of Armenian origin. In addition, the website states that permanent residence status is
granted if the applicant has a spouse or close relative (parent, child, brother, sister, grandparent or
grandchild) in RA who is an RA citizen or has a special residence status in Armenia; has an
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia. “Special Residency Status.”
https://www.mfa.am/en/special-residency-status/. Accessed February 26, 2020.
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apartment in RA; and is of Armenian origin. One Syrian Armenian woman I interviewed, Amina,
told me she was an Armenian citizen because she was able to prove Armenian descent (another
parent was Syrian Arab). Her husband, a Syrian Arab, received a residence permit for Armenia,
yet their daughter is considered to be an Armenian citizen.
Syrian Armenian males under the age of 27 do not generally apply for citizenship until
they are older than 27 due to Armenia’s mandatory military conscription service. For this reason,
many Syrian Armenian males the age of 27 and younger apply for residence status. According to
the Republic of Armenia Law on Conscription, Article 3, the age of conscription in RA is 18-27
and there are 2 types of military service: 1) basic; and 2) reserve. The most common type
encountered in my fieldwork is basic, compulsory military service for 24 months for rank and
file. What is especially important for Syrian Armenian young men aged 27 and younger is that
they do not have to serve in the Armenian Army if they have served 12 months in the armed
forces in another state.
According to Article 3 of the RA Law on Conscription, 22 “Citizens of another country
who have naturalized in the Republic of Armenia shall be exempt from compulsory military
service if prior to naturalization in RA, he has served not less than 12 months in the armed forces
of another state.” Persons who can be exempt from compulsory military service include those
deemed unfit for military service due to health conditions; the citizen, whose father or mother,
brother or sister, lost their life during the defense of RA and he is the only male child of the
family; the citizen who had served the compulsory military service in the armed forces of foreign
states prior to admitting RA citizenship; or the citizen has an academic degree (“Candidate of
Science” or “Doctor of Science”) in case he is engaged in professional, scientific, or pedagogical
activity (Article 12 of the RA Law on Conscription).

22

Law of the Republic of Armenia on Conscription. September 16, 1998. untitled (translation-centre.am).
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According to my research, this was the case with 3 Syrian Armenian women with sons
aged 27 or younger. The women were fearful that their sons, most of whom had just finished
serving in Syria’s mandatory military conscription, would have to do the same in Armenia and
chose not to risk this, despite Armenian law regarding military service. One woman, Nanor,
explained she did not want her son, who is under 27, to do military service in Armenia, “because
we already escaped a war zone.”
However, this action (young Syrian Armenian men choosing residence status over
citizenship to avoid military conscription) was viewed as unpatriotic, particularly by 2 NGO
employees. Nayiri, a high-level NGO employee, observed that “refugee status [for Syrian
Armenian men] is not to support your country.” Diana, a UN employee, added that “refugee
status [for Syrian Armenian men] is shameful and late to do now, not encouraged by the
[Armenian] government.” These conversations seemed to imply a larger state emasculation of
Syrian Armenian men who did not want to do more military service in Armenia, as many had
already served in the Syrian Army. According to a U.S. Embassy political officer, Allison,
Syrian Armenian men under the age of 27 opt out of citizenship because it limits relocation
options and carries military service requirements.
3.3.4 Refugee Status (UN Definition, Pros and Cons in Armenia)
This final section of Part II will focus on the United Nations definition of a “refugee” and
its application to Syrian Armenian women in Yerevan, pros and cons of refugee status as reported
during fieldwork. According to the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, Article 1.A.2, a “refugee”
is a person who: “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
return to it.”
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“Refugee” status, as defined by the Republic of Armenia, 23 means that refugees are
protected by the non-refoulement principle, meaning they cannot be returned to the country of
origin (country of citizenship or permanent residence), in this case, Syria. Since Armenia is
considered to be a safe country, there were reports in my research of Syrian Armenians, who had
acquired Armenian passports even before fleeing Syria, being sent back to Armenia after trying to
flee to Europe, as was expressed by Hasmig earlier in this chapter. This will be discussed in the
final section of Part II. Furthermore, refugees in Armenia are entitled to the right to work; right to
basic general education; right to receive medical care; right to social protection; right to
intellectual property rights; right to be engaged in entrepreneurship, just like citizens. However,
refugees do not need to serve in the Armenian Army, cannot acquire land as their private
property, and cannot participate in national elections.
One of the drawbacks to refugee status of Syrian Armenians in Armenia has to do with
international refugee law. Under the “safe third country doctrine,” many countries will not accept
refugees if they have previously been in a country that respects the Refugee Convention, of which
Armenia is a signatory. Because Syrian Armenians went to Armenia first, international refugee
law may limit their access to refugee rights and a third country may send them back to Armenia
(Goodyear 2019). This has been expressed during my ethnographic fieldwork (deportations of
Syrian Armenians particularly from Europe to Armenia). According to 3 high-level employees,
from UNHCR, International Organization for Migration (IOM), and Caritas, respectively,
mentioned reports of Syrian Armenian families and individuals getting rejected in Europe and
deported to Armenia, as it is considered to be a safe country. Diana said, “hundreds of families
were deported from Europe.”
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Republic of Armenia Law No. HO-211-N of 2008 on Refugees and Asylum. November 27, 2015.
Refworld | Armenia: Law No. HO-211-N of 2008 on Refugees and Asylum (2015). Accessed April 16,
2020.

103

When asked about refugee status, I received a wide range of reactions, although the cons
seemed to outweigh the pros. According to two UNHCR employees, refugee status provides an
individual with “specific protection from refoulement [being sent back to the country one is
fleeing from]” and is a “protected legal category…. a person has to flee a war, conflict, and
persecution for safety. Then, you become a beneficiary.” Another NGO worker named Tsoghig,
from Migration Service of Armenia, noted that approximately 1,000 Syrian Armenians now have
refugee status (as of Spring 2019). Saro from the former Ministry of Diaspora added that in 20112012 (the beginning of the conflict), 1,000 people had applied for refugee status as well. I
observed that NGO and government workers seemed to take pride in the fact that, compared to
other, larger countries receiving Syrian refuge-seekers, such as Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon,
Armenia received more Syrian refuge-seekers per capita even though it is considerably poorer
(Maro from Caritas). Diana added that, “Armenia is the third country after Germany and Sweden
to receive the highest number of Syrian refugees per capita,” a point of pride informally and
occasionally commented upon by local state and non-state employees.
The benefits of acquiring refugee status include receiving apartment rental subsidies
(only intended for refugees, according to Tsoghig), as well as short-term financial assistance, an
“integration center” (like a dormitory) in Yerevan for approximately 1-1.5 years temporary
accommodations, and 60,000 AMD (approximately $124 USD) per month for 9 months, as well
as a civic orientation. Additionally, Lusine from Caritas noted that more Syrian Armenians are
applying for refugee status because it makes them eligible for humanitarian aid. Anecdotally, I
noticed this during preliminary fieldwork in Istanbul in 2016 when I encountered local Turks in
the streets calling out “Souri! Souri!” [“Syrian! Syrian!”] trying to compel passersby to give
them money by pretending to be Syrian. In other words, pretending to be Syrian was temporarily
viewed as advantageous.
However, Syrian Armenians do not comfortably self-identify as “refugees” nor are they
considered to be “refugees” by local Armenians. One NGO worker, Arusyag from Mission
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Armenia, told me in 2017 that Syrian Armenians were, “mainly not considered refugees because
they speak Western Armenian and feel safe here [Armenia] for their children, but don’t have a
sustainable income.” This leads to the next section, the cons of refugee status and stigma
associated with it.
Overwhelmingly, many Syrian Armenians dissociated themselves from refugee status for
several reasons--many do not view themselves as “refugees” in their socially constructed
ancestral homeland (which is also echoed by state discourses), the term “refugee” also implied a
step-down in class. Katherine, a Syrian Armenian woman also conducting research with Syrian
Armenian women, explained that she “didn’t want refugee status or experience unless you need
it--they [her family] was not in a dire situation.” In other words, she is “not really a refugee” due
to her class (wealth and education). I had the impression that the word “refugee” for Katherine
also implied a loss of dignity and status. In short, according to my research, the word “refugee”
was not overwhelmingly embraced by interlocutors--it was also viewed as a “dirty” word
(Masquelier 2006) in some contexts. Most Syrian Armenian women I spoke with distanced
themselves from other Syrian refugees who were reduced to poverty and fleeing to Europe across
the sea. Nanor described the situation best, in Western Armenian, “As mer hayrenike. Souria mer
dznntavayrne” [“This (Armenia) is our homeland/fatherland, Syria is our birthplace”]. Tsoghig
and Nayiri, prominent NGO workers from Migration Service of Armenia and Red Cross
Armenia, observed that Syrian Armenians do not want refugee status because they are in their
hayrenik, their homeland, literally their “fatherland.” A young Syrian Armenian woman in her
mid to late 20s, Karun, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, noted that, “lots of people
don’t want refugee status.” An older Syrian Armenian woman in her 60s, Kayane, added that
refugee status is viewed as negative by Syrian Armenians. Kayane herself said that she is not a
refugee because she has Armenian citizenship. This same sentiment-- “I’m not a refugee because
I’m a citizen” --was expressed during a broadcasting workshop held by Radio Activité, French
journalists in Yerevan who wanted to work with Syrian Armenian women. Sona, a Syrian
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Armenian woman in her mid to late 30s, described negative experiences with local Armenians.
She said, “Local Armenians make us feel like refugees--not in a good way. Like, ‘you’re Syrian,
you’re different.’” She does not want to feel like a refugee, as was also expressed by Hermine.
Saro from the former Ministry of Diaspora declared that it is, “important to be Armenian
in the motherland, be a citizen, not a refugee.” Maro from Caritas echoed the same statement,
adding that former President Serj Sargsyan (who was also deeply unpopular and overthrown
during the 2018 Velvet Revolution) initially said that “No Armenian should be a refugee in
Armenia.” 24 I also observed an element of shame, particularly aimed at Syrian Armenian men for
seeking refugee status, from a few NGO and government workers. Syrian Armenian men who
seek refugee status are viewed as unpatriotic and shameful, as discussed earlier. An employee
from Red Cross Armenia put it simply, “refugee status [is] not to support your country.” Men
who seek refugee status do not have to serve in the Armenian military. Another employee, from
UNHCR, noted that Syrian Armenians do not need to seek refugee status, like “wearing a hat [a
legal status], but grandma tells you to wear another [legal status].” According to this same
employee, Syrian Armenian men who are seeking refugee status are almost too late now and it
would be embarrassing to apply for refugee status now (February 2019, date of interview) and
they are not encouraged by the government to do so, but she added that refugee status is
perceived as “shameful” particularly for Syrian Armenian men.
Other cons of refugee status include fears about Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, as
mentioned by Maro from Caritas. According to Maro, “Syrian Armenians are registered with
UNHCR and when they go back to Syria, are concerned that ‘Assad will know this and punish
me.” My requests for interviews at the Syrian Embassy in Yerevan to substantiate these
statements went unanswered, unfortunately. Maro added that there are no benefits to refugee

24
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status, and that many Syrian Armenians have asked, “Why should I get refugee status without any
benefits?” Furthermore, the Migration Service has little shelter space, limited financial resources,
and only a small number of Syrian Armenians have sought asylum. Additionally, Maro noted that
most Syrian Armenians registered in the beginning of the conflict, “when they thought they could
get benefits.” Diana from UNHCR added that, “refugee status isn’t a bonus; it’s temporary.” Her
quote shows the lack of perceived benefits to refugee status, particularly it’s temporary nature.
In Armenia, there appeared to be a clear preference towards providing for ethnic
Armenian migrants, although during many interviews in 2018-2019 in Yerevan, there is currently
a shift towards focusing on all migrants in Armenia, regardless of ethnic or religious background
(Nayiri from Red Cross Armenia). I interviewed a few non-Armenian migrants in Armenia in
2016, one of whom was from Africa and suffered from Islamophobia and racism in Armenia. She
also spoke fluent Armenian and was trying her best to stay in Armenia legally and positively
contribute to the economy. It is undoubtedly harder for non-ethnic Armenians to acquire refugee
status in Armenia. Amalia in 2016 told me she had an asylum-seeking card, not official refugee
status. This made it harder to work in the village in which she had resettled, must renew visas
annually, and experienced Islamophobia and racism even though she married a Christian man
from her ethnic group, and is tied in socially to Armenian kinship life by having a local Armenian
man serve as a godfather to her son. This is an extremely important role (godfather) in the
Armenian Orthodox faith.

3.4

Conclusion

I argue that “repatriation” is a phrase that is wielded much too freely by Armenian state

and non-state organizations striving to curb state anxiety about emigration. My critique is both of
Western and regional state interventions as well as impositions of categories and labels (such as
“compatriots,” “repatriates”) on Syrian Armenian migrant women to come “home” to a
constructed homeland they had never really been a part of for centuries. Earlier coordinated
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repatriation efforts, such as the Nerkaght movement in 1940s Soviet Armenia, were not entirely
successful. I assert that contemporary repatriation efforts focusing on socioeconomic integration
of Syrian Armenian migrant women in Armenia still miss the mark, despite the well-intentioned
state and non-state employees involved in these initiatives. The result of global and local
pressures interlocutors are feelings of discomfort, anxiety, and uncertainty about paths forward in
this newly constructed “homeland,” the Republic of Armenia. “Painful belonging” is the term I
coined to describe this tension, anxiety, and discomfort among Syrian Armenian women in
Armenia. This term, “painful belonging,” refers to the expectations of seamless integration that
ethnic Armenian women from Syria have upon migrating to Armenia. Ironically, a constructed
“return” to one’s socially constructed ancestral “homeland” is not simply pleasant and
comforting. It can be incredibly painful and disorienting as well, as my data suggests. I found that
painful belonging was also experienced by Syrian Armenians in Syria, carved by feelings of
precarity living as members of an ethno-religious minority group in Syria over five generations
since the Armenian genocide. At the same time, my data also showed that many Syrian Armenian
women were nostalgic for the social lives and physical homes, the intimate Armenian community
they had in Syria, but many had resigned themselves to the sad realization that they cannot go
back to Syria “because there’s no one and nothing left.”
Despite the best intentions of local government and non-government staff I interviewed
and Syrian Armenian migrant women’s responses to these efforts, such as training programs,
workshops, and funding, it is clear there is tension. This tension is due to a tangled web of
collective and individual memories, constructions of homeland, and life histories experienced by
people belonging to the same ethnic group but raised in entirely different geographical locations
over the course of five generations since the initial displacement. Vocational training programs
and Syrian Armenian women’s activities in Yerevan will be examined more closely in Chapter 6,
as well as a robust discussion of the tensions and positive developments arising from this
interface. I am not saying that government and non-government staff are not empathetic to the
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needs of Syrian Armenian migrant women. Rather, I am saying that they are simply overworked,
underfunded, and desperately need to be listened to as well (Chapter 6). These sentiments are not
coming from a place of malice or hostility. It is just as important to keep in mind the
sociohistorical background of NGO staff members as it is of Syrian Armenian migrant women.
The Armenian state’s propaganda and current repatriation attempts to “beckon” ethnic
Armenians from anywhere in the world, in this case from Syria to the Republic of Armenia begs
the question: is this truly what Syrian Armenian migrant women want? How do they choose to
self-identify? I argue that Syrian Armenian migrant women make conscious choices between
selecting citizenship, residence status, or refugee status, and these decisions are moralized by
some members of the host community (i.e., “good” Syrian Armenians are those who stay in
Armenia and apply for citizenship). The “repatriation” of Syrian Armenians to Armenia is too
convenient a label to place on Syrian Armenian migrant women and does not describe their lived
experiences or self-identity. This runs contrary to state and historical international efforts to put
ethnic Armenians on certain territories. Are Syrian Armenian migrant women positively
responding to the Armenian state’s vigorous attempts to “beckon” them “home” to their
constructed ancestral homeland, or do they wish to return to Syria, their actual country of birth
(thus really repatriating to Syria rather than Armenia)? Or are they caught between the two,
emotionally and sometimes physically? Furthermore, where does Syria stand in this neorepatriation propaganda campaign? 25 The next chapter, Chapter 4 Where is Home? will address
my view of Syria as being an “ironic home” for Syrian Armenian women (being a place of both
historic killing fields of Armenians and a place of refuge for genocide survivors and their
descendants), and social and physical aspects of home in both Syria and Armenia for Syrian
Armenian women.
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This final rhetorical question is not extensively answered in this dissertation, but may be a potential
future research project.
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CHAPTER 4.

WHERE IS HOME?

“If the war had not started, I would have never left Aleppo.”
-Nanor, February 2019, Yerevan, Armenia
After a breakfast in honor of St. Sarkis’ Day (the Armenian equivalent of Valentine’s
Day) in February 2019, hosted by Aleppo NGO, I briefly met with Nanor, a Syrian Armenian
woman in her 40s, about her decision to come to Armenia. Nanor replied, “If the war had not
started, I would have never left Aleppo,” indicating the decision to come to Armenia was forced
on her, moreover the decision to leave Aleppo was forced on her. Aleppo is still viewed as home
for many of the other Syrian Armenian women I spoke with as well.
The crux of this chapter is to see how receptive Syrian Armenian migrant women are to
the Armenian state’s beckons to come home to their socially constructed homeland, the Republic
of Armenia, as well as their nostalgia for Syria. Aside from the socially constructed homeland,
another (experiential) home is just as important to Syrian Armenian migrant women--the Syrian
Arab Republic. I argue that over the course of five generations, a secondary home was
constructed by descendants of Armenian genocide survivors who had settled in and were
displaced to Syria. While Armenia offered relative safety to Syrian Armenian migrant women and
expedited the pathway to citizenship, in contrast to other non-Armenian Syrian refuge-seekers in
Europe, many Syrian Armenian migrant women nostalgically remembered Syria and expressed
the painful belonging of settling in Armenia.

4.1

Introduction

This chapter speaks to an anthropological literature of the home. “Home” is both socially

constructed (Jackson 1995), with feelings of security and sense of possibility (Hage 1997) and
refers to physical shelters (Janning 2017; Dimova 2010, 2013; Fehevary 2013; Miller 2005,
2008). My project focuses on the social and physical aspects of home and contributes the idea of
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an “ironic home” constructed in post-genocide communities (simultaneously sites of refuge and
mass violence).
Home was made in Syria within the Armenian community over the course of five
generations since the Armenian genocide, but it was also ironic in the sense that Syria was
simultaneously a place of immense intergenerational trauma including areas where Armenians
were killed during the genocide (for example, the deserts by Deir-el-Zor), and a place of refuge
for genocide survivors and their descendants. This irony cannot be ignored or understated. Syrian
Armenian women were one of the main conservationists of Armenian culture through their active
involvement in charity organizations, social life, and the church. Syrian Armenian women then
brought these long-overlooked leadership skills to Armenia, transplanting them to organizations
such as Aleppo NGO and providing each other with a safe space in Yerevan. Many Syrian
Armenian women made a home in Yerevan socially, but this also backfired in the sense that it can
sometimes impede local NGO integration efforts and not every Syrian Armenian migrant woman
living in Yerevan felt comfortable or accepted by this niche social environment. Most of the
interlocutors who were active in Aleppo NGO and may have known each other in Aleppo proper
were middle to upper class. In short, members of this community in Yerevan may have known
each other in Aleppo, but not every Syrian Armenian woman was part of the initial social circles
in Aleppo.
The loss of a physical home and ownership of it in Syria was also mourned repeatedly by
both Armenian and non-Armenian women from Syria interviewed in Armenia, Istanbul, and
Berlin. Loss of physical homes and ownership of them also indicated a perceived loss of dignity
and status, particularly when interlocutors had no choice but to rent apartments, as was mostly the
case in Yerevan, or some non-Armenian interlocutors ended up in urban warehouses doubling as
makeshift refugee camps (Berlin). The frustration of interlocutors with renting apartments in
Yerevan, especially in central Yerevan (Kentron) also collided with the perspectives of local
Armenian NGO workers, some of whom felt that Syrian Armenian migrant women were
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ungrateful compared to other Syrian refuge-seekers who were settled in refugee camps in Europe
(a common sentiment observed during fieldwork). While a social home could feasibly be
repurposed and transplanted to Armenia, a physical home and feelings of a loss in status and
dignity were more challenging to replace. Additionally, physical homes were sometimes
destroyed in Syria, and in some cases, physical homes were also part of livelihoods, for example,
a clinic attached to a house. “Home may invoke a concept of nationalism (homecoming,
repatriation), but I want to demonstrate in this dissertation that home can be more flexible than in
a nationalist sense.
4.1.1 Organization of the Chapter
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part examines what I term the “ironic
home” constructed in Syria over the course of five generations since the Armenian genocide. The
second part discusses the social construction of home through various home-making practices,
particularly through the creation of social networks and activism in Armenian charity and social
life in Syria, which was then transplanted to Armenia. Lastly, the third part of this chapter
analyzes the importance of physical homes (renting an apartment in Armenia versus Syrian
Armenian migrant women owning their own homes in Syria).

4.2

Part I: Five generations in [Post-Genocide, Pre-2011] Syria, Ironic Home

Home is ironic in the case of ethnic Armenian genocide survivors and their descendants

in Syria in the sense that it served as a place simultaneously for refuge and sites of literal death
camps and marches for genocide victims. It is ironic because home is supposed to be safe and
protect you from danger (Hage 1997). Before Syria became home over the course of five
generations for genocide survivors and their descendants, it was a major site of trauma and pain
that I feel is understated in some accounts of minorities living in Syria. Like most Syrian
Armenian migrant women I interviewed, our ancestors (mine and the women I interviewed)
settled in Syria to escape forced death marches, or survived concentration camps close to one of
the largest massacre sites in the Syrian desert, in Deir-el-Zor (pictured below). As mentioned in
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Chapter 1, my paternal grandfather always told me stories about his leaving what is now
southeastern Turkey and arriving in Syria tucked into a donkey’s saddlebag as a 1-year-old. I
unfortunately never believed these stories until after his death in 2004, as I read more about my
genealogy through oral history accounts gathered from older Armenian relatives. I did not think
my grandfather was lying--it was more of an incomprehensible story for a U.S.-born-and-raised
grandchild to grasp. It was only when I was older that I realized the solemness and tragedy of his
stories, corroborated with understanding the impacts of French colonialism on my ancestral
hometown, Aintab (now Gaziantep). My family eventually settled in Aleppo, as did the ancestors
of many of my interlocutors. As a young adult, and a Birthright Armenia volunteer at age 20, I
recall sitting in a bus in Armenia traveling to another excursion site in the lush northeastern
province of Armenia called Lori and chatting with a Syrian Armenian volunteer from Aleppo
(this interaction took place in 2009, before the Syrian conflict). This volunteer later became my
friend, gatekeeper, and relative of a migrant woman interviewed for this project. He told me
during this trip that it was not uncommon to find bones of Armenian genocide victims sticking
out of the sand during his visits to areas around Deir-el-Zor. Grinning at the look of utter horror
on my face, he pulled out his phone and showed me pictures of bones laid out on a blue cloth on
his lap. I am not sure why this moment horrified me so much, as we were both ethnic Armenians
descended from genocide survivors. Perhaps it was the callous way the bones were displayed, not
just in the picture, but the imagery of the bones sticking out of the sands of the Syrian desert
almost a century after the genocide. I, too, had ancestors sent to these same deserts. Fortunately,
many had escaped and settled in Aleppo, then Beirut, and finally the U.S. Unfortunately, I know
of a few direct ancestors (I believe my great-great-grandmother) who died of typhus en route to
the deserts, were executed in Syria for refusing to marry a local Turkish bey or died in Deir-elZor with their small children. Seeing those bones affected me in very unexpected ways and
caused my visceral reaction to my new Syrian Armenian friend.
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Figure 4.1 Map of Massacre Sites and Deportation Routes to Syria During the Armenian
Genocide. Derived from map 224 in Hewsen, Robert H., Salvatico, Christopher C.
“Armenia: a historical atlas,” Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 224, 2001.
I later learned that there was a genocide memorial, an Armenian church with relics of genocide
survivors (more bones) constructed in Deir-el-Zor. This same memorial (pictured below) was
unfortunately destroyed by ISIS in 2014. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, also a member of an
ethnic minority group in Syria, promised to rebuild the memorial site. 26 I later learned that my
visceral reaction to my Syrian Armenian friend’s pictures of him nonchalantly holding our
ancestors’ bones was quite symbolic in Syria. According to Elyse Semerdjian, “Bone rituals and
displays are enacted in spaces of memory that lie outside of official state memorials, making
unmarked sites of atrocity more legible” (Semerdjian 2018, 57). Frequently, diasporan and Syrian
Armenians would make pilgrimages to sites of historical massacres, sometimes taking away
pieces of ancestral bones with them, sometimes re-burying them by Armenian churches in their
countries of origin. Semerdjian noted that bone relics are traditionally common in the Armenian
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“Assad to rebuild Armenian Genocide Memorial Church in Deir Ezzor,” Al-Masdar News, January 10,
2019. Assad to rebuild Armenian Genocide Memorial Church in Deir Ezzor (almasdarnews.com).
Accessed March 5, 2021.
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church, some of which I had seen before, such as relics of saints displayed in the Holy See of
Etchmiadzin in Armenia. In addition, local Arabs also helped Armenian pilgrims locate these
mass grave sites, but, as Semerdjian states, “While the bone collectors are sometimes Arabs, the
bone keepers are almost always Armenian” (Semerdjian, 59). Semerdjian also observed that the
only formal memorial for Armenian genocide survivors in Syria was created by the Armenian
Apostolic Church of Syria under the jurisdiction of the Armenian Catholicosate in Antelias,
Lebanon, not by the governments of Syria or Armenia. Essentially, my visceral reaction to my
friend’s picture from Syria explains my upbringing in the United States, far from the bone
memory of Syria. Semerdjian used the term “bone memory” to describe the “informal ritual
displays and interactions of Armenians with bone that work to produce communal memory in the
mostly unmarked necrogeography [geography of death] of Dayr al-Zur [Deir-el-Zor, Syria]”
(Semerdjian, 67). What I perceived as insensitive was respectful and symbolic. This prompted me
to think about the responses of interlocutors to memories of the Armenian genocide passed down
through their own families. Intergenerational traumatic memories have also been addressed in
anthropological literature on genocide, which is still a burgeoning field. While this dissertation
does not explicitly focus in-depth on intergenerational trauma, I observed recounting by
interlocutors of oral history passed down through family accounts of the genocide, a practice I
also observed in my household among Armenian relatives. I did not interview Armenian genocide
survivors--I interviewed descendants of Armenian genocide survivors, like myself. Growing up
as a descendant of a genocide survivor means that you are exposed to oral history and are
secondary recipients of collective memory. You may not have survived a genocide yourself, but
someone near and dear to you may have, and this is still meaningful. In some cases, trauma is
also passed down. Referred to as “chronotope memory,” intergenerational traumatic memories
are “deep memories,” or memories that, “recalls the self as it was in a period in the past and
reveals a ‘doubling of self’” (Langer 1991; Hinton and Hinton 2015). Carol Kidron’s fieldwork
among descendants of Holocaust survivors found that intergenerational trauma also includes
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“wounded-body memory,” which is the permanent inscription of a trauma event on the surface of
the body, or permanent memorials of the genocide time, such as tattoos (from Auschwitz, or in
the Armenian context, facial tattoos of Armenian women and girls kidnapped by some Kurdish
and Arab families during the Armenian genocide, Jinks 2018), gunshot sounds, or frostbitten toes
(Kidron 2015). Devon Hinton and Alexander Hinton noted that chronotopes or “deep memories”
are “flashback-like remembering not of just an event but of an entire time and a certain sense of
self--the sense of self as it was experienced when in a particular event, location, and time”
(Hinton and Hinton 2015). Children of trauma survivors also experience a “doubling of self” -this witnessing of a parent [reliving a traumatic event] may be a kind of trauma” (Hinton and
Hinton 2015, 10). This would refer to my father’s lived experience, or interlocutors’ parents or
grandparents who also survived the Armenian genocide, but grandchildren of genocide survivors,
as trauma descendants, also experience a legacy of PTSD-related psychosocial scars (Danieli
1998; Rousseau and Drapeau 1998; Bar-On 1992). As a descendant of an Armenian genocide
survivor, I interpret my visceral reaction to my friend’s photographed display of our ancestors’
bones as a chronotope. Although I have not personally experienced mass violence or genocide, I
am a granddaughter of an Armenian genocide survivor who has experienced forced deportations
and death marches when he was young. My grandfather’s stories, which I found incredulous as
his high school-aged audience, about death marches as an infant strapped into a donkey’s
saddlebags touched me in a deep and surreal way. Seeing that photograph was startling and
slightly outraging initially, because some part of me felt they were discarded, and that I was
discarded, too. Traumatic memories of genocidal violence also bring with them “unwanted recall”
of the events, as was discussed by Parantsem, a Syrian Armenian woman in Yerevan and a
founding member of Aleppo NGO. Parantsem described her mother’s unwanted recall and
persistent fear of the Turks coming to finish her off, until she realized she was “safe [from the
Turks]” in Syria. Writing this dissertation also raised instances of “unwanted recall,” also
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separated by space and time, particularly researching sexual violence during the Armenian
genocide.
Authors writing in the anthropology of genocide have explored descendants’ resistant
passage from oppressive silence to liberation through voice (Kidron 2015; Hinton 2002). One
generation of trauma descendants may differ from another--one may be oppressively silent, the
other may be outspoken. Growing up, genocide stories and participating in genocide memorial
protest-marches every April 24th were pervasive in the Armenian American households I was
familiar with, at least in southeastern Michigan. At age 12 or so, for example, I recall asking my
mother what “rape” was on the way to church in the Detroit area because I had just read an
Armenian genocide survivor’s memoir. Oral history accounts of genocide and kinship charts,
recorded before my grandfather’s death by my aunt, were a frequent presence in my household,
particularly before my grandfather’s death in 2004. My grandfather lived with my family before
he passed away, and I remember that period fondly, full of him teaching my family how to make
elaborate lamb and yogurt soups in the winter, called tahnabour, and sitting at the dinner table,
making sure his grandchildren ate every morsel of food on our plates. I was a picky eater, and I
hated this practice, although his lesson was that he did not want food to be wasted, since he had
grown up in a post-genocide community. Kidron observed a similar sensorial memory occurring
with food, after interviewing an Israeli woman, Yonit, who observed her mother absent-mindedly
eating potato peels. The daughter asked her mother why she was eating potato peels, and the
mother replied, “this is what there is to eat.” I did not need to eat everything on my plate--it could
have been set aside for later consumption. But because I helped myself to a larger portion than I
could eat, my grandfather felt that I needed to accept my fate and eat what I put on my plate. I
later learned his practice and reaction was a symptom of poverty and starvation growing up in a
post-genocide community, Aleppo.
My positionality as an Armenian American researcher with roots squarely in Syria did
enable me to establish rapport more quickly with many interlocutors, particularly connecting over
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our shared experience as descendants of genocide survivors who settled, willingly or not, in
Syria. I was often asked where I was from. I would reply that I was born and raised in the United
States. When this answer was still unsatisfactory, I realized I was being asked where my pregenocide Armenian roots are from--what town in Western Armenia was my family from? I
replied that I was Aintabsi [a descendant of someone born in the Western Armenian town of
Aintab, now present-day Gaziantep, Turkey]. My reply helped interlocutors figure me out (and
“placed” according to Kingsolver 2011), and it helped me feel more figured out as well. With this
one word, “Aintab,” I was suddenly plugged into a recognizable web, beyond slight language
barriers and cultural differences. I was able to position myself as not only a U.S.-based
researcher, but as someone genuinely curious about their roots in pre-genocide Western Armenia
(present day southeastern and eastern Turkey) as well.

Figure 4.2 Armenian Genocide Memorial in Der el-Zor, Syria, aftter ISIS bombed it in
September 2014. Photo taken by journalist Ahmad Hamdush. First photos of Armenian Genocide
Memorial Church in Der Zor after the liberation of the city (horizonweekly.ca).
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The majority of the Syrian Armenian migrant women interlocutors told me their ancestors arrived
in Syria from Sassoun, Marash, Urfa, and Aintab, towns in Western Armenia (present day
southeastern and eastern Turkey). On at least three occasions, after finding out that we (myself as
the researcher and an interlocutor) had roots in the same Western Armenian town, we both smiled
giddily, and continued with the interview. For example, while visiting H.O.M., an Armenian
organization that focuses on maintaining traditional Western Armenian customs such as
embroidery, the director of the branch office enthusiastically pulled out a book of Aintabsi
embroidery to show me. Inside the book were images of Aintab’s famous lace samples that had
survived the genocide and deportations. One young Syrian Armenian woman in Yerevan,
Shaghig, upon hearing that I was also Aintabsi, laughed and told me that Aintabsis had a
reputation for being “intelligent, but manipulative,” which I had also heard from my father
growing up (that Aintabsis are “smart, but sneaky”). Another woman, named Nuritsa, told me her
grandparents were deported from Aintab to Deir-el-Zor, “the killing fields” (her words), and
settled in Aleppo. Syria was indeed socially and physically constructed as home by Syrian
Armenians over the course of five generations (not to mention ethnic Armenians who had already
been living in Syria prior to the genocide), but it was importantly also the site of immense pain
and bloodshed well before the Syrian conflict. Part II will examine how a social home was
constructed in Syria over the course of five generations (within Armenian communities) and
demonstrate ethnographically how this social home was transplanted to Armenia.

4.3

Part II: Social Home

Social constructions of home, enacted through practices that I refer to as “home-making,”

include building a community of Syrian Armenian migrant women in Yerevan and feelings of
security in the host country. As Marisa Della Gatta notes, “while Armenians in Syria cultivated a
‘diverse way to be Syrian,’ they are cultivating a Syrian way to be Armenian in Armenia,
adapting to two different systems” (Della Gatta 2017, 18). Social constructions of home also
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emphasize feelings of security and possibility (Hage 1997) and social relationships (Jackson
1995). Ghassan Hage’s study of Lebanese immigrants in Australia observed that there are four
parameters involved in the conceptualization of homemaking, namely 1) security, 2) familiarity,
3) community, and 4) a sense of possibility (Hage 1997, 15). To Hage, “a sense of possibility”
challenges the passive notion of home as mere social and physical shelter and attaches to it the
opportunities for change, improvement, and the unexpected, leaving room for dreaming and
imagining (Hage, 15). Syrian Armenians in Armenia were able to make a home in a place they
felt was secure (as was expressed time and again by interlocutors), familiar (common ethnicity,
language, and religion), community (as will be discussed below), and sense of possibility, which
will be explored in Chapter 8 with Syrian Armenian women-owned businesses in Armenia.
My interlocutors asserted that home was constructed socially in both Syria and Armenia,
and the destruction of a physical home was the secondary trauma, after initial displacement of
Armenian genocide survivors five generations earlier (Part III). Other anthropologists made
assertions about home, such as Michael Jackson, a New Zealand poet and anthropologist who
worked among the Warlpiri of the Tanami Desert in Central Australia. Jackson focused on the
existential meaning of being “at home in the world.” He posited that “home” is a metaphor for the
intimate relationship between the part of the world a person calls “self” and the part of the world
called “other” (Jackson 1995, 3). The concept of being “at home” refers to the relationship
between people all over the world trying to find a balance between acting and being acted upon,
closure and openness (Jackson, 3). To the Warlpiri, an Aboriginal culture both “at home” and “in
exile,” Jackson notes, “being at home in the world has less to do with living in a particular place
or abode than it does with participating in activities or relationships that promote a graceful
balance between self and other” (Jackson, 125). Furthermore, Jackson defined “home” as the
feeling when, “you can come into your own” and where “person and place coalesce.” In the same
way that descendants of Armenian genocide survivors in Syria learned how to adapt to, even
thrive, in life in Syria, descendants of Armenian genocide survivors in present day Armenia
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adapted to life in Soviet Armenia. These respective backgrounds come to a head concerning the
Syrian Armenian migrant community in Armenia and their relationships with local NGO
workers, government officials, and other members of the host population. The connection
between social belonging and a physical location (such as diasporan Armenians being drawn to
the physical Republic of Armenia through state repatriation campaigns) itself is complicated in an
environment where home was made and re-made several times within a century.
Syrian Armenian women were active participants, indeed creators, of the Armenian
community in Syria and transplanted these social activities, relationships, and geographical
proximity to each other to Armenia. However, it should be noted that most of the women
occupying leadership positions in the community were middle to upper class, and had access to
greater social mobility, either personally or via marriage. Middle to upper class women were also
able to leave Syria earlier, in 2012 as opposed to 2016 or later, as they generally had the financial
resources to do so. Similar leadership positions as the positions in Aleppo were also transplanted
and reincarnated in such Armenia-based NGOs serving Syrian Armenians, such as Aleppo NGO.
Women’s groups (dignants hantznakhoump) provided a safe space for Syrian Armenian migrant
women in Yerevan to get together, air grievances, and work toward solving solutions on their
own terms, as they had done in Syria over the course of five generations. However, it is
premature to say that home was easily transplanted from Syria to Armenia through these
networks, as many interlocutors said they would go back to Syria if they could and had a physical
home they could return to. Homemaking, in short, is a work in progress, and not every Syrian
Armenian woman in Syria feels at home in Armenia in relation to the physical and social space,
as well as to the Syrian Armenian women’s hub, largely encapsulated by Aleppo NGO.
4.3.1 Social Home in Syria, Pre-Syrian Conflict
Both a social and a physical home were constructed in Syria by Armenian genocide
survivors and their descendants over the course of five generations. The Armenian community in
Syria, before the 2011 conflict and after, maintained the Western Armenian dialect, communal
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institutions, such as schools, cultural clubs, welfare and recreational organizations, and churches,
and maintained links with the Armenian diaspora worldwide and with the Republic of Armenia
(Migliorino 2012, 2-3). The initial influx of Armenian refugees into Syria caused the community
to swell to as many as 100,000 people (Migliorino, 3). Syrian cities with significant populations
of Armenians include Aleppo, Damascus, Qamishli, Latakia, Al Hasakah, and the village Kessab,
to name a few.
The Armenian community in Syria was small, but well established and extremely active.
Eleven (11) compatriotic unions have also survived, originally founded by refugees from various
regions of the Ottoman Empire, such as Marash, Aintab, Kilis, Urfa, and Zeytun, founded in the
1920s. Geographically, Armenians in Aleppo tended to cluster together. According to Hermine, a
middle-aged Syrian Armenian pediatrician from Aleppo, “In Aleppo, Armenians lived close
together. There were a few taghamaser [neighborhoods]--Suleymaniye, Nor Qyugh [New
Village], Aziziye--more Christians were here [in this area]. It was a shrchanag [round, tightly knit
area]. Haleb shad medz eh [Aleppo is very big] --Armenians lived in a small area.” Kayane, a
woman in her late 60s, added, “it was like living in an Armenian ghetto in Syria. Until today,
Christians are in the center of Aleppo. People in general preferred Christian tenants.” Parantsem,
an employee and founding member of Aleppo NGO, said Syrian Armenians in Armenia were,
“all volunteers in Syria--they continued the tradition in Armenia. Everyone knew everyone [in
Aleppo]. The Armenian community in Aleppo was only 4 kilometers [in diameter, referring to the
clustering of Armenian neighborhoods].” A local NGO employee from KASA, Dzovinar,
observed that, “Syrian Armenians used to live in close communities in Muslim countries. They
don’t want to lose that connection.” The above statements show the intimacy and physical
proximity Armenians had with each other in Aleppo. Most of the stories shared here focus on
Aleppo, as many interlocutors are Halebsis [people from Aleppo]. Siranoush, a middle-aged
Syrian Armenian woman, told me proudly, “Hayere zarkatsoutsin Halebe” [“Armenians
developed Aleppo”]. Nayiri, a local Armenian employee at Armenian Red Cross, said:
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Many Syrian Armenian women were involved in social clubs, had girlfriends and social
activities [in Syria], were not skilled in job skills--they were doing stuff at home or
charity work. Women were active in Syrian Armenian life. The treatment of Armenian
women was not bad in Syria [not as much domestic violence compared to Armenia].
They chose to live [stay] at home. They were also very active in Syria, like with AGBU,
charity work, and church life.
This interview fragment also shows how some local NGO workers in Armenia, like Nayiri,
viewed the livelihoods of middle to upper class Syrian Armenian women in Syria, as will be
discussed in the following chapters. It is important to note that not every Syrian Armenian woman
experienced bad treatment (defined as domestic violence, financial status, relationship with
spouse). When questioned about what life was like in Syria before the war, most interlocutors
told me they were active in “Scouts” (a patriotic Armenian volunteering organization) through
AGBU, and other charitable associations, particularly middle to upper class, middle-aged women,
many of whom did not need to work in Syria before the war. Aleppo’s extremely active
Armenian community brought this volunteering culture with them when many settled in Armenia.
Nerses, a young Syrian Armenian man in his late 20s/early 30s, said, “I was a boy scout in Syria.
Each church had its own boy scouts. We even had badges like U.S. boy scouts.” Shaghig said she
had a “fairly normal life in Aleppo. I went to Armenian club, didn’t play any sports, but
participated in Homenetmen.” Homenetmen is a pan-Armenian sports association, where teams
from different parts of the Armenian diaspora and Armenia compete against each other. Zabel, a
Syrian Armenian woman in her late 20s/early 30s, said her husband was in Homenetmen, but
“now he doesn’t have enough time to go to Homenetmen. They don’t help you.” She added that
before the war, the agoumpnere [social clubs] were cultural centers in the Armenian community,
“it was like Pokr Hayasdan [Little Armenia].” Salpi, a Syrian Armenian woman in her 40s, said
she also, “wasn’t involved with any organizations, but was in Scouts. I participated in AGBU
[Armenian General Benevolent Union] and the Tashnags [Armenian political party] and went to
Vilat/St. Mary Church.” Knar lamented the last time she was in Aleppo, in November 2011,
saying, “it was not normal. I missed school [teaching], clubs, Scouts, tashnagtsagan
parekordzagan [Armenian Tashnag political party charitable organization].” Nazani added that
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she was active in agoump [Armenian club], participated in camps and theater groups. Karun said
she was, “an active member in AGBU, scouts for 15 years. I was raised in scouts, from 16-17
years old, then I went to cafes [to socialize]. I was active in volunteering with the Armenian
community in Aleppo, camping, military (small, non-political NGO).” Shakeh, a woman in her
mid-30s, also said she did Homenetmen and scouts in Aleppo. Arpi, a woman in her late 20s/early
30s, described how she was a student and violin teacher before the war, “I was one of the top 3
students with best grades. I was active in Armenian club [agoump], scouts, social life, we had
nice lives. I was a member of Hamazkayin literary group. We did poetry readings, and I was very
active in the Armenian community.” She later commented that she is not as active in Armenian
organizations in Yerevan because she does not feel she needs to keep her identity alive,
explaining, “in Middle Eastern communities, Armenian identity was muted. Now in Armenia, it’s
everywhere.”
Hermine, the pediatrician from Aleppo, described the different compatriotic associations
in Aleppo to me. These associations were established immediately after the genocide, in the early
1920s, and were meant to provide support to survivors from respective towns and villages in
Western Armenia (present day southeastern and eastern Turkey). Hermine explained:
There was Tashnagtsagan, Ramgavar, and Hnchak [all 3 are Armenian political parties].
Urfatsi Miyutyun [Union of people from Urfa], Marashetsi, Aintabsi [compatriotic
associations for descendants of survivors from the cities of Urfa, Marash, and Aintab]
cultural events, theater groups, dance groups. Every cultural union had its own cultural
events. Until the [Syrian] war, these events happened. As far as the church--if people
need a scholarship or financial aid, they ask these organizations. They are all different
organizations, but they all worked together to be helpful [it doesn’t matter if one’s
ancestors are from Marash or Aintab; they would still help]. The unions in Aleppo helped
each other, and [the branches of] H.O.M. help each other.
Hermine, as a pediatrician, was certainly a leader within the Armenian community in Aleppo, and
an incredibly helpful source of Aleppo’s Armenian social history since the genocide. In Yerevan,
she is equally active in Aleppo NGO (“they focus on charity and community”), as well as H.O.M.
masnajyugh [branch or regional office].
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Another organization many Syrian Armenian women were active in in Syria prior to
migrating is the Armenian Relief Society (ARS), referred to by the Armenian transliterated
acronym, “H.O.M.” As with AGBU, this Armenian organization operates worldwide. For
example, I grew up attending Western Armenian language classes in the Detroit area through the
ARS Zavarian (Eastern Region of the U.S.) chapter. Aside from weekend classes, participants
held holiday recitals of Armenian poetry and songs. H.O.M. encouraged the training and
maintenance of traditional Armenian embroidery skills (to be explored in Chapter 8). H.O.M.
stands for Hay Oknutyan Miyutyun, which directly translates to “Armenian Aid Union.” Nanor, a
woman in her 40s, said she participated in, “Homenetmen and dignants H.O.M. [the women’s
group of H.O.M.] after I got married,” indicating her involvement was partially due to her change
in marital status.
4.3.2 Nostalgia for Syria
Throughout fieldwork, I observed powerful nostalgia for Syria (cuisine, social life,
physical home) still experienced by many Syrian Armenian women in Armenia. Some women
mentioned missing Syrian food but said they could now find Syrian ingredients and dishes in
Yerevan. Shushan said, “I didn’t cry at all about leaving [Syria]. I just miss work...I miss good
memories, food. I missed home at the beginning, but everyone left [nothing more to miss].” She
misses her workplace and the cuisine in Syria, but there’s nothing more to miss about Syria, in
her view, as other women have noted, because nobody is left to miss. Katherine stated she does
not miss anything about Syria because, “Syrians brought products to Armenia, I can make Syrian
stuff at home (pakhlava), and Derian Kebab [a restaurant in Yerevan] is Syrian.” While my sister
was visiting me in Armenia (January 2019), Katherine and Sona, respectively, invited us over for
traditional Syrian food during Armenian holidays, such as Armenian Christmas. Katherine
offered Syrian liqueur upon entering her apartment and a selection of desserts, including khadayif
(a shredded wheat dish). At the end of my year of dissertation fieldwork in Yerevan, Katherine
sent me back to the U.S. with a large jar of varti muraba [rose jam] using rose petals from Syria.
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Other women commented on the strength, resilience, and beauty of the Syrian people. For
example, Talin told me:
Menk Haleb chenk tzker, aveli lav eh vijage [We don’t leave/forget Aleppo, the situation
is better now] ...No matter how awful life is, Syrians always have smiles and are
ashkhadaser [hardworkers].We had freedom in Haleb [Aleppo]. [People were]
hamperadar [patient], sirogh [loving], oknutyun hasnogh [helpful]. We didn’t leave
because of the war, but because of the fighting against each other, just bombings, very
unfair (Talin, March 11, 2019).
The phrasing in italics is in the Western Armenian dialect. Talin commented on the temperament
of Syrians in Syria, noting how they were patient and helped each other, even though everyone
was suffering in some way. People in Syria, to Talin, were always smiling, despite the dangerous
circumstances, and were hardworking, characteristics which helped many Syrian Armenians
succeed in business and hospitality in Armenia (Chapter 8).
Like Shushan, Siranoush said she misses her work in Syria, but for a special reason. She
said, “Serount ge medztsnes [you raise the next generation, as a kindergarten teacher]. I miss my
work in Syria” and began to cry during the interview. I paused and offered a hug, which she
accepted. She not only missed her work as a kindergarten teacher in Armenia--Siranoush also
mourned the loss of a generation of Syrian Armenian children (she worked in an Armenian
school) through violence and displacement. She viewed it as her responsibility to nurture and help
raise the next generation of Armenian children living in Syria.
Some women would have stayed in Syria despite the war or said the war did not change
their opinions about life in Syria. Salpi said, “I miss everything I owe to Aleppo. The bad days
didn’t change anything,” crediting Aleppo with her happy life and childhood. Nanor added, “If
the war had not started, I would never have wanted to leave Syria,” echoing Sona’s point earlier
about not having a choice in leaving Syria and feeling forced to come to Armenia. Hermine also
said she did not feel she had a choice in leaving Syria and going to Armenia, “I didn’t feel, I felt
the surroundings [in Syria] were different. I didn’t decide to leave Aleppo. I want to go back to
Syria, but I also like it in Armenia.” Hermine sensed the surroundings around her were different
but did not feel she had a choice in staying. She also feels ambivalent about staying in Armenia
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and wants to visit Syria someday. The sentiments expressed by many interlocutors, regarding the
desire to return to Syria but the sad realization that there’s nothing really left or home-like in
Syria, resonates with Stef Jansen’s work in post-war Croatian villages. He found that most of the
people he worked with were not only displaced but were also actually distimed [original
emphasis] (Jansen and Lofving 2009, 55). He argues that “rather than reducing ‘home’
retrospectively to a remembered site of belonging, we can and should analyze it prospectively as
a socially constituted object of longing” (Jansen and Lofving 2009, 57). From his ethnographic
fieldwork, he found that few Croatians returned when the opportunity arose, even for those who
had no fears for their safety, because they realized there was a time lag that separated them from
their memories of home. For a place to become home again, it was necessary to have a “sense of
hope” (Jansen and Lofving 2009, 59). In the case of Syrian Armenians, many interlocutors were
nostalgic for Syria, for the lives that they had, and Syria for them is indeed a socially constituted
object of longing. In the case of this dissertation, there are two socially constructed sites of
belonging--Syria, where many interlocutors fled from, and Armenia, which the Armenian state is
actively promoting as the rightful home for Armenians dispersed all over the world. Effectively,
there is a clash of memories and social constructions of home occurring among the Syrian
Armenian community in Armenia. Unfortunately for the Armenian state, there is an even greater
time lag for descendants of Armenian genocide survivors displaced to Syria and the home (in this
case, Western Armenia) left behind generations ago. At the same time, there is also distiming
happening with Syrian Armenians who return to Syria, either permanently or temporarily. Most
expressed to me that it’s simply not the same Syria they had left.
Nostalgia for a strong social life back in Syria was echoed by several interlocutors.
Nazani remarked, “Nature is more beautiful in Yerevan, but Syria was my home. I missed my life
there and community.” In other words, Nazani is trying to establish herself in Yerevan and
attempting to not dwell on the past in Syria. She specifically asked me to not ask about the war,
which I respected. She mostly missed her social life and community in Syria. Ghassan Hage, a
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Lebanese Australian anthropologist, noted that expressions of nostalgia by people on the move
attempting to create new homes carry within them, “a desire to promote the feeling of being there
here” (Hage 1997, 108). Marisa Della Gatta argued that, “despite the ethnic link to the ancestral
homeland, Syrian Armenians experience an enforced, conflict-generated diaspora of diaspora that
represents a continuation of the complex diaspora of Armenians over space and time” (Della
Gatta 2017, 2). I agree with Della Gatta that there is a “persistence of Syrian identity and
attachment to Syria, which led Syrian Armenians to go beyond ethnicity in the strict sense” and
that “different attachments can be simultaneous and coexisting, not always conflicting” (Della
Gatta, 18). She argued that instead of repatriation, which I argue is championed by the Armenian
state, the migration of Syrian Armenians to Armenia is more “enforced and sometimes unwanted”
(Della Gatta, 12). I build on her assertions but add that these attachments certainly are conflicting.
I agree that the move to Syria was certainly not voluntary in many cases, but also was not entirely
enforced, which is why I employ the term “impelled migration” to describe the different reasons
many interlocutors came to Armenia. Largely, this move was a practical decision, based on
citizenship possibilities in relation to the lived experiences of Syrian counterparts seeking refuge
in Europe. As expressed by Katherine, a Syrian Armenian migrant woman living in Yerevan, “I
don’t want to be a poor refugee.” However, citizenship does not necessarily mean conflict-free
integration, even in one’s socially constructed ancestral homeland.
I observed a sense of resignation and realization among interlocutors that life in Syria
will not be the same as it was before the war, which was touched upon in earlier sections. Syrian
Armenians who are nostalgic for normalcy in Syria mourned the loss of the long-established
Armenian community in Syria, the Syria that was. They also mourned the future, the Syria that
could have been, as seen in Siranoush’s grieving of the next generation of Syrian Armenian
kindergarteners she is now unable to help raise. Kayane, a woman in her 60s, said, “I miss the
symmetry, life in Syria. The most important was my husband, and he’s not there anymore. No
one will go back.” Her husband had passed away right before the war began, so, like Salpi, she
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mourned the fact that she had nobody left in Syria and missed the comfortable life she led with
her husband. Azniv also showed resignation, defeat, and acceptance, saying “I know there is no
going back to Aleppo,” which contributed to her decision to stay in Yerevan.
Finally, an interview with a Syrian Armenian man and NGO employee in Yerevan,
Kevork, found that he was also nostalgic for Syria, but for slightly different reasons. Kevork
stated, “We miss authoritarianism, prison in Syria,” he said in a sarcastic tone, “there was also
democracy and freedom in Syria. Before the conflict, we used to live with freedom and
democracy, respect for minorities in Syria. There was no poverty, everyone had shelter and food,
great opportunities. Many Armenians were able to be wealthy.” It seems that Kevork was
nostalgic for the system that was in place in Syria before he left for Armenia, the good and the
bad as well as financial security and social status, or the opportunity to be wealthy. He said there
was respect for minorities in Syria and a place for the Armenian community, in which he was
quite active. Like several other interlocutors, he said there was no poverty, food shortages, or lack
of adequate housing before the war. Despite their status as minorities, many Armenians were
upwardly mobile. Kevork did not necessarily miss authoritarianism or prisons in Syria, as he said
this in a slightly sarcastic tone. But he did seem to have reverence for the system that was in place
that he perceived as enabling some members of his own ethnic minority group to achieve higher
socioeconomic status, or the opportunity to do so.

4.3.3

Social Home in Armenia, Transplanted from Syria

Volunteering culture in Syria within the Armenian community was transplanted to the
Syrian Armenian community in Yerevan largely by Armenian middle to upper class women. I
interpret the term “social home” to refer to the active Armenian social community in Syrian
cities, particularly Aleppo, that was transplanted to Yerevan by Syrian Armenian migrant women.
This social community, composed of members of the ethnic Armenian minority group in Syria,
was largely organized by middle to upper class women. In addition, the Syrian Armenian
community bears resemblances with the Lebanese Armenian community, studied by
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anthropologist Joanne Nucho, due to members of both communities claiming descent from
Armenian genocide survivors and the fact that Syria and Lebanon were historically part of the
French Mandate. Joanne Nucho argues that the term “sectarian community” is not a naturalized
social category represented by various institutions. Instead, “it is a networked system with
differential access to those claiming ‘Armenianness’ through various means not narrowly limited
to religious-ethnic identity” (Nucho 2016, 28). She also stated that the network of medical and
social service organization events held at places such as Aleppo NGO, “is lived and experienced
as both a social and symbolic realm and a way in which resources and services are transmitted
and obtained” (Elyachar 2011; Nucho 2016, 86). I build on Nucho’s research and add that Syrian
Armenian middle to upper class women who were viewed as leaders among the Armenian
community in Syria serve similar roles within Syrian Armenian organizations in Armenia. In
Yerevan, many Syrian Armenian women attend social events such as social-psychological
meetings every Friday at Aleppo NGO (via Zoom during the COVID-19 pandemic) to air
concerns with other women in similar circumstances, as well as benefit from professional
knowledge from occasional guest lecturers on topics such as health and marketing strategies. Like
Nucho’s fieldwork with Tashnag Party women’s organization meetings in Bourj Hammoud (an
Armenian-majority neighborhood in Beirut), I observed that most of the female Syrian Armenian
attendees at Aleppo NGO social events, particularly social-psychological meetings, were middle
to upper class and generally did not work outside the home or did not have young children to care
for (Nucho 2016, 89). This explains the absence of women under the age of 35-40 at Aleppo
NGO meetings as well as lower to lower middle-class women who needed to work outside the
home and support their families. Younger Syrian Armenian women (under the age of 35-40) who
were employed, married, and had young children, such as Sona, expressed that they were unable
to attend social events at local NGOs and interact with other Syrian Armenians when the events
took place in the afternoon. Parantsem, a founding member of Aleppo NGO, one of the most
prominent Syrian Armenian NGOs in Yerevan, observed that most members of Aleppo NGO are:
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benevolent ladies who worked in charities, and this was passed down post-genocide when
the Armenian community was stuck in a rut. We grew from that, and the other ladies feel
the same. Charities are not necessarily humanitarian. It includes big dinners, shopping,
religion. Kids are done with it, because the ladies [in Syria] were very extreme with
preserving their identity. It was also the “golden generation,” ages 30-50, where everyone
had to get married...Over time [in Armenia], women got more confident. Their family
was relying on them, but everything was perfect before [in Syria].
Volunteering culture in Syria was also intergenerational, beginning with life immediately after
the genocide, and was more than having a social life--it was also focused on preserving Syrian
Armenian identity in Syria. The “golden generation” Parantsem mentions was also distinct in
terms of class, age, and marital status--middle aged, married, and middle to upper class. Given the
use of snowball sampling during data collection, primarily among Aleppo NGO, many
interlocutors associated with Aleppo NGO generally fit into these categories. Parantsem was also
a leader in the Syrian Armenian community of Aleppo before fleeing to Armenia and helping to
open Aleppo NGO. Some members of Aleppo NGO and other Syrian Armenian women who
were not Aleppo NGO members knew of her prior to coming to Armenia. For example, Joanne
Nucho noted that Armenian women who claimed leadership roles among Bourj Hammoud
neighborhoods and social service organizations, “rested even more so on their ability to appear as
an ‘upstanding’ woman in the community and abide by normative ideas of gendered propriety”
(Nucho 2016, 90) and was a position reserved for the most permanent fixtures in the
neighborhood. I am not certain exactly which neighborhoods in Aleppo each respective member
from Aleppo NGO hailed from, but my research aligns with Nucho’s observation that, “gender
propriety and class positioning allow women to connect social infrastructures, to network into
other networks glossed as ‘Armenian middle class’” (Nucho, 77). In other words, class
positioning and social status, which enabled access to social networks, security, and resources in
Syria, were also transplanted to Armenia to ease social home-making practices in Yerevan, such
as social events hosted by Aleppo NGO and workshops held by UNHCR. However, not every
Syrian Armenian woman I interviewed fit into this mold of class positioning and social status in
Syria and Armenia.

131

Regarding women as leaders in the Syrian Armenian community in Yerevan, a new
friend and Aleppo NGO employee, Zvart, told me about a new project she was starting for
refugee (her term) women at Aleppo NGO in early October 2018, called “Refugee Women as
Change Initiators.” She explained that she initiated the project because, “Women have the power
to do stuff, but they don’t have any skills. Their background is in volunteering, charity, religious
activities, education in Syria. They are trying to do something in Armenia, but they don’t know
how.” I asked her about the application and selection process. She replied, “Not all applications
are approved. Only the women who have the ability and leadership qualities,” indicating
applicants are assessed by staff members for their leadership roles within the Syrian Armenian
community in Yerevan.
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Figure 4.3 Aleppo NGO Workshop schedule. Photo by author, “Refugee Women as
Change Initiators” Workshop Schedule, Aleppo NGO, Yerevan, October 2018
Following is an excerpt from my field notes about my first day sitting in on this project (more
details about NGO training for Syrian Armenian migrant women will be provided in Chapter 6):
I was also asked to participate and introduce myself, as well as network with Katherine
[pseudonym] and other attendees. It was exhilarating being around Siriahay [Syrian
Armenian] women who really wanted to contribute to the community. Most women said
they didn’t work in Armenia but wanted to help other Siriahay women. Today’s meeting
was about consensus building and was led by staff from the Eurasia Foundation...Topics
discussed included addressing the major problems Siriahay women noticed about life in
Yerevan, and our activity was mapping a tree to address the roots of problems, or
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consensus building. A group of 12 women was selected based on their connections to the
SA [shorthand for “Syrian Armenian] community, and it looks like a continuous set of
meetings.
The above excerpt indicates the intentionality behind participant selection for this project. Twelve
(12) Syrian Armenian women living in Yerevan who were deemed as social community leaders
[in Yerevan, within the Syrian Armenian community] were invited to participate. Most, not all, of
these women, according to my observations, were not small business owners. It appeared most
were married, middle aged, and middle to upper class, and oversaw charity events in Yerevan.
This social prestige also seemed to follow some of these families to Yerevan. It also highlights
the volunteering culture transplanted from Syria through the selected women’s stated desires to
help support other members of the Syrian Armenian community in Yerevan.
Aleppo NGO provides vocational training (training that helps individuals with skills
necessary for employment, such as social media marketing for small businesses) for Syrian
Armenian migrant women in Yerevan. It is also a hub for much of the Syrian Armenian
population in Yerevan, particularly women, referred to simply and affectionately in English by
members as “NGO.” For example, Knar, a Syrian Armenian woman in her late 30s/early 40s,
said that she meets with her Syrian friends from the “NGO,” “once a month, from the job
[embroidery] group [will be discussed in Chapter 8].” Hermine, a pediatrician from Aleppo and
another active, leading member of Aleppo NGO women’s group and embroidery group (like
Knar, except Knar was not a pediatrician in Syria), noted that she volunteers as a dzerakordz
[handicraft] specialist at Aleppo NGO and H.O.M. (another Syrian Armenian organization in
Yerevan) and has been volunteering since 2015. Another woman in her 40s, Nanor, added,
“There is a strong social network here [Aleppo NGO]. If not for the women’s organization, we
would be alone.” Both quotes show the necessity and intimacy of Aleppo NGO and its space for
Syrian Armenian women in Yerevan. It’s physical location [to be explored in Part III Physical
Home] on Northern Avenue in central Yerevan, an upscale shopping and dining area known for
its expensive housing area (occupied typically by wealthy locals, expats, and repatriates), is also
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intentional. Several wealthy Syrian Armenian families do own buildings or apartments next to or
close to the NGO location. Northern Avenue is also where many Syrian Armenian charity fairs
are held.
While in Yerevan during dissertation fieldwork (August 2018-August 2019), I attended
vocational trainings, made frequent visits to Aleppo Cuisine Center (established by Aleppo
NGO), participated in two traditional embroidery classes (Chapter 8), and attended social events,
such as the Armenian equivalent of Valentine’s Day brunch and several holiday parties, excerpts
of which will be discussed below. Attending Aleppo NGO events throughout fieldwork opened
the gates for data collection, but it also took tremendous time to position myself in relation to the
community and establish rapport. I was able to accomplish this through attending all events at
Aleppo NGO over the course of two short summer trips (2 weeks in summer 2016 and 1 month in
2017) and a full year (August 2018-August 2019) in Yerevan. In short, I scheduled Aleppo NGO
events into my weekly fieldwork agenda. Members slowly began to recognize me, offer me a seat
at social-psychological meetings held every Friday afternoon in the “NGO” basement, and
frequent invitations to partake in Syrian snacks. Aleppo NGO events, which were attended by
90% women (Friday meetings were 100% female attendees save for 2 male staff members who
did not usually actively participate), were immensely powerful. According to Allison, a U.S.
Embassy political officer:
[Syrian Armenian] women need to have a place to come together. [They] need people to
share their stories with, psychological meetings. Each Friday, Aleppo NGO gets together
with women for psychological meetings, inviting speakers. This gives a platform for
women to tell their stories, like how you [Anahid] are empowering them. People are
becoming more open--give women a platform and need to be hearing them.
The above quote highlights the importance of Aleppo NGO as a predominantly women-friendly,
safe hub for Syrian Armenian migrant women. While guest speakers (both from within and
outside the Syrian Armenian community) are invited to attend meetings, the active interlocutors
still seemed to be a select group of well-known middle to upper class Syrian Armenian women in
Yerevan. Some of the more active members also held professional positions in Syria. I
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interviewed at least two Syrian Armenian women active in Aleppo NGO who were medical
doctors in Syria and were trying to practice in Armenia (Hermine and Santoukhd). According to
Diana, one of my main contacts at UNHCR, “[Syrian Armenian social events in Yerevan] rescued
society life [from Syria and brought to Armenia]. It’s the community life--type of activities based
on skills and going out. Many Syrian Armenian women used to volunteer and do charity work in
Syria,” echoing earlier sentiments by migrant women about volunteering culture in Syria.
As an Armenian American with relatives living in Aleppo, I felt I was tied in more
quickly once members learned the names of my family in Syria, gleefully commenting that one of
my second cousins was their teacher or someone they knew from AGBU in Aleppo. Aleppo NGO
members were not only focused on professional trainings, or even social-psychological meetings-it was also incredibly social. According to my field notes, within the space of 12 months, I
attended a Wine and Cheese Charity event (December 7, 2018); a closing ceremony of the
Refugee Women as Change Initiators Project (December 19, 2018); another holiday party
(January 12, 2019); Armenian equivalent of Valentine’s Day brunch-- St. Sarkis (February 13,
2019); and Hampartzoum holiday (May 30, 2019) through Aleppo NGO.
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Figure 4.4 Aleppo NGO Breakfast Invitation. Photo by author. Receipt for St. Sarkis
(Valentine’s Day) breakfast at Aleppo NGO 27
Following are field notes for the image provided above, for the brunch in honor of St. Sarkis’
Day:
The Syrian charity brunch consisted of foul [bean soup with spices and lemon], some
sweets, and lots of tea and coffee. We also had shabiyat [baklava with cream], St. Sarkis
halva [like taffy]. I made new friends with Hermine (roots from Urfa, a town in Western
Armenia, now southeastern and eastern Turkey), who agreed to an interview, Zarouhi
(from Lebanon, originally Syria via Aintab), Azaduhi and her mother-in-law, Diana
[UNHCR colleague], and Katie [fellow American researcher]. Hermine and Zarouhi
knew each other as classmates and 45 years later, Hermine found Zarouhi (who has been
here, in Yerevan, for 1 month) on Facebook. We had Sourp [St.] Sarkis halva, played a
raffle and bingo to no avail [none of us won], and I networked and practiced my
arevmdahayeren [Western Armenian dialect]. I also played bingo for 1000 drams
[approximately USD $2] and I almost won! There were also [Armenian] nationalist
27

The English translation of the invitation is “Aleppo Compatriotic Charitable Organization Women’s
Group invites you with pleasure to the brunch held in honor of St. Sarkis’ Day. Wednesday, February 13,
2019 at 10:30am. Inside Aleppo NGO’s office, address: 11 Northern Avenue, -1 floor [basement level].”
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poetry recitals and toasts kind of in honor of husbands and sons named Sarkis. I danced
with Zvart and Katie and played games like MadLib for Armenian songs.
At this charity brunch, I connected with other attendees I had met before and met their friends,
two of whom had not seen each other in 45 years. We also discussed our origins and degrees of
separation from Western Armenia (now southeastern and eastern Turkey), i.e., Western
Armenia→ Syria or the United States. I felt my brunch companions were trying to place me, as
much as I was trying to place them (Kingsolver 2011). For example, I met another “Anahid” (not
common in Lexington, KY, where my coursework took place) and another brunch companion
was also descended from genocide survivors from Aintab, as I am. Admittedly, this was
intentional on my end. I wanted to position myself as not only Armenian American, but as
someone with mutual origins as some of my interlocutors. The results from this positioning were
positive and every time mutual origins were discovered, or an interlocutor recognized one of my
relatives’ surnames in Syria, both of us would instantly smile.
The food offered during the brunch featured dishes well known to Syrian Armenians, but
not as familiar to local Armenians, such as foul and halva. We played many games and danced to
traditional and popular Armenian music. Attendees were mostly Syrian Armenian migrant
women, and I saw only a few men there, despite the holiday being held in honor of men named
“Sarkis.” This experience was interesting to me on a personal as well as a professional level. I
was also raised within the Armenian Apostolic religion but was not familiar with certain
Armenian customs and holidays, such as St. Sarkis’ Day and Hampartzoum.
I can see how Aleppo NGO is a compelling hub for Syrian Armenian migrant women in
Yerevan, however not every Syrian Armenian woman in Yerevan was a member of this
organization. In addition, several non-Aleppo NGO workers (local Armenians) felt that Aleppo
NGO, while extremely supportive of the Syrian Armenian community in Yerevan, was too
insular and cliquey. Nerses, a young Syrian Armenian man in his late 20s/early 30s, told me he is,
“not involved in Syrian events in Yerevan because it will hold me back because I would want to
go back [to Syria]” however he has “many Syrian friends here [Yerevan].” Adriana, a Syrian
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Armenian woman in her early 30s, also said she “didn’t join any Syrian Armenian organizations”
in Yerevan. Nazani, a Syrian Armenian woman in her late 20s/early 30s said she is a member of
Aleppo NGO and is invited every 3 months to give a seminar on nutrition at the Friday socialpsychological meetings. She noted that she does not like Syrian organizations, because she,
“doesn’t want to separate between Armenians [particularly locals] and Syrian Armenians.”
Nazani does not want to be “labeled” as Siriahay [Syrian Armenian], like Karun’s conversation
discussed at the beginning of Chapter 3. A young Syrian Armenian woman in her late 20s/early
30s, Arpi, said she, “has no involvement with Syrian organizations. In Aleppo, yes, but here
[Yerevan], no. I always wanted to keep my Armenian identity alive because I was in a foreign
country [Syria, which was also her country of birth], every day, in Syria. I don’t have to in
Armenia because I am busier with work and family.” Her statement indicates that she does not
feel any pressure or need to actively be involved in any Syrian Armenian organizations in
Armenia because she is less worried about maintaining her Armenian identity in Armenia than
she was in Aleppo. Other Syrian Armenian women, both in their mid-30s, expressed hesitation
about getting involved in the Syrian Armenian community and felt it was cliquey, because
generally the same people (organizers and beneficiaries, sometimes these categories were
interchangeable) would attend the same events and befriend other interlocutors, some of whom
they may have already known from Syria. Amina said, “Syrian Armenians [in Armenia,
associated with Aleppo NGO] have a negative atmosphere. They are not very open to others.”
Hasmig added in summer 2016 in Yerevan, “Syrian Armenians are only worried about their own
problems first. You can’t ask them for any extra help. I do have Siriahay friends here, but the first
thing they talk about is their lives.” The above statements show feelings of exclusion not only
from the local Armenian community, but also from other Syrian Armenian women in Yerevan,
most of whom are active in Aleppo NGO. I do not believe Aleppo NGO members had any
malicious intentions of excluding other Syrian Armenians based on participant observation.
However, this data demonstrates the issues with insularity, class tensions (local Armenians and
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Syrian Armenians, and within the Syrian Armenian community) and keeping only within certain
Syrian Armenian circles. I attended numerous Aleppo NGO events, workshops, and classes, and
noticed the same members attending every time. Syrian Armenian women who did report feeling
excluded were generally in their early to mid-30s, with small or no children, and had full-time
jobs, so they were unable to contribute more time to NGO activities and integrate more fully into
forms of social belonging.
Zvart, an Aleppo NGO employee, told me a little bit more about Aleppo NGO’s purpose
and issues that some members have with integrating into the host community. Following is an
excerpt from our conversation:
Anahid: What is the mission of Aleppo NGO?
Zvart: Aleppo NGO helps to ensure the welfare of Syrian Armenians in Armenia by
providing durable solutions for housing and employment, such as trainings, financial
assistance, hygienic packages (food, clothes), “Adopt a Family” project.
Anahid: What are some of the challenges that Aleppo NGO faces?
Zvart: Finding donors! There are single parents with 4 children who need financial aid.
Some people only get $100-150/month for one year.
Anahid: I see. What are some of the challenges faced by Aleppo NGO beneficiaries?
Zvart: Integration. Generally, people over 50 are not integrated in Armenia. They don’t
have local friends, only their Syrian Armenian circle, thinking “only Syrian people can
understand us.” Young people are more integrated. Their [people over 50] children are
already integrated. They speak Eastern Armenian [dialect spoken in Armenia] and
Western Armenian [dialect spoken in Syria], but it is still very difficult [for them to learn
both].
The above excerpt shows the age disparities concerning integration. Zvart observed that younger
Syrian Armenians can more easily integrate into host Armenian society because they have an
easier time adjusting to the Eastern Armenian dialect. Moreover, younger Syrian Armenians tend
to branch out more from the Syrian Armenian circle referenced by Zvart. Nayiri, a local
Armenian employee at the Armenian Red Cross, also commented upon integration problems
faced by Syrian Armenian women. Nayiri said, “There are problems with integration motivation.
Syrian Armenian women all get together with other Syrian Armenian women, but not locals.” I
add to Nayiri’s statement that there is also tension within the Syrian Armenian community in
Yerevan as well, largely based on class. The next section, “Physical Home,” will discuss the
trauma experienced in physical homes as a result of the Syrian conflict, women’s longing for
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what they describe as “normalcy” (i.e., owning their own homes in Syria vs. renting in Armenia),
selling property in Syria to supplement incomes in Armenia, and attempts to stay in Syria and
endure the war for as long as possible.

4.4

Part III: Physical Home

In addition to the social home created within the Armenian community of Syria over the

course of five generations since the Armenian genocide and resurrected in Armenia after
migration, the destruction and ownership of physical homes was another common theme revealed
through my research. Owning a physical home in Syria implied status, normalcy, and comfort,
dating back from the earliest Armenian genocide survivors who had settled in Syria.
Anthropological literature about “home” addresses both physical and social constructions of the
concept. Some scholars focus on the material aspect of home (Dimova 2010, 2013; Fehevary
2013; Janning 2017; Kertzer and Barbagli 2001; Miller 2005, 2008), whereas others focus on
broader social conceptualizations of home, as linked to belonging (Hage 1997; King 2010;
Jackson 1995), and post-conflict perceptions of home (Wollentz 2017; Jansen 2002, 2008, 2009).
“Home” refers to, “a space that has socially defined meaning attached to it...a house is the
physical dwelling, but a home is what it all means to the people who are there” (Janning 2017, 3).
I use Janning’s definition of “home” as a space with socially defined meaning to it, in the sense
that Syrian Armenian women in Armenia mourned the loss of their physical houses in Syria and
the emotional attachments to them. These homes represented the legacy of Armenian genocide
survivors who had sought refuge in and were expelled to Syria and, in some cases, passed down
their homes to their descendants whom I had interviewed. A loss of a physical home also
represents the loss of a social life, a “normal” life according to some interlocutors, where in many
cases, only one parent needed to work to support the family and the Armenian community was
clustered together, geographically and socially.
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The destruction of physical homes, or other damage to them, directly contributed to the
impetus for displacement for at least 7 women from Syria (6 Armenian, one Iraqi Arab woman),
and several ethnographic stories will be shared below. I interpret the destruction of these homes
as another form of betrayal felt in Syria, as one is presumably supposed to feel safe sitting in
one’s living room in Syria a century after the Armenian genocide. Owning homes in Syria vs.
renting apartments in Armenia was another chief concern expressed by Syrian Armenian women
in Yerevan, playing a large role in nostalgia for life in Syria, despite dangerous conditions. The
loss of a physical home in Syria, or other destruction of it, also signified loss of status and
normalcy that cannot easily be replicated in Armenia. During fieldwork, I also observed the
intimacy (home decor from Syria, guests/researchers usually always being offered a snack or
meal along with cardamom-spiced Armenian coffee; and social interactions with
guests/researchers such as hugging, crying, laughing even though we were virtual strangers) of
new homes in new host countries and the centrality of Syrian food. Despite occasional language
barriers, especially with Arabic, I was able to connect with Syrian interlocutors over a shared
appreciation and recognition of Syrian dishes that were offered during interviews. Part III will
also include ethnographic stories from local and international NGO employees working with
Syrian Armenian migrant women in Yerevan, expressing their frustrations with Syrian Armenian
women’s annoyances with housing, comparing the situation of Syrian Armenians with the
housing crisis faced by Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan in the late 1980s/early 1990s.
Frustrations of NGO employees towards Syrian Armenians largely center around location
preferences of Syrian Armenian women, who prefer Yerevan’s city center to settlement in other
provinces outside of Yerevan. The final section of Part III will focus on the trend of Syrian
Armenians traveling back to Syria to sell property to generate income for surviving in Armenia.
4.4.1 Destruction of Physical Homes in Syria and Decisions to Flee
Throughout interviews, I realized that for at least 7 women from Syria (6 ethnic
Armenian, one Iraqi Arab displaced to Syria and displaced again to Germany), the destruction or
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other damage to their physical homes in Syria was the direct impetus for their displacement. The
action of telling me, and even showing me videos of their destroyed homes, felt like an act of
testimony, a desire to find a sympathetic witness. Santoukhd, a physician in her early 60s who
owned her own clinic in Aleppo, said:
My house and clinic were in dangerous areas. On July 24, 2012, a bomb fell. People fled
and went to a different house--the house and clinic were in the same building. The clinic
is still closed to this day. I stayed in Aleppo for 3 years, but the clinic wasn’t there
[operating]. I hoped the war would end soon, but it didn’t. I lived in Aleppo for 3 years
during the war. In April 2015, one day was very bad. There were rockets, people died in
the house, so I decided to leave. The quickest place to go was Armenia with my family
and 2 sons, who were 17 and 14 years old. The rockets fell in 2013, fell in front of my
sons and injured my sons. We lived a very hard life--no water, electricity, gas was not
there (Santukhd, February 7, 2019).
Santoukhd is an active member of Aleppo NGO and works part-time at a hospital in Yerevan,
which is not the same as owning her own clinic in Aleppo. Like many women interviewed for this
project, she tried to stay in Aleppo and endure the war. After one bomb (2012) and two rocket
attacks (one in 2013, the other in April 2015), she decided to leave. Not only was the clinic
destroyed, but her home was also damaged multiple times, and her sons were injured. She
decided to go to Armenia because it was the “quickest” solution. Nanor, a Syrian Armenian
woman in her 40s, also commented that, “The building in front of my house blew up,” which led
to her decision to flee to Armenia. While initially some women were hesitant to open up to me
about their experiences of flight and decisions to leave Syria, some of them, such as Lilit, only
talked about the destruction of her physical home, Syria, and loss of her life there:
I rented a house in Haleb [Aleppo]. Everyone lived in one house. My brother’s son lived
with us. One day in Haleb, a mortar hit our house. One day, I was coming home from
work at 6pm and there were soldiers who didn’t let me in, so I started crying. I was told
there was nobody left in the neighborhood [injured, dead, or fled]. I entered my building
and saw my mother and handicapped brother. The building next door had collapsed.
There were bad conditions, no money. In 2014, Islamic militias attacked, these were old
clashes. I used to live in Nor Qyugh. One day, they were shelling my neighborhood, so I
went to my boss’s home and stayed there for 4 days. My house in Haleb [Aleppo]…. I
called the landlord, who was a Christian, and gave a key to my neighbors before I left.
The balcony of the house collapsed…. Haleb is my favorite place. There was war and
clashes there, but rent was reasonable there. Rents in Armenia are too high. The houses in
Armenia only have 1 bedroom, no decent rooms. My house in Haleb before the war was
10,000 Syrian pounds. I talked to my landlord and he said, ‘don’t worry, the house will
still be here when you return.’ Life was better in Haleb. I will go back, but I don’t have
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enough money to pay for flights. There’s no future left for me [in Armenia]. I only care
about my mother being healthy (Lilit, June 16, 2016, Yerevan).
A native of Raqqa, Syria who lived in Aleppo, Lilit describes how her house and neighborhood
[Nor Qyugh] was attacked by mortars, shelling, and clashes with Islamic militias. It is also
important to note her statement, “There was war and clashes there, but rent was reasonable there.
Rents in Armenia are too high.” Even though her neighborhood was incredibly dangerous, she
still had a sense of ownership and belonging in Nor Qyugh, compared to Armenia, where she
must pay high rent prices (which will be discussed in later sections of Part III). Moreover, she
repeatedly expressed during our interview how badly she wanted to return to Syria, as is
evidenced by the faith she had in her landlord keeping her house for her when she returns. It was
challenging to speak with Lilit--she was certainly one of the more reserved women I spoke with
and was mostly animated when speaking about her home in Syria. The act of locking the door
while fleeing a conflict zone or entrusting the keys to a neighbor was echoed in other interviews.
Karine, a Syrian Armenian woman in her late 30s, said, on June 24, 2016:
At the beginning of the war, in 2012, I was in the living room and a bomb fell near me
and God saved my life. I took some necessary steps [to survive]. I locked my door and
came to Armenia. I only thought about coming to Armenia for just 3 months, not
permanently. The house I used to live in was destroyed by the bomb.
In the above excerpt, Karine credits God with saving her life after a bomb fell nearby as she was
sitting in her living room. She locked her door (remember: her house was destroyed by a bomb)
and left for Armenia, never intending to stay permanently. Like Lilit, even after her home and
neighborhood was destroyed by violence (bombs, mortars, shelling in these cases), her home was
still powerful and significant enough to protect.
While most women from Syria interviewed for this dissertation were ethnic Armenians,
and are the focus, stories from ethnic Arab women from Syria are equally important and relevant.
One woman, Najwa, is an Iraqi woman originally displaced from al-Nasiriyah due to the U.S.
invasion, and married a Syrian man and settled in Syria. As a 20-year-old mother of two children
(1 toddler and pregnant with her second) at the time of our interview on June 29, 2016, she was
all smiles in her Berlin apartment. She read my coffee cup, reading the dregs flecked with
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cardamom, Syrian style, giggled, and told me she saw “beards, tears, and Batman” in my coffee
cup. It was truly welcoming sitting in her apartment and playing with her toddler, even with a
language barrier. After our interview, she and her husband offered me tabbouleh and cake paired
with rose-flavored lokhma [also known as “Turkish delights”]. Her family’s escape route, from
Syria to Germany, is encapsulated in Chapter 2. The below excerpt from our interview explains
why she left:
Our house was destroyed by an airplane because we lived in the Free Syrian Army
territory. Our dream house was destroyed, and we only stayed there about 1-2 weeks.
After the destruction of our house, we wanted to go to the regime area but couldn’t
because we were worried about the military draft. I met Abdullah at a previous refugee
camp, because another Syrian Kurd tried to rape or sexually harass me in the bathroom,
so he was sent to intervene as a social worker.
Najwa describes how her “dream house,” which they only lived in for 1-2 weeks, was destroyed
by an airplane because she lived in the Free Syrian Army territory. This excerpt also shows how
their escape routes were limited due to fears about her husband getting drafted by the Syrian
government. Abdullah, a Syrian Kurdish translator who assisted with several Arabic interviews in
Germany, met Najwa at a previous refugee camp, where he intervened and protected her from
getting raped or sexually harassed in the camp bathroom.
Young newlyweds escaping the war was also a theme from my research. Arpi, a Syrian
Armenian woman in her late 20s, told me, “I got married during the war. The family came, the
wedding time was hard. My mom made my wedding dress. A bomb came close to my
[apartment] building, and I remember laughing, running in my wedding dress during the bombs.”
Arpi and her husband, who now co-own a travel agency in Armenia and produce hummus and
mutabal for Yerevan grocery stores, desperately tried to stay in Syria and endure the war. Despite
the bombs, her mother still made Arpi’s wedding dress and wanted to have a special day. Amina,
another young Syrian Armenian woman in her late 20s/early 30s who was a pharmacist in Syria
and now owns her own cookie business in Yerevan, also described the impact of the war on her
newlywed life. She said she got married in late 2012 when she began feeling the impacts of the
war:
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I lived in a small neighborhood between 2 conflict zones. There were random bombings,
friends died, but my family was okay. But it was a dangerous area to start a family. My
family’s house is still intact and the flats [apartments] were not affected. I was renting a
flat [apartment] in Damascus, but I’m not 100% sure if it’s still there (Amina, August 3,
2019, Yerevan).
In Amina’s case, there was no physical damage to her physical home. But this excerpt is still
important because it shows how dangerous her neighborhood was (being located between 2
conflict zones in Damascus) and her decision to flee was based on a desire to start a family
somewhere else. Ultimately, she was able to accomplish this (starting a family) in Dubai before
moving to Armenia. Traumatic experiences like the stories recounted above (i.e., destruction of
physical homes and neighborhoods) negatively inform a person’s notions of home because it
takes away their sense of belonging and security. However, merely replacing an apartment in
Yerevan for a physical home people had owned in Aleppo or other parts of Syria does not cover
the emotional void experienced through the destruction of homes established in Syria, sometimes
over the course of five generations. In short, it is not a quick fix or a simple solution. I argue that
the trauma is deeper than having to flee Syria because one’s home was destroyed by a bomb, and
it is deeper because the trauma is intergenerational, and loss has already been experienced
generations before.
At least 3 Syrian Armenian women I interviewed did go back to Syria to visit (Nanor,
Sona, and Talin). Talin went back to Syria in February 2019 to see her old house. She did not just
tell me her experience, she also showed me videos of her first impressions. Talin told me, “I
cleaned my house, saw churches that were down, saw Old Aleppo. Lman chga [it was all totally
gone]. All my friends left, but the schools and churches were still there. Averag er, payts huysov
en martig [It was ruined, but the people are hopeful].” I sat in her Yerevan living room with her
and her mother, together on their couch, sipping Armenian coffee and snacking on Middle
Eastern pastries. Talin held the phone up and we solemnly watched the video together. Talin
wiped a tear away, I suppose due to her thinking about what was lost, and I could feel Talin
watching me and my reactions to her first impressions of Aleppo upon coming back. I witnessed
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her clicking her tongue [a common way to express disapproval in Middle Eastern Armenian
culture], gesticulating at the pools of water that had come onto her balcony in the video. It looked
like a spacious apartment, with plenty of natural light and potted plants. It looked normal, but it
was not. The act of showing me videos served as a sort of testimony or witnessing from a
sympathetic observer and was not the first time this happened during fieldwork. Shaghig told me
in January 2019 she wants to go back to Syria, “but it breaks my heart to see people see their
houses,” indicating that “witnessing” is shared between Syrian Armenian women, not just with
outside observers. Najwa, the Iraqi woman doubly displaced from Syria to Berlin, also showed
me “selfies” of her crying with her small child and husband in the raft in the Aegean Sea, heading
to Greece, and miraculously, her family and her phone survived. Hasmig, a Syrian Armenian
woman whose husband was brutally murdered by ISIS before fleeing to Armenia, also showed
me videos by the Syrian Red Crescent of corpses presumably thought to be her husband. Verbally
recounting stories is one form of witnessing, another, as I have found during my fieldwork, is
witnessing through documentation of videos, “selfies,” and literal documentation, such as
showing me Syrian passports, symbols in and of themselves. In this sense, it is unclear whether
Hasmig’s physical home was destroyed. Her social home certainly was, with the violent death of
her husband and sudden, involuntary dissolution of her marriage and “home” she had built with
her husband. Only her and her children remained from that social home.
I am also drawn conceptually to the symbols invoked in social and physical constructions
of home. Throughout the course of my preliminary fieldwork, I have found that, upon invitation
to a family’s house or an interlocutor’s apartment, I usually notice objects such as embroidered
pillows from Syria and Damascene mother-of-pearl coffee trays, chess boards, coffee tables, or
clocks. However, I can recognize and interpret these objects because I was also raised around
similar objects, as my paternal grandfather grew up in Syria. I also noticed during fieldwork in
Yerevan, that I would occasionally be presented with Syrian passports, very informally. Initially,
I felt uncomfortable being presented with such personal documents, but upon further insistence, I
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accepted the offer with enthusiasm. I also assert that Syrian food products are just as symbolic as
pillows and coffee tables, such as special spices Hayasdansis [Armenians from Armenia] do not
usually indulge in (such as za’atar and sumac), and meat products, like kibbeh and kufta. I have
found that my familiarity with these objects also facilitated my entry into the field, or at least
helped make the interlocutor feel more comfortable around me, and reflexively, it made me feel
more comfortable around my interlocutors as well.
4.4.2 Owning a House in Syria vs. Renting an Apartment in Armenia
In almost every conversation I had with a Syrian Armenian migrant woman living in
Armenia, most expressed their frustrations with high rent prices compared to low salaries in
Armenia, when they owned [or in a few cases, rented their own standalone homes] in Syria.
Many women expressed frustration with the high rent prices in Yerevan (such as Berjouhi, Knar,
and Salpi). Nerses, a young Syrian Armenian man in his late 20s/early 30s, said that he rented a
“big house” in Yerevan for his parents to settle in, but his mother and sister returned to Syria after
1.5 years because “they hated Armenia,” but did not expand upon their reasons for hating
Armenia. Ruzanna, a local Armenian employee at the Armenian Round Table Foundation, said
approximately, “95% of Syrians are renting [in Yerevan].” Santoukhd, a physician in Aleppo,
added:
Rent is very expensive in Yerevan; life is hard here. You can’t save money, everything is
expensive. NGOs helped, not the government. The NGOs helped with clothes, food,
eyeglasses. The Red Cross helped with 3 months’ rent, KASA lectures, trainings, but not
money, clothes, rent. AGBU helped, paid 50% of school tuition...Syrians miss their
houses the most, miss spices.
Santoukhd said life is hard in Yerevan due to the high rent prices, and the fact that one cannot
save money since everything earned from meager salaries goes to high rent prices. She recounted
how NGOs, such as the Red Cross and Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU), helped
with tuition and rent. Moreover, she also thinks that Syrians miss their houses and spices the
most. Incidentally, the high rent prices that many Syrian Armenian women expressed frustration
with also coincide with location preferences, with many women preferring to live in Kentron, or
Yerevan’s city center, like urban areas they had lived in in Aleppo and Damascus.
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Figure 4.5 Map of Kentron, Yerevan’s city center, indicated in orange, yerevan.am |
Administrative districts of Yerevan. Accessed March 7, 2021.
Owning a physical home in Syria was a source of pride expressed by many Syrian Armenian
women, particularly Sona and Siranoush. According to Siranoush:
Everyone had their houses [in Syria], no poor people, michag [people were middle-class].
Syrian Armenian poor people didn’t exist. Hos ge neghvim [It bothers me here] in
Armenia, why people eat out of trash here? We lived normally in Syria, then came to
Yerevan. For 100 years, we owned our own houses [in Syria]. Arabs didn’t eat out of
trash like [people do] here [Armenia] (Siranoush, December 10, 2018, Yerevan).
In this excerpt, Siranoush declares that, in her opinion there were no poor people in Syria,
certainly not among the Armenian community in Syria. She genuinely seemed annoyed, shocked,
and disillusioned to discover that there was poverty in Armenia, and Yerevan did not seem to
match her expectations, despite the productive life she has built there. In a sense, she seemed to
be rejecting Armenia at this moment, at least as far as poverty is concerned. She proudly noted
how long her family, Armenian genocide survivors and their descendants, had owned their own
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houses in Syria over the course of 100 years. This fact anchored the Armenian community in
Syria and leaving physical homes also meant leaving behind this history and persistence, which is
nothing short of excruciating. Sona, a Syrian Armenian woman in her late 30s, met with me at a
cafe by Yerevan’s Opera House the day after New Year’s 2019. Like Siranoush, she emphasized
the normalcy of her life in Syria before fleeing:
We had a house, a normal life in Syria. We were forced to come here because of war, not
by choice. I know people, also living by rent, who have a messy life. I don’t want my
children, my daughter (older and more impressionable) to see my emotions, my
discomfort here (Sona, January 2, 2019, Yerevan).
Sona did not come to Armenia by choice, and visibly lamented leaving behind her life and house
in Aleppo. She did eventually go back and bring me the gifts of dried roses, rose toner, and
special Syrian candies described at the beginning of Chapter 1. Sona does not like paying rent in
Armenia, describing people who do as having a “messy life.” She also did her best to hide her
emotions and discomfort from her daughter in Yerevan, who is old enough to know when
something is making her mother unhappy. Her hope for the future is, “I want my own house. I am
tired of renting.” Not having to pay rent anymore was also a priority expressed by Karine below,
when asked about hopes for the future. Zabel, a Syrian Armenian woman in her late 20s, added in
February 2019, that, “Life was organized in Aleppo, I was very happy with my life in my home.
There was no rent in Syria…My hopes for the future are to have a home, free myself of rent, help
my husband with the lifestyle. I want to do this.” Zabel has tried desperately to earn an income in
Armenia and connected her happiness in Syria with having a home to call her own, rent-free.
Compared to Armenia, Syria felt like it was rent-free, to Zabel. She expressed that she wants to
“free me of rent,” indicating how burdensome high rent prices are for people living in central
Yerevan. Nuritsa, a talented cook and shop owner in Halebi Shuka [Aleppo Shopping Center],
added in May 2019, “My hope for the future is I want to have a house in Armenia. Armenia is
very beautiful. We feel safe here.” Overall, owning a home in Armenia would be a meaningful
way for Syrian Armenian women to feel more integrated into the host Armenian society, and help
them feel more anchored and secure in Yerevan.
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Concerning home ownership in Syria, as Najwa expressed in the last section, some
women had just bought their “dream house,” but did not have a chance to spend much time in it.
Katherine, a Syrian Armenian woman in her late 30s, said, “We bought a house in Syria, but
never enjoyed it. Just now, we bought a house in Yerevan, moving from the city center to the
outskirts and are ready to move anytime. We are not physically attached to anywhere.” Katherine
had set herself apart from other migrant women applying for refugee status due to her wealthier
status and education, “we are not in a dire situation.” A Syrian Armenian woman in her late
30s/early 40s, Karine, added in June 2016, “We had just bought a new house in Haleb before the
war. The number 1 issue in Armenia is the rent and illness problems. I want the chance to buy an
apartment. Food and clothes are not important. I want to stop paying rent--not only me, all of the
Syrian Armenians. This is my primary aspiration.” Owning a home, or owning one’s own
apartment, in Yerevan is so important to women such as Karine, that they prioritized owning a
home or an apartment over food or clothes. The loss of a “dream house” or the start of a new
chapter was also worthy of grieving.
4.4.3 Location Preferences and Urban Refugee Camps
Most Syrian Armenian women did not like renting in Yerevan due to the high prices, but
they rented apartments in Kentron, Yerevan’s city center. For example, Zepyur, a Syrian
Armenian woman, stated simply, “Everyone wants to live in Kentron.” I mostly interviewed
NGO employees about the location preferences of Syrian Armenian women in Yerevan. Sarah
from Homeland Development Initiative Foundation (HDIF) said that “Syrian Armenians had to
live on Komitas [a major street in northern Yerevan] and Kentron. They refused to live outside
[these areas],” and Hovhannes from Jinishian Memorial Foundation (JMF) added that, “All
Syrian Armenians in Armenia want to stay in Pokr Kentron [Little Kentron], they all want to stay
here.” These statements imply Syrian Armenians demanding to stay in Kentron, without any
negotiation, as perceived by several local NGO employees working with Syrian Armenians.
Ruzanna, an employee at Armenian Round Table Foundation (ART), noted in July 2017, that,
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“Most Syrians want to live in Kentron, and only the miserable ones are in the suburbs.” The
language she used is strong, and I interpret her statement to refer to class--wealthier Syrian
Armenians are generally able to afford or nearly afford apartments in Kentron as opposed to
Yerevan’s suburbs. Megheti, an employee at the International Organization for Migration (IOM),
added, also in July 2017, that, “[Syrian Armenian] people try to stay in Yerevan. Charentsavan [a
town outside Yerevan] is cheaper. Most Syrians are in Yerevan.” Megheti’s statement shows that
areas further from Yerevan’s city center, or Kentron, are cheaper, but less preferable for Syrian
Armenians. These statements remind me of an informal “update” meeting I regularly held with
UNHCR contacts, in which Karolina asked me about “wealthy Syrian Armenian women” who
settled by Northern Avenue, in Kentron. This main artery of Yerevan is part of an upscale
shopping and dining area, and Aleppo NGO is nestled in the basement of a building off to the
side of Northern Avenue. Karolina encouraged me to interview Syrian Armenian women from
different classes, which I incidentally did, although most interlocutors were middle to upper class.
An employee at KASA, Dzovinar, noted that, “Syrian Armenians prefer to live in urban areas,
mostly Yerevan and Kentron, they love urban areas. Syrians love Kentron.” The statement she
made about Syrians loving urban areas parallels the large urban Armenian communities in
Aleppo and Damascus, where the majority of the Syrian Armenian migrant women I interviewed
in Yerevan hailed from. Kohar, an employee at GIZ interviewed in July 2017, also noted that
Syrian Armenians generally settled in Kentron, “about 70% in Gomidas and Zeitun
[neighborhoods shown in the map above].” Furthermore:
Syrian Armenians spend a lot of money on Yerevan transportation. Their work is in the
center, and apartments cost more than in Davtashen [located on the outskirts of Yerevan],
no logic to it. In Aleppo, they used to live in the center and [Armenian] communities
were just living together for traditions in the center (Kohar, July 12, 2017, Yerevan).
In this excerpt, Kohar gives her opinion about the perceived illogical settlement patterns of Syrian
Armenians. Most employment sites of Syrian Armenians are in Kentron, and they are spending
more on apartments in Kentron as opposed to living on the outskirts of Yerevan, according to
several local NGO employees. However, Kohar, a local woman, observed that in Aleppo (where
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many Syrian Armenians in Armenia are from), Armenian communities also lived in city centers.
Another local employee at GIZ, Ovsanna, told me in July 2019 about a mapping project of Syrian
Armenians through GIZ. 28 Ovsanna said, “Most of them [Syrian Armenians] live in Yerevan, but
it’s very expensive. There are not many Syrian Armenians in the regions, approximately 300-400
households in regions close to Yerevan. There are housing issues in the region, but housing is
cheaper there. Youths also work in Yerevan and support their families.” Overall, there is a clear
preference among Syrian Armenians (not only women) for living in the city center of Yerevan,
Kentron, and this settlement pattern is reminiscent of Armenian neighborhoods clustered in urban
areas of Syria, particularly Aleppo and Damascus. I only interviewed individuals living in urban
areas, not rural areas or those who had settled in Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh Republic).
As much as Syrian Armenians did not like renting apartments, local NGO employees
pointed out they (NGO employees) felt renting apartments was preferable to living in refugee
camps, like many other Syrian migrants. For example, Maro, an employee at Caritas, said,
“Syrian Armenians rented apartments, [they were] not living in camps. None [Syrian Armenians]
were living in camps.” I had interviewed two residents of an urban refugee camp during
preliminary fieldwork in Berlin in summer 2016, Fatemeh from Iran and Saida from Syria. Both
women were residents of the same camp, and it was clear there was tension between the two of
them. The urban refugee camp resembled a large warehouse, barricaded with barbed wire,
graffiti, and armed guards who spoke Turkish, German, and Arabic. There were separate sections
for living quarters: one for families, and one for young men, but none for single women traveling
alone. Living quarters lacked privacy, and consisted of bunk beds, which people would partition
with bedsheets for a semblance of privacy.

28

“Mapping of Syrian Armenians in the Regions of Armenia and their Needs (SyRAD) Analytical
Report,” GIZ, Yerevan, Armenia, 2019.
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Figure 4.6 Urban refugee camp in Germany. Photo by author. Image of the outside of an
urban refugee camp in Berlin, July 2016
I visited a friend of a friend from my master’s program at Purdue, who was working as a social
worker at the camp. This acquaintance, Anne, greeted me warmly and invited me into her office
for a brief meeting, and then introduced me to several of the women. I also spent some time as a
childcare volunteer, drawing with mostly Syrian and Afghan children. Saida, a Syrian Arab
woman in her early 30s, was going through a divorce at the time of the interview (July 2016). She
said:
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There is drama in the camp because of my impending divorce. People gossip about me
being alone and talking to single men, even if they are my friends. Mahmoud [the
translator, pseudonym] and I agree that it’s like being back in the Middle East. We were
surprised it was still this way in Germany. Some parts of Germany remind me of Syria,
like the gossip. People fast in the camps during Ramadan, but I don’t really (Saida, July
5, 2016, Berlin).
The above interview excerpt describes the social life in this urban refugee camp. Saida recounts
the gossip about her impending divorce and friendship with some men in the camp, her newfound
painful belonging in this space. In this sense, the camp in Germany reminded her of what she
describes as the “gossipy” Middle East, Syria, she left behind. She also notes how she is further
ostracized in the camp community because she does not fast during Ramadan, like other Muslim
camp residents.
Fatemeh, an Iranian woman in her late 30s/early 40s, told me about her journey from Iran
to Germany, and her own painful belonging in the camp (again, gossip and secular outlook). As
mentioned earlier, she did not want to talk in front of Saida at the lunch table (where our
interview had been) and led me to her living space in the family section. Fatemeh offered me a
seat on her bunk bed and drew the curtains/blankets closed for privacy. I noticed she kept her
living space extremely tidy. She said:
Austria was the best, but Germany is better because there is more privacy here. Before,
the refugee camps felt like they were located in deserts. No privacy or blanket barriers
separating my bed from others’ beds…. I have no problem with local Germans. They are
pretty nice to me, but I don’t really interact with them as much as I do with Arabs and
Afghans in the camp--these have its own problems. Life in the camp...privacy is a big
concern, and I mostly have friction with Arab women. I’m not very religious. I identify as
Muslim, but I don’t wear a headscarf or fast during Ramadan. Because of this, I am given
the worst pieces of meat during food distribution because I don’t fast. It is very gossipy in
the camp. I am able to talk to Afghan refugees because Dari is very similar to Farsi,
almost the same language, and there are lots of Afghan refugees in Iran (Fatemeh, July 5,
2016, Berlin).
In the above interview excerpt, Fatemeh, like Saida, said privacy is a big issue in the camp,
although compared to camps in Austria, German camps were better. Her blanket barrier
essentially gave her a sense of security and privacy, which I felt sitting on her bunk bed. Janning
(2017) reminds us that anthropologists methodologically studying the home examine objects and
spaces, not only looking at objects, but also how people perceive their belongings (Jansen 2017).
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In Fatemeh’s case, her blanket was used for privacy and helped her adapt to various refugee
camps, as well as her control over her personal space through keeping it tidy. Like Saida,
Fatemeh is Muslim but is not religious in the sense that she does not wear a headscarf or fast
during Ramadan. She feels she is punished accordingly by other camp residents by being given
the worst pieces of meat during food distribution because she does not fast. However, she is smart
and was able to learn Dari to communicate with Afghan camp residents, since Dari is like Farsi,
her first language. Our interview was also conducted entirely in English without the help of a
translator, so she was able to learn languages relatively quickly.
4.4.4

Staff Annoyance about Housing Issues in Armenia and Comparisons with other Migrant
Groups
NGO employees stated that Syrian Armenian refugees (classified by NGOs) were given

rental subsidies for approximately 6 months. It is important to remember that the largest waves of
Syrian migrants fleeing to Armenia occurred in 2012 and 2014, so, “emergency assistance ended
2 years ago [in 2016]” for many migrants, according to an interview with Diana, a UNHCR
employee, in September 2018 and “rental subsidies are fading away now” (Diana, May 28, 2019).
Recall in Chapter 3 that not every Syrian Armenian chooses refugee status as a legal option after
entering Armenia, due to various pros and cons of refugee status. Rental subsidies are a
temporary benefit of refugee status, as rental subsidies are only provided for 6 months (Maral and
Hrant from American Missionary Association of Armenia in July 2017). According to Migration
Service employee, Tsoghig, in February 2019, “apartment rental subsidies are only for refugees.”
One young local woman, the daughter of a Syrian Armenian parent who had repatriated to Soviet
Armenia in the 1940s, was critical of Syrian Armenians, “who come to Armenia and then leave
and don’t appreciate the Armenian government’s help. Syrian Armenians complain about being
resettled in Ashtarak [outside of Yerevan], not Kentron” (Sirvart). Sirvart’s statement indicates
resentment towards, as described in Chapter 3, “bad Syrian Armenians,” who are perceived as
those who leave after presumably reaping government benefits.
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My research has also found that many NGO workers compared the housing situation of
Syrian Armenians with the housing crisis still experienced by Armenian refugees from
Azerbaijan, 30 years after their initial displacement from Soviet Azerbaijan in 1988. Several
NGO, UN, and state workers provided a brief history of the fall-out from the Post-Soviet housing
crisis due to migration and economic collapse, echoed by other scholars of the South Caucasus
(Kabachnik et. al. 2010; Koch 2012; Koch 2015). Natasha, a UNHCR political officer, explained
that housing is still the biggest issue for Syrian Armenians, “Post-USSR, housing collapsed,
especially due to Azerbaijani [ethnic Armenians from Soviet Azerbaijan] refugees, who were put
in places like resorts and dorms. 20 years later, some places were privatized, but there is the
absence of something new.” A U.S. Embassy employee, Allison, added that there is a “PostSoviet mentality that the Armenian government should give them [Syrian Armenian migrants]
apartments [left over from Azerbaijani refugees].” Although Syrian Armenians do not come from
a post-Soviet state, this expectation of state-supported housing remains in Armenia, a post-Soviet
state.
Other NGO and UN workers explained the evolution of the Armenian state’s ability to
provide for ethnic Armenian migrant groups, since Armenia gained its independence in
September 1991. They explained that therefore they feel Syrian Armenians have a comparably
easier time securing housing than earlier migrant groups, particularly Armenians fleeing from
massacres in Soviet Azerbaijan. Dzovinar, an employee at KASA, said:
In 1988, there were massacres of Armenians in Baku and Sumgait (Soviet Azerbaijan).
Not every NGO in Soviet Armenia was ready to support ethnic Armenian refugees from
Azerbaijan, the government didn’t support many refugees. Azeri Armenians kept refugee
status to get housing, and they didn’t want to be naturalized. During the Syrian war, there
are more projects, more assistance to Syrians because [the Armenian government thinks]
30 years is enough for Azeri Armenian refugees to integrate. Every 5 years, Azeri
Armenians get mad about the lack of support (Dzovinar, July 7, 2017, Yerevan).
Dzovinar explained that at the time of the Sumgait and Baku massacres in Soviet Azerbaijan, the
Soviet Armenian government and various NGOs were not prepared to support ethnic Armenian
refugees from Soviet Azerbaijan. Refugee status was also instrumentalized, in some cases, to
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acquire housing without any intentions of naturalization, in the same way that some Syrian
Armenian decisions to apply for refugee status are viewed (pros and cons of refugee status). She
noted that there is more state support for Syrian Armenians now because, in her opinion, the
Armenian state feels nearly 30 years (at the time of the interview in 2017) was enough time for
Armenians from Azerbaijan to integrate, so resources were redirected to Syrians. However, the
housing crisis of Armenians from Azerbaijan is still prevalent and serious. Kevork, an employee
at the Center for the Coordination of Syrian Armenian Issues (CCSAI), a Syrian Armenian man,
added in July 2017, “When [ethnic Armenian] refugees came from Azerbaijan and Iraq, the
[Armenian] government was [still quite] new. Now that the government is older, the government
was able to do more for Syrian Armenians. The government will be more ready now.” This
statement shows how, ostensibly, the Armenian government is better equipped “to do more for
Syrian Armenians,” compared to Armenia’s early years of independence and housing crisis faced
by Armenians from Azerbaijan. However, not all problems faced by Syrian Armenians who
settled in Armenia have been easily resolved. Diana, one of my main contacts at UNHCR, added
in February 2019 that:
Syrians had privileges compared to Iraqi or Azeri Armenians. For 30 years, Azeri
Armenian refugees were never satisfied. We want the attitude from the Armenian
government geared towards other refugees [not just Syrians]. UNHCR cannot afford to
pay rental subsidies for the rest of the years. There is also a culture of sharing apartments.
Housing is still the main issue, people feel it’s “not worth staying here, very shameful [to
rent]” (Diana, February 5, 2019, Yerevan).
Diana contrasts the privileges she feels Syrian Armenians have compared to Armenians from
Azerbaijan. The latter group, she feels, were never satisfied with state solutions for housing, but
she also feels that the Armenian government should treat all migrant groups in Armenia equally,
not just give perceived preferential treatment to Syrian Armenians. Finally, she notes that paying
rental subsidies is a temporary, not a sustainable, solution that cannot be relied upon by Syrian
Armenians in Armenia. The expectation on the part of some Syrian Armenian migrant women to
get housing support from the Armenian government is like the experience of Georgian internally
displaced persons (IDPs), as well as the rhetoric from some Armenian NGO employees to help
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Syrian Armenian women “help themselves,” for example through vocational training and support
in Armenia. The “passive mentality” of migrant women was echoed rarely during fieldwork, from
local and international (including Western) NGO employees, but still shows tension between
NGO employees and migrant women/beneficiaries in Yerevan. Erin Koch (2012) argued that the
“passive mentality” is “reinforced by the lack of information they [Georgian IDPs from
Abkhazia] are provided by local and national government officials about accommodations, health
insurance, and other social services” (Koch 2012, 19). Furthermore, Georgian IDPs are caught in
a “tension between social immobility and shifting cycles of bureaucratic upheaval and
uncertainty. IDPs reconstitute meanings of living a healthy life in ways that suggest that
assistance might be keeping them alive, but they are hardly living” (Koch, 23). In contrast to
Georgian IDPs discussed in Koch’s article, I would argue that Syrian Armenian migrant women
(particularly middle to upper class women) have relatively secure apartment units in central
Yerevan, but some Syrian Armenian migrant women feel there is still a disconnect about
information, such as emergency assistance for Syrians needing to stop after the immediate
emergency period (according to Diana from UNHCR). I feel that the experience of Georgian
IDPs from Abkhazia is more like the experiences of Artsakh refuge-seekers, because Artsakh is
not protected internationally and Syrian refuge-seekers are eligible for emergency assistance from
international organizations, like UNHCR. However, displaced Armenian women (as this project
focuses on women’s experiences of migration), from Artsakh and Syria, do experience tensions at
times with local and international NGO employees and members of the host community because
many locals feel they have also suffered economically, especially in the early years of
independence.
Additionally, home for displaced populations in the South Caucasus also shifted.
Georgian internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Abkhazia were displaced in 1992-1993 and in
1998, respectively. Peter Kabachnik, Joanna Regulska, and Beth Mitchneck (2010) argued that
home is multidimensional, in which temporality (past, present, future), intersects with spatiality
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(physical and imaginary) and social relations (family, oppression, domination) (Kabachnik et. al.
2010, 317). Georgian IDPs from Abkhazia experience a double displacement in place and time-they were displaced physically from their homes in Abkhazia and are experiencing further
(temporal) displacements as they construct understandings of home in the past and in the future
(Kabachnik et. al., 322). Like the Armenian government’s discourses with ethnic Armenian
returnees, branded “repatriates,” the Georgian government’s discourse and the discourses of
Georgian IDPs conflicts because both are focused on “return” more so than the profound changes
that occurred in the years since displacement (Kabachnik et. al. 2010, 327). Aside from this
discourse, home-making practices among Georgian IDPs are more than just physical acts (such as
hanging photographs or decorating living areas). More often, “conservations, memories, and
ideas can play the more significant role in the construction of home” (Kabachnik et. al., 331).
Sociality in Yerevan among Syrian Armenian migrant women includes intimate spaces and social
events, but also unintentionally excludes women from different classes, younger women, and
working mothers with young children.
4.4.5 Going Back to Syria to Sell Property (Circulating and Visiting Syria)
Many Syrian Armenians visit Syria to sell property and use the funds to supplement their
income in Armenia. These visits are often extremely emotional, as physical homes and
neighborhoods were destroyed or otherwise damaged during the period that their inhabitants were
living in Armenia. In this final section of Part III, stories from both NGO workers and Syrian
Armenian women about visiting Syria and selling their property, will be shared.
Several NGO, state, and UNHCR employees noted how Syrian Armenians “circulate,” or
travel back and forth between Syria and Armenia, before ultimately settling in Armenia. For this
reason, it was difficult to ascertain how many Syrian Armenians had currently settled in Armenia,
permanently. Saro, from the former Ministry of Diaspora, noted that, “there are approximately
22,000 Syrian Armenians who have come to Armenia. 3,000-4,000 of them are currently
circulating, going back to Syria to check on businesses and property. They face two challenges:
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1) rent/housing; and 2) economic integration, and there are no long-term programs for either.”
Diana from UNHCR noted that, “some people are going back to Syria to sell [their] houses,” but
that as of September 5, 2018 (the date of the interview), not many Syrian Armenian families were
coming to Armenia. Instead, “they are going to sell their real estate in Syria. [In the] Armenian
districts [of Aleppo, they are] selling their own homes to other Armenians in Syria. But now,
[they are] selling to Arab families because they want to stay in Yerevan.” Diana’s statement
shows how close-knit the Armenian community in Syria is, even after displacement, as
demonstrated by the fact that Armenians generally sell their real estate to other Armenians in
Syria. Recently, some are selling to Arab families due to the dire need to have a supplemental
income to remain in Armenia. Other NGO employees added that “the ones who want to stay” (my
phrasing) must go back to Aleppo (where most Syrian Armenians in Armenia are from) to sell
properties and land. According to Natasha, an employee at UNHCR, “the most vulnerable [Syrian
Armenians] are selling their property in Syria and investing in Armenia.” As before, this shows
the class differences in relation to migration waves. Generally, wealthier Syrian Armenians were
able to leave at the beginning of the conflict (mostly in 2012, with a second emigration wave in
2014 after the rise of ISIS in Syria), and generally, the “most vulnerable” or lower middle to
middle class people had to leave later.
Two NGO employees, who are also Syrian Armenian, as well as three Syrian Armenian
women, noted the practical and emotional tolls of returning to Syria to sell property. Kevork, a
physician and employee at CCSAI, said, “Syrian Armenians left property behind. There is a lot of
stress, and they lost relatives.” Kevork points out that it was not only a physical home, or a clinic
(like Santoukhd’s experience) left behind--relatives were also killed and survivors are still dealing
with an incredible amount of stress after migrating to Armenia. Parantsem, from Aleppo NGO,
added that, “If things get better in Syria, they [Syrian Armenians] can sell properties in Syria and
live well in Armenia, but only when Syria becomes safer (they can’t sell now).” Many Syrian
Armenians still cannot return to Syria now to sell property and supplement their incomes in
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Armenia, as the political situation in Syria is still unsafe, leaving Syrian Armenians in Armenia
essentially in flux, neither fully there [Syria], nor here [Armenia]. Berjouhi, a Syrian Armenian
woman, told me in November 2018 that her husband recently went back to Syria to check on their
house. Some Syrian Armenians did not have time to decide what to do with their property as they
were fleeing Syria. Hripsime, a Syrian Armenian woman, said:
I just left my home and came to Armenia, so there was no use in selling my house. I am
not sure about the current condition of my house. I didn’t have any information about the
exact situation in Syria, so I decided to save my children and leave Syria. My purpose is
to sell my Syrian house [now] because my son is 30 years-old and wants to get engaged.
It’s his iravounk, his right, to do that, his right to lead a normal life (Hripsime, June 24,
2016, Yerevan).
Hripsime did not have any time to sell her home before coming to Armenia. Her main priority
was saving her children’s lives and fleeing Syria. After living in Armenia for a few years, she
now wants to sell her Syrian house because her son was 30 years-old (in 2016) and wants to get
engaged, which she views as his iravounk, or right, to do so--his right to have a normal life.
Selling her property in Syria would help him buy an engagement ring and have an engagement
party, which he would have been able to do in Syria under “normal” conditions. In other words,
selling her property, her physical home, in Syria would mean her son has a chance to start a new
life in Armenia. Kayane, a Syrian Armenian woman in her 60s, told me, “I am selling the main
apartment in Aleppo. People ask me to bring the bones of their parents [from Syria to Armenia].”
This shows that returning to Syria to sell property also carries with it the responsibility, or
expectation, that one would be willing to bring back the bones of a friend’s parents to Armenia.
Bone symbolism and memory is held sacred among the Armenian community in Syria, as
discussed at the beginning of this chapter. The action of bringing the bones of a friend’s parents
to Armenia represents finality--home, the physical resting place of one’s parents, would literally
be transplanted to Armenia. Graves and bones of parents occasionally came up during interviews,
implying a deep connection to Syria through necrogeography. For example, Salpi told me, “only
my property is behind and my parents’ graves” when I asked her what she misses about Syria. A
similar practice--digging up parents’ graves and transporting them to safer places--has also been
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practiced in the recent war with Azerbaijan (September 2020) over Artsakh (shared in the
Epilogue).

4.5

Conclusion

This chapter examined the social and physical homes of Syrian Armenian women living

in Armenia. “Home” for the Armenian community in Syria (Part I) is “ironic” in the sense that
Syria was originally simultaneously the site of death marches and concentration camps for
Armenian genocide victims, and a site of refuge for genocide survivors and their descendants.
Pilgrimages to the main massacre sites in the deserts of Syria by descendants of genocide
survivors from the Armenian diaspora and carrying away fragments of victims’ bones as religious
relics, are part of the necrogeography of Syria. This necrogeography is remembered by
Armenians from Syria who have since migrated to Armenia, such as many of my interlocutors
(i.e., enacted through requests to bring back the bones of one’s parents to truly be able to
emotionally leave Syria behind). A social and physical home was constructed in Syria, especially
in Aleppo, over the course of five generations since the Armenian genocide. Social home (Part II)
in Syria was constructed by descendants of Armenian genocide survivors through schools,
churches, volunteering, and activities in organizations such as scouts, and geographically
clustered in urban areas. This geographical clustering is mirrored by the Syrian Armenian
community in Armenia, who prefer to settle in Yerevan’s city center, called Kentron. The
involvement of Syrian Armenian women in volunteering and charity activities in Syria was also
transplanted to the migrant community in Yerevan, as evidenced by the activities of one Syrian
Armenian organization, Aleppo NGO. This organization is a hub for social-psychological
meetings specifically held by and for women, vocational training for women, charity fairs and
fundraisers, and other social events.
Narratives about physical homes (Part III) in Syria largely focused on the destruction of
homes which prompted displacement for several Syrian Armenian women, owning a home in
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Syria versus renting an apartment in Yerevan, and the temporary return of Syrian Armenians
(men and women) to sell property and use the funds to supplement incomes in Armenia. The
destruction of physical homes in Syria also symbolized a loss of status, “normal life” compared to
life in Armenia, and the use of testimony or witnessing such as showing me videos, photos,
“selfies,” and forms of documentation such as passports. Life in Armenia was also discussed in
this section, particularly complaints about high rent prices in Yerevan compared to owning their
own homes in Syria. However, life in apartments in Yerevan was considered to be an
improvement over living in refugee camps, as described by two non-Armenian migrant women
from Iran and Syria, respectively, who settled in Berlin. Several NGO workers in Armenia
expressed frustration with the complaints of some Syrian Armenians about having to live in
apartments, compared to housing issues experienced by earlier ethnic Armenian migrant
populations who had settled in Soviet and newly independent Armenia, particularly Armenians
from Azerbaijan. The final section of Part III discussed the stories of several Syrian Armenians
who returned to Syria temporarily to sell property (businesses and homes) to use the funds as
supplemental income in Armenia. The next chapter will examine discourse analysis of Armenian
state media’s efforts, particularly the former Ministry of Diaspora, to “beckon” ethnic Armenians
from Syria “back” to their socially constructed homeland, the Republic of Armenia, even though
many Syrian Armenian women still feel strongly attached to Syria, as was shared in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 5. BECKONED BY, AND BELONGING TO, THE STATE
“I remember first getting into a taxi in Yerevan, looking at the driver, and thinking, ‘He could be
my brother.’ I feel like I’m finally among my brothers and sisters, in Armenia [compared to living
in an Arab-majority country, like Syria].”
-Mane, June 2016, Yerevan, Armenia
Mane, a Lebanese-born Armenian woman married to a Syrian Armenian man, had been living in
Aleppo for years before the Syrian conflict. Over dinner at a Lebanese restaurant in Yerevan,
called Lagonid, in June 2016, we chatted about her adjustment to life in Armenia. Immediately,
Mane commented upon feeling at home in Armenia simply because she was surrounded by other
Armenians. She used a kinship metaphor to describe this perceived intimacy with random people
in Yerevan, such as a taxi driver. A shared ethnicity with random people in Armenia, like taxi
drivers, also contributed to Mane’s feelings of security--she is home and surrounded by people
like her. What compelled her family to come to Armenia specifically, and how did state and nonstate messaging play a role in pulling people like Mane and her family from Syria to Armenia?

5.1

Introduction

In this chapter, I describe the pull dynamics, which I term “beckoning,” of the Armenian

state through ethnographic narratives and discourse analysis. Several of my interlocutors were
lured to Armenia by promises of living in a largely monoethnic, secure state with messaging
urging a return to the socially constructed ancestral homeland, a birthright robbed from
Armenians dispersed around the world due to the Armenian genocide. Through discourse analysis
of state and non-state media, as well as ethnographic interviews and participant observation, this
chapter will examine the actions of previous Ministers of Diaspora pertaining to Syrian Armenian
women and the women’s socioeconomic contributions to their socially constructed homeland.
Lastly, it is important to keep in mind, as mentioned in Chapter 3, that there is more than one
“beckoning” state in play in this dissertation: Syria and Armenia beckon Syrians “home,”
although more emphasis is placed on Armenia as my primary field site. In this chapter, I argue
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that there are gaps in the discourses between state narratives of repatriation and memory in the
socially constructed homeland and individual memories and lived experiences of migrant women
living in a socially constructed homeland into which they were disjointedly inserted. I assert that
the Armenian state is wielding and instrumentalizing memories of the Armenian genocide to
create new citizens through calls for repatriation and nation-building. These calls clash with
Syrian Armenian women’s nostalgic memories of home created in Syria over the course of five
generations since the Armenian genocide, leaving gaps in the discourses people are attaching to
certain places and gaps in the imagination of some diaspora populations. In short, “home” is
interpreted differently by the Armenian state (repatriation, calls for homecoming of diasporan
Armenians) and Syrian Armenian migrant women (Syria is also “home,” and Western Armenia is
a homeland their parents and grandparents were displaced from). This chapter will examine how
state narratives specifically targeted Syrian Armenian migrant women in Armenia, depicting them
as potential citizens and contributing members of society through an emphasis on their economic
contributions to the Armenian state (i.e., hospitality, improved customer service, traditional skill
sets as artisans and jewelers, housewives- turned- businesswomen). In sum, I will demonstrate
ethnographically the gaps in the discourses of the Armenian state versus the lived experience of
Syrian Armenian migrant women living in Armenia, who are also members of the Armenian
diaspora.
5.1.1 Organization of the Chapter
This chapter is organized into two parts. Part I will include ethnographic data from NGO
workers’ perspectives on current migration policies pertaining to Syrian Armenians (particularly
at the beginning of the conflict). This part also includes a discussion of ethnographic data
illustrating a desire on the part of NGO workers for Armenian state migration policies to be more
inclusive of non-ethnically Armenian migrant populations in addition to non-Syrian Armenian
diasporan populations. The final section of Part I will include a robust discussion of the
importance of belonging for Syrian Armenian women, as illustrated ethnographically, and their
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responsiveness to state policies about migration and integration of ethnic Armenian migrants in
Armenia. In addition, perspectives will be shared from members of the local community,
including local NGO and government workers, on Syrian Armenian reception and integration by
the host community.
Part II will discuss return literature and discourse analysis of Armenian state and nonstate media, particularly from the former Ministry of Diaspora and the Office of the High
Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs. This section argues that a change in state narrative from
beckoning Syrian Armenian women to focusing on the total Armenian diaspora is due to state
anxiety about emigration. For example, the first Minister of Diaspora, Hranush Hakobyan,
enthusiastically beckoned Syrian Armenians (not only women) home to Armenia through
emotional speeches and appearances at charity fairs featuring Syrian Armenian women-owned
businesses. The third minister, the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs, Zareh Sinanyan, in
contrast, stated his focus was less on beckoning Syrian Armenians home to Armenia, and more
on the “brain gain” of young diasporan Armenian professionals from anywhere in the world. Part
II will then introduce a second, less prominent (only in the sense that this case study took place
primarily in Armenia, not Syria) beckoning state in this dissertation, Syria and its pull factors
(“beckoning” strategies) for returning Syrians.

5.2

Part I: Belonging to the Armenian State

“The opportunities [of the 2018 Velvet Revolution in Armenia] are huge because we are
first of all ... a small state but a global nation; there are four or five times, probably more,
Armenians living abroad than in Armenia today. A lot of them are very good citizens of
the countries that they are living in today; some of them are highly recognized by [the]
international community as professional successful businessmen, scientists, politicians,
etc., and most of them are highly respectful, honest people. So it’s the time that
everybody recognizes that Armenia, their homeland, is really their homeland, and they
belong to this state and they belong to this great nation, and to use this opportunity to
rebuilding our country, our state, for the next generation to make sure that, tomorrow,
Armenia will be better than today…You are the sons and daughters of Armenia...no
matter where you live...you have to believe that you are part of this great nation.”
-Armen Sarkissian, President of Armenia, spoken at University of Southern California in May
2018.
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The above quote is from a speech Armenian President Armen Sarkissian on May 20,
2018 at a conference called, “Armenia Tomorrow: Citizen Diplomacy at Work” held at the
University of Southern California Institute of Armenian Studies. This conference was quite
timely, as it occurred a mere month after the 2018 Velvet Revolution in Armenia, which were
successful anti-corruption protests against the previous President Serj Sargsyan, who showed
intentions of becoming the next Prime Minister. This movement also brought with it a renewed
interest in beckoning diasporan Armenians from all over the world to return to a new Armenia,
one striving to be corruption-free and focused on the development of the technology sector and
start-ups. What this meant for Syrian Armenians, however, is that less attention was paid to the
integration of Syrian Armenians in Armenia and more efforts directed toward non-Syrian
Armenian diasporan repatriation. The above quote emphasizes the responsibility of all
Armenians, anywhere in the world, to return to their socially constructed homeland and positively
(economically) contribute to their socially constructed homeland. I had not observed any
resentment on behalf of Syrian Armenian migrant women towards this shift in attitude, 29 i.e.,
from a heavy, performative state and non-state focus on beckoning Syrian Armenians home to
Armenia, to beckoning primarily young professional diasporan Armenians from all over the
world home to Armenia, not just from Syria. However, one NGO worker from Caritas, Maro,
observed that the current head of Diaspora Affairs, Zareh Sinanyan, has not made as many efforts
for Syrian Armenians in Armenia compared to previous ministers, but hopes, “it [Syrian
Armenians in Armenia] will be a priority” for Sinanyan. Previous chapters highlighted the
historical context and the distinctions between Western Armenia/former Ottoman Empire and
29

This shift in attitude occurred in summer 2019, when former Mayor of Glendale, Zareh Sinanyan,
rebranded the Ministry of Diaspora into the Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs. It also
occurred during my last 3 months of dissertation fieldwork in Armenia, and the transition was gradual in
the months prior to the formal transfer of power to Sinanyan. For example, I attended repatriate happy
hours in Yerevan about once a month, and attendees would casually discuss what the rebranding would
mean for repatriation and Syrian migrants, as well as earlier waves of migrants who came from Iraq (mid2000s) and Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh Republic, intermittent arrivals since the war in the late 1980s-early
1990s).
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Eastern Armenia/former Soviet Republic of Armenia/current Republic of Armenia, the labels and
legal statuses imposed on and available to Syrian Armenians in Armenia, problematic past
“repatriation campaigns” for diasporan Armenians to “return” to Soviet Armenia, belonging as
both painful and reassuring, and constructions of “home” (social, physical, and ironic) for Syrian
Armenian women.
The original, geographical idea of the Armenian state was long lost with lands and
ancestral hometowns located in Western Armenia (present day eastern and southeastern Turkey)
during the Armenian genocide. However, the new idea of the Armenian state (in the form of the
current Republic of Armenia, viewed by many Armenians as a sliver of the original geographical
homeland) has been repurposed time and again to beckon potential ethnic Armenian citizens
home, both to Soviet and the independent Republic of Armenia. A descendant of an Armenian
genocide survivor, who grew up in the Armenian diaspora, can live in Armenia and legally
become a citizen without expending a significant amount of effort (although the process is
certainly time-consuming bureaucratically). This same descendant can gaze upon the symbolic
Mount Ararat, 30 located just across the border and skyline of Armenia’s capital, Yerevan, and
even partake in one of the many tours to Western Armenia (present day eastern and southeastern
Turkey) offered by at least 4 travel agencies in Yerevan. One can visit ancestral hometowns, such
as Kars, Van, or Ani, or even visit the Black Sea region and mingle with an ethnic group partially
descended from genocide survivors who converted to Islam, the Hamshen. 31 But then, this
descendant does not get to stay after 3 or 6 days in their ancestral hometown. This ethnic
Armenian descendant is eligible for Armenian citizenship, but not Turkish citizenship. The same
can be argued for state and non-state officials, as their backgrounds, experiences, and motivations

30

Mount Ararat is symbolic to Armenians because it is perceived as historically being part of Western
Armenia and is best known as the legendary site where Noah’s Ark landed.

31

Such agencies include Ani Tour, Barev [Hello] Armenia,and One Way Tour. This link is from Ani
Tour’s website: http://anitour.am/en/tour.php?!western_armenia. Accessed June 26, 2020.
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for urging others to return to the Republic of Armenia also vary. The Armenian state is playing a
critical role of setting parameters of cultural and political belonging. Sociologist Philip Abrams
(2006, 122) viewed the state as being, “neither a thing nor a political reality that stands behind the
state system,” such as government agencies. Instead, he proposed that researchers should,
“seriously examine the idea [original emphasis] of the state, which has been so influential, but
that we should suspend belief [original emphasis] in the real existence of the state as a backstage
political reality” (Abrams 2006, 122). Some scholars have also commented upon the
performativity of the state (Aretxaga 2003; Basu 2015). Basque anthropologist Begoña Aretxaga
added to Abrams’ state as an idea, namely, “to emphasize the notion of a powerful state devoid of
content, which then serves as a screen for a variety of identifications and as a performative mask
[Abrams 1988] for a variety of power discourses and practices” (Aretxaga 2003, 394). The idea
of the state in this case study is encapsulated by the former Armenian Ministry of Diaspora’s
(currently Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs) calls for diasporan Armenians
to not only “return” to a socially constructed homeland, but to socially and, perhaps more
crucially, financially contribute to its development as well. However, the idea of the Armenian
state has been formless for so many generations since the Armenian genocide of 1915, even when
the Republic of Armenia had its own physical territory and internationally recognized
sovereignty. Ethno-nationalism, in this case, was also formed by elites, such as government
officials. According to anthropologist Mark Whitaker’s account of the story of Sri Lankan
journalist, Dharmeratnam Sivaram, Sivaram felt that ethnically based nationalism “cannot be
understood separately from the state...because nationalism is actually a way of organizing states
that achieves, for the elites that run them, maximal efficiency….and, for them, the greatest
return” (Whitaker 2006, 162). I suggest that in this case study, Sivaram’s words apply to
Armenian government officials, particularly the former Ministry of Diaspora and President, as
rhetoric influences popularity and electability, or the greatest return for them. I hold that the
“idea” of the Armenian state is wielded indiscriminately, yet intentionally, by state and non-state
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officials, which can lead to both positive and painful experiences, as found in my ethnographic
research.
The performativity of the state expressed by Aretxaga is evident in the many press
releases, photo ops, speeches, and presence of Armenian state officials, particularly the first
Minister of Diaspora, at Syrian Armenian events, such as charity fairs. Aradhana Sharma and
Akhil Gupta added, “how people perceive the state, how their understandings are shaped by their
particular locations and intimate and embodied encounters with state processes and officials, and
how the state manifests itself in their lives” (Sharma and Gupta 2006, 11). Instead of viewing
states “as pre-constituted institutions that perform given functions, they are produced through
everyday practices and encounters and through public cultural representations and performances”
(Sharma and Gupta, 27). Summarily, what anthropology brings to understanding how state
institutions, practices, and forms of knowledge shape people’s daily lives is through
understanding how the state and its boundaries are culturally constructed and who is included in
the state (or the role of cultural difference in forming and informing states) (Sharma and Gupta,
11). I agree with Sharma and Gupta’s assertion that it is important to understand who is included
in the role of the state. In this case study, there are multiple actors and stakeholders at play:
Armenian state and non-state officials and employees who experienced growing up in the Soviet
Union, some of whom were descended from Armenian genocide survivors; Syrian state officials;
Syrian Armenian migrant women living in Armenia; local Armenians (i.e., native-born Armenian
citizens from the Republic of Armenia); and the amorphous Armenian diaspora. The two main
actors/stakeholders that this dissertation focuses on are Armenian state and non-state officials and
employees and Syrian Armenian migrant women. Sometimes, these categories are not clear cut--I
interviewed several Syrian Armenian non-state officials in Armenia, for example. Additionally,
some NGO employees are also local Armenians. Despite the multiplicity of backgrounds,
interests, and storylines, Syrian Armenian migrant women end up caught in the middle of this
push/pull web between home in Syria versus a socially constructed homeland in Armenia, with
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little qualitative research done on their lived experiences or perspectives in Armenia. I argue that
Syrian Armenian migrant women living in Armenia are also coerced into this performativity,
through guest appearances on local Armenian TV shows and interviews with local media outlets,
or even participating in charity fairs. For example, Yoland, a middle-aged Syrian Armenian
woman who co-owns a pastry business in Yerevan appeared on Armenian national TV in
December 2019. The hosts interviewed her about her escape from Aleppo and how she started her
business, and Yoland answered the questions while demonstrating how to decorate holiday
cookies. Additionally, on September 22, 2020, a few days before the most recent war between
Armenia and Azerbaijan over Artsakh (the Armenian term for Nagorno Karabakh Republic),
Arayik Harutyunyan, President of Artsakh, gave an award to Yoland and her husband for being
“Heroes of Our Time.” In a tearful speech, Yoland thanked the committee and her husband then
gave a small speech, code-switching to Eastern Armenian in the beginning and then immediately
switching to Western Armenian. I transcribed and translated the 1-minute speech and am sharing
part of it that I thought was the most discursively intriguing regarding belonging. He said:
We are Syrian Armenians, Armenians, we are from Western Armenia. For 100 years, we
lived in Syria, we fled [Western Armenia] in 1915, and we experienced many difficulties
there, in Arab countries. Our fathers [forebears] lived in the deserts and we were born
there [in Syria]. I want to say we never forgot our fatherland and our father’s and
mother’s language. Armenia was always in our dreams. But unfortunately, 100 years
passed, and we established our work and were successful in Syria. In 2012, we fled to
Armenia, leaving all our wealth behind, and we started from zero, my wife and me. I
thank my wife for already having these skills [pastry baking] and we work hand in hand
(Yoland’s husband, to an audience at the “Hero of Our Time” awards ceremony hosted
by Artsakh President Arayik Harutyunyan, September 22, 2020).
Here, Yoland’s husband tells the audience that Armenia was always the couple’s dream, even
after a century living in Arab-majority countries like Syria. The “we” in the beginning of his
speech was not referring to him and his wife--it was referring to their respective ancestors and
other Western Armenian genocide survivors and their descendants displaced to Syria. His speech
was heartfelt, yet as the listener, I also felt it was dialectical with the other audience members,
including the President of Artsakh and the Catholicos of Armenia. I also thought her husband’s
code-switching was interesting, beginning with Eastern Armenian and quickly switching to
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Western Armenian, as if he were trying to connect more with a predominantly Eastern Armenianspeaking audience, including state officials and the highest-ranking religious figure in the
Armenian Apostolic Church. Yoland’s speech was entirely in Western Armenian, a nd I felt her
husband’s speech was also significant because he emphasized the fact that her pastry-baking
skills jump started the business plan in Yerevan. The performativity on the part of state and nonstate officials is not malicious in nature, but I would argue that it is self-serving on the part of the
state. Would Yoland and her husband have received this award, for example, had they not
socioeconomically contributed to Armenia’s development, if they were not entrepreneurs? Would
they still be valued and respected as fellow ethnic Armenians coming home to a socially
constructed ancestral homeland?
The relevance of the Armenian state, then, for my case study, and its role in setting
parameters of cultural and political belonging is primarily that the state is paradoxically viewed as
both “contested and fragile,” yet also yielding “an illusion of cohesion” (Sharma and Gupta 2006,
11). I assert that the Armenian state is paradoxically viewed by many members of the Armenian
diaspora as being “contested and fragile” due to the fragility expressed in state discourses over
loss of land and lives, dating back to the Armenian genocide in 1915. It is “contested” because its
citizens or citizens-in-the-making (for example, Syrian Armenians) are constantly grappling with
their role within, and most importantly, responsibilities to, the Armenian state, as evidenced by
the introductory quote by President Sarkissian. Furthermore, Armenian diaspora understandings
of the state as “fragile” relate to the notions of the state put forth by the aforementioned state
theorists in the sense that the idea of the state is also fragile and not concrete. While there is a
physical territory for the Republic of Armenia and ethnic Armenian citizens (both native-born
and diasporans-turned-citizens), both the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian diaspora (as an
entity) are still pushing the idea of the Armenian state. This physical state is still fragile in the
sense of border security (two closed borders out of four, with Azerbaijan and Turkey),
emigration, and “brain drain.”
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The state creates parameters of belonging, and my research shows that belonging has
changed in Armenia in response to geopolitical instability and emigration. Here, I utilize Diane
King’s (2010) definition of “belonging,” which:
can mean fitting in, feeling at home, feeling a part; this kind of belonging is profoundly
social. Belongings can be possessions, objects closely associated with one’s deepest
notions of identity. Both kinds of belongings pertain to people, kindreds, ethnic groups,
and nations (and/or states) they call their own…. belonging is rendered in its complexity,
with its agonies as well as its joys. Belongings of both kinds are emplaced and
territorialized (King 2010, 1).
In this dissertation, I examine both the social and physical aspects of “fitting in, feeling at home”
as well as the complexity of belonging--its pain and comfort. Citizens in modern states are also
ideally “made legible” (Scott 1998) through documents, such as a birth certificate, nationality
document, or identity card, which is evidenced by my research (Chapter 3) with Syrian Armenian
migrants in Armenia needing to provide documented "proof" of their Armenian ethnicity to
acquire Armenian citizenship and its associated benefits.
The kind of descent reckoning that is found in Armenia and in much of the population
living outside Armenia is patriliny. According to patrilineal descent reckoning, “all persons
inherit membership in a patriline through their father, but only sons can transmit it to their
offspring” (Stone 2016, 61). Patrilineal identity categories were transmitted over the course of
five generations among ethnic Armenians living in Syria and other places in the diaspora. Ethnic
Armenians, whether descended from genocide survivors or not, whether their father or mother is
Armenian, whether they are from the Armenian diaspora or the Republic of Armenia,
indiscriminately recognize each other as kin and are rendered legible by the state’s citizenship
process should they choose Armenian citizenship. However, this recognition (socially and
legally) is not necessarily conflict-free. Furthermore, the Armenian state’s anxiety about
emigration has expanded upon patrilineal descent reckoning like Soviet Armenia’s erosion of the
importance of patriarchy and traditional Armenian gender roles in the early years of the Soviet
Union (Matossian 1962). Mary K. Matossian noted that, “the communists tried to transform the
traditional family and tried to develop in individuals outside loyalties which supplemented or
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supplanted traditional family loyalties...the communists tried to ‘emancipate’ Armenian women
by educating them, encouraging them to take jobs outside the home, and drawing them into the
arena of public life” (Matossian 1962, 63). Building on Matossian’s work, Stephanie Platz
observed that, “the relationship between the extended family and the state in the articulation of
ethnic identity is dynamic, multidirectional, and often, ambivalent...Kinship may be invoked as a
symbol of national survival, or as an impediment to personal achievement, economic
development, and independent statehood” (Platz 1995, 30). Bringing women into public spaces
and into the paid labor force did not change how they were understood legally as citizens, but
socially, at least for Syrian Armenian migrant women living in Armenia, it changed gender
dynamics at home (with spouses) and within host Armenian society in the sense that it showed
their worthiness or economic contributions to Armenian society (which will be explored in
Chapter 7). As Matossian and Platz were writing about fieldwork in Soviet or immediately postSoviet Armenia, my work builds on theirs in the sense that I agree patrilineal identity categories
were not erased in Armenia after the collapse of the Soviet Union but are less salient now due to
state anxiety about emigration and dire geopolitical circumstances, particularly since September
2020. For example, according to my ethnographic data, when I asked Karolina (UNHCR) and
Arusyag (Mission Armenia) about whether or not it matters if a Syrian Armenian person or child
has an Armenian father when applying for citizenship, both responded that it did not matter, but
would be easier if the father was Armenian (as applying for Armenian citizenship is predicated
upon the ability to provide documentation of Armenian ethnicity, and as Armenian surnames are
patrilineal, this provides "proof" of ethnicity). Arusyag said if one does not have an Armenian
father, “it can take longer to get citizenship” and Karolina said parentage of applicants, “doesn’t
really matter as long as you can prove on paper ethnic Armenian descent.” Although the child’s
surname could be non-Armenian, the child is still rendered legible by the state (Scott 1998) as a
potential ethnic Armenian citizen.
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I add that identity categories have been expanded by the state to include anyone who is
of ethnic Armenian descent. Patrilineal descent reckoning is still status quo in Armenia
(patrilineal surnames on birth certificates), but it has also expanded to include any "proof" of
Armenian ethnicity (such as baptismal records), as illustrated in my ethnographic fieldwork with
people who fled from or voluntarily left the Middle East to settle in the South Caucasus. For
example, Amina, the Syrian Armenian woman who married a Syrian Arab man and their daughter
received Armenian citizenship because the Armenian identity category was passed down from
mother to daughter. In this example, Amina said that her father is a Christian Syrian Arab man,
but did not disclose her husband’s religion, according to my interview notes. Consequently, I
view the Armenian state as having to liberalize identity categories and belonging to make space
for constructing new and potential members of the Armenian state.
While descent in Armenia today does follow patrilineal descent reckoning as status quo, 32
it does not mean that the potential for citizenship is excluded for individuals with mixed
Armenian parentage, particularly if the father is not Armenian. Ethnic identity categories and
belonging in the modern Armenian state are open to anyone who can provide "proof" of
Armenian ethnicity, as shown in Chapter 3 and Amina’s case. In other words, Armenian state
anxiety about emigration and calls for repatriation obfuscates group membership vis-a-vis the
legibility of citizenship. Even if one’s mother is Armenian and their father is not, if the mother
can provide "proof" of Armenian ethnicity, the child of that union can be considered to be a
potential Armenian citizen. In other words, anyone who can provide "proof" of Armenian
ethnicity can and should belong to the Armenian state, but this is not true in practice. Not

32

For example, while applying for a gym membership in Yerevan, I was asked for my first name, my
surname, and my father’s first name. Initially, I misunderstood and entered my first name, “Anahid,” my
middle name, “Mari,” and my surname, “Matossian.” The gym staff wanted my first name, my father’s first
name, “Viken” (pronounced in Eastern Armenian as “Vigen”), and my surname. Instead of “Anahid Mari
Matossian,” I was read as “Anahid Vigeni Matossian” and given a strange look when I offered “Mari”
instead of “Viken”/”Vigen.”
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everyone who is eligible for membership (via the gradient of documented "proof" of ethnicity) in
the Armenian state is accepted. Tamar Shirinian, an Armenian American cultural anthropologist,
observed that queer individuals, for example, threaten the homogeneity of the Armenian state as
they cannot pass on recognized kinship categories to their offspring, so in the eyes of the
Armenian state, queer individuals threaten its sovereignty (Shirinian 2018). Additionally, concern
about emigration (Shirinan 2016, 2018), primarily of male seasonal labor in Russia, also
highlights the importance of patrilineal descent reckoning in contemporary times, as well as
aggression with Azerbaijan. If the young men are leaving, who is going to generate new
Armenians for the body politic? This resonates with the disdain expressed by several local NGO
workers described in Chapter 3, towards Syrian Armenian young men (under the age of 27) who
did not choose to become Armenian citizens (and avoid military service in Armenia).
I assert that Syrian Armenian migrant women are “hailed” by the Armenian state to
return to their socially constructed ancestral “homeland.” Louis Althusser’s concept of being
“hailed by the state” applies here, in the sense that the Armenian state actively “hails” migrants of
ethnic Armenian descent, but this also leads to unintended consequences, as will be described
ethnographically later in this chapter. Althusser’s “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses”
chapter in The Anthropology of the State: A Reader, argued that “ideology” refers to a
“representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals in their real condition of existence”
and that ideology interpellates individuals as subjects (Althusser 2006, 100). The phrase, “hailing
by the state,” refers to his notion that ideology “acts or functions in such a way that it ‘recruits’
subjects among the individuals or transforms the individuals into subjects by that very precise
operation which I have called interpellation [original emphasis] or hailing, and which can be
imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police hailing, ‘Hey, you there!’”
(Althusser, 105). Althusser’s “hailing by the state” applies to my case study of Syrian Armenian
women’s socioeconomic integration and home-making practices in the Armenian state through
Armenian state (and institutional) messages calling Syrian Armenians to come “home.” In
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addition, Benedict Anderson asserted that the nation is an “imagined community” because it is
imagined as both limited and sovereign (Anderson 2006, 6) and that nations are imagined
because, “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellowmembers, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their
communion” (Anderson, 6). Additionally, Brooke et. al.’s edited volume, State Formations:
Global Histories and Cultures of Statehood, discusses memberships in the constitution of the
state as: involving “negotiations, claims, and counterclaims: if the state makes claims on its
member, they in turn make claims on the state, or perhaps dodge its agendas” and that
membership in the state examines “the ways in which subjects and citizens engage with the state”
(Brooke et. al. 2018, 12). This directly correlates to my case study in the sense that the Armenian
state is actively making claims on its members (current Republic of Armenia citizens) and
potential members (diasporan Armenians, in this case Syrian Armenians) through calls for
repatriation and beckoning both categories of members home to Armenia, as a duty to their
ancestral socially constructed homeland. Both member categories also make claims on the state,
as the state offers accelerated asylum procedures and the potential for citizenship for anyone of
ethnic Armenian descent. Members and potential members make claims on the Armenian state
through citizenship, visits to Armenia, fundraising for Armenia, and volunteering (for example,
an organization based in Armenia called Birthright Armenia, like Birthright Israel). Thus,
diasporan Armenians (including Syrian Armenians) are “hailed by the state,” but they also need
the state.
Belonging and coming home usually connotes a positive sentiment (Ilcan 2002), but it
can also result in rejection and disillusionment (Constable 1999; Shami 1998; Laycock 2012,
2016). Seteney Shami is a Circassian anthropologist from Jordan who conducted fieldwork with
Circassian returnees from Jordan to the North Caucasus. She observed that a common ethnicity is
expected to constitute “sameness” or a familiarity, but this was not the case with Circassian
returnees in the North Caucasus. According to Shami, “the more salient experience of most of
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those who journey to the Caucasus, men and women, is generally one of shock, of nonrecognition, and the encounter of ‘the self as other’” (Shami 1998, 628). She continued to
describe the tension between Circassian returnees and locals in the North Caucasus, who
experienced difficulties in finding commonalities with one another. Like my observations of the
expectations of many Syrian Armenian women not being met upon settlement in Armenia, as
well as shock, Shami noted parallels among Circassian returnees. Specifically, she states that,
“the coming together in the very location where Circassians expect to find commonality and a
naturalized ethnicity, instead generates an experience of difference, disjuncture, and a sense of
rupture--not the portrait of ethno-nationalism portrayed in scholarly or popular representations”
(Shami 1998, 630). The experiences of “difference, disjuncture, and a sense of rupture” among
Syrian Armenians in Armenia were unexpected by many interlocutors and locals, despite the
history of previous repatriation attempts to Armenia. Equally, expectations of finding
commonalities were also met, to a certain degree. Both local and Syrian Armenians were
descendants of survivors from the same historical traumatic event, the Armenian genocide; they
share mutually intelligible dialects, with stark grammatical and vocabulary differences; and most
(though not all) share a common religion, membership in the Armenian Apostolic Church. It is
also important to emphasize that this relationship (between locals and Syrian Armenians) is not
entirely negative. But this tension is often excluded or overlooked in contemporary literature
about the experiences of Syrian Armenians in Armenia. Syrian Armenian women have not been
interviewed in-depth or their stories shared beyond the opinions of Western NGO employees and
volunteers working in Armenia. Syrian Armenian women’s perspectives and experiences are
generally refracted through Western humanitarian lenses and have been since the aftermath of the
genocide. However, in the five generations since the Armenian genocide (the initial historic
traumatic event), home was experienced differently by descendants of survivors in Syria and
Soviet and post-Soviet Armenia. These different experiences are reflected socially in the
perceived tension among Syrian Armenian migrants in Armenia, local Armenians, largely local
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and Western NGO employees working with Syrian Armenians, and non-Syrian diasporan
Armenian repatriates in Yerevan.
Syrian Armenian migrant women are being instrumentalized by the Armenian state in a
similar fashion and are used to quell local discontent about Syrian Armenian migrants “taking”
scarce jobs from local Armenians. In other words, Syrian Armenian migrant women are useful to
the Armenian state because they are potential or actual citizens and can provide economic
benefits to the state. Michael Herzfeld observed that, “the state uses a language of kin, family,
and body to lend immediacy to its pronouncements” (Herzfeld 1997, 2). “Cultural intimacy,”
then, “is the recognition of those aspects of a cultural identity that are considered a source of
embarrassment but that nevertheless provide insiders with their assurance of common sociality”
(Herzfeld, 3). While the abstract nation-as-family metaphor (Herzfeld 1997; Carsten 2004, 136;
Delaney 1991) is certainly compelling for this project, I feel it does not adequately explain how
the “everyday forms of relation among members of the nation are structured by demands,
expectations, obligations” (Shirinian 2018, 7). Khachig Tölölyan, a renowned Diaspora Studies
scholar, adds that:
By Armenian standards, being Armenian requires more than ethnic belonging, citizenship
to the republic, or a claim of identity. It necessitates doing for Armenia by committing to
fulfill responsibilities to the Armenian national cause, to work to assure the nation’s
survival--these obligations, even in the diaspora, are the medium through which
Armenians think of themselves as kin (Tölölyan 1996, 14-15).
However, as Tölölyan and Armenian American anthropologist Tamar Shirinian observe, ethnic
belonging requires a commitment to fulfilling certain obligations of the Armenian state and
national cause. The Armenian diaspora, as President Sarkissian and the three Ministers of
Diaspora claim, is responsible for repatriating to their rightful homeland, the Republic of
Armenia, and more importantly, contributing to its financial success. However, even this message
(diaspora contributing to Armenia’s financial success) has also transformed significantly within a
decade of the Ministry of Diaspora’s existence and operation under three separate leaders.
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As will be demonstrated throughout this chapter, the Armenian state is instrumentalizing
notions of the genocide, using language such as hayrenagitsner (“compatriots”), and urging
diasporan Armenians, including Syrian Armenians, to come home to their hayrenik
(“fatherland”), thereby using “a language of kin.” The opening quote to this chapter, by current
Armenian President Armen Sarkissian, spoken at an Armenian Studies conference at the
University of Southern California (USC), literally declares, “You are the sons and daughters of
Armenia….no matter where you live...you have to believe that you are part of this great nation,”
hence a high-ranking state official using language of kin to appeal to an audience of diasporan
Armenians. However, the use of the term “fatherland” is itself contentious. Dawn Chatty points
out that for Syrian Armenians, “Syria could not be the first fatherland because of the moral
imperative to preserve the attachment to the imagined Armenian homeland rather than because of
perception of subalternation” (Chatty 2010, 32). My point of departure from Chatty’s statement is
that while this does hold true according to my ethnographic fieldwork among people who were
impelled to migrate from the Middle East to the South Caucasus, my research has shown
nostalgia for and attachment to Syria is just as powerful, if not more, for many Syrian Armenian
migrant women in Armenia than Armenia itself. Additionally, Tamar Shirinian points out that,
“Armenians in Armenia treat each other as if they were among kin--they are intimate in that they
assume a shared narrative based on a sense of genealogical belonging to a ‘nation-family’: being
of the same nation and sharing a history, origins, a set of values, and relatives” (Shirinian 2018,
2). Furthermore, “Armenians perceptually conceive of the nation as continuous with an ancient
past and as an extended family in which members of the nation can all trace genealogical
belonging to this past” (Shirinian, 3). Shirinian’s ethnographic fieldwork with the queer
community of Yerevan and internship with an LGBTQIA NGO, PINK Armenia, led her to
conclude that, “the notion of the caring nation-family provides Armenians a sense of belonging,
but it also produces its own margins, marking as genealogically perverse those who do not meet
its expectations of propriety” (Shirinian, 3). Queer individuals in Armenia, described as “those
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whose failure to fulfill national expectations” [i.e., of becoming potential patrogenitors of the
Armenian nation], have an andaneli [unbearable] experience of the nation-family. While
Armenia’s general homophobic stance towards queer individuals is certainly more andaneli than
the experience of cishet ethnic Armenian migrant women from Syria living in Armenia,
Shirinian’s ethnography indicates the limitations of the nation-family.
The Armenian state is making a claim that Syrian Armenians are repatriates (as
discussed in Chapter 3) and are provided with the opportunity to acquire Armenian citizenship if
migrants can legibly (Scott 1998) identify themselves through documentation of Armenian
ethnicity (for example, birth certificates listing "proof" of Armenian ethnicity). I question whether
this claim on membership is sincere on the part of the state, and conversely, on the part of Syrian
Armenian migrant women as well--what are the reasons for coming to Armenia in the first place?
Is it because Armenia is constructed as their homeland and they genuinely identify with state
claims for membership? Or is this the most practical solution for surviving a horrifying reality in
Syria, by having the option to acquire Armenian citizenship rather than risk a tumultuous and
expensive journey to Europe or a third country, as some have done?
5.2.1 Return, as Constructed by the State
Anthropologists writing in the topical area of return migration have grappled with the
concept of “return,” in that “return” migrations are not always idyllic and welcoming (Allen and
Turton 1996; Constable 1999; Hammond 1999; Hirsch 2011). Diasporas also play a role in
discussions of “return” (Clifford 1994; Safran 1991; Tölölyan 1996). According to anthropologist
Takeyuki Tsuda’s fieldwork among Brazilian-born Japanese returning to Japan:
Although many return migrants feel a nostalgic ethnic affiliation to their countries of
ancestral origin, because they have been living outside their ethnic homeland for
generations, they are essentially returning to a foreign country from which their ancestors
came. As a result, diasporic homecomings are often ambivalent, if not negative
experiences for many ethnic return migrants. Despite initial expectations that their
presumed ethnic affinity with the host society (as “co-ethnics”) would facilitate their
social integration, they are often ethnically excluded as foreigners in their ancestral
homelands because of the alien cultural differences they have acquired while living
abroad for generations (Tsuda 2009, 5).
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As noted in this dissertation, Syrian Armenian migrant women who have “returned” to Armenia
experienced both what I term “painful belonging” and a welcoming reception. I also found
ambivalence of diasporic homecomings described by Tsuda evident in my ethnographic research,
made even more jarring by state and NGO interventions in citizenship construction--Syrian
Armenian women’s contributions, particularly women-owned small business owners,
contributions to Armenia’s socioeconomic development. While there is indeed evidence of social
integration in this case study (i.e., feelings of being “at home” and surrounded by other Christian
Armenians), there is also exclusion based on real or perceived differences (such as sociolinguistic
discrimination and gender dynamics concerning employment). Tim Allen and David Turton
noted that mass voluntary return could have devastating consequences, and in most cases, returns
were not even voluntary. The people Allen worked with, the Mursi of southwestern Ethiopia, told
him they were constantly “in search for cool ground,” in other words, where they could find
safety. Allen and Turton noted that “going home” may not be the “natural” outcome of population
displacement for displaced people, as “attachment to territory is not the only source of group
identity” (Allen and Turton 1996, 12). Furthermore, displaced people may view their ethnic
identity not as given in nature, but as actually quite problematic and fragile: “Simply ‘going
home’ in the sense of taking up residence in one’s former territory after a forced exile will not
automatically recreate a sense of belonging and of moral obligation to neighbors and kin” (Allen
and Turton 1995, 12). Particularly in post-war environments, if the return is to an area with a
severely destroyed infrastructure, these communities are already fragile and need to build
themselves from scratch (Allen and Turton, 12). The authors also conclude that the idea that
“return” is the most desirable solution to refugee movements contains the “implicit assumption
that a given population has its own proper place, territory, or homeland,” essentially carrying with
it a Western-centric bias (Allen and Turton, 10). This resonates with my research in the sense that
all Syrian Armenian migrant women I interviewed did not feel an unwavering connection to their
socially constructed homeland, the Republic of Armenia. In fact, as expressed earlier in this
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chapter, some felt unwelcome, experienced discrimination, and uncomfortable. Armenia as an
ancestral “homeland” seemed to be more of an afterthought in some cases, whereas Syria was
nostalgically remembered, albeit with a recognition that it is unsafe. However, nearly all the
Syrian Armenian migrant women I interviewed reported they felt safe in Armenia, and it could be
said they were successful in searching for “cool ground.”
I argue that the repatriation as homecoming model championed by the Armenian state
largely ignores the lived experience of many Syrian Armenian migrant women living in Armenia.
Instead of a homecoming, this experience should be viewed as a practical solution to a
complicated conflict. Laura Hammond’s work with Tigrayans between Sudan and Ethiopia also
notes the dangerous assumption of a happy ending to return migration. Hammond (1999) offers
an alternative to the repatriation as homecoming model by showing that the assumption that it is
desirable and possible for returnees to get back what they had before becoming refugees is
problematic--“whether a returnee comes back to their birthplace or settles in an entirely new
environment, they consider return to be more of a new beginning than a return to the past”
(Hammond 1999, 299). She argues that just as different world views, visions of the future and
survival strategies in the returnee settlement reflect the various opportunities and constraints
presented by that environment, “these forms of culture change and community formation may be
similarly constructed even for those who do return to their birthplaces” (Hammond 1999, 229).
Hammond further argues that in many cases, returnees only return in the sense that they
physically return to their country of origin, but this place of origin may be no longer where they
have ancestral or kinship ties” (Hammond, 235). I build on Hammond’s work in the sense that
Syrian Armenian migrant women are indeed returning to their socially constructed country of
origin, but not to their country of birth. While they may indeed have ancestral and kinship ties to
the Republic of Armenia because of forced migration and displacement, this territory may not
feel like home to many Syrian Armenian migrant women in the same way that Syria has felt like
home over the course of five generations since the Armenian genocide.
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My research on the dissatisfaction, awkwardness, and discomfort expressed by some
Syrian Armenian migrant women resonates with William Safran’s “six features of diaspora,”
although I do not agree with all the six proposed features. William Safran (1991) addressed the
emotional pull and nostalgia of diasporas, and consequently, of return migration. Safran described
six features of diasporas: 1) they, or their ancestors, have been dispersed from a specific original
“center” to two or more “peripheral” regions; 2) they retain a collective memory, vision, or myths
about their original homeland (physical location, history, and achievements); 3) they believe they
are not fully accepted by their host society and feel partly alienated from it; 4) they regard their
ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and a place to which they or their descendants would
eventually return; 5) they believe they should collectively be committed to the maintenance or
restoration of their original homeland and its safety and prosperity; and 6) they continue to relate,
personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one way or another (Safran 1991, 84). He also
pointed to the Armenian and Jewish diasporas as fitting in with his description of an ideal
diaspora. In terms of return as a concept, Safran noted that the return of most diasporas can be
seen as making life more tolerable and going home to the utopia of the homeland (Safran, 94).
However, James Clifford (1994) argued that no society can possibly be expected to qualify as a
diaspora according to all Safran’s features. Clifford argued that diasporas connect multiple
communities of a dispersed population and transnational connections linking diasporas do not
need to be articulated primarily through a real or symbolic homeland (Clifford 1994, 306).
Diasporas have also rarely founded nation-states (like Israel) and he refers to these homecomings
as the negation of diaspora (Clifford, 307). Marisa Della Gatta (2017), who also worked with
Syrian Armenians in Armenia, added that the “ancestral homeland is not fixed, but continuously
reimagined and reconstructed” (Della Gatta 2017, 2). Based on my research, I agree that Safran’s
description of an ideal diaspora does fit most Armenian diaspora populations, such as Armenian
Americans being encouraged by the Armenian state to return to Armenia, work there, and their
moral obligation to financially contribute to the struggling homeland. I disagree that this is true
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for all Syrian Armenian migrant women who have settled in Armenia and agree with Della
Gatta’s assertion that the Armenian diaspora is “continuously reimagined and reconstructed.” Nir
Cohen’s work in Israel highlights similar state schemes evaluating highly skilled returnee
worthiness [my emphasis] based on their potential economic contributions to Israel (Cohen 2009,
Cohen 2020). As my data shows throughout this dissertation, some Syrian Armenian migrant
women truly do not feel fully accepted by their host society and feel partly alienated from it. I
disagree with the repatriation=happy homecoming model as it is not indicative of everyday lived
experiences for all Armenian diaspora members who have made the decision, or were otherwise
compelled to, move to Armenia. I argue that overwhelmingly, Armenia presents a practical, in
some cases temporary, solution to a complicated conflict. This coincides with the Armenian
state’s plan to beckon diasporan Armenians home to Armenia. The notion that Armenia is the
“true, ideal home and a place to which they and their descendants would eventually return”
neglects the nostalgia, pain, and collective memories of many Syrian Armenian migrant women
who feel more connected to Syria, a home constructed (socially and physically) over five
generations, than to Armenia.
Given the fact that the above discussion sheds light on hostile forms of return migration
and conceptual underpinnings behind diasporic pulls to come home, what happens when certain
groups return to their perceived ancestral homelands, in a relatively safe environment? Fran
Markowitz and Anders Stefansson’s edited volume, Homecomings: Unsettling Paths of Return,
posited that, “homecomings have unsettling consequences for social science as well as for
returnees and populations who have stayed behind in their homelands--in the course of protracted
absence, home develops, and so too do the people living away from home” (Markowitz and
Stefansson 2004, 4). Similar to Jansen’s perception of examining home in a future-oriented sense,
Markowitz and Stefansson’s edited book, Homecomings: Unsettling Paths of Return, suggested
that studies of return should analyze homecomings as, “future-oriented social projects that are
based on continuous emotional attachment to natal or ancestral homelands, and which result in
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complex, dramatic encounters with institutions, social conditions, and cultural traditions in these
places” (Markowitz and Stefansson, 5). I situate my project theoretically in Markowitz and
Stefansson’s future-oriented analysis of homecomings, but I also argue that it is equally important
to understand the larger social constructs behind homecomings such as the importance of the past
(particularly memory of the Armenian genocide) and memories of a secondary home constructed
socially and physically in Syria over the course of five generations since the initial displacement.
My research shows the “dramatic encounters with institutions, social conditions, and cultural
traditions'' in Armenia, particularly in relation to sentiments regarding integration (local NGO
workers and Syrian Armenian migrant women). These encounters are not only happy and
peaceful, but also awkward, frustrating, and even painful, even when settling in one’s constructed
ancestral homeland.
Other examples of problematic return migration include cases in Bosnia-Herzegovina
(Huttunen 2010), diasporan Circassians in the North Caucasus (Shami 1998), Asia Minor Greeks
in Greece generations after displacement (Hirschon 1998), and Japanese Brazilian factory
workers in Japan (Tsuda 2003). Conversely, return migration is also viewed in a positive light,
such as voluntourism by young diasporan Armenians visiting Armenia (Darieva 2011, 2013). As
mentioned in Chapter 3, return migration to Armenia in the mid to late 1940s was not entirely a
positive experience for diasporan returnees during Nerkaght (Laycock 2012, 2016; Pattie 1999).
To reiterate, from 1945-1947, the Soviet Republic of Armenia beckoned diasporan Armenians
from the Middle East and all over the world to return home, but reality in Soviet Armenia was
disappointing and impoverished. Joann Laycock’s (2016) examination of repatriate narratives
revealed divisions both between the homeland and diaspora and within the diaspora--thus, “demythologizing” return (Laycock 2016, 142). Disillusionment with not having expectations met
during return migration is also echoed in other anthropological case studies (Shami 1998;
Hirschon 1998), as well as my research. Return, as constructed by the Armenian state, is “demythologized” by many Syrian Armenian migrant women upon arrival in their socially
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constructed homeland, namely economic disparities, poverty, and high rent prices relative to low
wages. Rene Hirschon’s fieldwork with Asia Minor Greeks in Greece, descendants of the 1923
“population transfer” between Greece and Turkey sheds light on the presumption that the two
populations--Asia Minor Greeks and local Greeks--in Kokkinia, Greece would have integrated
quite smoothly over the course of several generations. However, “by preserving a sense of
separate identity in the face of close similarity, the residents of Kokkinia had worked continually
at constructing a ‘boundary’: in this way, they came to constitute a group distinguishable in
conceptual terms but not by readily observable criteria” (Hirschon 1998, 5). Through consciously
maintaining a separate identity, even though there is a shared ethno-religious identity between the
two groups, Asia Minor Greeks can be seen as a minority group of Greeks within Greek society
(Hirschon, 5). Conceptually, this applies to my dissertation research, particularly about some of
those interlocutors who were happy to be home in Armenia and relieved at not seeing any more
Muslims or Arabs. I have not noticed Syrian Armenian women relinquishing their Syrian identity
either. What I have heard is comparable to Hirschon’s study, particularly regarding the fact that
some Syrian Armenians believe their cuisine and manners are superior to Hayasdansi (Armenian
from Armenia) cuisine and manners (particularly regarding customer service and the fact that the
perceived blandness of Hayasdansi food is attributed to a Russian influence).
5.2.2 “Yerazes er” [It was my dream]: Ethnographic Data about Belonging
When asked how Syrian Armenian women feel about migrating to Armenia, the majority
replied they were happy to be in their homeland and felt safe in Armenia, which is unsurprising as
many had just fled from the Syrian conflict. Several interlocutors (Mane, Karine, and Berjouhi)
mentioned they were happy to be around other Armenians, without any Arabs around. As
Berjouhi stated, “Life is very different in Armenia. Meg azk eh. Polors hay en” [“It is one nation.
We are all Armenians”]. Mane, a middle-aged Armenian woman originally from Lebanon but
married to a Syrian Armenian man, recalled sitting in a taxi in Yerevan and happily realizing that,
“this [the driver] could be my brother!” implying that locals are her brothers and sisters [fellow
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ethnic Armenians] and she feels welcome in Armenia. Siranoush, a Syrian Armenian woman, and
Diana from UNHCR commented that Armenia is yergrort hayrenik, a “second homeland” for
Syrian Armenians. Hermine, added, “Ampoghch kaghake hay ga” [“There are Armenians all over
the city (Yerevan)].” Nanor said she was, “happy to be in the hayrenik [homeland, literally
fatherland], and after 3 years in Armenia, Yerevansis [people living in Yerevan] accepted that it is
the Syrian Armenians’ hayrenik as well.” Talin said she had no problems with local Armenians,
because “it is a similar culture and is our hayrenik.” As mentioned in Chapter 3, Karun asked,
rhetorically, “Why come to Armenia? It is the best move for every Armenian.” Others
commented on Armenia’s natural beauty and safety, at least relative to Syria, particularly Aleppo.
Arpi said that she is treated well by locals, and “this is our country, it’s a beautiful city.” Nuritsa
added simply, that “Armenia is very beautiful, and we feel safe.” However, she told me she was
asked by some locals when she first came to Armenia, “Inchou touk yegak Hayasdan? [Why did
you come to Armenia?].” Her reply was, “Armenia is our homeland. Where else are we going to
go?” Like Arpi, Takouhi said that she had good relations with locals.
Knar, a Syrian Armenian woman, expressed her sentiments that, “Yerazes er. Midkes hos
eh” [“It was my dream (living in Armenia). My mind was here”], particularly after a family trip
to Armenia in 2012 for her niece’s baptism. Shakeh said, “It was my dream to live here, rare to
see kids play in Lebanon. There were no gardens in Lebanon,” referring to the layover country
she had stayed in prior to coming to Armenia. However, Armenia was not the yeraz, or dream, for
everyone, as will be discussed below.
Nazani simply stated that “Yerevan wasn’t my dream,” indicating that Yerevan did not
meet her expectations. Santoukhd also had quite a bit to say about the sentiments of belonging in
Armenia. We sat down for a coffee at my favorite cafe in Yerevan, Green Bean, which reminded
me of the U.S. and was where I camped out to write field notes:
Anahid: What are your thoughts about adapting to life in Armenia?
Santoukhd: It’s our homeland, but was hard in the beginning, because of the salary. We
were happy to live in a safe country, it’s our homeland, but I am upset that work is poor.
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Anahid: Okay. What is your relationship like with local Armenians? Do you have local
or Syrian Armenian friends?
Santoukhd: Well, the relationships were not very warm, especially at the beginning, but
it’s not very bad with locals. But also, not very happy, but people are not very happy [in
Armenia]. The relationships are not very close, and people didn’t help. Neighbors never
asked if we needed anything, even after 3 years. They didn’t offer any help.
Echoing Santoukhd’s feelings about poverty and the challenges of finding adequate work in
Armenia comparable to what she was making as a pediatrician in Aleppo, Siranoush said, “Hos
ge neghvim [“I’m annoyed here (in Armenia)]. Deghatsiner [local Armenians] are narrowminded, but I don’t have problems with them. I’m annoyed because people eat trash here. Even
the poorest Syrian Armenians didn’t eat trash in Syria!” This indicates that Siranoush’s and
Santoukhd’s expectations of a happy, successful life in Armenia were certainly not met, at least in
the beginning of their residence in Armenia. Sona said that, “Local Armenians make us feel like
refugees. ‘You’re Syrian and different.’ But I don’t want to feel like a refugee.” As both an NGO
employee and a Syrian Armenian woman, Parantsem noted that she had a “disgusting opinion of
local people. It’s very disgusting that locals and people in high positions are against helping
Syrians with rent.” Nanor said the local community was not good initially, and she is still asked if
she can read or write in Armenian, but “now they accept me.” Amina said, “it’s not easy to come
to Armenia and start a new life,” echoing Santoukhd and Siranoush, “you need others to push you
forward. But meeting local Armenians feels less like a stranger than other Syrian Armenians.”
She did not feel entirely accepted by other Syrian Armenians in Yerevan.
At least two interlocutors expressed pros and cons of belonging. Arsine stated, “We had
problems, we came to Armenia because it’s our homeland. I have an Armenian passport, but we
had difficulties in Armenia.” Back in Green Bean Café, on a snowy March 2019 day, I met with
Shakeh to hear her perspective on belonging in Armenia:
Anahid: What is your relationship like with local Armenians? Do you have any local
friends, or are they Syrian Armenians, too?
Shakeh: I have no problems with locals. I’m friends with Jews, Iranians, Indians,
Armenians. We are in their country; we have to respect them. People live here like they
were living in Syria.
Anahid: What do you mean by that?
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Shakeh: Syrians wanted everything to be free at first. They were studying or “enjoying”
but were taking someone’s place and then going to Canada and left. Syrians didn’t pay
for school. Syrians brought dzerakordz [handmade crafts, in this case embroidery], good
food, brought good things to Armenia. Syrians brought culture. Doctors studied in
Armenia and went to Syria to work. I have a good support network here--good friends,
good reciprocity. It was not the same in Lebanon. You had to arrange ahead of time,
people will always help here. “Behave good, you will talk good,” but only coffee and
cake are offered in Armenia [when you visit someone’s house].
In contrast, local NGO workers overwhelmingly sold the positive benefits of Syrian Armenians
coming to Armenia. I am not sure if this was because I am an Armenian American researcher
who was in Armenia on a Fulbright. Diana from UNHCR noted that, “Syrians are returning home
to Armenia, their new homeland, their second home, Armenia. If assisted properly, they are more
patriotic than Eastern Armenians [local Armenians] --patriotism, inspiration, knowing the
language, those who will remain here.” This last part, as mentioned in Chapter 3, adds to the
trope of “good Syrians are the ones who stay” and seek citizenship, which is directly tied to their
patriotism, as perceived by Diana. Hrant, one of the few male NGO workers I interviewed,
observed that Syrian Armenians have a positive relationship with locals in this new environment,
saying, “We must learn from them [Syrian Armenians].” Zepyur, an Armenian American NGO
worker based in Yerevan, told me in 2017 that, “[Syrian Armenians] don’t have problems with
locals.” Maro from Caritas added that, “Syrian Armenians feel they are treated well by locals.”
Ovsanna from GIZ stated that, “Locals were open and appreciated Syrian Armenians--we always
notice foreigners. Syrian Armenians were accepted with open arms, locals don’t mind that Syrian
Armenians are here, and they bring a new culture to Yerevan [this is what locals think].” One can
glean from this data the distinction between the perspectives of mostly local NGO and
government workers and Syrian Armenian migrant women. Additionally, Ovsanna still viewed
Syrian Armenians as foreigners and outsiders, not as integrated members of society.

5.3

Part II: Discourse Analysis of Beckoning State(s)

Part II will examine discourse analysis concerning appeals to Syrian Armenian migrants

and calls for repatriation from the three Ministers of Diaspora in Armenia: Hranush Hakobyan
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(October 1, 2008-April 23, 2018); Mkhitar Hayrapetyan (May 11, 2018-January 11, 2019); and
the Minister of Diaspora-turned-High Commissioner of the Office for Diaspora Affairs, Zareh
Sinanyan (June 14, 2019-present). Akhil Gupta noted that studying the state ethnographically
means analyzing “everyday practices of local bureaucracies and the discursive construction of the
state in public culture” (Gupta 2006, 212). Furthermore, focusing on the discursive construction
of the state enabled Gupta to “draw attention to the powerful cultural practices by which the state
is symbolically represented to its employees and to citizens of the nation” and that any analysis of
the state means anthropologists need to conceptualize a space intersected by local, regional,
national, and transnational phenomena (Gupta, 213). This applies to my dissertation research
because, as mentioned earlier, the Armenian state beckons diasporan Armenians (including the
focus of my project, Syrian Armenian migrant women), home to Armenia, where they are
positioned by the state as belonging to the socially constructed homeland, and diasporan
Armenians also lay claims to the socially constructed homeland.
Prior to the section on discourse analysis, I will provide a review of how descent and
collective memory of the Armenian genocide a century ago still impacts state and non-state media
messages towards Syrian Armenian migrants and repatriation today. This will be followed by
discourse analysis of the three ministers mentioned above, their respective messages, initiatives,
and speeches, and ethnographic data about Syrian Armenian migrant women’s participations in
exhibitions, media sensationalization about Syrian Armenian migrants, and memories about the
genocide.
5.3.1

Collective Memory of the Genocide and Return, Instrumentalized by the Armenian State
I argue that the Armenian state instrumentalizes collective memory of the Armenian

genocide and belonging to compel Syrian Armenian migrants, in this case, women, to come home
to Armenia. Collective memory of the Armenian genocide a century ago still impacts state and
non-state media messages towards Syrian Armenian migrants and repatriation today. Maurice
Halbwachs, a French sociologist, posited that a society can have a collective memory and this
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memory is dependent upon the framework within which a group is situated (Halbwachs 1992,
22). There is not only an individual memory, but also a group memory which exists outside of the
individual, so an individual’s understanding of the past is strongly linked to this group
consciousness (Halbwachs, 22). Collective memory is socially constructed and, “every collective
memory requires the support of a group delimited in space and time” (Halbwachs, 84). Social
groups construct their own images of the world through, “agreed upon versions of the past,
versions constructed through communication, not private remembrance” (Halbwachs, 23). While
ethnic Armenians living in Syria and the Republic of Armenia have grown up in different
environments and have distinct individual memories of those sociohistorical contexts, both
groups share the collective memory of the Armenian genocide.
State priorities have also shifted in Armenia, concerning messaging. Kristin Cavoukian
observed the reframing strategies of the former Ministry of Diaspora. The new frame (2008,
2010, the early years of the former Ministry of Diaspora) expanded the definition of the diaspora
to include all Armenians outside the Republic of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh (called Artsakh
by Armenians and in this dissertation). The old frame viewed the diaspora as a benevolent giver,
and the new frame viewed the diaspora as a needy recipient (Cavoukian 2016). The new frame
emphasized helping Armenia through investment, not just charity, uncritical, patriotic support of
Armenian policies (especially in public), and re-Armenianization as opposed to repatriation
(Cavoukian, 2). Since 2010, those priorities have shifted to an emphasis on repatriation and
investment through populating Armenia with young diasporan Armenian professionals. Kristin
Cavoukian described the former Ministry of Diaspora as a:
discursive power ministry...which requires us to look beyond its specific programs and
instead, focus on what is said to and about the diaspora. As an official state body, the
Ministry of Diaspora named, framed, defined, and delineated the state-diaspora
relationship. In short, its most noteworthy acts were ‘speech acts,’ which did not
describe, but rather, helped to construct reality (Cavoukian 2016, 5).
Furthermore, Cavoukian uses the term “identity gerrymandering” to “refer to official, state-level
manipulation of transborder national identity categories to further state interests'' (Cavoukian, 10).
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To Cavoukian, the Armenian state targets populations, such as diasporan Armenians, viewed as
extensions of their national community abroad. “Identity gerrymandering,” then, “is a state
strategy for managing populations the state perceives as its actual or potential (quasi-)
constituents, but cannot control via the usual levers of compulsion states have over their resident
populations (compulsory education, policing, incarceration, etc.)” (Cavoukian, 10-11). The vision
of the former Ministry of Diaspora, now Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs is
that “First, it advocated hayapahpanutyun [the protection of ‘Armenianness’] among diasporan
Armenians. Second, it sought to harness and utilize the diaspora’s potential to help develop the
Republic of Armenia. Its third priority was hayadartzutyun [return to ‘Armenianness’]”
(Cavoukian, 104). Cavoukian notes that the third priority suggested the Ministry prioritized the
“re- Armenianization'' of Armenians where they were in the diaspora as opposed to enticing them
to move home to Armenia (Cavoukian, 104). Prior to the establishment of the Ministry of
Diaspora in 2008, a small office for “diaspora affairs'' was in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The
genocide “issue” was another priority during the new frame, used by the former Ministry of
Diaspora to reinforce Armenia-Diaspora relations. As Hranush Hakobyan noted at a meeting
with the Armenian Union, during the new frame:
The Armenian people are strong and undefeatable. Today Armenians are a victorious
nation. Today, we are united as one in Armenia, Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh] and the
Diaspora. We are no longer the poor, beaten nation of the 20th century that barely
survived the genocide and the nation that was forced to spread across the globe
(Cavoukian 2016, 119).
As a priority, however, the “genocide issue” was mostly focused on academic conferences
attended only by certain elites, round tables, discussions, and commemorative events rather than a
heavy emphasis on repatriation (unlike later ministers).
The Armenian Genocide Centennial, held on April 24, 2015, was also rife with
symbolism of collective memory and descent. In a news release from April 9, 2015, then Prime
Minister Hovik Abrahamyan announced that he had received members of the Kardashian family,
many of whom are Armenian American. According to the release, “Hovik Abrahamyan stressed
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the fact that like all Armenians worldwide, the Kardashian family never forgot their ethnic roots,
trying to render the homeland more recognizable by paying visits like this.” 33 The Kardashians, in
turn, said, “they had long dreamed of their historical homeland and were happy to be in the
country of their dream [sic]. They apologized for not speaking Armenian and said to be trying to
learn the native language.” Well-known celebrities, such as the Kardashians were certainly
instrumentalized by the Armenian state to draw attention to Armenia, as is evidenced by the
phrase, “trying to render the homeland more recognizable.” This phrase speaks more to public
relations (PR) possibly for tourism to Armenia rather than efforts to encourage diasporan
Armenians to return home. Three years later, during the Velvet Revolution in 2018 (in which
Nikol Pashinyan, the current Prime Minister of Armenia, overthrew the corruption-laden
administration of former President and Prime Minister Serj Sargsyan), other Armenian American
celebrities were also heavily championed for their support of the revolution, most significantly
Serj Tankian, the lead singer of System of a Down (SOAD).
There are several connections between state and non-state messaging campaigns about
the genocide and repatriation, about Syrian Armenians in Armenia. As mentioned in Chapter 2,
the Syrian-Armenian state relationship is usually referenced by Armenian state officials. During
the Armenian genocide, many survivors fled to Syria. Some survivors were rescued from death
caravans and were integrated into Syrian Arab or Kurdish families. Some of these activities were
also non-consensual yet depicted as humanitarian. Later, during the aftermath of the 1988
earthquake in northwestern Soviet Armenia, Syria provided humanitarian support to Armenia.
Recently, a team of Armenian doctors and de-miners traveled to Syria to repay the favor in
September 2018. On April 23, 2015, Armenian Prime Minister Hovik Abrahamyan met with the
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“PM Welcomes Kardashian Family,” The Government of the Republic of Armenia Official News, April
9, 2015. Accessed June 7, 2020. PM Welcomes Kardashian Family - Official News - The Government of
the Republic of Armenia.
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Syrian Parliament Speaker, Mohammad Jihad al-Laham. 34 The following is from the official
press release:
Hovik Abrahamyan said that the Armenian people have always felt a warm attitude on
the part of Syrian authorities and expressed appreciation to the people and authorities of
Syria for great attention and thoughtfulness of the needs of Syrian Armenians.
Mohammad Jihad al-Laham condemned the genocide of Armenians committed in the
Ottoman Empire in 1915, noting that Syria has always supported and will stand by the
Armenian people. He stressed that Syria is ready to deepen and expand cooperation to the
benefit of both nations.
State messaging and priorities linking the dispersal from the genocide and creation of the
Armenian diaspora to the need for repatriation to Armenia shifted since the nascent years of the
former Ministry of Diaspora. It should also be noted that on the centennial anniversary of the
genocide, victims were canonized as saints in the Armenian Apostolic Orthodox Church. Since I
began preliminary fieldwork in Yerevan (summer 2016), there were two new ministers: Mkhitar
Hayrapetyan and Zareh Sinanyan, with a revolving door of Presidents and Prime Ministers,
sometimes one and the same (Serj Sargsyan).
When I first started conducting fieldwork in Armenia, in summer 2016, the leaders then
in power included President Serj Sargsyan and Prime Minister Hovik Abrahamyan. In summer
2017, the Prime Minister was Karen Karapetyan, with President Sargsyan still in power.
Leadership changed significantly in 2018, when I began dissertation fieldwork, with President
Armen Sarkissian taking charge of the presidency and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, the leader
of the Velvet Revolution in spring 2018. Messaging linking the genocide, diaspora, and collective
memory since the 2018 Velvet Revolution seems to focus more on the centrality of Armenian
statehood and obligation to contribute to the socially constructed homeland socially and
financially, the Republic of Armenia.
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likens it to terrorist crimes nowadays (almasdarnews.com).
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During dissertation fieldwork (August 2018-August 2019), I felt compelled, largely as an
Armenian American, to attend the commemoration march to the Genocide Memorial Complex in
Yerevan, Tsitsernakaberd. I had visited the memorial complex many times before in different
capacities--as a tourist, a Birthright Armenia volunteer, a Fulbright researcher, and a Ph.D.
candidate conducting dissertation fieldwork. Having family members directly impacted by the
genocide contributed to the somberness of this memorial complex. Usually, I would go on a hot
summer day, quietly reflect, visit the museum, and retreat to a local Georgian restaurant to
process the heaviness of the complex over a hot plate of ajaragan khachapouri (an elongated
bread pastry saturated with melted cheese and topped with an egg and pat of butter). Since I was
in Armenia for a year, I decided to participate in the annual commemoration march to
Tsitsernakaberd with a local Armenian friend and interlocutor, Zvart. While we shared an ethnic
background, my ancestors were directly affected by the genocide and hers were from Iran. Her
respective ancestors had not directly experienced the genocide. Following is an excerpt from my
field notes on April 24, 2019:
Today was Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day. I knew I was going to walk to
Tsitsernakaberd with Zvart. Nobody was really working today, so we met by SAS [a
grocery store] on Amiryan and took a taxi to Kievyan and walked to Tsitsernakaberd
from there. The path to Tsitsernakaberd was packed with vendors selling all sorts of
flowers, and with people also making the pilgrimage with us. The walk up to
Tsitsernakaberd was uphill, but I didn’t really feel stressed until the eternal flame. I felt
we were all grieving for the same reason.... Zvart and I talked about our respective
families’ histories (mine went through the genocide, her’s didn’t but were displaced by
Shah Abbas 400 years ago). I felt emotional by the eternal flame (wreaths outside and
police presence) and laid my daffodil bouquet and thought of my Aintabsi [people from
Aintab, a town that is now called Gaziantep in southeastern Turkey] relatives and family
dispersed around the world. It was a somber experience for sure, I would probably do it
again.
The above excerpt shows how I was feeling the unity, collective memory, and grief of the
genocide, shared by locals and diasporan Armenians like myself. I laid a small bouquet of
daffodils around the eternal flame and dedicated the action to my family in Syria and ancestors
from Aintab, including my grandfather. On that day, it did not matter whether one was Iranian
Armenian, Armenian American, or Syrian Armenian--this was a common grief for all of us.
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Figure 5.1 Armenian genocide memorial in Yerevan. Photo by author. Image of author at
the Armenian Genocide Memorial Complex in Yerevan. April 24, 2019.
Following are three quotes on this past year’s commemoration of the Armenian genocide, on
April 24, 2020, by three state leaders: President Armen Sarkissian, Prime Minister Nikol
Pashinyan, and High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs Zareh Sinanyan. Due to the Covid-19
pandemic, which started affecting Armenia in March 2020, genocide commemorations took place
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virtually instead of the traditional march. Armenians from around the world could text a message
or names of loved ones who were killed to a local Armenian number and these messages would
be projected onto the memorial complex. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan emphasized the need
to fortify Armenian statehood in his statement on April 24, 2020 35:
Due to the Genocide that had been perpetrated at a state level for many years, Western
Armenia was completely emptied of Armenians. 1.5 million of our compatriots were
killed, hundreds of thousands of Armenians became refugees, deprived of the right to live
in their historical homeland...we are still facing the challenges posed to our people at the
outset of the twentieth century. And the only way to effectively defy these challenges is
to have a powerful statehood and build an Armenia ready to face security threats…. In
order to have a highly capable, dignified, and sovereign state, we need an education
system that meets all modern standards, a dynamically developing high-tech economy, a
well-established military-industrial complex, a powerful army and special services. By
consolidating the pan-Armenian potential around the Armenian statehood we will
guarantee our nation’s scientific, diplomatic, and economic progress.
President Armen Sarkissian also highlighted the loss of land [Western Armenia], loss of potential
citizens, and how Armenia has triumphed worldwide:
The Armenian Genocide took place more than one hundred years ago; the Armenian
people were deprived of their possessions and of their fatherland...The loss of 1.5 million
lives had a substantial impact on the reproductive abilities of our nation: today our
numbers should have been not 10-12 million [Armenia and Diaspora] but at least its
double. The Genocide was also a story of daily survival and struggle of the Armenian
nation, a story of strong spirit and unbending will. It was a struggle for life. Struggle for
the preservation of the national identity, a struggle for the right to preserve national
memory and pass it to the next generation. The Genocide was also a story of a daily
heroism when life and survival became a struggle. We strived, struggled, and triumphed.
We were able to triumph over death; we survived and reemerged. Today’s independent
Armenia, the free Artsakh, as well as the well-organized and successful Diaspora testify
to that and give us new opportunities. Opportunities to unite as a nation and people, to
combine our efforts and abilities to achieve our national aspirations.
High Commissioner of Diaspora Affairs Zareh Sinanyan added, poetically, on the same day
(April 24, 2020), messages about statecraft:
Because of the Genocide, we inadvertently became a people of all nations, whose core is
Armenia. But by re-establishing Armenian statehood and liberating Artsakh, our identity
is no longer that of a victim, but a state-centered person, who proudly bears their origin,
history, and ancestors. The ancestors who built a state on the ashes and ruins of a small
35
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piece of our historical homeland, who defeated the deserts of Deir-ez-Zor in the struggle
for life, and who found themselves across oceans taking their homeland in their hearts,
never forgetting their right to historical justice and revenge. This day is of special
significance for our compatriots in the Diaspora, who, living far from their homeland,
feel the pain of the yet unhealed wounds of the Genocide more severely. It is the pain of
loss and impunity, injustice and denial, the driving force of the institutions, organizations,
and individuals in the Diaspora who are at the forefront of the fight for recognition, for
international condemnation and genocide prevention.
The above quote gives extra weight to grief experienced in the diaspora and emphasizes
territoriality and statecraft. Pashinyan spoke about the inadvertent dispersal of Armenians all over
the world, but that their core is the Republic of Armenia. As descendants of survivors, Pashinyan
indicated that we are no longer victims, but people with a purpose--building a state “on the ashes
and ruins of a small piece of our historical homeland.” Armenians were part of a larger physical
territory, and to Pashinyan, are still grieving, yet have a purpose--building upon the ruins in
Armenia and Artsakh, the Armenian term for Nagorno-Karabakh.
5.3.2 State Anxiety about Emigration
I have argued and observed that state anxiety about emigration contributed to messaging
campaigns urging the integration of Syrian Armenian migrants in Armenia--a need to put bodies
on land to replace those who were a) killed during the genocide (and recent wars with
Azerbaijan), and b) emigration (either for seasonal labor to Russia or “brain drain” of young
professionals). In 2017, former President Serj Sargsyan said his goal was to increase Armenia’s
population to 4 million by 2040 by 1) reducing the rates of emigration; 2) increasing birth rates
and life expectancy; and 3) creating conditions for the return of emigrants. 36 A 2015 UN report
noted that Armenia’s population is expected to decrease to 2.7 million by 2050 and to 1.8 million
by 2100. The largest emigration wave occurred in the early to mid-1990s, coinciding with the
collapse of the Soviet Union, war with Azerbaijan over Artsakh, and the 1988 earthquake in
northwestern Armenia. State concerns about emigration are also attributed to “brain drain” being
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considered a threat to the country’s security (according to Armenia’s National Security
Strategy 37), presumably resolved by Mkhitar’s and Zareh’s push for a “brain gain” through
beckoning diasporan Armenian young professionals to “return” to Armenia. According to Armen
Ghazaryan, the Head of the Migration Service of Armenia, approximately 80% of Armenia’s
current emigration is attributed to economic concerns (i.e., seasonal labor migration and other
“brain drain”), and the remaining 20% is due to human development emigration. The need for
appealing to diasporan Armenian young professionals is further buttressed by the fact that
Armenia has a remarkably high elderly population.
It is also important to examine the “2017-2021 Strategy for Migration Policy of the
Republic of Armenia' 38' in the context of which priorities pertain to the socioeconomic integration
of ethnic Armenian migrants into the Republic of Armenia. A cursory examination reveals
Armenian state anxieties about emigration and the need for migrant and diasporan contributions
to Armenia’s economic development. The below quote pertains to the need for migrants and
diasporan communities to contribute to Armenia’s economic development:
Migration regulation policies should provide for effective utilization of the potential of
the Diaspora and migrants to the benefit of the country’s development. Involvement of
returning migrants into the process of economic development is also important in the
context of ensuring Armenia’s continuous economic development (2017-2021 Strategy
for Migration Policy of the Republic of Armenia, 4).
As for state anxiety about emigration, the Strategy notes that from 2013-2015, on average 35,000
people were leaving Armenia annually. Not only is there apparent state anxiety in Armenia over
emigration and the need to create new ethnic Armenian citizens, but there is also concern about
the ethics behind providing pathways to citizenship or expediting asylum procedures for ethnic
Armenians. According to my research, this anxiety about emigration is also shared with NGO

37

“Armenia 2020 National Security Strategy,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, July
2020. Armenia 2020 National Security Strategy.pdf (mfa.am). Accessed September 8, 2020.
38

Haykanush Chobanyan. “Policy Brief: Assessing Armenia’s Migration Strategy for 2017-2021,” Prague
Process. Policy_Brief_AM Migration Strategy_EN.pdf (pragueprocess.eu). Accessed June 8, 2020.

201

workers, Syrian Armenian migrant women, and a repatriate organization, Repat Armenia, as well.
Hrant, an Armenian Missionary Association of America (AMAA) employee, noted in 2017 that,
“12,000 Syrian Armenians are here and many left. It is difficult to control how many are left or
not. About 30,000 people left due to [general, not only Syrian] emigration. By 2050, there will be
nobody left in Armenia.” This sentiment echoes similar emigration reports. Katherine, a Syrian
Armenian migrant woman, asked me rhetorically during an interview, “Why do people want to
leave Armenia? The world is better outside [of Armenia]. I cannot blame people for leaving.”
Katherine’s words resonate closely with those of other Syrian Armenian migrant women
expressed earlier in this chapter: dissatisfaction with Armenia’s socioeconomic situation. A
practical solution for Armenia’s emigration problem, then, is repatriation, at least from the
perspective of the state. As Ani, a diasporan Armenian [non-Syrian, non-local] employee from
Repat Armenia, notes, “Pashinyan plans on repatriation being a part of population increase [for
Armenia]. There is a dire need for this.” I assert that Syrian Armenian migrant women are shoved
into this priority, repatriation, as well. Furthermore, Armen Ghazaryan, Head of the Migration
Service of Armenia, observed that the Pashinyan Administration is working on an immigration
policy, because historically, Armenia has focused more on resolving the issue of emigration.
Ghazaryan states, “We have a migration strategy, but it doesn’t include immigration because
Armenia was always a country of emigration and we concentrated on those issues. And currently,
we’re changing...We are becoming a country of origin, a country of transit, and a country of
destination.” His quote shows how Armenia is transforming into a place where people want to go,
instead of leaving, and it also indicates his pride in this transformation.
Concerning the ethics of migration policies, two NGO and two UNHCR employees
expressed dismay at the Armenian state’s past preferences for Christian, ethnic Armenian
migrants. This category, and only this category, possesses the capacity to become potential
Armenian citizens and contribute, socially but especially economically, to the Republic of
Armenia. According to Sarah, an Armenian American employee from Homeland Development
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Initiative Foundation (HDIF), the Armenian state should not “hand pick refugees based on
ethnicity. It’s unethical.” Karolina, a UNHCR employee, added that, “The screening process in
Armenia is biased against Muslim refugees, as it is in other countries, blaming it on national
security and closed borders on two sides.” I nodded in agreement and added that my country, the
United States, was also biased against Muslim refugees during the Trump Administration.
Armenia is bordered by Iran, Georgia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. Its borders are closed with Turkey
and Azerbaijan, the two sides to which Karolina was referring. Natasha, a UNHCR political
officer, added that the “[Armenian] national security service banned people from Syria and Iraqi
refugees of Islamic origin from joining [entering Armenia], due to the Paris attacks, which
impacts Armenia with discrimination against Muslims.” The final comment concerning the ethics
of migration policies focused on the preferential treatment of Syrian Armenians. Syuzanna, a
local Armenian Red Cross employee, noted, “[Syrians are] treated differently in other countries
on the basis of legislation, not Armenian ethnicity...different approaches to Syrians and other
displaced people--why should it be different for Syrians?” In other words, why are Syrian
Armenians treated more preferentially in Armenia than Syrian Arabs or Syrian Yazidis, both of
whom have also settled in Armenia? Why should they be treated better only because they are
ethnically Armenian? The concerns expressed above by NGO employees directly contradict the
“2017-2021 Strategy for Migration Policy of the Republic of Armenia,” which states that one of
its fundamental principles is, “Equality of all migrants and refugees regardless of their gender,
race, color, ethnic or social origin, genetic traits, language, religion, world view, political or other
commitments, belonging to the national minorities, property status or personal or other social
circumstances” (Strategy for Migration Policy, 6). While Syrian Armenians, particularly during
Hranush’s tenure and still significantly, although not as prioritized, during Mkhitar’s tenure, were
certainly treated preferentially in Armenia, this is not to say Syrian Armenian migrant women’s
lived experiences were not painful or confusing.
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5.3.3

Discourse Analysis of Armenian Ministers Regarding Syrian Armenian Integration and
Migration
Discourse analysis of speeches and news releases pertaining to Syrian Armenians

(particularly women) during Hranush’s tenure speak to an almost overly enthusiastic attempt to
beckon Syrian Armenians home to Armenia. In summer 2012, during the first wave of migration
of Syrian Armenians to Armenia, the former Ministry of Diaspora established a task force to
study the key issues of Syrian Armenians and greet arrivals at the airport. 39
Hakobyan frequently used language highlighting the kinship of Syrian Armenians and
their connections to Armenia, labeled the “Homeland,” as evidenced in the below examples. On
August 11, 2012, Hranush Hakobyan visited Lusabats Camp in Hankavan, Armenia, meeting
with 120 young Syrian Armenians spending their summer vacation in Hankavan. 40 She noted
that, “Even though they all live in different corners across the globe, Armenia is their homeland
which is always ready to receive them with warmth and pleasure.” In August 2013, there was an
initiative supporting the construction of Nor Haleb [“New Aleppo”] district in Ashtarak, a city
near Yerevan. 41 To garner widespread community support, among diasporan and local
Armenians, Hakobyan stated, “Dear Compatriots: Due to the war in Syria, 10,000 Syrian
Armenians have moved to the Republic of Armenia. They will fully feel the warmth of the
homeland if they have a place to call home.” At a New Year’s charity fair, held on December 17,
2014, her opening speech to participants included, “You are in your homeland. You are on your
land. You are home.”

42

These speeches were targeted at audiences consisting of both local and
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Syrian Armenians--she appeared to want to convince Syrian Armenians that there was a new
physical home in Armenia for them, and she seemed to want local Armenians to help Syrian
Armenians feel welcome in Armenia.
Hranush Hakobyan also highlighted the benefits of the new Syrian Armenian culture in
Yerevan. On October 7, 2013, 43 she noted, “Syrian Armenians have introduced a new culture,
have a new attitude towards their job, and are honest and responsible. We must solve all their
problems. Our compatriots have rediscovered their homeland and have no right to become
refugees again.” At the first charity fair described below, on December 20, 2013, 44 she noted that,
“Syrian Armenians stand out as good, faithful workers in all spheres of activity.” At a subsequent
charity fair (for Easter) on April 19, 2014, 45 her opening speech included more accolades for
Syrian Armenian entrepreneurs: “Syrian Armenians have always shone with their talent and
meticulous approach to their work. They have brought a new culture, new breath, and new quality
to the Homeland. Their work in many spheres deserves high appreciation and encouragement.”
These accolades by Hakobyan seem to speak to the positive socioeconomic benefits of Syrian
Armenian migrants to Armenian host society and seem to be more focused on convincing local
Armenians that Syrian Armenians will not be a burden rather than a sincere attempt to welcome
Syrian Armenians to Armenia.
Hranush Hakobyan also spearheaded ցուցահանդէս-վաճառք, or charity fairs, featuring
Syrian Armenian entrepreneurs. These charity fairs were and still are held on national holidays
and at Ministry of Diaspora-sponsored events. Of record, the first charity fair for Syrian
Armenians in Yerevan was held on December 20, 2013, mentioned above. It was hosted by the
43
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Ministry of Diaspora at the Aram Khachaturian Concert Hall and proceeds went to the
construction of Nor Aleppo district. 40 Syrian Armenians participated (not only women, but the
stalls were gendered--mostly women sold pastries and embroidered jewelry; men generally sold a
variety of Syrian spices and silver jewelry). The event was called, “Breath of Syrian Armenian
Culture in Yerevan.” Subsequent charity fairs with the same name were held in the years that
followed. It is not clear whether Hranush Hakobyan intentionally tried to “brand” Syrian
Armenians as diligent, talented workers beneficial to Armenian society, but it certainly was the
result.

Figure 5.2 Former Ministry of Diaspora. Photo by author of the former Ministry of
Diaspora, Yerevan, Armenia, April 27, 2019
Subsequent Ministers of Diaspora and heads of Diaspora Affairs made gradually less
waves about Syrian Armenian migration to and integration in Armenia. The second Minister of
Diaspora, Mkhitar Hayrapetyan, was a balance between the first and last ministers in the sense
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that he did not only focus on Syrian Armenians, but he did not ignore them either. On September
20-22, 2018 he made an official visit to Syria, being the first official representative of Armenia to
visit Aleppo or Syria since the conflict began in 2011. 46 In September 2018, Mkhitar Hayrapetyan
met with Armenian religious communities in Damascus and Aleppo, visited the Armenian district
of Nor Gyugh [“New Village”], and met with the Chairman of the AGBU Syrian Framework
Committee. In an October 2018 meeting with UNHCR representatives, he discussed his visit to
Aleppo a few weeks prior to the meetings. He noted, “I can’t help but mention that the Armenian
community in Syria, despite the many obstacles, was full of hope and life. In Aleppo, we often
heard bombings, it was an emergency for us, but for the people of Aleppo, it has become a
common part of their daily lives.”
Mkhitar Hayrapetyan also partnered with various local NGOs, such as the Armenian Red
Cross Society (ARCS) and the Center for the Coordination of Syrian Armenian Issues (CCSAI),
to create a program called “Increased Resilience of Syrian Armenians and Host Population”
(IRIS) in July 2018, continuing Hranush’s programmatic support of Syrian Armenians settled in
Armenia. From July 2018-June 2021, the IRIS program focuses on long-term integration and the
full protection of Syrian Armenians in Armenia and the program will contribute to the National
Integration Policy. Some of the results from this program include 720 Syrian Armenians now
benefiting from housing support, 200 Syrian Armenian entrepreneurs supported with business
plans and training, and 1,100 Syrian Armenians and locals to benefit from improved socialpsychological well-being. 47 Like Hranush, Mkhitar continued supporting public charity fairs
benefiting Syrian Armenians (which mostly female entrepreneurs attend).
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The Ministry of Diaspora was rebranded in 2018 due to criticism (particularly during
Hranush’s tenure) over mismanagement, corruption, and reliance on the diaspora for financial
resources instead of supporting the diaspora, 48 and Mkhitar took another government position.
The third minister of the now rebranded Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs,
Zareh Sinanyan, was the former Mayor of Glendale, a heavily Armenian populated city in Los
Angeles. While repatriation is still important for the Armenian government, Zareh Sinanyan
noted that Armenia cannot economically handle the large-scale influx of “compatriots” at the
same time. This is supported by his comments in the EVN Report interview listed below:
Maria Titizian: Okay, is repatriation on the horizon? A policy, a program, a campaign
for repatriation?
Zareh Sinanyan: Sure, on an industrial level, on a mass level, on type of level that this
government of new state of Armenia foresees, it’s too soon. The state’s not ready for it,
that’s what we believe. And we need to gear the state up for it because it’s inevitable and
it’s the only guarantee whatsoever.
Maria Titizian: Is the state interested?
Zareh Sinanyan: The state is absolutely interested. We just need to get to that point. We
were interested in repatriation now, but Armenia cannot keep accepting tens of thousands
of repatriates now, intentional kind of driven repatriation. But repatriation is happening
already, we encourage it, we want it to come. But the situation has to change, rules have
to change. Policies have to change.
Zareh’s statements reveal a measured, cautious approach to encouraging repatriation to Armenia,
compared to statements by previous state officials. Regarding the role of Syrian Armenians in
Armenia today, Zareh also seemed to have a measured, cautious tone. As the aforementioned
EVN Report interview with Zareh Sinanyan and Sara Anjargolian was on Facebook Live, viewers
were able to submit questions in advance. I submitted one about Syrian Armenians in Armenia:
Maria Titizian: I have a question from one of our readers. I’m just going to read her
question. It’s from Anahid Matossian. She’s a Ph.D. student in Anthropology. She’s
doing her research here with Syrian Armenian women. And she says, “I’ve been studying
how the history of messaging of the Ministry of Diaspora regarding Syrian Armenians
has changed since 2012. I am curious about what the current restructuring of the Ministry
of Diaspora into the Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs means for the
integration of Syrian Armenians in Yerevan, or is the focus less on emergency assistance
and more on long-term integration?” You know, I don’t know if you have the time
48
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because you’ve only been in office now for little over a month, so I’m sure you’re still
trying to understand the system and all that. But is this on your radar? We talked earlier
about communities in distress, Armenian communities in distress, that heighten those
needs for assistance, and what did you have in mind?
Zareh Sinanyan: So, one of the things that we did early on is talk to the Head of the
Migration Service, Armen Ghazaryan, he’s a very capable young man, his heart is there
for Armenians, and he’s very enthusiastic. We are in the business of developing longterm strategies, the policy for how to deal with migration once it happens, because you
know, we’re definitely in the business of helping people to come to Armenia, but we
have to deal with the consequences, too. But in terms of the day to day dealing with those
folks who actually come over, that’s what the Migration Service is for. Having said that,
with any other program that doesn’t fall under our jurisdiction, such as education, culture,
sports, there’s a ministry that’s being formed for these programs. Because we deal with
diasporans, to the extent they deal with diasporans, we’ll have to be on top of it. We have
to analyze the good, the bad, and the ugly in them so that we can deal with it...Ultimately,
we [the Diaspora office] are the clearinghouse. We are the one through which all
Diaspora Affairs have to filter through. So, we will not be dealing with the day-to-day
problems of those that have repatriated, but we’ll be on top of it.
Maria Titizian: Is this how it was working in the previous system?
Sara Anjargolian: No, in the previous system the Ministry of Diaspora was also
responsible for…
Maria Titizian: Yeah. I remember they [Ministry of Diaspora staff] would be at the
airports at the height of the [Syrian] war. They would send the Diaspora Ministry to go
and bring Syrian children to Armenia for a few weeks, to get them away from the
situation in their home country. The Ministry was there, it was the Diaspora Ministry,
who was trying to be of some assistance to the Syrian Armenians. So, what you are
saying is now there will be other agencies if there is such a need?
Zareh Sinanyan: There’s no need for, you know, someone has to be good at it and do it
well. They’re the ones who need to do it. We’ll be better at monitoring, analyzing the
data and working on our policies.
This interview fragment demonstrates that there is a clear, conscious shift in Sinanyan’s policies
towards Syrian Armenians in Armenia--that they should not be treated any differently from other
diasporan Armenian groups. I argue the fact that Syrian Armenian women provide socioeconomic
benefits to Armenia neatly fits into Sinanyan’s paradigm of a mutually beneficial relationship
between the Diaspora and Armenia. Syrian Armenian charity fairs are still held in Yerevan.
5.3.4 Another Beckoning State: Syria
Aside from the Republic of Armenia beckoning diasporan Armenians, in this case Syrian
Armenians, to return “home” to Armenia, there is another “beckoning state” involved in this case
study: the Syrian Arab Republic. While Syria is not deemed a safe location for displaced Syrian
citizens to return to, the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Walid Muallem, argues that it is safe
for Syrians to come home and blames host countries for hoarding foreign and humanitarian aid
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directed at Syrian refugees. Following is an excerpt of a speech 49 Syrian Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Walid Muallem, gave at the 73rd session of the United Nations General Assembly in
September 2018:
All conditions are now present for the voluntary return of Syrian refugees to the country
they had to leave because of terrorism and the unilateral economic measures that targeted
their daily lives and their livelihoods. Thousands of Syrian refugees abroad have indeed
started their journey back home. The return of every Syrian refugee is a priority for the
Syrian state. Doors are opened for all Syrians abroad to return voluntarily and safely. And
what applies to Syrians inside Syria also applies to Syrians abroad. No one is above the
law. Thanks to the help of Russia, the Syrian government will spare no effort to facilitate
the return of those refugees and meet their basic needs. A special committee was recently
established to coordinate the return of refugees to their places of origin in Syria and to
help them regain their lives. We have called upon the international community and
humanitarian organization to facilitate these returns. However, some western countries
and in line with their dishonest behavior since the start of the war on Syria continue to
prevent the return of refugees. They are spreading irrational fears among refugees; they
are politicizing what should be a purely humanitarian issue, using refugees as a
bargaining chip to serve their political agenda, and linking the return of refugees to the
political process.
The above excerpt specifically beckons Syrians not deemed as “terrorists” [government
opponents] by the Syrian state to return to Syria. The word “home” was only mentioned twice in
Mr. Muallem’s speech, whereas the word “terrorist” or “terrorism” was mentioned 23 times.
Additionally, a large portion of his speech indicated distrust of primarily western host countries
and accusations of using Syrian refugees as “bargaining chips.” His speech also seems to focus
less on warmly beckoning displaced Syrians “home” to Syria, compared to the Armenian state,
and more on scolding western host countries. President Bashar al-Assad added, in a televised
speech held on February 17, 2019, that:
...the Syrian state is working to return every refugee and displaced [person] who left his
home because of terrorism since this return is the only way to end their suffering...We
will not allow the sponsors of terrorism to turn the Syrian refugees into a political card to
achieve their interests...We call upon all those who left the country because of terrorism
to return to it and contribute to the reconstruction process. The country is the homeland
for all the Syrian people...the issue of refugees has been a source of corruption exploited
by officials of some countries supporting terrorism. The return of the displaced [person]
will deprive these parties of the political and financial benefit.
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The above quote excerpted from a televised speech by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad also
accusingly points to western host countries using displaced Syrians as a “political card,” namely
for the political and financial benefits afforded to host countries for hosting Syrian refugees.
Following Wedeen earlier, Assad’s “strategy of domination is based on compliance rather than
legitimacy” (Wedeen 2015, 6). Those who do not comply with what Wedeen terms the Assad
“cult” are deemed disloyal and not eligible or desirable for return. In Assad’s televised speech,
moreover, he shifts blame for terrorism to other parties, although some interlocutors might blame
their traumatic experiences directly on the Syrian state led by Assad. I also interviewed
interlocutors, mostly ethnic Armenians, who supported Assad and did not blame him for their
decision to flee. Whereas the Armenian state’s focus is currently on appealing to young
professional diasporan Armenians, the Syrian state’s stance is defensive, accusatory, and only
pertains to Syrians who did not participate in “terrorism” (government opponents), not all
Syrians, regardless of their political affiliation or support. Both Syria and Armenia serve as
“beckoning” states for the purposes of reconstruction--after the decade-long war in Syria, and
generations after the Armenian genocide and collapse of the Soviet Union. Syrian Armenian
women (although not exclusively) are asked to reconstruct a socially constructed homeland they
were not born in and are in a sense doubly burdened by calls to come home to Syria and fix Syria,
and fix their socially constructed ancestral homeland, Armenia.
However, according to my research, I found that ethnic Armenian migrants from Syria
living in Armenia, were split between allegiance to the Assad administration and fearful of his
rule, particularly younger individuals. I found similar data through ethnographic interviews in
Istanbul and Berlin with ethnic Armenian and ethnic Arab young women. Armine, a key
gatekeeper and friend I met in Istanbul during preliminary fieldwork, told me she had been
arrested by the Assad government in Syria. Her friend, Hala, a Syrian Arab woman I interviewed
in Istanbul, told me that she had been arrested 4 times by the Assad government in Damascus. A
Palestinian woman in her late 30s, a former sniper for the Free Syrian Army, told me she had also
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been arrested by the Assad government and for vengeance, she became a sniper. However,
throughout ethnographic interviews in Yerevan over the course of 3 years (2016-2019), many
primarily middle-aged ethnic Armenian women from Syria living in Armenia told me they were
supportive of the Assad government, as the Assad family are members of the Alawite ethnoreligious minority group in Syria. Nerses, an ethnic Armenian man from Syria whom I
interviewed in 2018 in Yerevan, and Hripsime, a middle-aged ethnic Armenian woman from
Syria I interviewed in 2016 in Yerevan, as well as Hala, told me their personal connections to the
Assad government helped in Syria. For example, Hala was arrested four times in Syria, but was
treated well in comparison to other prisoners since she was related to a prominent family. As one
ethnic Armenian woman in Armenia, Salpi, told me in Yerevan in 2019, “people with money
liked Assad… [but he] failed people with no education.” This statement is in line with what I
have observed during ethnographic fieldwork, and both Muallem’s and Assad’s speeches about
the preferential return of displaced Syrians to Syria.

5.4

Conclusion

I argue that Armenia, serving as a “beckoning” state for Syrian Armenians, began with

an overly eager, almost superficial, push to “beckon” Syrian Armenians home to Armenia
through emphasizing Syrian Armenian migrant women’s socioeconomic contributions to
Armenia. Part II examined discussions about return and homecomings, as well as discourse
analysis and ethnographic interviews from my fieldwork. The first Minister of Diaspora, Hranush
Hakobyan, emphasized the importance of welcoming Syrian Armenians home to Armenia and
Syrian Armenian migrant women’s socioeconomic contributions to Armenia, such as through
performative charity fairs and exhibition sales, which were also immensely helpful for Syrian
Armenian women entrepreneurs. The second Minister of Diaspora, Mkhitar Hayrapetyan, sought
to distinguish his period from Hakobyan’s (viewed as a byproduct of corrupt Soviet
administrators) through appealing to younger diasporan Armenians from all over the world, not
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just Syria, but also not completely ignoring Syria. The transition of the Ministry of Diaspora to
the Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs led by former Mayor of Glendale,
California, Zareh Sinanyan, continued Hayrapetyan’s legacy. Instead of emphasizing bringing
Syrian Armenians to Armenia and showcasing migrant women’s talents and businesses, Sinanyan
appeals to a need for a “brain gain” in Armenia, using the Diaspora as a major resource. The final
section of this chapter focused on Syria as another “beckoning” state, calling its citizens to return
home. However, as demonstrated through ethnographic interviews in Istanbul and Yerevan, not
every ethnic Armenian (or Arab) who fled from Syria is comfortable returning to an Assadcontrolled government. The next chapter will examine how the Armenian state and non-state
organizations are instrumental in promoting the Syrian Armenian “brand,” a phrase occasionally
heard throughout fieldwork by interlocutors. It will also show how state and non-state
organizations provide business and vocational training to Syrian Armenian women, particularly
those women who pursued entrepreneurship careers in Armenia. I will also provide participant
observation experiences I had in attending social-psychological meetings at Aleppo NGO,
vocational workshops at NGOs, and exhibition sales.
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CHAPTER 6. THE SYRIAN ARMENIAN “BRAND”
Anahid: What are some of the challenges you and your organization face working with
Syrian Armenian women?
Diana: ...Well, the Armenian media is very interested in Syrian Armenian businesses,
and I think this can be annoying because it is a constant obsession. Syrian Armenian
women are also upset by the labels. As [name redacted, leader of a prominent NGO] said,
‘In Syria, we are Armenians. In Armenia, we are all Syrians.’ Syrian Armenian women
don’t want to be called ‘Syrian Armenians.’ They want to just be called ‘Armenians.’ The
labels are also dictated by decision makers [not the women themselves].
Anahid: Thank you. And what are your hopes for the future, in terms of your work?
Diana: I wish to travel to Syria.
Anahid: Me, too.
Diana: And I think we should raise the Syrian brand, amplify messages, just mirror and
amplify.
Diana’s final statement was also echoed by interlocutors in a joint Dutch and GIZ (NGO in
Armenia working on Syrian Armenian socioeconomic integration) report, called “Bringing the
Colours: The effects of Syrian Armenian economic integration in Armenia.” According to one
Yerevan municipal official in November 2017, “Syrian Armenian is a quality brand,” referring to
the reputation of Syrian Armenians for being well-known craftsmen and jewelers, as well as their
“reputation for diligence, integrity and the production of high-quality goods” (Uzelac and
Meester 2018, 40). The integrity, reputation, and good customer service skills of Syrian
Armenians were also reported by 3 NGO worker interlocutors as well.
Syrian Armenian women living in Armenia were encouraged by the Armenian state and
non-state organizations to develop vocational skills and seek employment in Armenia. Of the 17
Syrian Armenian women (out of 32) who are currently working in Armenia, 14 started their own
small businesses, formally or informally (i.e., running them out of their living spaces or in
apartment courtyard archways, called dalan). Over time, local and international NGO employees
noted the work ethic of Syrian Armenians in Armenia and their reputation for artisanry in Syria,
leading to what has been termed the Syrian Armenian “brand.” The social construction and
marketing of the Syrian Armenian “brand,” I assert, is part of the Armenian state’s repatriation
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campaign, albeit not in a sense of “beckoning” Syrian Armenian migrant women to Armenia.
Instead, the purpose is more of an attempt to convince local Armenians that Syrian Armenians are
useful for Armenia’s development. Recall the phrase echoed throughout this dissertation—
“good” Syrian Armenians are those who stay in Armenia and choose to become Armenian
citizens, as well as those who socioeconomically contribute to Armenia’s development. The
intentionality behind the Syrian Armenian “brand” is again not malicious, nor are the repatriation
campaigns beckoning Syrian Armenians “home” to Armenia. I believe the “branding” is due to a
combination of factors: socioeconomic usefulness to the Armenian state, state anxiety about
emigration and hostile borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey leading to the impetus for statesponsored repatriation campaigns, and encouragement for future Syrian Armenian migrants to
come “home” to Armenia and find there is a space for them economically.
Part I will provide an overview of the Syrian Armenian “brand.” Part II will provide a
brief discussion of business skills development assistance provided by NGOs and an analysis of
NGO employee frustrations and descriptions of the benefits of Syrian Armenian women receiving
training in vocational skills and business development. It will include ethnographic stories from
my fieldwork in Yerevan, particularly participant observation in vocational workshops offered by
NGOs, interviews with both Syrian Armenian women and state and non-state employees and
attending exhibition sales promoting Syrian Armenian products and businesses. The following
chapter will describe the benefits and drawbacks of Syrian Armenian women working in Armenia
and their transition from most women not having to work in Armenia.

6.1

Part I: Syrian Armenian “Brand”

The Syrian Armenian “brand” refers to state efforts and humanitarian marketing

referencing Syrian Armenian migrants in Armenia (i.e., “we are all Armenians, welcome
home!”). My research found discomfort expressed by some NGO workers, state workers, and the
resistance of Syrian Armenian migrant women to the use of the Syrian Armenian “brand” to
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describe the lived experiences of Syrian Armenian migrant women in Armenia. While not an
official legal category used to refer to refuge-seekers in Armenia, the Syrian Armenian “brand”
nonetheless helps to explain why certain barriers to socioeconomic integration exist for Syrian
Armenian migrant women in Armenia. Which Syrian Armenian migrants are considered more
deserving of humanitarian aid, particularly when local Armenians are also subjected to a
distressed socioeconomic environment--any migrant woman or generally only those who are
small business entrepreneurs?
The Armenian state’s response to the influx of Syrian Armenian refuge-seekers, newly
branded by the state as “repatriates,” stands in stark contrast to earlier waves of ethnic Armenian
refuge-seekers fleeing from conflict in Azerbaijan (1980s to early 1990s) and Iraq (early 2000s).
Compared to earlier migration flows, renewed interest in providing humanitarian relief, such as
rent subsidies for 6 months, tuition assistance, and other emergent funds, led to one UNHCR
Armenia employee (Diana) referring to this response as the Syrian Armenian “brand,” as well as
a desire to not only preserve it, but to amplify it as well. The Syrian Armenian “brand” described
by this employee also refers to the media attention (discussed in Chapter 5) paid to Syrian
Armenian women who were generally housewives in Syria and are now transformed into small
business owners in Armenia, many of whom operate small store fronts in an underground
shopping center called Halebi Shuka (Aleppo Shopping Center) by a main metro station in central
Yerevan. These store fronts mostly center around selling Syrian or Middle Eastern baked goods,
spices, embroidery, or jewelry.
Local government and non-profit workers, who weathered the fall of the Soviet Union
and war with Azerbaijan (մութ ու ցուրտ տարիներ, mut u tsurd tariner, “the dark and cold
years”), many of whom work diligently to support Syrian Armenian refuge-seekers, also are
frustrated with the media and Ministry of Diaspora attention (especially when it was led by
Hranush Hakobyan, who championed the Syrian Armenian “brand”), as local Armenians suffered
greatly especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s (1988 earthquake in northwestern Armenia,
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Armenian independence in 1991, and war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh in the early to
mid-1990s). Some local NGO workers and civilians are annoyed with attention paid to Syrian
Armenians because they feel local Armenians suffer just as much, if not more, than Syrian
Armenians. Additionally, more state, NGO, and media attention is paid to Syrian Armenians than
other ethnic Armenian migrant populations, such as those who fled from Azerbaijan and Iraq,
although this has changed post-fieldwork with the refuge-seeking crisis from Artsakh in the
aftermath of the Second Karabakh War (which ended in November 2020 and will be discussed in
the Epilogue). For example, Armenians who fled from Azerbaijan (after the First Karabakh War
in the late 1980s-early 1990s) are still struggling with housing after 30 years, a fact which some
NGO employees felt they had enough time to sort out housing and integrate. Syrian Armenians
also already speak Armenian, whereas ethnic Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan primarily speak
Russian. Concerning Syrian Armenian integration, the same NGO workers told me they felt the
Armenian government is more prepared now than it was when ethnic Armenians were fleeing
from Azerbaijan in the late 1980s, early 1990s, because during that time, Armenia also recently
gained its independence and was struggling with major humanitarian and economic crises.
Examples of Syrian Armenian “branding” include the publication of brochures and
booklets by local organizations, for example “Restart,” featuring Syrian Armenian entrepreneurs
who have established themselves in Armenia; televised appearances of a select few Syrian
Armenian business women exhibiting their crafts; and frequent exhibitions of Syrian Armenian
businesses featuring Western Armenian embroidery and jewelry, soaps, silver jewelry, spices,
and baked goods, alternately hosted by one of the major NGOs supporting Syrian Armenian
integration or the Ministry of Diaspora itself (as of Spring 2019, the Office of the High
Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs).
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Figure 6.1 Restart pamphlet. Photo by author. Image of “Restart” pamphlet from GIZ in
Yerevan

Figure 6.2 Inside of “Restart” pamphlet. Photo by author, from GIZ in Yerevan.
A 25-year or so veteran employee of the UN system, Diana currently serves as a liaison between
various NGO and state partners and constantly encourages Syrian Armenian women to expand
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their horizons and teach other Syrian Armenian women skills they acquired through vocational
training programs. As a veteran employee, Diana has both seen and experienced the collapse of
the USSR and Armenia’s debilitating humanitarian crisis in the early 1990s (as well as postfieldwork, post-Second Karabakh War), after Armenia weathered a war with neighboring
Azerbaijan and a devastating earthquake. “I know what lack of stuff feels like,” she would tell
Syrian Armenian women beneficiaries, referencing memories of bread lines in post-independence
Armenia, as well as poverty and extremely limited use of electricity and gas. As a humanitarian
worker and a local civilian in the early 1990s, Diana recalled serving as an English translator for
international NGOs while grappling with the fact that her birthplace was struggling so much, and
she could only do so much.
While “brand” and “labels” are key words used in the context of Syrian Armenians, it is
also important to consider why labels matter to Syrian Armenian migrant women and impact
lived experiences of socioeconomic integration in Armenia, in addition to past historical “labels”
via legal statuses. It is also important to consider the legal statuses of genocide survivors in both
post-Ottoman Syria and post-Soviet Armenia and why this led to tensions between Armenians
during and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, tensions which persist in present-day
Yerevan.While the Armenian state and non-government organizations (NGOs) classify and
identify Syrian Armenians as “repatriates” due to the state’s current geopolitical situation (i.e.,
emigration from Armenia and need for more ethnic Armenian citizens), Syrian Armenians largely
reject this label because they could never repatriate to a land they were never displaced from.
Syrian Armenians also do not like the term “refugee” as it undermines their potential for ethnic
Armenian citizenship. As discussed in chapter 3, most Syrian Armenians I interviewed prefer to
simply be called “Armenians” based on possessing Armenian passports and residing in their
perceived ancestral homeland, as constructed by the Armenian state.
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Figure 6.3 Syrian Armenian Industrial Zone. Photo by author, Yerevan, Armenia
One of the implementers of the Syrian Armenian “brand” is the Syrian Armenian
Industrial Zone (SAIZ), which is a product of SAU (discussed below) and is a business center
that brings Syrian Armenian businesses together and provides services to foster development.
SAIZ members can network with each other, receive a space in the “production zone” where they
can develop their products and have a space in the showroom to showcase their products. SAIZ
members also can access accounting services, legal consultancy, customs clearance, and logistics
support. SAU also has a women’s group, but both men and women held workspaces at SAIZ. I
visited SAIZ and SAU frequently in summer 2019, where I took a free embroidery class and
interviewed the director, Takouhi. Located on the outskirts of Yerevan, it took me a solid hour to
reach SAU/SAIZ without a taxi. Entering the SAU/SAIZ building felt like I was entering a
warehouse, as one walked down a hallway flanked by offices housing craftspeople. Both Syrian
Armenian men and women entrepreneurs were housed at SAU/SAIZ and my embroidery classes
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were always welcoming and included passing by metalworkers, professional embroiderers,
culinary experts and bakers, and interior decorators.

6.2

Part II: Business and Vocational Assistance, and Perceptions of Engagement in
Training Programs
6.2.1 Business Skills Development Assistance

Local Armenian and international NGOs based in Yerevan are focused on the socio-

economic long-term integration of Syrian Armenian women, as evidenced by vocational training
programs offered to Syrian Armenian women based in Yerevan. In addition, business loans and
advice were also provided to Syrian Armenian women, largely through GIZ. Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) is a German development agency that has
been working in Armenia since the early 1990s and had an office established in Yerevan in 2002.
According to American political officer, Allison and former GIZ employee Kohar, “GIZ focuses
on economic development, the economic integration of Syrian Armenians.” Maro, an employee at
Caritas, recalled the early years of Syrian migration to Armenia (2012-2013). According to Maro:
During this time [2012-2013], there were lots of vocational trainings, charity fairs, and
development of entrepreneurial skills, financial literacy training, like how to save money
they can earn. They need to acquire the skills and tools to implement, and they need
knowledge awareness raising sessions. For example, there is digital marketing training
later this month. We want women to be self-employed, to transfer their skills (Maro,
Caritas, February 21, 2019).
The first major wave of Syrian migration to Armenia after the outbreak of the war occurred
largely in summer 2012, and unintentionally brought with its media sensationalism of Syrian
Armenians in Armenia (discussed in Chapter 5). Syrian Armenian women were encouraged to
learn how to be self-employed and were provided with vocational training that promoted the
development of entrepreneurial skills, digital marketing, and financial literacy training. Maro said
that Caritas’ entrepreneurial support activities includes business incubation, where applicants
approach Caritas with a business idea, are trained with entrepreneurial skills, get help with
business idea generation, develop a business model and plan, and are given grants upon approval
of the business plan. In total, Caritas offers 6-12 months of entrepreneurial support. As of
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February 2019, Caritas had 198 applicants, of whom 18 were selected for grants financed by
World Vision Armenia. One successful project was chocolate production because it included
local Armenians as potential employees, and Caritas employees, like other local Armenian NGO
employees, felt that locals needed to be included in integration efforts. Of the 18 approved and
financed businesses, at least 10 were proposed by Syrian Armenians and the rest were proposed
by local Armenians. Caritas partners with a consortium of other organizations--Austrian Red
Cross, Armenian Red Cross, Center for the Coordination of Syrian Armenian Issues (CCSAI),
and Small and Medium Enterprises (SME), to work on a project called, “Increased Resilience of
Syrian Armenians in Host Population.” This project is funded by the EU Madad Fund (a regional
European Union trust to support the Syrian crisis) and its goal is to support the integration of
Syrian Armenians in Armenia. Caritas and SME helps with economic integration through
business incubation. The grants awarded through business incubation help fund physical spaces
for resident businesses. As will be shown in Chapter 8, not every Syrian Armenian woman-owned
small business (WOSB) has its own store front and business owners sometimes must come up
with creative solutions to this problem, such as selling pastries at a small table underneath an
apartment courtyard’s dalan, or archway. Maro proudly told me about the success of Caritas’
business incubation, “We have trained about 480 people so far, supported 140 businesses, 60
people became self-employed, 70 established SMEs (small and medium enterprises), and 60 startups that began to exist 1-3 years ago,” indicating that locals and Syrian Armenians both benefit
from this project. Hovhannes, a local Armenian man employed at JMF NGO, added that Syrian
Armenian entrepreneurs can apply for a subsidized loan (4%) from banks to help start their new
businesses, but face certain legal challenges as some are not yet Armenian citizens and thus have
no credit history. Hovhannes said, “Syrian Armenians face legal regulations. Banks can’t give
loans to Syrian Armenians because they are not citizens. Syrian Armenians don’t have history
with banks and no credit history, so they are risky.” As discussed in Chapter 3, there are pros and
cons to choosing Armenian citizenship over refugee or temporary residence status, and the
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decision to pursue Armenian citizenship is not solely based on a desire to simply “return” to one’s
socially constructed ancestral homeland. Armenian citizenship would also enable potential Syrian
Armenian entrepreneurs to apply for a subsidized business loan from a local bank and may
provide an attractive incentive for applying for citizenship. However, none of the Syrian
Armenian entrepreneurs I interviewed listed this (citizenship for a subsidized business loan) as
the sole reason for pursuing citizenship, but it may be another reason for doing so.
Ovsanna, a local Armenian employee at GIZ, told me about two projects GIZ had been
working on, called “Economic Integration of Syrian Refugees in Armenia” (EISRA), from
November 2015-October 2017 and “Economic and Social Participation of Vulnerable Displaced
Persons and Local Population in the South Caucasus” (EPIC) from 2017 to 2021, as well as the
main purpose of GIZ. One project will be discussed here. GIZ focuses on the economic
integration of Syrian Armenians in Armenia, working with the state employment agency, career
guidance, capacity building, and the increased employability, employment, and entrepreneurship
of Syrian Armenians in Armenia. EISRA was part of the Private Sector Development in South
Caucasus (PSD SC) program launched by GIZ on behalf of the German government. In general,
GIZ supports existing businesses, marketing, and trainings, and provides business advice but no
vocational trainings like other local and international NGOs, such as Caritas. Ovsanna told me
that GIZ focuses on developing entrepreneurial skills with Syrian Armenian women, helping
them talk about their business profiles and that GIZ has conducted “mapping” of Syrian
Armenian entrepreneurs to identify needs. She also told me about a website called
www.syrarbi.am, available in both English and Armenian, that provides information about skills
development, financial information, legal and taxes (setting up a business in Armenia). SyrArBi
(Syrian Armenian Business) website was created by GIZ “to serve as a digital platform on
economic integration issues of Syrian refugees in Armenia” and the website is now hosted and
managed by Syrian Armenians’ Union (SAU) NGO. Ovsanna noted that there is a total of 1,500
economically active Syrian Armenians (both men and women) recorded in SyrArBi’s database
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(as of July 2019). Aside from SyrArBi, there is another website called Siramark [“Peacock”]
created by a repatriate organization, Repat Armenia, showing the locations of Syrian Armenian
and other repatriate-owned businesses in Yerevan. As of December 2020, however, this website
was defunct.
Kohar, another GIZ employee I interviewed in 2017, added that GIZ assists with
economic integration of Syrian Armenians by teaching interested entrepreneurs how to adapt their
skills to the Armenian market (discussed below). According to Kohar:
GIZ provides access to financing funding...to earn enough money to cover basic needs,
first of all, and secondly GIZ helps with the [Syrian Armenian] industrial zone, which is a
business center that provides accounting and marketing services for a better price. We
usually don’t provide everything for free. People have to contribute something. Syrian
entrepreneurs are registered at the Syrian Armenians’ Union. The present situation of
Syrian Armenians is dire, but so are local Armenians. Many organizations are bringing
money for Syrian Armenians. The first time, everyone wants to give money to Syrians
(Kohar, GIZ, July 12, 2017).
Like Zvart, Kohar observed the initial enthusiasm of donors to provide financial support to Syrian
Armenians (“many organizations are bringing money for Syrian Armenians”) but noted that local
Armenians are just as vulnerable as Syrian Armenians. GIZ does not provide vocational training
like other local and international NGOs but does offer business advice and seed funds for certain
projects. The next section will discuss other forms of assistance provided to Syrian Armenian
women and aspiring entrepreneurs, such as vocational and financial assistance.

6.2.2

Vocational and Financial (Business Loans) Assistance

Throughout my fieldwork, I found that there were many vocational trainings, workshops,
social events, and other classes offered to Syrian Armenian women mostly by local and
international NGOs, such as KASA, Caritas, GIZ, Red Cross, and Aleppo NGO. At least two
Syrian Armenian women told me that NGOs helped them more directly than the Armenian
government with rent, vocational training, and other forms of humanitarian aid. Santoukhd, a
pediatrician from Aleppo, said that, “NGOs helped, not the government, with clothes, sometimes
food and eyeglasses. Red Cross helped with 3 months’ rent, KASA gave lectures and [vocational]
trainings, but they did not give any money, clothes, or rent money.” This dissertation will not
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provide an overview of the extent of humanitarian aid provided to Syrian Armenians living in
Armenia, but it will particularly focus on the aid NGOs provided in terms of vocational and
business assistance. Here, Santoukhd credited KASA with providing vocational training and
guest lectures for Syrian Armenian women who are interested in entering the paid labor force in
Armenia. Santoukhd herself did not necessarily need vocational training since she had already
worked as a physician in Syria and was able to find similar employment in Yerevan. Arsine
added that, “Caritas helped us with language, cooking, make-up, and embroidery.” She is an
active member of H.O.M. (a global cultural Armenian organization involved in preserving
Western Armenian crafts) where she serves as a volunteer and invited me to attend several art
classes there and is an Aleppo NGO member. In this quote, Arsine mentioned that Caritas (a local
NGO) helped her and other Syrian Armenian women with Eastern Armenian lessons, and
vocational training, such as cooking, cosmetology, and embroidery.
One of the main NGOs that I followed in Yerevan, Aleppo NGO, was instrumental in
hosting vocational trainings and workshops, distributing aid, providing social-psychological
meetings every week for Syrian Armenian women, runs a collective called Aleppo Cuisine
Center, and hosts many Syrian Armenian social events. Effectively, it is founded by Syrian
Armenian women and is for Syrian Armenian women. One of the founders, Parantsem, told me
about Aleppo NGO’s origin story:
Life was very different in Armenia. I didn’t know anyone. There were no Armenians
from Syria at that time. After July 2012, many Syrian Armenians came after the bombs. I
thought, ‘what would the newcomers do? We all have to come together.’ I started
negotiating with SA businessmen and women from different organizations in Syria. In
March 2013, we registered Aleppo NGO. In 2015, the Save A Life project began. We
helped 480 people come to Yerevan. It was very difficult--too many people from
Armenia didn’t help. We brought people, after 6 months’ rent (subsidized), we then
asked, ‘what will they do?’ There were too many people against that. If things get better
in Syria, they can sell properties in Syria and live well in Armenia. When Syria becomes
safer, because you can’t sell now. But women have started working here, in Armenia
(Parantsem, August 2, 2019).
Parantsem described how she was one of the first Syrian Armenians to arrive in Armenia in 2012.
Active with charity life and businesses in Syria, Parantsem quickly got to work in Armenia and
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identified a major need--to get as many Syrian Armenians out of Syria as quickly as possible. She
kickstarted the Save a Life project in 2015, which many Syrian Armenian interlocutors have
described as essential in helping them leave Syria. Gradually, Aleppo NGO grew to provide
further financial, charitable, economic, and social support to Syrian Armenian women, including
hosting various workshops. Vocational training workshops are important to discuss here because
they demonstrate the collision between expectations of Syrian Armenian women in Armenia of
finding employment and truly feeling “at home,” and the perspectives of local and international
state and non-state employees in terms of what they feel Syrian Armenian women need to know
about living in Armenia. These workshops targeted ethnic Armenian women community leaders
in Aleppo whose networks had been transplanted to Yerevan, such as through initiatives like
“Refugee Women as Change Initiators” or preparing Syrian Armenian women for life in
Armenia, such as gender-based violence awareness.

6.2.3

Capacity-Building and Leadership Workshops

The workshops that I attended at Aleppo NGO in Fall 2018 were organized by Zvart, an
Aleppo NGO employee and friend, and were part of a project called, “Refugee Women as
Change Initiators.” I asked Zvart about the name of the workshop, and she replied that it was
inspired by a senior UNHCR employee, who suggested, “Refugee women as change initiators” as
a title. This indicated that change is viewed as coming with women. Zvart explained, “women are
the backbone of the family. If they are integrated, so will their children,” highlighting the pivotal
role played by Syrian Armenian women both in Syria and in Armenia, as well as Armenian
women in general. I attended at least three workshops through this project, two of which I will
highlight here. I attended the first workshop on October 3, 2018. My friend, Zvart, an employee
at Aleppo NGO, had always facilitated my attendance at Aleppo NGO meetings and events, and
invited me to attend this project. I was initially hesitant to attend because of my positionality as a
researcher, not as a potential beneficiary, but she assured me it would be appropriate to attend.
Upon entering Aleppo NGO at noon, I saw a few Syrian Armenian women I had recognized from
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previous trips to Armenia, and immediately felt comfortable sitting down next to them at the table
and listening in to the meeting. I was invited by the guest speaker, Gayane, a local Armenian
employee of Eurasia Foundation, to participate and introduce myself as well. I felt it was
exhilarating to be around Syrian Armenian women who really wanted to contribute to their
community in Yerevan. Most interlocutors at the workshop casually told me they did not work in
Armenia but wanted to help other Syrian Armenian women. Today’s meeting was about
consensus building and was led by Gayane and a local Armenian man named Varuzhan. Topics
discussed included addressing the major problems Syrian Armenian women noticed about life in
Yerevan, and our activity was mapping a tree to address the roots of problems, or consensus
building. In this case, the roots of problems faced by Syrian Armenian women in Armenia
included low wages for high rent prices, Russian language as a barrier to employment
opportunities (as many Syrian Armenian women do not speak Russian), cultural differences, age
discrimination, and job quality, among other “roots.” The trunk of the tree was labeled “women”
and the branches represented the “effects” on Armenian host society, with two suggested effects
being “emigration” and “despair.” A group of 12 women was selected to participate based on
their connections to the Syrian Armenian community, and most seemed actively engaged in this
workshop.
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Figure 6.4 Aleppo NGO workshop. Photo by author from first workshop, “problems and
solutions,” using a drawing of a tree, Aleppo NGO.
The second Aleppo NGO workshop that I attended and will describe here was with Lara
Aharonian of Women’s Resource Center in Yerevan, which took place on October 26, 2018. I
saw most of the same Syrian Armenian women participants as I had the past few workshops.
Participants introduced themselves and were asked by Lara to explain what our names mean and
why we were given them. I explained that my namesake, “Anahid,” was a pagan Armenian
fertility goddess in ancient Armenia. There was a group of about 10-11 women who participated
in the workshop, and we met in Aleppo NGO, in the cigarette-choked, fluorescent-lit basement of
a high-rise building on Northern Avenue in central Yerevan. Lara introduced her own trajectory
to Armenia, from Lebanon to Canada to Yerevan in 2003, where she has been living for the past
15 years. With a characteristic wisp of dyed hot pink hair, Lara was an incredibly powerful and
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empathetic leader, certainly one of the most memorable workshop leaders I had met so far. Her
NGO, Women’s Resource Center, focuses on women’s rights, sexual health, and the fight against
domestic violence in Armenia. Her presentation included a slideshow of images of famous
Armenians and most participants (most of whom were Syrian Armenian women and a few local
Aleppo NGO staff members) could identify the famous Armenian men, but not the famous
Armenian women. Lara commented on our surprise, reminding the workshop participants that,
“we can be proud of being Armenian, but we need to accept the ugly side, too, such as beating
wives.” She quoted a famous Armenian writer from the 12th century, Mkhitar Gosh, “women
and men are equal.” Lara went on to explain that the lesson for this workshop is that as
Armenians, even as Armenian women, we have a hard time remembering the women, but easily
remembered the male writers. Lara reminded the workshop participants that more than half the
population in Armenia is women (51.5% as of October 2018), but she asked rhetorically, “where
are we?” meaning “where are the women?” The rest of her workshop focused on discussing sexselective abortions in Armenia (100 girls to 120 or 130 boys), and concerns of parents with
patrilineality--who will continue the family name without a boy? In terms of paid labor force
participation in Armenia, Lara observed that, “women work hard here [Armenia], but men are
lazier [they can get away with it easier than women]. Armenian companies also hire women
based on their physical appearance and hire ‘hot young men’ because they might have kids soon.”
These observations seem to be in contradiction to Syrian Armenian women’s ability to participate
in the paid labor force in Armenia, as there seemed to be less emphasis on physical appearances.
Like other NGO workers described earlier in this chapter, Lara said that local Armenian women
work hard in Armenia, and men generally can get away with not working as much because they
can pass on the family name patrilineally. An incentive for local Armenian women to participate
in the paid labor force in Armenia is tied in closely with the ability to be good marriage prospects,
“women have more diplomas, but only get degrees to be good marriage material.” Lara reminded
us of a phrase in Armenian, “Gine prti nman e,” [“a woman is like cotton,” implying the more
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you beat her, the softer she becomes].” She explained that local Armenian women are socialized
to believe that “if someone beats you, they love you.” Women are taught, in other words, “you
belong to your husband, and women were embarrassed [to report domestic violence, so nobody
complained even when it was happening] and mothers-in-law made this worse.” Now, Lara says,
the police help, lawyers, and they take women and kids to a safe place. She concluded her
workshop stating that, “Verjin khoske mishd hay dghamartounne [the last word is always an
Armenian man’s].” Throughout her presentation, I could hear Syrian Armenian women
participants clicking their tongues, a non-verbal communication in Armenian culture that
indicates disgust, disappointment, and disagreement, reflecting their perceptions of domestic
violence in Armenia. Although there was less active participation given the format of this
presentation, it still felt extremely impactful among workshop participants, as Lara also showed
pictures from past and present domestic violence cases, pictures of abuse victims and survivors,
because she told us she wanted us to know their names and faces as much as we knew the names
and faces of famous Armenian men. The purpose of this workshop was to explain to the Syrian
Armenian women participants that domestic violence is a serious problem in Armenia, but that
there are resources, however few, for women experiencing domestic violence. The participants’
visceral reactions to reading the PowerPoint slides in Armenian with cartoons of Armenian
phrases, such as “a woman is like cotton, the more you beat her, the softer she becomes,” reflects
differences between local and Syrian Armenian gender dynamics. This is not to say that domestic
violence does not occur in Syria, and that Armenia is prone to domestic violence--however, it is
common and underreported in Armenia. I have experienced gender-based violence during my
fieldwork in Yerevan.
Aside from Aleppo NGO’s workshops on capacity-building, leadership skills, and
domestic violence awareness, I was invited by Diana from UNHCR, a friend, gatekeeper, and
research sponsor for my Fulbright Award, to attend a broadcasting workshop hosted by a few
French journalists in Etchmiadzin in May 2019. Unlike previous workshops, this workshop was
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co-hosted by the Armenian Round Table Foundation and invited prominent ethnic Armenian
migrant women displaced from Artsakh (the Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh Republic),
Iraq, and Syria to Armenia. The Armenian Round Table Foundation is an organization in
Armenia that works closely with the Armenian Apostolic Church (located in Etchmiadzin) and
contributes to poverty eradication, sustainable community development, and civil society
development in Armenia. They co-hosted this event with French journalists from Radio Activite
to provide a workspace for the broadcasting workshop. The broadcasting workshop was intended
to encourage Syrian Armenian women to discuss their experiences publicly in their own words,
and to practice interviewing each other. Like Aleppo NGO workshops, attendees were actively
involved in the Syrian Armenian community in Yerevan. Attendees met in Republic Square, in
central Yerevan, with other workshop participants, the French journalists, and Diana from
UNHCR, packed with lunch supplies (meat-stuffed pastries, fruit sujukh or fruit leather, and
water bottles). I could always rely on being fed at any possible research-related event in Armenia,
without fail. We piled into a bus and it took about 20-25 minutes to arrive in Etchmiadzin, located
just outside Yerevan, which is where the Armenian Round Table Foundation had their
workspace. As this workshop took place towards the end of my Fulbright research period, I was
familiar with most of the other workshop participants, but I had not yet met many of the Iraqi
Armenians and an Armenian woman from Artsakh. The workshop was run by three French
journalists, Mathilde, Constance, and Antoine, who were very friendly, but it was clear they
wanted to follow their agenda and not get distracted. We started out with icebreaker games and
met Iraqi Armenian women and an Artsakhsi [ethnic Armenian from Artsakh, or NagornoKarabakh Republic, a de facto independent state]. We moved around, met each other and then
played a drawing activity where we all had to take turns drawing each other based on our first
impressions. After this, we split up into groups. My group was with a woman from Aleppo and a
woman from Stepanakert, the capital of Artsakh. We were told to put together ideas for a
broadcast and came together as a group to develop “Radio Abakayi Houys” (Radio Future Hope).
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We went around the circle and presented our mini-broadcasts and came all together and prepared
a bigger broadcast about refugee women’s experiences in Armenia. All participants said they do
not like being called refugees when many hold Armenian passports. I think this was a cathartic
experience for all. I tried to sit back and listen because I did not have a story to tell that would be
appropriate in this context, aside from being a diasporan Armenian. I did feel like an interloper,
but everyone was welcoming. I made new friends and made sure to talk about how I felt
connected to all of them and my Syrian Armenian roots. Shushan, a friend, participant, and owner
of a shop in Halebi Shuka, pitched in and said that I am a big help with tsutsahantesner
[exhibition sales] because I spread the word about exhibition sales among the diasporan
Armenian community in Armenia when I was living in Yerevan and would always buy the
equivalent of about $40-50 of Syrian Armenian products at each exhibition sale. It was touching
hearing women’s stories about fleeing from crumbling houses and seeing family members shot in
front of them. The Artsakhsi woman told us about a student in Darbnik village who was killed
during the Four Day War with Azerbaijan in 2016 (between Armenia and Azerbaijan over
Artsakh). One Syrian Armenian woman, Lena, was asked to sing a short Armenian hymn at the
beginning of the broadcast, because the group knew she had a beautiful voice from singing in
church. She was asked by the French journalists how she felt to have been a wealthy, successful
woman in Aleppo to now having to basically start over in Yerevan. She said it was difficult, but
she is pushing forward. The broadcast was translated simultaneously into English for a more
global audience and included a mock question and answer session with the larger broadcast
group’s nominated hostess, Takouhi, about women’s experiences of migration and settlement in
Armenia. Takouhi, a leader of Syrian Armenians Union and the most outgoing of all the
participants, volunteered to be the hostess of the larger broadcast. After the broadcast, we rode
back to Republic Square, and I shared a taxi with Takouhi and another Syrian Armenian woman.
A few days later, Radio Activite hosted a screening of the broadcasting workshop at UNHCR
Armenia and invited participants to attend. The workshops described in this section seemed to
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focus on a selection of Syrian Armenian women community leaders living in Yerevan, as the
same attendees generally participated in the same workshops. All the workshops thematically
focused on building leadership skills, advising Syrian Armenian women about gender-based
violence in Armenia and the lack of resources and protection against it, and amplifying Syrian
Armenian women’s voices and encouraging women to practice interviewing each other. The
Radio Activite workshop, like Aleppo NGO’s vocational workshops that I attended, included
participants who were already active in the Syrian Armenian community in Yerevan, and did not
seem to include people from the general body, i.e., several younger women I interviewed who
were not affiliated with Aleppo NGO or active in the Syrian Armenian community due to family
and work obligations. In any event, workshops were a place for (a select group of) Syrian
Armenian migrant women living in Yerevan to socialize and learn new skills.

6.2.4

Vocational Training Feedback from NGO Workers and Syrian Armenian Women

Aside from capacity building and leadership workshops offered by Aleppo NGO, other

local NGOs were instrumental in providing vocational training to Syrian Armenian women.
According to Maro from Caritas, “women beneficiaries of vocational training will receive two
toolboxes,” one of which focuses on encouraging women to be self-employed in Armenia. Syrian
Armenian women are encouraged to be self-employed by being taught how to be hairdressers,
cook and open catering businesses, nail art, cosmetology, cake-making, and fourchette, which
focuses on the presentation of food for catering purposes. Maro noted a drawback to Syrian
Armenian women receiving vocational support, saying, “they get used to it and wait for it, and
don’t want to work.” Maro’s comments about Syrian Armenian women beneficiaries becoming
dependent on NGOs for vocational trainings and other resources reflects concerns of
humanitarian workers in a refugee camp in Kenya. Allyson Krupar, an anthropologist and
education specialist (2017), found that some humanitarian workers in Dadaab, Kenya felt that
refugee women’s dependence on vocational programs focused on capacity building and women’s
empowerment was disempowering to women interlocutors. NGO workers, referred to by Krupar
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as “field workers,” hoped that vocational training would help motivate and encourage women to
hone their skills (such as dyeing clothing) and enhance their autonomy, so they would not be
reliant upon NGO resources and services long-term and would use these skills upon repatriation
(Krupar 2017, 36). Women interlocutors viewed empowerment as the acquisition of new abilities,
particularly relating to the production of goods for sale. Krupar pointed out that vocational
programs focused on traditionally gendered female roles, such as women’s roles in dyeing
clothing, which reinforced traditional gender roles (Krupar 2017, 46). However, gender roles
have changed throughout conflict, displacement, and settlement, as migrant women are forced to
take on traditionally gendered male roles as income providers. Like my fieldwork with Syrian
Armenian migrant women living in Armenia, particularly participant observation at Aleppo
NGO’s workshops, Krupar found that women interlocutors felt empowered by acquiring new
skills, making products for sale, sharing knowledge with each other, and working in groups to
increase their income (Krupar 2017, 140). In my research, I also found that sharing knowledge
was viewed as important, which correlates with Armenian culture in general--sharing knowledge
and resources with other community members as well as outsiders. However, I did not find that
most of the Syrian Armenian women I interviewed who had started their own small businesses in
Armenia, preferred to work in groups. Ideas may have been exchanged and sometimes some
women would help each other watch their stalls at exhibition sales, but generally women
entrepreneurs worked independently. One exception to this observation is SAU’s Arevik (“Little
Sun”) center, which is more like a women’s co-op that gets together to make COVID-19 masks
(post-fieldwork) and children’s clothing.
Dzovinar, a local Armenian NGO employee from KASA, provided further descriptions
of vocational training programs offered for Syrian Armenian women in Armenia. She said:
[Syrian Armenian] women have to find low-paying jobs. Armenia is still very poor.
Examples of this training include cooking, hairdressing, manicures, which are good for
Syrian women. The agencies are not taking older people, mostly young people. Elderly
women usually cook and participate in UNHCR fairs. Other training is for computer
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skills (basic computer skills). We educate people on how to sell their goods and use basic
computer skills and social media, and basic marketing (Dzovinar, KASA, July 7, 2017).
Here, Dzovinar explains how Syrian Armenian women need to manage their expectations about
salaries and work environments upon settling in Armenia. As with other local NGO workers, she
said that Syrian Armenian women are taught how to open their own catering businesses, how to
give manicures and do hairdressing, which Syrian Armenian women find useful, in general.
Dzovinar also commented upon the age discrimination faced by middle-aged and elderly Syrian
Armenian women, as with local Armenian women--employment agencies are more likely to hire
younger people. Older Syrian Armenian women, who were already mostly comfortable with
cooking labor intensive traditional Western Armenian dishes in Syria for their families, are now
being encouraged by NGO vocational training programs to transfer these domestic skills into
opening their own small catering businesses. Older Syrian Armenian women participate in charity
fairs/exhibition sales (discussed later in this chapter) as well, such as those hosted by UNHCR.
However, the conventional vocational training programs (focusing on cooking,
hairdressing, and cosmetology) are no longer viewed as a priority by several local NGO workers.
Zvart from Aleppo NGO noted that humanitarian aid delivered to Armenia for Syrian Armenians
is, “mostly for trainings, which are not really getting results. All money is spent on providing
trainings. Syrian Armenians are tired of the trainings not taking account of their real needs.” By
“trainings,” Zvart is referring to vocational training programs offered by local and international
NGOs, in this case to Syrian Armenian women. She also references the frustrations felt by some
Syrian Armenian women that their “real needs” are not being addressed by vocational training
programs. She explained, “the community needs focus groups. For example, Syrian youth need
training on architecture, computer skills, not leadership skills. They also need English lessons,
designing, and Photoshop skills. Syrian youth need internship and practical skills.” Zvart
discussed the need for NGOs to hold more focus groups for needs assessment purposes, and the
need to focus on Syrian youths as well as middle-aged to elderly Syrian Armenian women. She
asserted that young Syrian Armenians need English language lessons, basic computer skills,
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Photoshop and computer design classes, as well as internship opportunities. In this dissertation,
in-depth ethnographic interviews largely focused on Syrian Armenian women from their late 20s
to their mid-60s, although Zvart raised an important point for future research. I did not interview
women younger than 20, nor did I interview a representative sample of Syrian men. Diana from
UNHCR also commented upon the redundancy of conventional vocational training programs,
implemented since the first major wave of Syrian Armenians arrived in Yerevan in 2012. She
explained simply, “NGOs are running out of people. There is no element of innovation. There is
mapping of Syrian Armenian women, but nothing qualitative.” Syrian Armenian women are
surveyed by several NGOs, such as Aleppo NGO and GIZ, but to date, there is no in-depth
qualitative analysis of the effectiveness of vocational training programs for helping Syrian
Armenian women successfully enter the paid labor force in Armenia. The short-term solution is a
redundancy in vocational training programs and skills (cooking/catering businesses and
cosmetology versus English language lessons and basic computer skills) but is not a desirable
long-term solution.
Ruzanna from the Armenian Round Table Foundation, described the logistics behind
vocational training programs offered by local and international NGOs, in July 2017:
Trainings are organized in restaurants because it’s hard to do in offices, they need more
hours. Trainings are 2 hours/day, 3 times a week. There are problems with cooking
classes, too. They are too long, and people hated it. Syrian Armenian women were not
used to working long hours and prefer to do private services. Sometimes, they have to
share their own earnings and own customers (Ruzanna, ART, July 7, 2017).
Like Maro, Ruzanna commented on the preferences of Syrian Armenian women to be selfemployed rather than work for an employer. She added that some of the main complaints of
Syrian Armenian women entering the paid labor force in Armenia included the time
commitments for participating in vocational programs. Adds Nayiri, an employee at Armenian
Red Cross:
When they first came here, everyone [Syrian Armenian women] went to vocational
training, but no one wanted to work. They were satisfied with their husbands’ incomes in
Syria. Salaries are low in Armenia, so their husband’s salaries are not enough anymore.
Here [in Armenia], a mom can leave kids in daycare and mom goes to work in Armenia.
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Their main goal and importance in Syria were basically supporting to a leading actress
[being second to their husbands]. Now, women are ready to work, but can’t find jobs
(Nayiri, Armenian Red Cross, February 20, 2019).
Nayiri’s metaphor of Syrian Armenian women as a “supporting actress” to their husbands in
Syria minimizes the important role Syrian Armenian women played within Armenian
communities in Syria. Furthermore, as other local Armenian women NGO workers have noted,
one income per household is insufficient to provide for basic living expenses in Armenia.
Syrian Armenian women would prefer to be self-employed and generally are not
interested in sharing their own earnings and customers with other employees. These preferences, I
assert, lead to tensions, particularly with some local NGO workers, who may feel Syrian
Armenian women do not appreciate the work local NGO workers do to help with their long-term
integration or comprehend and empathize with the daily economic challenges faced by local
Armenian women in general. In some interviews with local NGO workers, mostly women, this
has led to characterizations of Syrian Armenian women as being “spoiled.” I argue that, in turn,
this tension between local and international NGO workers (most of whom are local Armenian
women) and Syrian Armenian women can impede long-term socioeconomic integration efforts of
Syrian Armenian women living in Armenia.

6.2.5

Social-Psychological Meetings at Aleppo NGO, Women Supporting Each Other

Throughout 14.5 months of fieldwork, I attended at least 4 social-psychological meetings

hosted at Aleppo NGO. “Social-psychological” is a phrase utilized by the NGO. In the context of
this project, social-psychological meetings held weekly at Aleppo NGO were intended to provide
moral support to Syrian Armenian women, and at times, Syrian Armenian young people, reeling
from the psychological traumas faced during the war. In short, these meetings were intended to
provide a safe space for Syrian Armenian women to air their concerns about adjusting to life in
Armenia and offer support to one another, just as vocational training programs sometimes
included Syrian Armenian women teaching each other skills and supporting each other. Socialpsychological meetings were generally held every Friday evening, and occasionally featured
guest speakers lecturing about Armenian history related to Syria, how to give CPR, and
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navigating social media, among other topics. As Allison, a political officer at the U.S. Embassy,
observed:
Psychological meetings cover the difficulties for 40–50-year-old women. The main issue
is that they were housewives, men are old and can’t find jobs in Armenia, so women rely
on their culinary skills and exhibition sales. Women need to have a place to come
together. They need people to share their stories with, psychological meetings. Each
Friday, Aleppo NGO gets together with women for psychological meetings at 5pm,
inviting speakers (Allison, July 18, 2017).
Here, Allison highlighted the importance of a women-only space for Syrian Armenian women to
exchange ideas, relax after the week, and support each other, a space for women to freely express
their problems, and share their stories fleeing war in Syria. Aleppo NGO offers such a safe space,
and consistently, every Friday at 5pm, even during the COVID-19 pandemic that followed my
fieldwork period (which ended in August 2019), in which social-psychological meetings are held
via Zoom. Social-psychological meetings are an integral part, not only for airing concerns about
issues with integration and teaching each other practical skills (social media, CPR, etc.), but also
for Syrian Armenian women’s sociality. Below is an excerpt from my field notes about attending
one such social-psychological meeting on using social media, which was taught by an Aleppo
NGO member:
I entered a building next to a perfume shop off of Northern Avenue and descended
several floors to Aleppo NGO’s space. The first thing I noticed every time I stepped in
Aleppo NGO was the dim fluorescent lighting and cigarette smoke, quickly followed by
warm smiles and hugs from new and old Syrian Armenian friends. There were mostly
middle-aged women present at the meeting, and I noticed that they would keep each other
in line regarding using phones during the meeting. Knar gave a presentation about the
fundamentals behind using Facebook, which made sense considering the audience mostly
consisted of older women curious about using Facebook to promote their businesses or
stay in touch with family displaced around the world and in Syria. At the meeting, I
noticed that people are friendly and smiled at me, even though I did not know some of
them. The meeting attendees used Arabic words to communicate and emphasize main
points. (Field notes, May 17, 2019).
Aleppo NGO is in the basement of a building off a main avenue in central Yerevan, called
Hyusisayin Boghoda (Northern Avenue), which slices through an upscale dining and shopping
area connecting Republic Square to the Opera House. Upon entering the NGO space, which is
dimly lit with fluorescent lighting and smoking is allowed in Aleppo NGO’s space (as in many
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indoor places in Armenia, aside from certain restaurants), one is greeted with pictures from
Aleppo taped to a wall separating the main area from the kitchen area--pictures of ruins,
churches, famous Armenian monuments. There are several long tables in the middle of the main
area, where attendees sit around for official meetings and workshops, or set up chairs in front of a
long table for panel-style social-psychological meetings. I always felt welcomed entering this
space, despite my discomfort with smoking, because over 14.5 months of fieldwork (summer
2016-summer 2019) and repeat visits to Aleppo NGO, I was able to establish rapport and saw the
same attendees at meetings. In the field notes excerpt above, I observed that there were mostly
middle-aged women who attended social-psychological meetings, and they used non-verbal cues
with each other. For example, attendees would admonish each other for using their phones during
meetings by clicking their tongues, which is generally understood in Armenian culture as a
reprimand for social misbehavior. The meeting was conducted entirely in Western Armenian,
which I am conversational in, sprinkled with occasional Arabic phrases to emphasize points (I
could not understand most of these Arabic phrases). This meeting focused on teaching older
women how to make a Facebook profile and post status updates, which helped some attendees set
up an online presence for their respective businesses.
The social-psychological meeting described above was taught by a Syrian Armenian
woman and an Aleppo NGO member, Knar, who also teaches embroidery classes and owns her
own small embroidery business. In an interview I had with Knar in February 2019, she explained,
“I give classes in NGOs [embroidery classes]. Before, there were 30 women, and I gave classes at
Aleppo NGO.” I took one such embroidery class, hosted by Aleppo NGO and taught by Knar
(discussed in Chapter 8). There were two other Syrian Armenian women I spoke with who told
me they also teach embroidery, or dzerakordz (handicraft) classes. Siranoush is a Syrian
Armenians’ Union (SAU) member who said the reason she teaches dzerakordz classes, for free,
is, “I want to help other women. I want people to have easier lives.” Siranoush owns her own
embroidery business as well. Like Siranoush, Hermine, who was a physician in Syria and
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occasionally works in Armenia, spends most of her time helping other Armenian women learn
how to do embroidery. She said, “In 2015, I began participating in dzerakordz groups. I help
other women learn and I want my granddaughter to learn. It is a piece of our culture--Meche
badmutyun ga [in it (embroidery), there’s history/a story].” Here, Hermine feels compelled to
teach other Armenian women how to do traditional embroidery, because it’s part of our shared
cultural heritage. I participated in embroidery classes for standard participant observation
purposes, but also because I was genuinely curious to learn more about my Western Armenian
heritage and embroidery was a craft that had not been passed down to me personally through the
women in my family--it had to be sought out, and this is a similar experience with other diasporan
Armenian women. Hermine teaches embroidery classes to help other Armenian women gain a
skill, and more importantly, to help them reacquaint themselves with our cultural heritage.
Moreover, teaching other women how to embroider or improve traditional embroidery skills was
also a way of amplifying the Syrian Armenian “brand” in Armenia, via NGOs. For example,
organizations like Aleppo NGO, H.O.M., and Homeland Development Initiative Foundation
(HDIF) help produce and sell Syrian Armenian embroidery and provide stories behind the brand.
Branding also took place internationally, as shown by Syrian Armenian women entrepreneurs
who participated in the Smithsonian Folklife Festival in summer 2018 in Washington, DC, as part
of the Armenia exhibit, called “Creating Home” (Smithsonian Institution 2018). Armenia
program partners for this festival included the Government of the Republic of Armenia, the
Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography in the National Academy of Sciences of Armenia, and
the My Armenia Cultural Heritage Tourism Program. Funding was provided by the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), and implemented by the Smithsonian Institution
in Washington, DC, the U.S. Embassy in Armenia, and the Embassy of Armenia to the U.S. The
Armenia program consisted of three themes--Feasting, Handmade, and Cultures of Survival.
More will be shared about Western Armenian embroidery in Chapter 8.
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Several UN and NGO employees commented on the fact that some Syrian women helped
each other. Diana from UNHCR noted that Berjouhi is teaching others how to do fourchette, and
that many of the members at Aleppo NGO came from wealthy families who were active in
benevolent life in Syria and are now active in benevolent life in Armenia. Diana said, “they are
helping other people they knew. Many would put people in their own apartments. They gradually
learned how to act and opened up their NGO [Aleppo NGO].” This is a summary of how Aleppo
NGO was founded, which was discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Diana mentioned how
Syrian Armenian women helped other Syrian Armenian women they knew from Syria living in
Armenia, and even invited other women and their families to stay with them. In short, at the
beginning of the Syrian conflict especially, and subsequent early migration to Armenia (summer
2012), according to Diana, Syrian Armenian women transplanted not only themselves to
Armenia, but intimate social networks they had in Syria, and generally helped people they knew
first. Kohar, a local Armenian employee from GIZ, also noted that in the EISRA project, “6 or 7
[Syrian Armenian] women entrepreneurs from different fields, would organize different activities
together, coaching other women, managing other women, replicating their activities. The
community is close, it’s easier to get information out this way.” Kohar stated that, on a
programmatic level, GIZ also relied upon the Syrian Armenian community to help with the
EISRA project by helping each other and disseminating important, practical information from
vocational training programs. Aside from Syrian Armenian women helping each other learn skills
and coach each other, NGOs, the Ministry of Diaspora, UNHCR Armenia, and Syrian
Armenians’ Union, were also very instrumental in showcasing mostly Syrian Armenian women
entrepreneurs’ businesses. Another purpose of charity fairs and exhibition sales was to encourage
members of the local community to visit Syrian Armenian businesses and demonstrate to the
local Armenian community how valuable Syrian Armenian women entrepreneurs were to be
contributing to the Armenian economy through media sensationalism and press releases.
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6.2.6

Exhibition Sales of Syrian Armenian Products

Exhibition sales and charity fairs featuring or including Syrian Armenian women
entrepreneurs were especially popular in Armenia during the early migration waves and provide
further evidence of branding by the Armenian state (2012-2015). These events were hosted by
various entities: the Republic of Armenia’s then Ministry of Diaspora (Shounch Me Siriahay
Mshaguyti Yerevanoum, “A Breath of Syrian Armenian Culture in Yerevan”) with the first event
taking place in December 2013; Syrian Armenians’ Union (SAU), Siriahay Arvesdi Dzile (“A
Blossom of Syrian Armenian Arts”), which began in May 2019 and continued every 2 weeks (1st
of the month, and 15th of the month); and sponsored by other organizations, such as Caritas, Red
Cross, expositions at American University of Armenia for Women Entrepreneurs, Food and
Drink Expo at Mergelyan Cluster, and held in honor of various festivals and holidays (Rural
Harvest Festival, Christmas Bazaars, Easter). According to Diana, “There have been more than
100 exhibition sales so far. On Christmas, Easter, UN days, national days. Last December, there
was a regional craft sale in Tbilisi. 11 ladies went by mashrutka [minibus], who had been
working together for 5-6 years at Syrian Armenians’ Union.” Exhibition sales were extremely
popular and took place in Georgia and Iran. Like Diana, Maro from Caritas added that, “Since
2012-2013, there have been charity fairs, tsutsahantesner [exhibitions], donavajarner [holiday
sales]. Syrian Armenian women were selling products, they would produce and sell products
[during charity fairs] which took place before major events or holidays in the country.” Through
visiting exhibition sales, I noticed that there were not many local Armenians who attended these
events. I asked Armen, a UNHCR employee, his opinion about tsutsahantesner and attendance.
He replied, “The tsutsahantesner are fine. Syrian Armenians financially helped many
Hayastansiner [Armenians from Armenia] during the cold and dark years and naturally expect
the same in return, but they came to a poor country.” The phrase, “cold and dark years” (mut u
tsurd tariner) refers to the early 1990s, when Armenia was newly independent from the USSR,
grappling with the aftermath of a devastating earthquake several years before in 1988, and the
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first war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (referred to as “Artsakh” by
Armenians). The second war with Azerbaijan over Artsakh broke out while writing this
dissertation (September 27, 2020). Armen noted how Syrian Armenians, in the early 1990s
financially contributed to helping Armenia during these extremely difficult years, and now Syrian
Armenian migrants in Armenia are expecting reciprocal aid and financial support from Armenia.
Unfortunately, Armenia is limited with the ability to provide substantial financial support.
Accordingly, not many local Armenians are able to afford going to frequent Syrian Armenian
exhibition sales. As a Fulbright researcher, I was able to attend nearly every exhibition sale
advertised in Yerevan over the course of 12 months of dissertation fieldwork. I spent an average
of 20,000 AMD (approximately USD $40) per exhibition sale, which I viewed as a research
expense. Exhibition sales took place at various locations--Northern Avenue, which cuts through
central Yerevan, Marriott Hotel in Republic Square, other hotel plazas and conference rooms,
Malibu Park in Yerevan, English Park in Yerevan, local expo centers such as Mergelyan Cluster,
American University of Armenia, and underground beneath Northern Avenue at Tashir Mall,
among other locations. I attended every exhibition sale possible (August 2018-August 2019) and
established rapport with Syrian Armenian vendors over time, some of whom eventually became
close friends and invited me to their homes for Armenian holiday meals (Christmas and Easter,
for example).
Sensationalized by Armenian media and the then Minister of Diaspora, Hranush
Hakobyan, exhibition sales and charity fairs (tsutsahantesner and donavajarner) were deemed as
problematic by several NGO employees, because some felt some Syrian Armenian women
entrepreneurs relied too much on these events. Diana from UNHCR commented in May 2019,
“For exhibitions, we can’t have holidays every day, we need to do something different. That era
is gone…. We are not fortunate with finding places for exhibition sales.” Here, Diana remarked
upon the logistics behind organizing exhibition sales and the inability of organizations to keep up
with the demand of Syrian Armenian entrepreneurs for exhibition sales, such as finding spacious
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and suitable locations to host the events and limitations of holidays to mark these events, such as
Easter. Moreover, Diana felt Syrian Armenian women entrepreneurs needed to think of a
different way to promote their respective businesses, instead of relying upon the frequency of
exhibition sales. Although exhibition sales were organized quite frequently according to my data,
some state, UN, and NGO employees felt some Syrian Armenian women entrepreneurs were not
satisfied by the number of exhibition sales held per year. Sarah from Homeland Development
Initiative Foundation (HDIF) also expressed frustration with Syrian Armenian women
entrepreneurs, saying, “There are too many tsutshantesner!”
Of the approximately 15 exhibition sales I had attended over the course of one year of
dissertation fieldwork (August 2018-August 2019), I will describe three representative exhibition
sales based on my field notes: Shounch Me Mshaguyti Yerevanoum (“A Breath of Syrian
Armenian Culture in Yerevan” ) was hosted by the then Ministry of Diaspora, and co-sponsored
by Caritas, Center for the Coordination of Syrian Armenian Issues (CCSAI) and Yerevan
Municipality on September 19-20, 2018 and October 16-17, 2018. This exhibition sale was held
in honor of Armenian Independence Day (September 21st) and Yerevan’s 2800th birthday
(October 21st), and the Minister of Diaspora Mkhitar Hayrapetyan as well as then acting Prime
Minister Nikol Pashinyan attended the event.
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Figure 6.5 Breath of Syrian Armenian Culture event invitation, screenshot by author

Figure 6.6 Image of “A Breath of Syrian Armenian Culture in Yerevan” Exhibition Sale
on Northern Avenue. Photo by author
I attended this event on all 4 days (September 19-20, October 16-17), but this excerpt is from
October 16th:
I had an interview at the Ministry of Diaspora later this morning, but I stopped by the
exhibition sale first on Northern Avenue. I saw “Lucy” and immediately greeted her, and
she invited me to sit down on a little stool by her husband’s jewelry stall. Lucy and her
husband knew my cousin in Aleppo, and I had met Lucy during a previous fieldwork trip.
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Every exhibition sale I went to and would see her working at, she would always invite me
to sit down next to her and chat for a few minutes. This happened with several other
Syrian Armenian women I got to know over time--sit down for a chat, even in the middle
of a business day, and relax for a minute, have some coffee and a Syrian homemade
pastry. I was not used to this kind of intimacy coming from the U.S., but I greatly
appreciated the kindness. Lucy introduced me to other Syrian Armenian friends and
vendors at the exhibition sale, taking it upon herself to introduce me and my research,
vouch for me, and press her friends to give me an interview. I told her she didn’t need to
do this, although I’m grateful for her generosity, and I could tell people about my own
research. I went around the stalls and bought as much as I could with the cash that I had
on me. I bought embroidered necklaces and bracelets, Syrian pastries and savory snacks,
za’atar spices and spreads. On an earlier trip to this particular exhibition sale, I brought
Manti [my dog] and while some vendors were wary of my 7 lb. little fluffy white beast,
more people asked to pet him and said he reminded them of pets left behind in Syria
(Field Notes, October 16, 2018).
My ethnic Armenian background was certainly an asset with networking and establishing rapport.
Some Syrian Armenian women I met in Yerevan knew of my relatives in Syria, through similar
social circles. This is common in Armenian communities--you try to figure each other out, and
whenever people would ask me where I was from, I knew they were not asking where I was born,
but where my Armenian ancestors were killed or displaced from, like theirs. I enjoyed the
intimacy of fieldwork and attending exhibition sales and was often invited to sit down at a stall
during a business event, rest a bit, and have a small snack and chat. There were approximately 50
Syrian Armenian entrepreneurs at this event and were a mix of Syrian Armenian men and
women. Men generally sold silver jewelry as a full-time job in both Syria and Armenia (if they
were able to), like Lucy’s husband, and women generally sold embroidery, baked goods and food,
and other accessories. It was not uncommon for me to walk away with at least 3 necklaces per
exhibition sale and a couple dozen pastries.
The second exhibition sale I will describe here is from the “Food and Drink Expo” at
Mergelyan Cluster on May 24, 2019. I decided to share my observations from this event because
it tried to showcase both local Armenian and Syrian Armenian entrepreneurs, both men and
women. It may have made it more challenging for Syrian Armenian entrepreneurs to sell their
products, as many local customers attended this exhibition and I only saw a few local customers
at the Syrian Armenian stalls. I went to the Food and Drink Expo after visiting Syrian Armenians’
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Union for an interview with Takouhi. It was held at the Mergelyan Cluster, an
exposition/conference hall. I took escalators to the second floor and came across local Armenian
vendors selling dried fruit, nuts, cognac, wine, and gatah (sweet bread), picked up a free Jermuk
(bottle of sparkling water), and beelined to the Syrian Armenian exhibition section. Like Aleppo
NGO social-psychological meetings with the same attendees coming to every meeting, exhibition
sales almost always had the same Syrian Armenian vendors, so by the eighth exhibition sale I had
attended that year, I knew most of the Syrian Armenian vendors and knew what I wanted to buy. I
observed that there were mostly Syrian Armenian women entrepreneurs who attended the Food
and Drink Expo, most of whom I had met before: Berjouhi and her husband, who attended nearly
every exposition; a red-haired man selling spices (Arsine’s husband); a Syrian Armenian-Arab
woman selling decorated cookies who asked me to speak to her in English (Amina); a woman
selling khadayif (shredded wheat pastry drenched in honey and enveloping nuts); and Nuritsa,
who agreed to give me an interview at her shop in Halebi Shuka.
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Figure 6.7 Image of Invitation to Food and Drink Expo, May 24, 2019, Screenshot from
event
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Figure 6.8 Entrance to Mergelyan Cluster for Food and Drink Expo, May 24, 2019.
Photo by author
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Figure 6.9 Invitation to “Siriahay Arvesdi Dzile” Exhibition Sale, August 1st, 2019.
Screenshot of Facebook invitation.
The third exhibition sale I will describe here occurred at the end of my fieldwork, in summer
2019, called Siriahay Arvesdi Dzile (“A Blossom of Syrian Armenian Crafts”) hosted by Syrian
Armenians’ Union every two weeks in Malibu Ayki (Park) in central Yerevan. This was an event
organized by Syrian Armenian women for Syrian Armenian women entrepreneurs, although
occasionally Syrian Armenian men selling jewelry would have a stall at the exhibition sale. I
went to several of these events and made my usual rounds. The Dzile event seemed to be more
focused on embroidery, as I recognized classmates and teachers from my embroidery class at
Syrian Armenians’ Union. They called me over to look at their products, proudly showing me
what embroidery is supposed to look like (I was the beginner in the class and my classmates
would kindly encourage me to keep practicing, which was hard to do because they were master
embroiderers taking this class for fun as opposed to research), and warmly hugged me. The
following image is from my teacher’s stall, as she was displaying souvenir options to take back to
the U.S. for my mother:
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Figure 6.10 Image of an embroidery booth at Siriahay Arvesdi Dzile exhibition sale, July
15, 2019. Photo by author.
Overall, exhibition sales largely included Syrian Armenian women, but some also tried to include
local Armenian entrepreneurs. Syrian Armenians’ Union’s exhibition sales (Siriahay Arvesdi
Dzile, for example) tended to center around handicrafts such as embroidery. Exhibition sales took
place around national holidays (Easter, Christmas, Independence Day) and were organized by
state, UN, and local organizations. I noticed that the same Syrian Armenian entrepreneurs (men
and women) tended to go to any exhibition sale that was advertised. The next section discusses
frustrations expressed by Syrian Armenian women entrepreneurs and state, UN, and local
employees.

6.2.7

Frustrations Expressed by Syrian Armenian Women Entrepreneurs

Frustrations expressed by Syrian Armenian women entrepreneurs pertaining to vocational
training offered by local organizations center around the types of training that are provided and
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what some women feel would be more helpful, as well as frustrations with organizing exhibition
sales. More frustrations expressed by Syrian Armenian women entrepreneurs pertaining to larger
structural problems, such as the Armenian market and economy and language barriers, will be
discussed in the final section of Part II. Salpi, a Syrian Armenian woman in her late 30s/early 40s,
felt limited by the vocational trainings offered by NGOs:
I decided I wanted to build other skills. I took American University of Armenia [AUA]
English courses, Russian classes, GIZ trainings. My husband [an American who works at
World Vision in Armenia] worked with GIZ, helped with counseling Syrian Armenians,
and I helped him. GIZ had a workshop on computer skills. KASA had classes on
cooking, sewing, and make-up. But I think English and computer classes are more
important. I didn’t think GIZ was helpful. Aleppo NGO helped pay for private lessons,
computer, and leadership classes. But nobody was listening to what the women wanted.
The workshops felt like elementary school. But we’re not stupid or children. Aleppo
NGO workshops weren’t very helpful for me, but for others, they were helpful. The
women wanted a chance to speak about their skills that they already had. Now, Aleppo
NGO is more involved (Salpi, February 7, 2019).
In this excerpt from my field notes, Salpi expresses her frustrations with the limitations of skills
training available at NGOs. She would help her husband, an American who worked at World
Vision in Armenia, organize and run workshops with GIZ, and described the types of trainings
offered by various NGOs. Overall, she felt computer and English classes were far more important
than most classes offered by NGOs, such as cooking, sewing, and cosmetology. She did not feel
that some NGOs were listening to what the women wanted to learn and felt that Syrian Armenian
women were being infantilized by NGOs (“The workshops felt like elementary school. But we’re
not stupid or children”). While many state and non-state employees working with Syrian
Armenian women whom I interviewed were supportive of Syrian Armenian women and did not
seem to infantilize them, I certainly heard infantilizing language from several employees and
attribute this tension to stress experienced by both state and non-state employees and Syrian
Armenian women. This tension may impact motivation for long-term integration and women’s
empowerment, as both the mostly female NGO workers and Syrian Armenian migrant women
generally feel frustrated by this encounter. Some Syrian Armenian migrant women feel they are
not being listened to and feel that they are being “infantilized,” while some local NGO workers
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feel some Syrian Armenian women are not studying the local Armenian market and do not
understand that locals, including NGO workers, have suffered as well.
Syrian Armenian women also expressed frustrations in relation to marketing strategies
for exhibition sales and attendance. On two occasions, February 12th at a Syrian Armenians’
Union tsutsahantes (exhibition sale) at a cultural center in Yerevan, the Hay-Art Center, and
April 20th at an underground mall underneath Northern Avenue hosted by Caritas, vendors
expressed feelings of frustration to me about the lack of marketing strategies and low attendance
rate. By spring 2019, I had established enough rapport with vendors and had formed good
friendships with vendors who attended nearly every exhibition sale, so I was frequently invited to
join vendors/friends at their tables and be offered a Syrian pastry literally under the table. During
several of these table conversations (at the two events mentioned above), after making my rounds
and purchasing Syrian sweets, lunch food, and several pieces of embroidered jewelry (my
standard fare), vendors/friends commented upon what they perceived as terrible marketing
strategies and said they were upset that more customers were not showing up. At the February
12th event, Seda, my friend and owner of a shop in Halebi Shuka, asked me to advertise the event
on Facebook to my diasporan, expat, local, and non-Armenian friends living in Yerevan, and I
obliged. The April 20th event occurred on Easter and took place underneath Northern Avenue in
an underground shopping mall called “Tashir Street Mall.” Following is an excerpt from my field
notes:
The tsutsahantes was sponsored by Caritas, yet I was the only one who showed up. There
was going to be an Easter tsutsahantes earlier in the week but was cancelled due to
nonexistent rain. I tried to visit all the tables until my funds ran out. People were so
desperate to sell their food products and it was just depressing to see. I hung out with
Sona most of the time. I also met one of the organizers. The place was ridiculously hard
to find, no advertising, one sign in the room, which was not in the hallway, no sign
outside, nothing whatsoever on the ground level [Northern Avenue]. It was just not good.
There definitely seems to be a disconnect between the vendors and the NGO, but I would
be curious to hear the NGO’s take on the situation. I bought pastries, soaps, and
chocolates. The tables cost 5,000 drams for Hay-Art Center table and 20,000 AMD for
Marriott tables, free for Caritas tsutsahantes (April 20, 2019).
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From the perspective of several Syrian Armenian women who were vendors at the two exhibition
sales described above, marketing strategies on behalf of the NGO for the exhibition sales were
lacking and were viewed as one of the main reasons why customers were not showing up. Sona
told me that entrepreneurs had to pay for the tables for some exhibitions, not the one sponsored
by Caritas for Easter, but the February 12th event (5,000 AMD or approximately $10 USD). For
larger, more noticeable and marketed events such as the Christmas bazaar at the Marriott Hotel
(which showcased local and Syrian Armenian vendors) located in central Yerevan in Republic
Square, tables cost 20,000 AMD (approximately $40 USD). This is an expensive cost for both
local and Syrian Armenian vendors and is more of an investment as vendors would be able to sell
more products at publicized events such as the Christmas bazaar. An average monthly salary as of
August 2020 in Yerevan is 187,000 AMD or roughly $378 USD, and rent is roughly $500
USD/month. These statistics help explain why dual-income households are necessary in Armenia,
and why 20,000 AMD to save a space at an exhibition sale table is certainly an investment,
particularly given the frequency of exhibition sales. I observed at the April 20th exhibition sale at
Tashir Street Mall how much food products were wasted in preparation for an event which ended
up having a low turnout. I felt compelled, not as a researcher, to buy as many Syrian pastries as I
could to help prevent food waste, and morale was certainly low among Syrian Armenian vendors.
However, I noticed that vendors would support each other and wish each other, “Hachoghutiun,
Sona jan,” (“Good luck, dear Sona” or the name of the vendor). The next section will discuss
frustrations expressed by state and non-state employees. I view these frustrations as tensions
between state and NGO branding and the realities of Syrian Armenian women working in
Armenia, of making themselves into the “right kind” of Armenian citizen, one who contributes
socioeconomically to Armenia.

6.2.8

Frustrations Expressed by State and Non-State Employees about Syrian Armenian
Women

Overall, state and non-state employees’ frustrations with Syrian Armenian women living
in Yerevan included frustrations at the lack of business diversity and redundancy with the same
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people attending the same workshops and exhibition sales without expanding, and not researching
the local market by some Syrian Armenian women entrepreneurs, and generally the resistance to
integration by many Syrian Armenian women and acknowledgment of the challenges that local
Armenians face as well as Syrian Armenians. NGO work is emotional and, as will be discussed in
this section, one of the entanglements of NGO work is also its most difficult--with their ostensible
target group, “the people they are supposed to help” (Sampson 2017, 13). Regarding ethnographic
fieldwork, “the entanglement of NGOs with their target group affects the anthropological
fieldworker, who may share the NGOs’ general objective but is hesitant to critique the NGO
methods” (Sampson, 14). I did encounter this throughout fieldwork, as at times, I felt like the
“middle woman” between Syrian Armenian women beneficiaries and the NGOs serving them.
Adding to this complexity was the tacitly understood notion that we shared an ethnicity and
historical background, which seemed to carry certain obligations with it. I did not feel like an
outside, dispassionate observer, but my role was also distinct from other people I engaged with
daily. Occasionally, UNHCR gatekeepers asked me for my feedback regarding how to improve
certain initiatives. I was careful to politely show my research proposal and IRB letter, indicating
that I was not conducting research for UNHCR, but that I was there as an independent researcher
funded by Fulbright. To reciprocate this gatekeeper/researcher relationship, I gave two public
presentations on my research to an audience full of interlocutors and people associated with them
(at UNHCR and Eurasia International University, respectively). In the future, if I had an applied
role within an international development organization, for example, I would have more flexibility
sharing feedback. Methodologically, I was also impressed by efforts, such as through Aleppo
NGO and GIZ, with conducting quantitative analyses of Syrian Armenian women’s experiences
in Yerevan (i.e., surveys), and mini-qualitative projects, such as GIZ’s “mapping” project. Like
ethnographers, NGO workers in Yerevan, at least many whom I interacted with, “try to reach out
to their constituents and place a high level of importance to being among them and being part of
their communities” (Riles 2017, 34). In this sense, I knew that local and international NGO
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employees in Armenia, particularly those who were also ethnic Armenians, genuinely cared about
Syrian Armenian women beneficiaries and wanted to help improve their situations. But I also
noticed tensions between the groups and attribute these tensions to not having enough resources,
personnel, and general stress on both sides.
Several staff members said they were frustrated with integration motivation problems of
several Syrian Armenian women, from staying within Syrian Armenian circles to not studying the
local Armenian market. Zvart from Aleppo NGO and Nayiri from Armenian Red Cross agreed
that most Syrian Armenian women over the age of 50 have the hardest time with integrating and
making local friends. As discussed in Chapter 4 in the section titled “Social Home,” Zvart noted
that Syrian Armenian women over the age of 50 generally only stick within a Syrian Armenian
circle and do not have many local Armenian friends. Following is an excerpt from our
conversation:
Anahid: What are some of the challenges you face working with Syrian Armenian
women?
Zvart: Well, not everyone is thinking about locals. They’re like, ‘Here, we don’t like
stuff about locals.’ They are thinking in a box, only thinking in contrasts, Anahid jan.
They should explore Armenia and new people, new future, live and integrate in Armenia,
not wanting to leave.
Anahid: I see. You mentioned earlier how your family is hayrenatartz [repatriate], so
maybe you can relate to their experiences.
Zvart: Yes, my family came to Armenia in 1978 and built a future. I understand their
[Syrian Armenian women’s] feelings because my family is hayrenatartz, but still people
tell me I’m a local.
Zvart encouraged Syrian Armenian women beneficiaries to get to know local Armenian nature,
culture, and people, but felt that many beneficiaries did not give local Armenians a chance to get
to know each other. She noted how she could relate to Syrian Armenian women’s experiences of
alienation in Armenia as her parents migrated to Armenia from Iran but considers herself a local
since she was born and raised in Armenia. Like Zvart, Nayiri, an employee at the Armenian Red
Cross, also commented upon the insularity of Syrian Armenian women, and disconnect from
local Armenians:
There are integration motivation problems. Syrian Armenian women all get together with
other Syrian Armenian women, but not locals. They are not researching the local market,
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only the Syrian one. Hairdressing is even very different. That’s why locals don’t go get
Syrian services. The market grows only within the SA community [it’s very isolated].
Syrian women are not used to changing beauty salons, for instance, and locals aren’t
interested either. Red Cross organizes local events (refugee support projects), works for
the refugee population and involves local organizations. Many SAs are Armenian citizens
and have very negative approaches, but my experience working within protection tells me
this is their right [to be negative]. But there’s a dilemma for locals, too. Syrians are put in
a better situation; they have more benefits than locals. They can have access to free
medical support, but not for locals. Syrians should understand local concerns and issues,
and we should [NGO community] do equally for locals and Syrians [not treat either
group more favorably than the other]. Now, things should be more equal after the initial
years. We [NGO community] should concentrate on integration projects under Migration
Service umbrella and must appeal to all refugees, not just Armenians. The Armenian
government signing the UNHCR convention should also work on human rights. Refugees
should be treated on the basis of legislation, not Armenian ethnicity.
Nayiri raised several important points. First, she echoes Zvart’s observation that Syrian Armenian
women generally tend to stick to Syrian Armenian circles, and many do not have local Armenian
friends. Second, due to this isolation, Syrian Armenian women are also not studying the local
market, which may help to explain the low attendance rate at exhibition sales, as most of the
products being sold were targeted at Syrian Armenian palates. This disconnect can lead to
animosity in several cases between local and Syrian Armenians. Accordingly, NGO workers like
Nayiri do their best to offer programs for both local and Syrian Armenians. Other NGO workers,
like Kohar from GIZ and Kevork from Center for the Coordination of Syrian Armenian Issues,
also felt that local Armenians and Syrian Armenians face the same challenges. Kohar said, “There
needs to be help for locals, help with integration, social housing, vulnerable families, staying with
Syrian Armenians,” which certainly reflects NGO worker sentiments. The third important point
that Nayiri raised was the differences between local and Syrian Armenians in terms of benefits.
Syrian Armenians, like all diasporan Armenians, are eligible to apply for Armenian citizenship
(discussed in Chapter 3). According to Nayiri, Syrian Armenians have more benefits than local
Armenians, such as access to free medical support (refugee status), so local Armenians and
Syrian Armenians should be treated equally by NGOs. She also echoed an earlier sentiment stated
by Nayiri from Armenian Red Cross that Armenia should treat all refugees equally, instead of
giving an advantage to ethnic Armenian refugees, “Refugees should be treated on the basis of
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legislation, not Armenian ethnicity.” The final important point she made in the above interview
excerpt was her empathy for Syrian Armenians. Although she is clearly frustrated by integration
motivation problems among Syrian Armenian women, she also acknowledged that due to her
experience working on protection, she understands why some Syrian Armenian women are
negative about integration, “this is their right [to be negative].”
Additionally, several staff members felt it was hard to change mindsets of some Syrian
Armenian women, some of whom were not accustomed to working in Syria and now found
themselves in the position where they had to work in Armenia. Some Syrian Armenian women
transitioned from not wanting to work to now going to every possible workshop offered by
NGOs, to the extent that several staff members felt annoyed by the same women attending the
same workshops and not branching out, discussed below. Maro from Caritas noted there were
challenges at the beginning of the first waves of Syrian Armenian migration to Armenia
(approximately 2012-2015):
Syrian Armenian women were living in a Christian community in a Muslim country. It
was hard to change their mindset. Like they thought, ‘Nope! My husband worked; he can
do that here, too.’ It’s hard to change mindsets. Now, women learned to work and want to
participate in vocational training--to do make-up for themselves, not a business. They
want to be self-employed. Women now want to be everywhere and use all the toolboxes;
this is now the challenge. They also need to understand the local market. Adjusted
products to the local Armenian market do better (Maro, Caritas, February 21, 2019).
Maro observed that Syrian Armenian women were used to their husbands working in Syria,
where they were a Christian minority in a Muslim-majority country. Now, in Armenia, women
learned to work and eagerly participate in vocational trainings, but this took time and changing
their mindsets. Additionally, Maro said that Syrian Armenian women prefer to be self-employed
instead of working for an employer. The problem is that they are only going to vocational training
programs and not doing much beyond that, nor are many studying the local Armenian market.
Ovsanna from GIZ also commented upon the personalities of Syrian Armenian women:
There are stereotypes about Syrian Armenian women. They think they are good at
entrepreneurship, but don’t like working 8am-6pm. Syrian Armenian women don’t like
low salaries, want to be self-employed. Syrian Armenian women can get frustrated. They
want immediate results and support, know there are a lot of initiatives. Syrian Armenian
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women are a bit ‘spoiled’--they think they’re in a position of choosing options. They are
not as vulnerable as before, but their problems are still not solved--like housing and
unemployment is still high (Ovsanna, GIZ, July 29, 2019).
Ovsanna said that while initially many Syrian Armenian women were hesitant to attend
vocational trainings and start working in Armenia, since they began doing so, they consider
themselves to be naturally skilled entrepreneurs who do not like to work all day. She pointed out
that many Syrian Armenian women want immediate results, whereas GIZ focuses on long-term
results and provides knowledge and skills for further development. This is in stark contrast to the
expectations of many Syrian Armenian women beneficiaries, who want immediate results, but
this is impossible logistically from GIZ’s perspective. Ovsanna also felt they are a bit spoiled in
the sense that they feel they have many employment options. Like Ovsanna, Allison, a U.S.
Embassy political officer, felt that, “Syrian Armenians are picky, there are wealth disparities”
between local and Syrian Armenians.
Dzovinar from KASA said the challenge she faced in her work was, “investing in a
person and having them quit or leave suddenly,” relating to Ovsanna’s observation that Syrian
Armenian women generally expect immediate results from vocational training. She also
acknowledged the difficulties faced by other staff members, such as the fact that “we are not
psychological professionals, we have personal boundaries, but people are complaining, and it
impacts me. This causes stress for the NGO staff and the staff knows their limits.” KASA, to
Dzovinar, can only provide support through education and referring people to other sources if
they need it, and that staff members experience stress from this work. Like Nayiri, Dzovinar also
said that KASA has projects for both locals and Syrians, trying to bridge the gap between the two
groups and demonstrate the positive impact of Syrian Armenians in Armenia. Another GIZ
employee, Kohar, noted that there were not very tangible results from vocational trainings and
that Syrian Armenian women are generally educated at the university level, but need “a lower
level” for other skills needed in Armenia, such as cosmetology and hairdressing. Ultimately, staff
members felt limited in Armenia when it came to vocational trainings for Syrian Armenian
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women, especially a few years ago (summer 2017). According to Kohar, “we can’t support
people who don’t want to work,” referring to Syrian Armenian women who did not work in Syria
and were now expected to work in Armenia.
Lastly, several staff members were frustrated by the redundancy of trainings and
attendance, lack of business diversity, and the fact that some Syrian Armenian women stopped
attending trainings once they learned there would be no quick solutions to problems with
socioeconomic integration. Diana from UNHCR explained that as of May 2019, UNHCR is not
dealing with an emergency period anymore for Syrian Armenians but is focused on mitigating
suffering. Armenia is required to stop cash assistance to Syrians in 2020 and the main issue now
is with the health system, although this has changed after the second Artsakh war ended in
November 2020 amidst the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. Due to these constraints, Diana said
beneficiaries need to advocate for themselves now and voice solutions to authorities. She gave an
example of two Iraqi Armenian women who went to a local leader about broken pipes and found
a solution to their problem, “they capacitate and solve their own issues affecting themselves and
the local community. But they need to be lobbying for everyone, help improve the schemes.” To
Diana, currently there are Syrian Armenian women who are excellent businesswomen (Berjouhi),
but they keep going to the same trainings, exhibition sales, without expanding-- “We need to have
more Berjouhis. Berjouhi needs to expand, she hasn’t reached it yet. She’s in the same bubble.
Syrian Armenians need to emerge with existing structures. Like little bistros, how to mainstream
both into each other.” Diana felt that some Syrian Armenian ladies preserve their own “domain
and label” but it’s the same women every time, and she feels they are jealous of each other.
However, I did observe Syrian Armenian women helping each other, such as with embroidery,
and Berjouhi helped teach fourchette culinary classes to other Syrian Armenian women. Ovsanna
added that some Syrian Armenian women are indeed highly active, “but it’s the same people
applying for the same stuff. It’s hard to break out of the cycle. Some organizations have
databases, but they don’t share. Or the organizations are offering trainings but doing the same

260

thing.” Hence, there is redundancy in the same people attending the same trainings, and lack of
cooperation among organizations (not sharing databases or expertise in some cases). Hovhannes,
a local Armenian male employee at Jinishian Memorial Foundation (JMF) who works with GIZ,
noted that Syrian Armenian women, after business training, do not really follow through after
trainings and they need consultancy and mentoring. There is an issue with business
diversification. According to Salpi, a Syrian Armenian woman, “All the Syrian Armenian ladies
are doing the same businesses,” such as embroidery and baked goods, which will be discussed in
Part III. In sum, there are 3 groups involved in Syrian Armenian “branding” (which will be
discussed later in this chapter) --Syrian Armenian migrants (in this dissertation, I have focused on
women’s experiences of displacement and settlement), the Armenian state, and local and
international NGOs. The NGOs primarily work to help Syrian Armenian women meet state
expectations of socioeconomic integration, based on a shared ethno-religious identity with the
host state and collective memory of the Armenian genocide. Syrian Armenian women are
expected to contribute socioeconomically to Armenia, which is facilitated by the Syrian
Armenian “brand” promoted by state and local and international NGOs. Programming, such as
vocational training, exhibition sales, and participation in the 2018 Smithsonian Folklife Festival,
is intended to help Syrian Armenian women integrate and meet state expectations of making ideal
ethnic Armenian citizens. However, in some cases, programming highlighted tensions between
Syrian Armenian women (including entrepreneurs) and local and international NGO workers.

6.2.9

Pros of Syrian Armenian Entry into Armenia’s Paid Labor Force

Generally, Syrian Armenians are credited with their artisan heritage, hospitality and
customer service skills, and adaptability. Diana compared working with Syrian refuge-seekers to
working with Armenian refuge-seekers from Azerbaijan-- “Syrians are making positive progress.
You never hear about scandals, it is pleasant dealing with Syrian refugees” based on her
perception of Syrian Armenian personalities, in general. Other employees and a local Armenian
artist noted how Yerevan’s culture has changed since Syrians began arriving in Armenia, in the
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sense that cuisine has changed (more Middle Eastern spices and dishes, Syrian restaurants and
grocery stores), as well as personality and even how people dressed. Diana told me a few years
ago during my first preliminary fieldwork trip to Armenia (summer 2016) that, “local Armenians
used to wear mostly black before Syrians came, and now there is literally more color in Yerevan.”
This reflects cultural differences between Syrian Armenians and local Armenians, who generally
wore black until the mid-2000s. Culturally, wearing black in the Armenian community is viewed
as a sign of mourning, which makes sense since post-independence Armenia brought with it a
devastating earthquake, first war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh Republic (Artsakh is
the Armenian term), a period referred to colloquially by the Armenian phrase, mut u turd tariner
(“the dark and cold years”). Also commenting upon Yerevan’s physical changes, Zepyur from
H.O.M., an Armenian American volunteer, said she felt, “Syrians totally changed the culture in
Yerevan with food, taste, work ethic, different from post-USSR attitude, which is depressed and
victimized.” While Syrian Armenian migration to Armenia was not necessarily under voluntary
conditions, local Armenian employees and people who informally work with Syrian Armenians,
like Anna, felt that Syrian Armenians had changed Yerevan’s style (dark clothing to colorful),
work ethic, and cuisine. Anna, a local Armenian artist-activist, told me as we were sitting in a
lahmajoun (Armenian/Middle Eastern pizza) restaurant, “Armenian culture is changing a lot,
everything is different” compared to life in Yerevan prior to large-scale Syrian Armenian
migration.
Syrian Armenians were also credited with bringing improved hospitality and customer
service skills to Armenia, as was commented upon by local Armenian employees at local and
international organizations. Megheti from IOM said, “There are more hospitality businesses with
Syrians, they changed the quality and standards of before and after arrival. They can bring
benefits to Armenia.” The latter half of her quote shows the usefulness, or benefits, of Syrian
Armenians to the local Armenian host community. It almost felt as if she were trying to convince
local Armenian listeners/readers/witnesses that Syrian Armenian migration is positive for local
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Armenians as well, instead of an economic setback. Allison, a political officer from the U.S.
Embassy said there were positive changes concerning Syrian arrival in Yerevan, “Syrians are
changing the culture in terms of hospitality. Syrian Armenians speak better English and have
better customer service skills. The government here likes having Syrians--people coming
‘home.’” Compared to local Armenians, Allison felt that Syrian Armenians had superior English
language skills, customer service skills, and in turn, the Armenian government was generally
welcoming to Syrian Armenians due to a shared ethnicity. Maral and Hrant, from the American
Missionary Association of Armenia (AMAA) added, “It is a new culture in Yerevan with Syrian
Armenians, they bring new restaurants and good service. Locals think, ‘we must learn from
them.’” In this sense, Syrian Armenians are not only a positive influence on Armenia’s
socioeconomic life but can also serve as role models for customer service skills. Arusyag from
Mission Armenia said that Syrian Armenians have a good influence on Armenian society,
through, “good service provision, cooking skills, handmade items, more welcoming, and work as
auto mechanics.” Compared to local Armenians, Arusyag, a local Armenian NGO worker, also
feels Syrian Armenians are more welcoming, have good customer service skills, brought a novel
cuisine to Armenia, as well as certain handmade items (particularly embroidery and embroidered
jewelry). Kohar from GIZ again acknowledged Syrian Armenian personality traits, such as being
welcoming and having good customer service skills, as well as certain entrepreneurial skills, such
as negotiating. She added that Syrian Armenians are also known for their jewelry skills (silver
and gold), knitting, and for being electricians and auto mechanics. Another pro of Syrian
Armenian entry into the paid labor force, which also pertains to women, is their perceived
adaptability. As Kohar notes, “They are coming from a different culture, Syrian Armenians know
the language and Western Armenian and Arabic cuisine is now big. They can provide services to
tourists from Arabic-speaking countries, and they are adapting to each other. They are more
adapted to conditions living and working in Syria, never complain, only nicely complaining.”
Syrian Armenians, to Kohar, are adaptable not only in Syria, but also in Armenia with other
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Syrian Armenians as well as local Armenians. Furthermore, they can use their Arabic skills to
communicate with tourists from Arabic-speaking countries, although this may have seasonal
variation and is not common. Like Diana said at the beginning of this section, Kohar found Syrian
Armenians relatively pleasant to work with— “they never complain, only nicely complaining,” in
contrast to other beneficiaries (ethnic Armenian and not) with whom Diana and Kohar have
worked.

6.3

Conclusion

This chapter discussed the Syrian Armenian “brand” utilized by state and non-state institutions
and explores forms of business and vocational assistance available to Syrian Armenian women. It
included analysis of participant observation in social-psychological meetings at Aleppo NGO and
attendance at exhibition sales. It analyzed frustrations expressed by both state and non-state
employees and Syrian Armenian women, respectively. The next chapter will focus on changing
gender dynamics regarding entry into the paid labor force in Armenia.
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CHAPTER 7. “WOMEN ARE IN THE DRIVER’S SEAT NOW”: CHANGING GENDER
DYNAMICS FROM SYRIA TO ARMENIA
During one of my bi-monthly meetings with Diana at the UNHCR office in Yerevan, she
told me that Syrian Armenian “women are in the driver’s seat now” after migrating to Armenia,
because, according to Diana, women did not generally work in Syria. In Armenia, Syrian
Armenian women are provided with state and non-state resources (albeit limited) to help them
with opening their own businesses or entering the general paid labor force. This quote (“women
are in the driver’s seat now”) indicates that more Syrian Armenian women have entered the paid
labor force, in contrast to initial gender dynamics, and with ever more frequency, many are also
opening their own small businesses in Yerevan. I also interpret this quote literally, although
Diana did not intend for it to be interpreted in this manner, in the sense that some Syrian
Armenian women literally drove across the Syrian/Turkish, Turkish/Georgian, and
Georgian/Armenian borders to safety in Armenia, sometimes passing through Western Armenian
towns and villages, and ekeing by bandanna-clad highway robbers or terrorists. Recall Hasmig’s
story, mentioned sporadically throughout this dissertation, about her escape from Syria following
the brutal murder of her husband by Daesh (ISIS) fighters, as a widowed mother with three young
children. Syrian women were unable to travel without male companions, and she could not prove
to the Syrian state that her husband was murdered (ISIS does not issue death certificates). She
drove to Lebanon, after bribing a Syrian official to let her leave Syria and flew to Armenia from
Lebanon with her children. Syrian Armenian women are indeed in the driver’s seats, but this is
not the first time they have been in this position historically.

7.1 Introduction
Gender dynamics, specifically gendered participation in the paid labor force, have
changed significantly, according to NGO employees, among ethnic Armenian women from Syria
after migration to Armenia. Many interlocutors (NGO and state employees, Syrian Armenian
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women, and people associated with the above categories) indicated that life was more
comfortable in Syria before the war and before settlement in Armenia. Middle to upper class
ethnic Armenian women in Syria were generally able to rely on their spouse’s salary to provide
for the family, as well as for entertainment purposes (i.e., visiting friends and socializing a few
times per week) and did not have to work. Some women ran their own businesses in Syria or
occupied high-status jobs, such as doctors and pharmacists.
Prevailing international migration patterns used to be “the lone, rugged male who left his
family behind in the homeland as he ventured across seas to seek his fortune, hoping to return to
them after achieving success” (Pessar and Mahler 2003, 822). Now, many women have also
joined international migration flows. Over time, “women migrants have been moved, analytically
and theoretically, out of the category of being solely dependent or associational migrants--that is,
individuals who follow a spouse” (Brettell 2016, 172). Stef Jansen’s fieldwork among male
Bosnian refugees found that men generally had a more difficult time coping with settlement than
refugee women (Jansen 2008). In general, Bosnian refugees “had great difficulty in coping with
this drop in wealth, status, and recognition. I found this experience to be particularly prominent
amongst urban, middle-aged, professional, formally educated refugees…. Most studies show-explicitly or implicitly--that coping problems were especially sharp amongst men” (Jansen 2008,
6). I observed a similar trend during fieldwork, although my project did not focus on the
experiences of male migrants. The stories shared in this chapter illustrate the comfortable lives
most interlocutors associated with Syria, particularly Aleppo. As was discussed in the previous
chapter, most people owned their own homes in Syria and were employed or only one partner
needed to work to support a household. Migration for Syrian Armenian women, in general, also
indicated a drop in wealth, status, and recognition. While some women who migrated to Armenia
from Syria recognized each other from previous social circles in Aleppo (within the Armenian
community) and transplanted some of the initial community to Yerevan, it was still not the same
environment as Aleppo. Many local Armenians, for example, may not recognize the prominence

266

some of these women had in Aleppo. Jansen added that his data focused on the early coping
strategies of a specific section of Bosnian refugees—“formally educated, middle-class parents
who fled urban areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina-- self-proclaimed secular Bosnians with various
national backgrounds as well as persons in ‘mixed’ households” (Jansen 2008). He referred to
this category of refugees as “middle” refugees, which included professionals such as skilled
technicians, teachers, nurses, engineers, etc. Bosnian refugee men struggled with early coping
strategies because they, “were disengaged from ‘transnational’ social fields, for the context that
would allow them to establish their status was removed in space-time rather than simply in space”
(Jansen 2008, 194). Their tamo [‘there’], a localized context of concrete social relations, was
where they recalled having counted as someone, and the tamo was not in present-day BosniaHerzegovina, “but previous forms of organized sociality in that same geographical region”
(Jansen, 194). I draw from Jansen’s example in terms of sociality amongst Armenian women in
Syria (especially Aleppo). The Armenian state’s beckoning Syrian Armenians to return “home”
complicates integration, because Yerevan is still not a social home in the same way that Aleppo
was. Some features, such as social events and practices such as baking Syrian goods or reviving
Western Armenian embroidery traditions, or physical, predominantly Syrian Armenian spaces
such as Halebi Shuka, may be present, but in contrast to Jansen’s case, Armenia is not the same
geographical location as the previous social home. The “idea” of home, in my view, fails to
materialize or effectively convince all Syrian Armenian migrants that Yerevan can truly be home.
Both groups may share an ethnicity, and/or a religious background, but this does not resolve all
the tensions that are currently present in this interface.
In the ethnographic stories that follow in this chapter, I will share narratives of similar
“middle” ethnic Armenian migrant women from Syria, some of whom worked in skilled
professions in Syria (particularly doctors, pharmacists, and teachers). To reiterate, in contrast to
many state and non-state employees I interviewed who stated that most women did not work in
Syria, of the Syrian Armenian women that I have interviewed, many women whom I interviewed
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said they worked in Syria and work in Armenia. I primarily and purposefully interviewed
predominantly middle and upper class ethnic Armenian migrant women from Syria living in
Armenia, because to date, there has been no qualitative study focusing specifically on the lived
experiences of Syrian Armenian women in Armenia.
Additionally, most of the beneficiaries who attended social events at organizations like
Aleppo NGO in Yerevan were middle- and upper-class women who were also active in charity
and community life in Syria. I follow the framework of gender and migration scholars who hold
that, “a gendered theory of migration should be intersectional in its approach such that gender
differences are situated in relation to class, race, and even religion and immigration status”
(Brettell 2016, 173). Specifically, I follow the “gendered geographies of power” posited by
anthropologists Patricia Pessar and Sarah Mahler (2003), which focuses on three building blocks:
geographic scales, social locations, and power geometries. “Geographies” encapsulates the
understanding that “gender operates simultaneously on multiple spatial and social scales (e.g., the
body, the family, the state) across transnational terrains” (Pessar and Mahler 2003, 815). I apply
this “geographic scale” to my research findings because I observed that both state and non-state
institutions in Armenia appealed to Syrian Armenian women entrepreneurs and their capacity to
use their skills to contribute to the Armenian state. State and non-state institutions appealed to
their desirability and worthiness, which (desirability of migrants) is also echoed in migration
literature (Brettell 2016). Pessar and Mahler’s second building block, social locations, also
applies to my case study, “social locations…. refer to persons’ positions within interconnected
power hierarchies created through historical, political, economic, geographic, kinship-based, and
other socially stratifying factors” (Pessar and Mahler, 816). Furthermore, “social locations must
be viewed as fluid, not fixed, for people’s social locations can and usually do shift over time”
(Pessar and Mahler, 816). While most of the 32 ethnic Armenian migrant women I interviewed
were members of middle- or upper-class families and were part of an inner social circle in
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Yerevan (as they were in Aleppo for many of them), others outside of this social circle felt
excluded.
Overall, many Syrian Armenian women initially appeared to be dismayed (according to
NGO employees) to learn they would have to work in Armenia, as one income per family is not
enough to provide for basic needs. Other women eagerly participated in vocational training
workshops (referred to by NGO employees as “trainings”) offered by local and international
NGOs and exhibition sales/charity fairs promoted vigorously by the Ministry of Diaspora, and
many women opened their own businesses in Armenia, or were able to find jobs like what they
had been doing in Syria. A central argument in this chapter is that Syrian Armenian women who
were involved in charity and cultural life in Syria were not “bored housewives,” as perceived by
some state and non-state employees in Armenia. Instead, I view Syrian Armenian women, both in
the present as well as the past, as community leaders who are underutilized in socioeconomic
integration efforts in Armenia. However, not every Syrian Armenian migrant woman fits into this
trope, which is shaped by class, social mobility within the Armenian community in Syria, and
childcare duties in Armenia.
7.1.1 Organization of the Chapter
This chapter analyzes the changing gender dynamics regarding participation in the paid
labor force in Armenia. It also examines the perceived benefits of Syrian Armenian women
working in Armenia, such as more respect from their husbands and generally less domestic
violence rates among Syrian Armenian couples than local Armenian couples. Another aspect of
changing gender dynamics after migration to Armenia is the perspective of shame for men in a
patriarchal society such as Armenia, where some men feel embarrassed that their wives must
work, and they (husbands) cannot adequately support their families any longer on one salary. The
final section of the chapter concludes with a brief examination of the cultural differences between
local Armenian and Syrian Armenian women regarding work ethic and values.
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7.2 Part I: Gender Dynamics in Syria
Many women in Syria are raised or conditioned to take care of the stereotypical roles that
include caretaking of the home and family (Olimat 2014, 152). Some Syrian women, who had
been widowed, divorced, or abandoned by their husbands, have now become the families’ sole
breadwinners, a role traditionally held in Syrian society by men (Batha 2016), and includes doing
something most have never had to do before, such as acquiring a job (Simmons 2016). In
addition, ethnic Armenian women living in Syria did not need to work as one income was viewed
as sufficient to support a family before the war, as reported by 7 NGO and international
organization workers, one of whom was a Syrian Armenian woman. Maro from Caritas noted
that, “In Syria, most women didn’t work, their expenses were covered,” implying that only one
income [generally the husband’s] was required to support a family. Ruzanna from the Armenian
Round Table Foundation (ART) said that, “Husbands were working, and life was cheaper in
Syria,” such as, for example, most families were able to own their own homes instead of renting
an apartment as most people do in Yerevan. Arusyag from Mission Armenia said that, “Syrian
women don’t have professions generally…In Syrian culture, women stay at home and take care
of children. Most husbands don’t like their wives to work, their excuse is it will cause high blood
pressure for their wives.” To date, I have not heard this excuse reported by any other NGO
worker or Syrian Armenian woman throughout fieldwork.
Nayiri from Red Cross and Takouhi from Syrian Armenians’ Union (SAU) explained the
cultural transition for Syrian Armenian women, from life in Syria to life in Armenia. Nayiri is a
local Armenian woman and Takouhi is a Syrian Armenian woman. Takouhi noted that, “80% of
women lived a relaxed life in Syria, but they now have to work in Armenia. It was extremely hard
for women to work at first, but now they got used to it. They transformed. For example,
embroidery was a hobby before, where women would sit around and sell the products to friends.
Now, it is a form of an income.” Nayiri, a local Armenian NGO employee at Red Cross, provided
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a detailed description of this transition as well as her perception of Armenian women’s roles in
family life in Syria:
Women’s behavior changed since moving from Syria to Armenia. They have increased
importance in families [in Armenia, i.e., more respect for them from their husbands], but
women were also very powerful in their own families in Syria. They were active in social
clubs, had girlfriends and social activities, but were not skilled in job skills. Women in
Syria mostly were doing stuff at home or charity work. But women were active in Syrian
Armenian life. The treatment of Armenian women was not bad in Syria. They chose to
live at home but were also very active in Syria with AGBU [Armenian General
Benevolent Union], charity work, and church life (Nayiri, Red Cross, February 20, 2019).
Here, Nayiri emphasizes the powerful role Syrian Armenian women played in Syria. Aside from
being housewives, they were active in church, charity, and cultural life within the Armenian
community of Syria. Women in turn helped develop charitable organizations, churches, and
schools, as is still the case today among Armenian communities in Lebanon and Syria. As
members and descendants of Armenian genocide survivors, then, curating Armenian cultural life
in post-genocide communities in Syria was and is incredibly valuable to Armenian women.
Joanne Nucho’s (2016) ethnographic fieldwork with Armenian medical and social service
organizations in the Armenian-majority neighborhood of Bourj Hammoud in Beirut, Lebanon
found that the role of Armenian women was in “providing ‘relief’ to the ailing Armenian
community in times of violent conflict or economic hardship” (Nucho 2016, 75). Armenian
women have provided relief through active participation in charitable organizations in the
immediate aftermath of the genocide, the Lebanese Civil War, the Syrian conflict, and most
recently, the Second Nagorno Karabakh War (September-November 2020).
I reiterate that Syrian Armenian women who were involved in charity and cultural life in
Syria were not “bored housewives.” As Nayiri mentioned, they were incredibly valuable (i.e.,
through charity work, creating social networks in the aftermath of mass violence, and preserving
Western Armenian crafts) and these efforts involved a lot of labor and organizational skills.
Historically, Western humanitarian workers and missionaries were given credit for preserving
traditional Armenian crafts, such as embroidery, used as art therapy for Armenian female
genocide survivors (Armenian Relief Cross of Lebanon 1999; Odian Kasparian 1983). Female
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genocide survivors were frequently raped, kidnapped, or survived death marches, witnessed their
children and spouses brutally murdered. Yet, few Armenian female genocide survivors receive
credit for preserving their own traditions and fostering life in post-genocide communities, such as
organizing charity and social events, and passing down traditions like Talin’s grandmother did
below. This obscurity of female genocide survivors and their descendants from academic
literature and history texts is harmful. Similarly, female Armenian descendants of Armenian
genocide survivors also face erasure through categorizations of Syrian Armenian women as
“wealthy” housewives in Syria, however unintentional. A century later, the cycle continues in the
aftermath of the Syrian conflict. I feel the intergenerational activity of Syrian Armenian women
in post-genocide communities is like Jennie Burnet’s ethnographic fieldwork with female
survivors of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. In the aftermath of the genocide, Burnet observed that
Rwandan women adapted coping mechanisms to return to normalcy (Burnet 2012, 6). Women
shared food and hospitality with family and friends, joined women’s cooperatives, worked in the
fields, returned to church, and remade their social worlds (Burnet, 6). Like the Armenian
genocide, women were more likely to survive than men, but they often experienced sexual
violence. After the Rwandan genocide, many women found themselves as heads of household
because their husbands were killed, fled into exile, or were imprisoned on accusations of being
genocide perpetrators. Like the intergenerational trauma experienced by Syrian Armenian women
in Aleppo, for example, Rwandan women, in the aftermath of genocide, redefined “the proper
role of women” not because they sought liberation from gender oppression, but because they had
no other choice. In Rwanda, women were leaders in the country’s reconstruction and
reconciliation due to their positions as the primary social connection between nuclear family units
and the community that made their roles possible (Burnet, 6). Moreover, women from all
socioeconomic hierarchy rungs joined cooperatives and other organizations for mutual support,
where they found emotional and economic sustenance with which to rebuild their lives (Burnet,
13). Syrian Armenian female genocide survivors in Syria (particularly Aleppo) after 1915, and
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Syrian Armenian women descendants of those genocide survivors, living in Yerevan today, were
and are faced with similar circumstances. Thousands of female genocide survivors after 1915
were recovering from sexual violence and kidnapping, as well as the executions of their
husbands, fathers, and brothers. In communities settled by genocide survivors, such as Aleppo,
women survivors were then faced with the ominous task of rebuilding Armenian cultural life,
which was decimated during the genocide. This tradition has continued until the present in
Yerevan, with Syrian Armenian migrant women who fled from the Syrian conflict. Like Rwanda,
Armenian women genocide survivors and their descendants also relied on mutual support
organizations (i.e., hometown associations named for Western Armenian towns and villages
survivors hailed from, see Nucho 2016), and, in present-day Yerevan, social events hosted by
organizations such as Aleppo NGO, including social-psychological meetings which are attended
predominantly, if not entirely, by women.
Four Syrian Armenian women told me they did not work in Syria but now work in
Armenia or have started their own small businesses. Berjouhi, an active Syrian Armenian woman
in Yerevan who has since opened her own small business with her husband, said, “My husband
had a great job in Syria. I stayed at home before and during the war.” Azniv also noted that life
was good or financially secure before the war, “Life was good before the war. I wasn’t working,
my husband was working. His business was good until the war.” A master embroiderer in
Armenia and owner of her own small business in Yerevan, Talin also noted that her husband
worked in Syria and she was a housewife. She shared that she did embroidery at home, which
was passed down to her through her ancestors from Aintab (same city in Western Armenia my
family is descended from, which is known for its lacework). Talin said, “In Syria, my husband
worked, and I took care of the family. I was a housewife. I liked aseghnakordzutyun [embroidery]
and I did this at home and liked it. My medzmama [grandma] taught embroidery.” More details
about Talin’s business and a brief history of Armenian embroidery will be provided in Part III of
this chapter. Like Talin, Knar did aseghnakordz [embroidery] as a hobby, saying, “I didn’t sell
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anything, just as gifts [to her friends].” Unlike Talin, Knar did work in Syria, in a library from
2012-2014. Her husband made plastic molds in Aleppo and was able to find work easily in
Armenia. Nuritsa, who owns her own shop in Halebi Shuka [Aleppo Shopping Center] in central
Yerevan (also discussed below) and runs another small baked goods and Syrian spices shop in
another Yerevan neighborhood, said she did not work in Syria but her husband experienced
trauma while working. Following is a brief excerpt from our interview:
Anahid: What was your life like in Syria? Did you work?
Nuritsa: I was a housewife in Aleppo, my husband worked. He worked in a car shop.
Goghobdetsin, koghtsan [they robbed, stole from him, unclear who “they” is referring to].
My husband got sick. Armenians were targeted for years by Daesh [ISIS]. The church
was giving people water, gas. There were people that said, “register your name and we’ll
call you.” There were numbers for bread lines, males and females in different lines. My
daughter worked as a dentist. I called her 10 times [started crying during interview].
Anahid: Nuritsa jan [dear, term of endearment frequently used in Armenia], we can stop
the interview if you like.
Nuritsa: No, thank you, I want to do this. I am so grateful you helped a lot during
tsutsahantesner [exhibitions--I attended many exhibitions for fieldwork and bought many
items each visit, for research and personal purposes].
Anahid: Okay, just let me know if you would like to stop at any time. It’s okay.
Nuritsa: Okay. Anyway, all the Armenian boys were protecting Armenian
neighborhoods. I was worried about my son. We left for Armenia in 2014.
Nuritsa felt her husband’s business was targeted by Daesh [ISIS] because he is Armenian. Her
husband’s business was not the only one targeted for its owner’s ethnicity, as Hasmig and
Parantsem shared below.
I have known Hasmig for several years, from 2016-2019 through preliminary and
dissertation fieldwork in Yerevan. The first time we met, she told me how her husband was
brutally killed by ISIS in January 2014, and then told me about her life before and after then:
I was a kindergarten teacher before marriage. My husband had 2 jobs--an ironsmith and
making ice. My husband lost his job and income during the war. I decided to come to
Armenia with my husband, but we needed money. My husband wanted to re-start his icemaking factory. Then Daesh kidnapped my husband and father-in-law. The factory was
located in the countryside of Aleppo. The kidnapping occurred in the summer of 2013.
They were just running their businesses, there was no Daesh there. Pre-Daesh rebel
fighters were locals. After the business was running for just 1 month, my father-in-law
and husband were kidnapped. A worker snitched on my husband (that he was Christian).
During the kidnapping, Daesh first got my husband, and my father-in-law was visiting a
neighbor at the time. My father-in-law saw the kidnapping and said [to Daesh] to take
him instead because my husband had a family. But Daesh refused. The story was told to
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me by a male Armenian neighbor who witnessed the kidnapping (Hasmig, June 14,
2016).
Hasmig said life before the war was relatively comfortable. She was a kindergarten teacher before
she got married and was a housewife during the war. Hasmig’s husband had two jobs, as an
ironsmith and an icemaker. During the war, he lost his job and the family planned to come to
Armenia together, but needed money to leave and settle in Armenia, so her husband re-started his
ice-making factory, and the factory was only open for about 1 month before he was kidnapped by
Daesh [ISIS]. Hasmig explained that the factory was in the countryside of Aleppo and the
kidnapping occurred in summer 2013. Like Nuritsa, she felt her husband was targeted by Daesh
because he was a Christian and said that a worker told Daesh that the factory owner was
Christian. Ultimately, Daesh kidnapped her husband and father-in-law, and eventually released
the father-in-law but unfortunately murdered her husband. Parantsem, a Syrian Armenian woman
and Aleppo NGO co-founder, said she was very active in Aleppo’s Armenian community and
worked since she was 16. Her husband owned a factory and was also threatened by people,
although it was not clear who exactly was threatening Parantsem’s husband. Following is an
excerpt from our interview:
In Syria, I volunteered in 6-7 organizations. My husband and I had a culture foundation,
several events sponsored in Syria, published books. I worked since I was 16 and
volunteered in elderly homes. My life was dedicated to my family after I got married,
helping poor people, I used to be a lonely child (didn’t have TV), parents were restrictive,
so I read in bed. I had no social life with friends. My parents also volunteered. My father
was from Evereg-Fenese [in Western Armenia], and my mother’s father was a teacher
and head of school. My family was the first family who left Aleppo during the war. At
the beginning of 2012, people were threatening owners of factories and started calling my
husband. In January 2012.... I took old family photos, memories of parents and came here
[Armenia], where it was very cold and snowy (Parantsem, August 2, 2019).
Volunteering culture and charity life in Syria is important to Parantsem and this excerpt shows
how this has been instilled in her by her parents, who were Armenian genocide survivors from
Western Armenia. Parantsem is an upper class Syrian Armenian woman who took on leadership
roles within the Armenian community of Aleppo and transplanted these skills to Yerevan. Her
husband owned a factory and was forced to flee Aleppo with the family because people started
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calling and threatening factory owners, ostensibly due to their ethno-religious identities.
Parantsem’s family was the first Armenian family to leave Aleppo in January 2012 and she cofounded Aleppo NGO.
In contrast to several NGO employees who felt that many Syrian Armenian women did
not work in Syria, or did not need to, according to my research, more Syrian Armenian women
reported they had worked in Syria prior to migrating to Armenia. Of the 32 Syrian Armenian
women interviewed, 4 stated they did not work in Syria. Out of the 32 Syrian Armenian women
interlocutors, 17 stated they had worked in their home countries: 2 relied upon their language
skills (Katherine and Salpi); 5 worked as teachers (Zabel, Siranoush, Kayane, Arpi, and Hasmig);
2 worked as medical doctors (Hermine and Santoukhd); 1 worked as an accountant (Talar); 1
worked in packaging (Lilit); 2 worked as pharmacists (Amina and Shakeh); 3 worked with their
husbands (Kayane, Arsine, and Knar); and 1 worked at the Embassy of Armenia in Damascus
(Adriana).
Several Syrian Armenian women described the gender dynamics of the paid labor force
in Syria. Katherine said that she worked in an international educational research center for 5
years, where she focused on languages and computer science and worked with 85 scientists.
Regarding gender dynamics of paid labor in Syria, Katherine stated that, “There were no
Armenian beggars in Syria. You could have a single breadwinner in Syria, not dual breadwinners.
This is new for Syrian Armenians [coming to Armenia].” Katherine is well educated and was
pursuing her master’s degree online through a British institution when I interviewed her. She
notes the discrepancies between life in Aleppo and life in Yerevan, particularly the fact that only
one income is necessary to support a family in Syria (before the war). Syrian Armenians coming
to Armenia were shocked to find that one salary was insufficient to support a family (usually the
husband’s) and that Syrian Armenian women likely needed to work as well. A private tutor in
Syria, Zabel added that Yerevan is different from Aleppo because, “Just the father and husband
worked in Syria. Women got together in the morning and men gave women money to socialize.”
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This certainly seems like a leisure that most women in Armenia did not have, based on my
observations and interviews with local Armenian NGO workers (discussed below). Siranoush
helped to explain the gender dynamics of paid labor in Syria, particularly the contrasts between
Arab women and Armenian women:
I worked for 15 years as a teacher in Aleppo, before the war. My husband was a
silversmith. We had a normal life. Serount ge medztsnes [you raise a generation-referring to the next generation of Syrian Armenian kindergarteners missing out on a
normal life due to war]. Syrian Armenians in Syria lived with Muslims and government
work was okay. Women who worked were mostly single. For the last 20 years, Arab girls
also began to work. Arabs didn’t let their daughters go to university. Armenians went to
school and Armenian girls worked over the last 20 years [in Syria]. (Siranoush,
December 10, 2018)
In this interview excerpt, Siranoush began to cry as she described the pain of leaving behind the
next generation of Syrian Armenian kindergarteners. In her 15 years as a kindergarten teacher in
Aleppo, Siranoush felt responsible for helping to raise the next generation of Syrian Armenian
kindergarteners and feels sad that their generation is destroyed by the war and will not be able to
have a normal life. She goes on to compare the differences between Arab and Armenian women
in Syria, namely that until recently, Arabs did not let their daughters go to university and only
recently allowed their daughters to work. In contrast, Armenian girls and women were able to go
to university, but mostly only single Armenian women worked, as shown by Salpi’s story.
Like Katherine, Salpi’s talent with languages helped her get a job in Syria. She was
single in Syria and got engaged to an American man working at an NGO in Armenia after she
migrated to Armenia. Salpi was able to use her language skills working at the Syrian/Turkish
border during war time:
Before coming to Armenia, I worked in Syria at the duty-free airport, at Orient Gate. I
also worked at the Syrian/Turkish border during war time... The best years were the 1
year I worked at the airport, 2007 until the end of the year. I moved to the Syrian/Turkish
border because I spoke Turkish. I worked for a while and became a supervisor. I got my
BA, my dad was mad I was working at Orient Gate, collecting people. But it was a very
professional company (Salpi, February 7, 2019).
Salpi explained that her Turkish and Arabic language skills enabled her to work at the
Syrian/Turkish border during the war, and before then she worked at the airport in Aleppo.
Although she was an adult at the time, her father was upset she was working at the airport and
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interacting with strangers frequently, but she assured her father that it was a very professional
company. In another interview excerpt with Salpi mentioned earlier, she noted that it was hard
living and working in Aleppo or Syria alone during war time, especially as a “girl,” even though
she was an adult woman at the time.
Other Syrian Armenian women had promising careers before moving to Armenia, and
some were compelled to find other means of employment. Like Salpi, Talar also worked her way
up. Married to a doctor in Aleppo, she worked in a Japanese company as an accountant and
worked her way up to become the manager of the company. Although her husband is a physician,
he had a difficult time finding a job that paid well in Armenia (following section). Santoukhd
received her M.D. in 1994 and still works as a pediatrician in Armenia. She owned her own clinic
and house in Aleppo, which were both destroyed during the war. To reiterate, Santoukhd said, “I
had my own clinic in Syria, and I went to Aleppo University and was a lecturer there. I got
married and had 2 kids and then the Aleppo war began in 2012. A bomb fell on July 24, 2012 and
my house and clinic were now dangerous because they were in the same building. The clinic is
still closed. I hoped the war would end soon, but it didn’t.” With one bomb, both her physical
home and place of employment and status were destroyed. Shakeh, a pharmacist in Syria,
received her education in Armenia (like Hermine, the other pediatrician) and became a
pharmacist, returning to Aleppo in 2009. She said she is still working as a pharmacist in Armenia
as of 2018 and came to Armenia in August 2018. Amina was also a pharmacist in Syria and
Dubai but transitioned to opening her own cookie decorating business in Yerevan. In her
interview excerpt, Amina discusses the decisions she made for her family and career because of
the war:
I was trained as a pharmacist at Arab International University, where Christians were a
minority. I worked in a pharmaceutical company for 5 years in the cardiovascular
department. I was there for 3 years, until the end of 2012 in Damascus. The war started
affecting me at the end of 2012 and I got married at this time. My husband worked in the
Gulf. I also had contacts there and we went to the Gulf (Dubai) at the beginning of 2013.
I worked for a pharmaceutical company there, then an Australian one. I left my work
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when I was pregnant because of the long hours as a product specialist. My husband was
an engineer for a construction company. We had the option of staying in Dubai, but the
options were not family-friendly workwise. There were good schools, but it was very
expensive for kids. I had no time to spend with my kid if I worked, I would need an
Indian or Filipina nanny. I didn’t want a stranger watching my baby. I wanted more time
with family, but had no time for family life (Amina, August 4, 2019).
Amina and her husband both had good jobs in Syria and at one point, in 2013, were able to go to
Dubai and both found employment. They had the option of staying in Dubai and were financially
stable there, but Amina was concerned about being pregnant and working long hours. Dubai had
money and opportunity, but the couple was just starting their family. Amina considered staying in
Dubai but noted that it was not very family-friendly workwise (long hours) and the schools were
expensive. She said she wanted to spend more time with her young child and not leave the child
in the care of an Indian or Filipina nanny in Dubai, so the family moved to Armenia. In Armenia,
Amina observed that Armenia was more family-friendly than Dubai.
Some Syrian Armenian women in Syria owned businesses with their husbands or owned
their own businesses in Syria. Kayane’s husband had a pharmacy, but they co-owned an Italian
restaurant in Aleppo. Unfortunately, he became ill with heart problems and the couple sold the
restaurant. Kayane added, “Many years ago, I was a teacher before I got married. I taught for 10
years in an Armenian school. Most women never worked in Syria. My mom never worked.
Women thought if their husbands earned money, why should they work? Who will watch the
kids? There was no daycare.” Here, Kayane discusses gender dynamics of paid labor in Syria
among Syrian couples in general and addresses the logistical challenges behind childcare and lack
of daycare, although Kayane herself never had children. Arsine also said she ran her own
business in Syria, and the type of business changed upon migrating to Armenia (discussed
below). She stated, “I worked, had a store for accessories. My husband had his business.” Arpi, a
Syrian Armenian woman in her mid-to-late 20s, is also an entrepreneur, who opened two
businesses with her husband upon migrating to Armenia, but worked as a violin teacher in Syria
and said she was an excellent student in Syria and active in the Armenian community:
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I graduated from university in biotechnology. Before the war, I was a student and a violin
teacher. I was one of the top 3 students with the best grades. Things got worse in
university. There were protests every day, students leaving, bombs, last year there was
very scary. I did my thesis with ICARDA--the international agricultural dry areas
research center. 4-5 days after I submitted my thesis, the building was bombed. From
2013-2016, I worked at the medical university. Microbiology was my dream job in
Aleppo. I got married in 2016 before coming to Armenia. But we didn’t stop working
during the war. My boyfriend (now husband) was also working and going to social
meetings. Everything was working, but it was very stressful (Arpi, March 28, 2019).
Arpi recounts her experiences as a university student and dreams of pursuing a career in
microbiology. She got married in 2016 during the war and recalls running through areas with
bombs in her wedding dress that her mother made for her, laughing with adrenaline and fear at
the situation. After she got married, the newlyweds kept working in Syria until they decided to
come to Armenia shortly thereafter. She remembers how stressful it was working in Syria during
this time and eventually opened two businesses in Armenia after migrating there.
Other women commented upon the normalcy of their lives, or at least a semblance of
financial security, in those respective countries. Adriana, an employee at Repat Armenia in
Yerevan, said, “I worked for the Embassy of Armenia in Damascus and moved to Armenia in
2010. The war started in 2012 and I settled permanently in Yerevan in 2014” and more details
will be provided in the next section about her struggles with finding employment in Yerevan.
Lilit, a Syrian Armenian woman, said, “I worked for 5 years in packaging. I was never married. I
only take care of my parents and I sacrificed my life for theirs,” indicating that she was upset with
the trajectory her life had taken in relation to other Syrian Armenian women (most of whom had
married and/or had children) but was happy she had a sense of financial security and rented a
house in Syria.

7.3 Part II: Gender Dynamics in Armenia
Gender dynamics shifted in Armenia after the migration of Syrian Armenians to Yerevan.
Several local Armenian NGO workers claimed that Syrian Armenian women generally did not
work in Syria or did not need to work in Syria, in contrast to my data, whereas in Armenia,
women as well as men had to work. For example, Siranoush observed that many young men in
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Armenia do not work, whereas in Syria, men always worked, “Dadignere [grandmas] here work
on the streets [in Yerevan]. Young men don’t work here. Dzulutyun varjvetsav [they got used to
laziness].” Siranoush criticized the fact that elderly women are forced to work in Armenia and
observed that many seemingly able-bodied young men do not work. In 2019 in Armenia, before
the September 2020 war with Azerbaijan, the unemployment rate was recorded at 17% according
to the World Bank. Diana from UNHCR added that, “Nobody is going to sit idle [in Armenia].
[Syrian Armenian women] are doing stuff, so men should also work…. Women [in general] are
always working.” In this statement, Diana notes that people have no choice but to work in
Armenia. She also compared Syrian Armenian women in Syria versus their lives in Armenia:
Syrian Armenian women blossom here [Armenia]. They led a ‘too good to be true’ life in
Syria and were wealthier there. Their only value is religion. It was a luxurious and boring
life for Syrian Armenian women in Syria. Now, society has changed. The younger
generation was bored. They don’t want the same job as parents, which was very stable
and fancy. They come to Armenia and sense liberty and were unleashed. In Syria, they
were all volunteers, everyone knew everyone, 4km Armenian community in Aleppo.
They were benevolent ladies, went to charities post-genocide, and were stuck in a rut.
The leader of Aleppo NGO grew from that, but ladies feel the same. It’s a charity, not
humanitarian [Aleppo NGO]. Syrian Armenian women [in Syria and Armenia] have big
dinners, go shopping, observe religion but their kids are done with it, they are very
extreme with preserving identity. The golden generation (30 something to 50) --everyone
had to get married. But it’s different when you come with small kids, so we started
trainings with this group. Some women are role models and spark interest in others, like
Berjouhi (Diana, May 28, 2019).
In this interview excerpt, Diana paints an idyllic picture of Syrian Armenian women’s lives in
Syria, “they lived a ‘too good to be true’ life” in Syria. She notes the differences between younger
and older generations of Syrian Armenian women and girls, stating that the “golden generation”
(approximately age 30-something to 50) engaged in having big dinners for social events and
charity fundraising, participation in religious life, and going shopping. Organizations such as
Aleppo NGO in Yerevan, in Diana’s view, are comprised of members and leaders from this
“golden generation,” who came from a large volunteering culture in post-genocide Aleppo and
other Armenian communities in Syria. The younger generation of Syrian Armenian women, to
Diana, came to Armenia with a “sense of liberty.” Through my fieldwork, I attended quite a few
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charity events (breakfast, dinners, other social events for holidays) hosted by Aleppo NGO and
noticed the same interlocutors attended the same events. In terms of changing gender dynamics
from Syria to Armenia from an employee’s perspective, Diana observed generational differences
between younger and older Syrian Armenian women. In addition, Diana’s comment about Syrian
Armenian women of the “golden generation” preserving their identity and being active in church
life in Syria may reflect the perspectives of local Armenians who lived during the Soviet period,
where it was not as possible to be actively engaged in religious or cultural life and events.
A U.S. Embassy employee, Allison, observed that men in general in Armenia, “are not
working” and raised the generational employment disparity between younger and older Syrian
Armenian women. She said, “Women were not the primary breadwinners in Syria. After
migrating to Armenia, in some cases, their father or spouse has died or is impaired. So now, 40–
50-year-old women are now the primary breadwinners.” Like Diana stated above, women did not
usually work in Syria. Allison pointed out that in some cases, women from the “golden
generation” (ages 30-50, per Diana) need to work in Armenia because their husband or spouse
has died or is otherwise impaired. Zvart, an employee from Aleppo NGO, agreed with other
employees and said that women were mostly housewives in Syria, but now must work in
Armenia. According to Zvart, “Women were mostly housewives in Syria, now [in Armenia], they
have to work. They used to do handicrafts for fun, now they must work. Women are more
focused on getting new skills. The role of women in the Middle East was to live with children
while their husbands were working.” In this statement, Zvart observed the transition from doing
handicrafts as a hobby in Syria (for Armenian housewives) and now coming to Armenia and
having to work to help support their families. As Ruzanna from the Armenian Round Table
Foundation (ART) noted, “Not every man can support a family,” commenting upon class
disparities within the Syrian Armenian community. Zvart was active in organizing “trainings” for
Syrian Armenian women at Aleppo NGO and she noticed how excited some Syrian Armenians
were to acquire new skills they did not have in Syria. Lastly, Zvart noted the traditional gender
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roles prevalent in Syria pre-migration--women generally stayed at home while men worked.
Finally, Megheti (International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Ovsanna (GIZ) both
observed that Syrian Armenian women were “not used to working” in Syria. Ovsanna stated that:
The problems of Syrian Armenian women are that they are not used to working in Syria.
Now, they have to work here. This is something Syrian Armenian women have to
overcome. Their husbands have to adjust, too. Syrian Armenian women have
psychological issues. Mostly successful women asked, “why should I work?” But some
Syrian Armenian women are happy to work, and didn’t work in Syria (Ovsanna, July 29,
2019).
In this excerpt, Ovsanna noted that Syrian Armenian women are not used to working in Syria, but
must work in Armenia, as was mentioned by several other employees. Syrian Armenian men
must adjust to this transition as well, and men’s views of pros and cons behind Syrian Armenian
women working in Armenia (from the perspective of state, international, and NGO employees)
will be covered in the next section. However, as Zvart noted, some Syrian Armenian women who
did not work in Syria were excited to learn new skills and work in Armenia. Finally, Megheti
from IOM also observed that Syrian Armenian women were not used to working in Syria and
empathized with the challenges Syrian Armenian women faced with integration in Armenia.
Megheti said, “For Syrian women, integration is harder for them because it’s a cultural issue.
They are not used to working and have slower integration because they spend time with each
other. I think they are doubly disadvantaged, because it’s a different culture and is very hard for
them.” As mentioned earlier in Chapter 4 on “Social Home,” integration is indeed a challenge for
Syrian Armenian women because generally, certain groups of Syrian Armenian women (not all)
cluster together and attend the same events, and only socialize with other Syrian Armenian
women. Megheti viewed Syrian Armenian women as being doubly disadvantaged in terms of lack
of skills for the job market and having to adapt to a different culture in Armenia, despite sharing
an ethnic background with the host country.
Three Syrian Armenian women who were interviewed reported they were not currently
working in Armenia, although two of the three had worked in Syria. For example, Katherine, a
Syrian Armenian woman in her mid-30s, told me she was pursuing a graduate degree online
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through a British university and does not currently work in Armenia. She said, “I might want to
go back to work in Yerevan. My husband tried to establish a business in Armenia in 2007-2008,
but it didn’t work… Armenian people were always good, there were no Armenian beggars in
Syria. People would earn their bread in Syria versus cheating in Armenia.” In this excerpt,
Katherine recounted how her husband tried to start a business in Armenia in 2007-2008 but was
unable to do so. He now works outside of Armenia and returns every few months to visit the
family. Katherine said she would like to go back to work in Armenia but does not seem to need to
go back to work. She noted the differences in work ethic between Armenia and Syria, noticing
with disdain what she views as cheating in Armenia as opposed to “earning your bread” (i.e.,
honest work) in Syria. She said, “there were no Armenian beggars in Syria,” which is similar to
Siranoush’s comment earlier about “not even Arabs ate out of the trash in Syria [like they do in
Armenia].” I interpret these statements as coming from a place of shock--life, to Siranoush and
Katherine, at least felt more financially secure for the Armenian community in Syria before the
war. Now, women, including Syrian Armenian women, in Armenia are compelled to work to help
support their families and pay high rent prices.
Eight Syrian Armenian women described their transition into their current jobs in
Armenia. Other Syrian Armenian women’s small businesses will be discussed in Chapter 8. Most
of the women discussed here are in their late 20s-early 40s. Karun’s family owns a Syrian
restaurant in Yerevan. She is incredibly ambitious and said she has worked various jobs since
moving to Armenia--as a model, with Iraqi airlines, founded a Facebook campaign called Live
Love Armenia, marketing, and now is a wine export specialist. Karun is single and has never
been married. Here is a glimpse of her story in Armenia:
I started working at Iraqi airlines, took fashion modeling courses (modeled for 1 year)
and helped my family [at their restaurant]. In 2015, my friends and I founded Live Love
Armenia, 2 Syrian Armenian friends, inspired by Live Love Lebanon NGO. Our
Instagram now has 39,000 followers, Facebook has 15,000 followers. We promote
Armenia and products; income goes to charity projects. I wanted to do my Master’s, I
even took the GRE and GMAT math, but I worked instead. In 2016, my family opened
[restaurant name redacted] so I do social media for them. I took control of marketing and
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PR and learned a lot from restaurant marketing, learned great skills. My family business
is good, but I need more experience. I finally started working at Karas [popular wine
company] as an export specialist (Karun, March 23, 2019).
In this interview excerpt, Karun described how she worked at various jobs in different fields, and
founded her own Facebook campaign, Live Love Armenia with two other Syrian Armenian
friends, and they were inspired by the Live Love Lebanon campaign. Her campaign promotes
Armenia and Armenian products (i.e., support for the host country) and proceeds go to local
charity projects. She had ambitions of pursuing her master’s degree and took the necessary tests
but decided to work instead. She said she has acquired hands-on learning experience at work with
social media and marketing through working with her family’s restaurant.
Arpi is another young Syrian Armenian woman in her late 20s, married with 2 young
children. She worked in Syria as a violin teacher and was a student, but the war interrupted future
career ambitions of pursuing microbiology. She and her husband moved to Armenia a few years
ago and work together running a food production company that makes Syrian foods for local
Armenian grocery stores, such as hummus and mutabal [dips]. These dishes are not easily found
in local Armenian grocery stores. The couple also runs a tourism agency. Here, Arpi explains
why she and her husband were compelled to open two businesses in Armenia:
We have 2 businesses. One is not enough in Yerevan, and we are working hard on both
businesses. We have a travel agency and food production, which has good flow. The food
production company makes hummus and mutabal. We studied the market and nobody
else does the same thing, so we’ll have more reach (now in Yerevan). As for the travel
agency, my husband started it when he came here, made all the tours first, to Georgia,
Artsakh, Western Armenia. I’m now focusing on marketing and the website for the travel
agency. The travel agency’s main purpose is to meet new people and make friends. We
have more cars this year than last year, and we are trying to expand (Arpi, March 28,
2019).
It is evident that Arpi and her husband have a great partnership, personally and professionally.
Both are intelligent and diligently studied the local Armenian market to find certain gaps for
opening new businesses. Most Syrian Armenians who wish to open their own businesses,
according to several employees below, tend to not study the local market or cater to local
interests. For example, Arpi and her husband identified the fact that local grocery stores in
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Armenia do not carry hummus or mutabal. I have been traveling to Armenia since 2007 and 2016
was the first year I found both in Halebi Shuka, Aleppo Shopping Center, which will be described
later in this chapter. Although Syrian Armenians and local Armenians are both ethnically
Armenian, there are stark differences in cuisine. I also experienced this shock during my first visit
to Armenia as a Birthright Armenia volunteer in 2009. I had anticipated eating all the “Armenian
food” I could dream of in Yerevan and was frankly disheartened to find the opposite. Instead of
hummus and kebabs, I learned about South Caucasian cuisine--barbeque, fresh vegetables, lots of
fresh herbs, freshly baked bread, little seasoning aside from salt and pepper. This is in stark
contrast to the richly seasoned, heavily Middle Eastern food I always thought was “Armenian
food” growing up in Michigan. I was raised with Middle Eastern food because I had relatives
from Syria and Lebanon who were always present in my life, if not around constantly. To
reiterate, Arpi and her husband identified a need for hummus and mutabal in local Armenian
grocery stores and this decision was profitable. Arpi explained that her husband first started the
tourism agency by making small trips with her around Armenia, Georgia, and even trips to the
ancestral Armenian homeland, Western Armenia (currently eastern Turkey). Arpi is extremely
organized and wanted to make sure she and her husband liked the hotels and destinations they
recommended to tourists. My parents and I utilized Arpi’s tourism agency in May 2019 to travel
around Armenia with my dog. Their story also seems to be in stark contrast to traditional gender
dynamics among the Armenian community in Syria, as their relationship seems to have always
been a partnership.
As another example, Salpi was single in Syria, but got engaged and married in Armenia.
She is in her late 30s/early 40s, worked in Syria and Armenia, and reported she is happy at her
current job and loves learning new skills. Here, she describes her current work experience in
Armenia:
I am currently working at a local organization. I like to volunteer and take computer
lessons. I took Excel classes, volunteered at the Foundation for 3 days, and on the 4th
day, got a job. I am a care coordinator now and a data officer. I go to Lebanon, Jordan,
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Mauritania, and Egypt. I am like a butterfly now and am very thankful. I love my job. I
never complain. Sometimes, I go to the region, and think people in Vanadzor are very
negative and depressed. At the beginning, Vanadzor was very tough with locals, it took 2
years to get to know them. (Salpi, February 7, 2019).
In this interview excerpt, Salpi discusses some of the vocational training opportunities she took
advantage of, such as Excel and computer classes. She also describes how she worked her way up
at her current workplace, from a volunteer to a data officer who can travel and use her Arabic
language skills, as she had in Syria (along with Turkish on the Syrian/Turkish border during the
war). Salpi happily describes her current work experience, “I am like a butterfly now,” showing
her love for travel, meeting new people, and helping others.
Some Syrian Armenian women discussed gender dynamics among Syrian Armenian
couples in terms of participation in the paid labor force, whether their spouses were still alive or
not. Siranoush said, “My husband went to Sudan for 2 years, came back for 1 year and is now in
Qatar. He is a silversmith. We [Syrian Armenian women] are not used to men working out of the
home.” In this excerpt, she explained how her husband, like Katherine’s husband, must work
outside of Armenia to earn a stable income. Siranoush also works in Armenia, running her own
embroidery business. The second half of her quote explains that Syrian Armenian women are not
used to their spouses needing to work outside of the country. Like Siranoush, Sona said her
husband must work, although he works in Armenia, but she wanted her own job to help support
her family, “I didn’t like my old job here. My husband is working here as a security guard for a
university, but I wanted my own job.” Her business, a handmade soaps and lotions business, is
also discussed in Part III. Arsine reported that her husband could not find his own work, so he
opened his own spice shop. She volunteers at H.O.M., is active in the Syrian Armenian
community, and helps her husband with his business. In Syria, she owned her own accessories
business. In Armenia, Arsine said, “My husband couldn’t find his own work. Now, he sells
spices, like za’atar, laurel soap--it’s organic and it’s Aleppo soap.” During the interview, she
proudly went on to tell me about laurel soap and how it’s unique to Aleppo. I would occasionally
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see her at charity fairs and expositions running her husband’s spices booth and would always pick
up some za’atar for my Yerevan apartment. Santoukhd, a pediatrician in Syria who had her own
clinic, described the discrepancies between her work life in Syria and her work life in Armenia, as
well as her husband’s challenges with finding a job. Both Santoukhd and her husband worked in
Syria. Santoukhd said, “I now work in a hospital, not my own clinic. It’s different financially and
the way of doing things [in a local hospital] is different. I now work in Sourp Asdvadzamayr
[Holy Mother of God] hospital, as hertabah [the doctor on duty]. My husband accepted a job as a
lecturer, he has a Ph.D. in agriculture, on the agrarian faculty, but the salary is low, very low
salary.” In this interview excerpt, Santoukhd describes the differences between her work life in
Syria versus Armenia. In Armenia, she receives a lower salary, must work in a hospital as the
doctor on duty instead of in her own clinic, and said “the way of doing things [in a local hospital]
is different.” Her husband has a Ph.D. in agriculture and accepted a job in Armenia but the salary
is too low compared to the salary he had been receiving in Syria.
Some Syrian Armenian women divorced their husbands or were widowed because of the
war. Hasmig was the only Syrian Armenian widow I had interviewed. She and her husband had
been planning on moving to Armenia and selling his ice-making factory but could not leave until
they had more money to pay for the trip and initial months of settlement in Armenia. Her husband
had been kidnapped and killed by Daesh (ISIS) during the war, before they could leave, so she
had to flee to Armenia by herself with her children and find a job to support her family. In 2016
in Yerevan, Hasmig said, “I now work for an organization [name redacted to protect interlocutor
privacy], which gives out humanitarian aid, as a receptionist. They suggested the work and treat
me very well. They understand my situation and are flexible. They let me leave early for my kids.
My fears are now of traffic [in contrast to snipers and kidnappers].” Hasmig was able to find a job
that helps to support her family in Armenia and is supportive of her situation as a widow with
young children. For example, she can leave work early sometimes to pick up her children from
school.
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The next section will discuss perceived benefits of Syrian Armenian women working in
Armenia, largely from the perspective of local and international NGO and UN employees.
7.3.1 Benefits of Syrian Armenian Women Working in Armenia
Several NGO and UN employees (eight) commented upon the social benefits of Syrian
Armenian women working in Armenia, such as a higher potential for socialization in the
workplace, more independence, elevated status within the family, and overall, more respect from
spouses for working and less domestic violence among Syrian Armenian couples. Diana from
UNHCR said that Syrian Armenian women are telling her, “Help us open our business,” and
observed that “women are in the driver’s seat [now]. It’s harder to socialize here [in Armenia]
because people are always working. The best way [to socialize and make friends] is to work.”
According to my participant observation with Aleppo NGO social events, for example, this does
not seem to be the case among most of the Syrian Armenian community in Yerevan--women are
able to socialize and make friends outside of the workplace. However, this may be the case for
many local Armenian women as gender dynamics differ in Armenia compared to Syria--many
women need to work in Armenia, and the workplace is a site of socialization. I noticed this
socialization during interviews as well, at the UNHCR office and NGO buildings, for example,
even Aleppo NGO social psychological meetings every Friday. Socialization occurred mostly
amongst other women, and I think my positionality as an Armenian American woman
conversational in both dialects of Armenian helped with socialization and building rapport. In
these settings, as well as in the formal workplace, such as banks or phone companies, employees
(usually always women) offer to make coffee or tea for co-workers, served with a small piece of
candy or fruit in Armenia. This time offers employees a mini-break and is reciprocal, although I
rarely noticed men offering to make coffee or tea for co-workers, usually only in male-dominated
spaces, such as a police station. As Diana mentioned earlier, an advantage of working is the
ability to socialize and make friends with local Armenian women as well as with other Syrian
Armenian women. Additionally, Diana made the important observation that “women are in the
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driver’s seat,” referring to Syrian Armenian women migrating to Armenia and several of whom
have started their own businesses.
Nayiri from the Armenian Red Cross also discussed the elevated status of Syrian
Armenian women in their families after they started working in Armenia:
Red Cross activities include raising the role of women in the family. Syrian Armenian
women became the main leaders [in families in Armenia] ---why? The economic
situation in Armenia requires women to work. [Syrian Armenian] men see the benefits of
their wives working [in Armenia]. Women were still working in ministries in Armenia,
for example, but are not ministers. Leadership positions are still occupied mostly by men.
Local men are mad that women work, but Syrian men are not mad that women work.
[Syrian Armenian] women keep Syrian Armenian habits and culture, like dzerakordz
(Nayiri, February 20, 2019).
In this interview excerpt, Nayiri explained that the Armenian Red Cross focuses on elevating the
social role of Syrian Armenian women in their families through promoting the importance of
women working in Armenia. She then compared and contrasted gender dynamics among Syrian
Armenian couples versus local Armenian couples and Armenian society. Gradually, Syrian
Armenian men see the value of their wives working in Armenia, whereas local Armenian men, in
Nayiri’s view, are angry when women work, yet, as Nayiri and other local Armenian NGO
workers have pointed out, local Armenian women must work in Armenia to help support their
families. Nayiri noted that women worked in ministries in Armenia (Soviet and post-Soviet
Armenia; see Ishkanian 2003, who also notes that NGOs are largely dominated by women in
Armenia, which I have observed during fieldwork), but rarely worked as ministers themselves,
with former Minister of Diaspora Hranush Hakobyan as one such exception. Nayiri commented
upon the cultural importance of Syrian Armenian women preserving skills passed down from
mother to daughter, such as embroidery. Ovsanna from GIZ added that, “Syrian Armenian
women are happy to work and didn’t work in Syria. Now, they have respect from their husbands,
who treat them like equals.” She observed how Syrian Armenian women have respect from their
husbands for working and contributing to family expenses. Parantsem from Aleppo NGO, an
employee and Syrian Armenian woman herself, stated that, “[Syrian Armenian] women got more
confident, their family was relying on them. Everything was perfect before in Syria,” explaining
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the transition from life in Syria to life in Armenia. In Syria, Syrian Armenian women held
important roles, many of whom were tasked with taking care of the home and cultivating
Armenian cultural life in a post-genocide community for generations. However, Parantsem noted
that their confidence grew upon migrating to Armenia and learning that they could also contribute
to supporting their families financially. Furthermore, “everything was perfect before in Syria,” to
Parantsem. This idealization refers to the perceived financial security experienced by Syrian
Armenian women in Syria before the war.
Other benefits of Syrian Armenian women working in Armenia is the perceived
correlation between more women working, more respect from spouses, and less domestic
violence, from the perspective of NGO workers. Tom from HDIF said that, “More jobs for
women equals lower domestic violence rates. Job creation is the most crucial need in Armenia-what women could do, like crochet, knit, sew. 14-16 groups employ women.” Here, Tom, an
American who has been living in Armenia for many years, observed the importance of job
creation for both local and Syrian Armenian women, both groups which are employed by HDIF.
Satenig, an Armenian American NGO worker from Armenian Lighthouse Charitable Foundation
(ALCF), a domestic violence shelter which is run out of a small village outside Yerevan, shared
the problems with domestic violence in Armenia among local Armenian couples. Satenig said:
Domestic violence is a cultural problem in Armenia, not an Armenian problem. Domestic
violence happens in all groups. Eastern Armenian culture tolerates and accepts domestic
violence--’you do this if you are a real man.’ Some people are wired that way. There are
some abusive husbands--normal domestic violence. They follow women to the
shelter/center, accusing them of being prostitutes for learning how to give massages.
They even called me and my fellow workers prostitutes, so I have security at the center
with the help of a local policeman (Satenig, July 17, 2017).
Satenig was quick to point out that domestic violence is a cultural problem in Armenia, but not an
Armenian problem, and that domestic violence happens “in all groups,” not just Armenia.
Moreover, Armenia did not have a law against domestic violence until 2017, but that law’s
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implementation is viewed as weak and largely ineffective. 50 Most of the women who come to
Satenig’s shelter are local Armenian women, and she did not know of any Syrian Armenian
women who used the center’s services. She explained that vocational training programs, such as
teaching local women how to be masseuses, had dangerous repercussions because their husbands
mistook these programs to be a front for prostitution and accused shelter workers of being
prostitutes. In Yerevan, I saw many mini-massage parlors and was warned by local female friends
to not go into any if I wanted a spa day. I was never given a direct answer from my friends, but it
was tacitly understood that these mini-massage parlors were usually intended for men and “happy
endings,” not a ladies’ spa day. Accordingly, Satenig had to find security from a local policeman
for the shelter. Nayiri was quick to point out that domestic violence did occur in Syria, but that
Syrian Armenian women did not quite realize they were experiencing violence:
Cases in regard to GBV [gender-based violence] took place in Syria but were not
physical violence--more economic and psychological abuse. Syrian Armenian women
say, ‘there’s no violence against women in Syria,’ but that’s because the women didn’t
realize violence was violence. For example, they were not allowed to go out or even go to
their mother’s. Armenian men in Syria were more about a careful approach--they were
afraid of Muslims, afraid of women going to markets [and encountering strange Arab,
Muslim men]. So, there were different transitions to Armenia (Nayiri, February 20,
2019).
In this interview excerpt, Nayiri explained that gender-based violence took place in Syria but was
not necessarily physical violence--it was more economic and psychological abuse. She said that
in Syria, women were “not allowed to go out or even go to their mother’s,” which does not
correlate with my data. However, what has been prevalent in my data is Islamophobia within the
Armenian community in Syria. Nayiri addresses this as well, stating that Armenian men in Syria
were cautious because they were afraid of Muslims and their wives going to markets and
encountering strange [Arab, Muslim] men in Syria. It is unclear whether Nayiri categorized this
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caution as economic and psychological abuse. Regardless, the ability or encouragement of Syrian
Armenian women to earn their own incomes in Armenia does seem to mitigate economic abuse
or lack of respect for Syrian Armenian women, as described by several local Armenian NGO
employees. In the same vein, Arusyag from Mission Armenia and Kohar from GIZ noted the
amount of respect Syrian Armenian men have for their wives in Armenia. Arusyag said that,
“Syrian Armenians are more attentive to their wives, and get married later. More jobs=less
domestic violence.” Kohar from GIZ said:
Syrian Armenian women are very organized. Women influence the men, no domestic
violence in Syrian Armenians. Many times, couples stand together for exhibitions, there
is harmony among Syrian Armenians. Syrian Armenian men have respectful attitudes
towards women. There is lots of violence in Armenia, it’s cultural. In the USSR, there
was gender equality, but we didn’t face gender inequality until now, especially in the
regions. Local men have issues with listening to professional women (Kohar, July 12,
2017).
In this interview excerpt, Kohar stated that there is no domestic violence among Syrian Armenian
couples, in contrast to Nayiri’s assertion earlier. She observed that Syrian Armenian couples often
stand together for exhibitions/charity fairs and have harmonious and respectful relationships. Like
Satenig, Kohar agreed that domestic violence occurs in Armenia, and that it is cultural. She also
recounted how gender equality was prevalent during the USSR and gender inequality mostly
occurs in the regions of Armenia, post-independence. Kohar told me how she feels professional
women are discriminated against in Armenia by local men. The next section will address the
perceived shame felt by Syrian Armenian men regarding women working in Armenia.
7.3.2

Perceived Shame Felt by Syrian Armenian Men Regarding Women Working in Armenia
Most state, international, and local NGO workers and several Syrian Armenian women

stated that Syrian Armenian women did not generally work in Armenia, explaining that it was
viewed as shameful. Hermine, a physician in Syria, said that, “In Syria, working outside the home
[for women] is amot mdadzelagerb [a shameful mentality].” Although Hermine worked in Syria,
she noted that women working outside the home in Syria were viewed as shameful for their
husbands, who are culturally expected to work in Syria. Another aspect of shame for Syrian
Armenian men upon migrating to Armenia is the realization that they would not be making the
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same salary for the same job in Armenia as they had in Syria. In a sense, Syrian Armenian men
may have experienced “painful belonging” in Armenia, too, through shame. Talar worked in
Syria and her husband worked as a physician. They had a stable life in Syria, but experienced
major shock moving to Armenia and finding that the salaries were different for the same work.
She said, “My husband had a difficult time getting a job. I can never forget his first salary from
the hospital, it was $80, and our apartments’ rent was about $500, so just imagine how we
survived.” The family’s experience in Armenia was in stark contrast to their life in Damascus,
where her husband had two clinics. During the war, her husband’s first clinic in Damascus was
damaged “due to the big explosion that happened in Damascus in 2012” and his second clinic
“was taken by the opposition.” Her husband finally got a good job in Armenia “in one of the best
hospitals in Yerevan as a cardiologist and same time therapist with night shifts, things started to
light up a bit” because his improved salary meant he was better able to financially support the
family in Armenia. Maro, an employee at Caritas, helped to explain shame felt by Syrian
Armenian men in Armenia:
Men earned more money in Syria but are doing the same jobs in Armenia [not for the
same salary]. They feel ashamed, this is the Oriental mentality. Especially in the
beginning, most couldn’t accept that their wives worked in Armenia. In Syria, most of the
men had small shops under their apartments and have historically developed this way-they worked wherever they were. In Armenia, you have to work for 8 hours a day,
sometimes only earning 60,000AMD/month [about $120], but an average salary is
120,000AMD/month [about $240]. But 60,000AMD is better than 0 drams (Maro,
February 21, 2019).
In this interview excerpt, Maro addresses the wage gaps between Syria and Armenia for the same
work, and that Syrian Armenian men feel ashamed for this wage gap and the fact that their wives
now must work in Armenia, but attributes this to the “Oriental mentality.” Maro described work
environments in Syria--most Armenian men had small shops under their apartments and worked
wherever they lived. One can see this trend with Santoukhd, a female physician who had her
clinic and house in the same building in Aleppo. Overall, wage gaps for work in Syria versus
Armenia led to a sense of shame among Syrian Armenian men in Armenia, but also helped to
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improve the couple’s relationship through building mutual respect with women’s participation in
the paid labor force. In Armenia, Diana noted how Syrian Armenian men struggled with new jobs
in Armenia. She said, “[Syrian Armenian] men struggled with business decreasing and were
weighing pros and cons [of working in Armenia]. They did not want to waste their savings. They
[Syrian Armenian men] are not living in luxury here [in Yerevan]. Many men are jewelers at
Vernissage [an open-air market in central Yerevan].” Here, Diana described some of the
struggles faced by Syrian Armenian men working in Armenia. Simply put, their socioeconomic
lives in Armenia were not what many Syrian Armenian men had anticipated. Diana also touched
upon the fact that many Syrian Armenian men are jewelers (and have been for decades). Lastly, a
local Armenian artist, journalist, and filmmaker, Anna Kamay, who had introduced me to Halebi
Shuka in summer 2017, said that Syrian Armenian men were ashamed because of the wage gap in
Armenia and the importance of their skill sets compared with Syrian Armenian women. Anna
stated that, “Women don’t work in Syria, but have to now in Armenia. Their husbands were
blacksmiths or car mechanics in Syria, so women have more desirable skills now than men. Men
would never receive proper salaries in Armenia, so there is shame. There is a shift in gender roles
because the pay is not enough.” Here, Anna describes how Syrian Armenian men feel ashamed
due to their wives having to work in Armenia, the wage gaps between men’s work in Syria
compared to Armenia, and the usefulness of women’s skills in Armenia compared to men’s skills.
For example, Syrian Armenian men typically worked as jewelers, artisans, blacksmiths, and car
mechanics in Syria (with exceptions, such as Talar’s husband). In Armenia, many local men
already work as car mechanics, so there’s not much need for more car mechanics, for example.
Syrian Armenian women have skills such as embroidery and cooking that they are now
being encouraged to use to make an income for their families. Maro from Caritas compared
Syrian Armenian families to local Armenian families, “In local Armenian families, both parents
work because salaries are low, and rents are high. In 2012-2013, it was hard for Syrian Armenian
women and men to realize that Syrian Armenian women should work and could work, using
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skills for income, like embroidery and cooking.” While the transition to life in Armenia was
culturally challenging for Syrian Armenian couples, it showed Syrian Armenian men and the
Armenian state that Syrian Armenian women were valuable economically as well as socially.
This elevated Syrian Armenian women’s status within the family, a decrease in domestic violence
with the increase of more women working, but also has the drawback of some Syrian Armenian
men feeling ashamed that their income is no longer sufficient to support their families and that
their wives are compelled to work in Armenia. In contrast, in local Armenian households, many
local women have always been compelled to work, although there is also some shame among
local men that women need to work in Armenia, as recounted by Kohar.
7.3.3

Cultural Differences Between Local and Syrian Armenian Women Regarding
Employment
Several state, international, and local NGO employees discussed the cultural differences

between local and Syrian Armenian women regarding employment and privilege in Armenia.
Kohar, a local Armenian employee at GIZ, stated that:
Some of the cultural differences are that locals aren’t nice, Syrians are nicer, so they
shouldn’t take it personally. Syrian Armenians like to get higher salaries, locals don’t
care. Syrian Armenian women want more flexible working hours. They have privilege.
The Gulbenkian Foundation made it so that Syrians can pick a university and 75% of
university tuition is covered [as of July 2017]. This is a great opportunity for younger
generations. Some are bright and want to study--this is a cultural difference. In the USSR,
education was a priority and being educated (Kohar, July 12, 2017).
In this interview excerpt, Kohar described the cultural differences between locals and Syrian
Armenians. She said that local Armenians are “not nice” (Kohar is a local Armenian woman) and
Syrians are nicer, so she advised Syrian Armenians to not take it personally if they feel a local
Armenian is not being friendly. Kohar noted the expectations of Syrian Armenians for receiving
higher salaries, but that locals are used to low salaries, and that Syrian Armenians have privilege
because many Syrian Armenian students were able to have most of their tuition covered by the
Gulbenkian Foundation. Arusyag, a local Armenian NGO worker, also mentioned “privilege”
when describing Syrian Armenian women, “Women are more active in Armenia and more
passive in Syria--Syrian Armenians are benefiting from local privileges.” I argue that Syrian
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Armenian women were not “passive” in Armenia, as they had significant roles within the family
and larger Armenian community. The latter half of Arusyag’s statement-- “Syrian Armenians are
benefiting from local privileges” has several different meanings. “Local privileges,” as I
understand, refers to citizenship, a short period of humanitarian relief for Syrian Armenians (not
locals, which did create resentment) and connotes wealth prior to migration, which is not true for
every Syrian Armenian.

7.4 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the differences between gender dynamics in Syria among
Syrian Armenian couples and the transition to gender dynamics in Armenia between local
Armenians and Syrian Armenians. In Syria, generally women did not need to work, and men
worked, as recounted by local Armenian NGO and international employees. However, Syrian
Armenian women still held important roles in Syria, both within their families as caretakers and
within the larger Armenian communities as stewards of Armenian cultural life as descendants of a
post-genocide community. In my research, I interviewed 17 out of 32 Syrian Armenian women
who said they had worked in Syria, some of whom held high-status jobs. Upon migration to
Armenia, gendered participation in the paid labor force among Syrian Armenian couples had
changed. In some cases, Syrian Armenian men were injured, killed, or otherwise unable to make
the same wages for the same work they had done in Syria. Syrian Armenian women were
compelled to work in Armenia to help support their families. This section included an
examination of perceived benefits of Syrian Armenian women working in Armenia as well as
perceived shame (Amot in Armenian) of Syrian Armenian men for not being able to sufficiently
support their families and for their wives needing to work in Armenia, from the perspective of
various employees.
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CHAPTER 8. “I CAN WORK, I CAN GET ON MY FEET”: SYRIAN ARMENIAN WOMENOWNED SMALL BUSINESSES
My husband found work in Armenia. You start in Armenia with zero but get to know
people after time. I took cake-making classes, not for business purposes, but so I could be
prepared for my daughter’s birthday party. I put the pictures on Facebook, see? [shows
me her phone, proudly] Then I started getting business ideas--cupcakes and cookies.
Now, I tutor Arabic and am a babysitter for a U.S. Embassy employee’s family. My
clients trust me, and I asked this family for help with cupcakes. I’ll take any arit [chance]
I can. I can teach in 3 languages, but business in Armenia is very bad. Working is hard
because I have a child and they didn’t pay me. All the classes I took in Syria were in
Arabic. I worked in a children’s clothing store and they only paid me 2,500AMD/day
(about $5) (Zabel, February 26, 2019).
A Syrian Armenian woman in her late 20s, Zabel, said her husband found work in Armenia, but
she still struggled with finding supplementary income. She tried working in Armenia, at a
children’s clothing store, but was rarely paid. When she was paid, she was only paid 2,500AMD
(about USD $5) per day. Like several other Syrian Armenian women, she stated, “You start in
Armenia with zero.” In this context, “zero” refers to both employment and social contacts in
Armenia. She eventually met a U.S. Embassy employee who hired her to teach her children
Arabic and Zabel decorated cupcakes for her children.

8.1 Introduction
This final chapter continues to discuss economic challenges and frustrations expressed by
Syrian Armenian migrant women living in Yerevan, particularly entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs in
the context of Syrian Armenian migrant women refer to women who wish to or have already
opened their own small businesses in Armenia, which mainly focus on embroidery or selling
baked goods. Most of the women described in this final section work in Armenia or have
attempted to find work in Armenia.
8.1.1 Organization of the Chapter
This final chapter examines economic challenges and successes behind Syrian Armenian
women’s entry into the paid labor force in Armenia. It is divided into three parts. Part I examines
economic challenges and Syrian Armenian women’s frustrations with entering the paid labor
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force in Armenia. Part II examines the two main types of businesses opened by Syrian Armenian
women in Yerevan (cuisine and embroidery) and provides a brief history of Western Armenian
embroidery and embroidery classes. Part III ends with women-owned small businesses in
Armenia (a selection) and hopes for the future.

8.2 Part I: Economic Challenges: Syrian Armenian Women’s Frustrations
Many Syrian Armenian migrant women were shocked and disappointed that it was so
challenging to find work in Armenia. They were looking forward to promises of security, which
they were mostly granted in Armenia. Security in this sense included both geopolitical security
(fleeing a conflict zone to relative security in Armenia, before the Second Karabakh War in
September 2020), as well as security from gender-based violence, which I have discussed earlier
in this dissertation. However, security in the form of socioeconomic protection was not
guaranteed in Armenia, at least not for many of the Syrian Armenian women I had interviewed in
Yerevan. In Syria, there was the threat of bombs dropping in living rooms, disrupting physical
security, but there was a sense of socioeconomic protection, whether from some women owning
their own businesses in Syria to having their partner be the main breadwinner. Siranoush and
Hermine simply said there was no work. Conversely in Armenia, most women I interviewed felt
that they were physically safer but were more insecure financially and did not have a strong social
network outside of the Syrian Armenian community in Yerevan. For example, Arpi explained
that she and her husband started their own businesses (a tourism agency and food production
company) to supplement life in Armenia, “Salaries are very low in Armenia. We started our own
business to grow, and having business is good.” The couple helps each other run both companies.
For example, Arpi’s husband drives tourists all over Armenia, Georgia, Western Armenia (now
eastern Turkey), and Artsakh, and Arpi carefully plans tourist itineraries. Together, they vet
potential hotels and tourist sites before suggesting them to interested tourists. Running their own
businesses also helps them have some control over their income, although with the tourism
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agency, it varies seasonally. Other Syrian Armenian migrant women were frustrated with the
employment opportunities available in Armenia. Sona said, “I am disappointed with jobs here,”
and ultimately decided to use her background in chemistry to open her own handmade soaps and
lotions business.
Several Syrian Armenian migrant women commented upon the language difficulties they
faced. While all Syrian Armenian women already speak a dialect of Armenian (Western
Armenian), knowing Russian was voiced as a prerequisite to getting a job. However, some local
NGO workers said it was not necessary to speak Russian to find a job. Adriana said, “I looked for
a job, but didn’t speak any Russian, so I went to many interviews [to find a job].” Shakeh, also in
her 30s, said, “I can’t work as a pharmacist in Armenia because I don’t speak any Russian, but
will start Russian classes. I don’t work now, but I’m going back to school for a refresher course.
My husband works as a goldsmith.” However, Dzovinar from KASA said that learning Russian is
not a quick fix for finding a job, “Most women complain about the Russian language, but
knowing Russian doesn’t mean you will get a job, though.” Kohar from GIZ added that,
“Learning Russian is important for jobs, but it’s not very popular now. Mostly English is
important now.” Based on fieldwork, it seems that Russian is more commonly spoken among the
older generation of local Armenians, whereas the younger generation seems to speak more
English. In my interactions with NGO workers, for example, who generally ranged in age from
their 20s-40s, most of my interviews with them were conducted in English, in contrast to my
interviews with Syrian Armenian migrant women, most of which were conducted in Western
Armenian.
In addition to linguistic obstacles, age discrimination was also cited as a factor in not
being able to find jobs. Arusyag, a local Armenian employee in her 50s from Mission Armenia
said, “In Armenia, it is hard to find jobs because of age, and it is a must for people to know
Russian. People work long hours here. Women-headed families are in the same situation as local
families. Women have Syrian passports, so they can’t be registered as workers. The situation is
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the same that refugees have.” Arusyag is one of the older local Armenian NGO employees I
interviewed, who feel that speaking Russian is still imperative for finding employment. Age
discrimination in employment in Armenia appeared to be a common concern, particularly among
Syrian Armenian women over the age of 40. Moreover, Arusyag feels, as do other local
Armenian NGO employees, that Syrian Armenian women are in the same situation as local
families socioeconomically. Syrian Armenian women arrive with Syrian passports, so they cannot
be registered as workers until they gain citizenship. Lilit, a woman in her 40s/50s originally from
Raqqa, Syria, said, “I have been in Yerevan for 6 months now and I can’t find a job because I
don’t speak Russian and am told I am too old to work. Life in Armenia is expensive. There is no
work, not even any part-time jobs.” Here, Lilit blames her inability to find a job in Yerevan on
age discrimination and the fact that she does not speak Russian. However, it should be noted that
of the Syrian Armenian women who were able to find employment in Yerevan (discussed below),
few, if any, speak Russian and several of the older women (in their 40s/50s) managed to open
their own small businesses, especially catering businesses. The older women were roughly the
same age as Lilit. The next and final section of Part III will describe several examples of Syrian
migrant women-owned small businesses in Yerevan, as well as other examples from previous
fieldwork trips to Istanbul and Berlin with non-Armenian migrant women.

8.3 Part II: 2 Main Syrian Armenian Businesses--Embroidery and Middle Eastern Cuisine
Overall, there are two main businesses owned by Syrian Armenian women--embroidery
and Middle Eastern cuisine/catering businesses. These businesses are generally owned by middleaged women (defined here as 40s-50s), who used both these skills in Syria. Western Armenian
embroidery traditions, passed down from female genocide survivors to their daughters and
granddaughters in Syria, are now seeing a revival in the Armenian market due to the influx of
Syrian Armenian women entrepreneurs. A brief history of Western Armenian embroidery will be
described here, particularly the origins of Syrian Armenian embroidery, indigenous to Western
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Armenia, being marketed by Western missionaries during the Armenian genocide and now in
Armenia. Following this brief history, I will discuss my participant observation in 2 embroidery
classes, Van embroidery (Van is a city in historic Western Armenia) at Aleppo NGO, and Urfa
embroidery (another city in historic Western Armenia) at Syrian Armenians’ Union. The
embroidery sub-section will end with a discussion of Siranoush’s, Talin’s, and Knar’s businesses.

Figure 8.1 Van embroidery class. Photo by author. Day 1 of Van embroidery class, Aleppo
NGO, Yerevan.
The Van embroidery class was taught by Knar, Hermine, and a third Syrian Armenian
woman I did not interview, Maryam. I paid 10,000AMD (roughly USD $20) for 8 classes at
Aleppo NGO, held every Thursday afternoon. I had the least amount of training in the group and
was the only diasporan Armenian. The other interlocutors were active members of Aleppo NGO
and had informally learned Western Armenian embroidery at home from their mothers and
grandmothers. While my ancestors did come from Western Armenia, embroidery was not passed
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down to me, as is the case with many other Armenian Americans. One reason for this may be
because I did not have an Armenian mother, and Armenian men were largely not taught how to
do embroidery. However, my family (particularly male relatives) were active rug-weavers and
merchants in a village called Alaja by Aintab (now Gaziantep, Turkey, close to the
Syrian/Turkish border). In summer 2019, Urfa embroidery classes were offered by a Syrian
Armenian woman I did not interview but got to know at exhibition sales, Heghine, and classes
were free to interlocutors. I attended 7 Urfa embroidery classes, which were all held at Syrian
Armenians’ Union, specifically at the Syrian Armenians’ Industrial Zone (SAIZ).
8.3.1 A Brief History of Western Armenian Embroidery and Female Survivors
Embroidery in Western Armenia (present-day eastern Turkey) traces its roots back to
weaving fishing and hunting nets and was widely used before and after the Armenian genocide
and massacres of the late 1890s to the early 1920s (Serig Davtyan, Haykakan Janyak, 1967).
Originally, women from this region made lace from the fibers (hemp) of a native plant called
djout (cannabis), which was also used medicinally. Armenian knotted needlelace developed out
of the earliest nets made from hemp, which were used to catch fish, birds, and animals (Davtyan
1967, Armenian Relief Cross 1999, 33). In Ottoman society, young girls from different ethnic
groups across the sociopolitical spectrum (lower class to upper class) were expected to learn
embroidery and lacemaking to produce items for household use and for their dowries (Merian
2013, 199). Embroidery was also used for religious functions (such as embroidered curtains and
vestments for churches and temples during the pagan era) (Mania Ghazarian, Movses Zirani,
Armenian Relief Cross 1999). Later, embroidered items were used for decorative purposes.
Armenian women would showcase their embroidery talents as part of their ojid (dowry), and have
the community admire their work (Merian, 199), as was recounted by Knar. Women from
different ethnic groups would also supplement their family’s income by selling embroidered
items in the local bazaar, although Sylvie Merian notes that the men would probably bring
embroidered items to the local bazaar and do the selling, but women would make the products.
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Western Armenia’s location on the Silk Road also meant that embroiderers readily had access to
dyes and silk. Designs showed women’s individual personalities and included motifs such as
pomegranates for fertility and a nightingale which symbolized longing for the homeland and
homemaking (Armenian Relief Cross of Lebanon 1999, xiii). According to Anush Sharambeyan,
needlework was one of the few forms of self-expression open to a woman in a society where she
was largely without rights or prestige (Levon Abrahamian and Nancy Sweezy, Armenian Folk
Arts, Culture, and Identity, 2001, 165). Young married Armenian women were expected to be
totally silent in their husband’s family’s home (where brides moved after marriage) and not speak
to elders or male family members for several years. Needlework was thus viewed as a means of
giving women a “voice” --stitches instead of words. This craft provided Armenian women with
individual expression, but also trained them in the values of diligence and patience traditionally
expected of Armenian women (Levon Abrahamian and Nancy Sweezy, Anush Sharambeyan
2001, 165; Levon Abrahamian is an Armenian anthropologist). Needlework also kept women
inside, while men sold embroidered items outside in the bazaar.
During the Armenian genocide and other massacres before and after 1915, Armenian
embroidery and lace has largely not survived death marches and deportations to killing sites in
the Syrian desert, as textiles erode quickly. It is also hard to determine where surviving textiles
came from and who produced them, and origins of specific textiles were mostly determined by
oral history (Merian, 199). Additionally, artisans were killed, and workplaces were destroyed
(Armenian Relief Cross of Lebanon 1999). The forced migration of hundreds of thousands of
Armenians to Aleppo meant genocide survivors’ exposure to other embroidery styles, so Aleppo
became a cradle of Western Armenian embroidery during and after the genocide (Yeranouhy
Gotting Haidostian, Armenian Relief Cross 1999). This explains the presence of different
regional embroidery styles that have traveled with some of the Syrian Armenian women that I
interviewed, from Aleppo or other places in Syria to Yerevan (Aintab, Van, Urfa, etc.). During
the genocide and massacres, Western missionaries in Western Armenia opened workshops that
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employed Armenian widows and orphans to make embroidery to be sold in Western countries. A
philanthropic society, called Friends of Armenians, helped sell Armenian-made embroidered
items in Europe. For example, Alice Shepard-Riggs, born in 1885 to American missionaries in
Aintab, continued her mother’s work of employing Armenian widows and orphans to produce
lace and embroidered items and helped them sell these items to support them financially (Merian,
200). This specific factory example was called the “Aintab Cottage Industry” by Mrs. Riggs, and
American missionaries referred to Aintabsi needlelace as “Armenian white work.” After the
genocide, an American organization called Near East Relief established embroidery workshops in
orphanages throughout the Armenian diaspora (from Syria to Greece) to help Armenian orphans,
widows, and other female survivors produce needlework (Merian, 200). Embroidery and
lacemaking were relatively easy to produce on a large-scale because neither required special
equipment and both crafts were easily transportable, so they could be done anywhere survivors
were dispersed. Survivors from Aintab who settled in Soviet Armenia opened a lace-making
factory in their new town south of Yerevan, called Ayntap. During fieldwork, I visited this town
but was unable to interview any embroiderers due to lack of time. Furthermore, after World War
II, repatriates to Soviet Armenia during Nerkaght also helped to reintroduce needlework to Soviet
Armenia through hobby groups organized by Yerevan’s Palace of Pioneers (Sharambeyan,
Abrahamian and Sweezy 2001, 171). As Tom mentioned earlier, plain Russian cross-stitch
dominated embroidery circles in Soviet Armenia by the early 1940s, but after Nerkaght,
repatriated women brought back traditional embroidery motifs from Western Armenia
(Sharambeyan, Abrahamian and Sweezy 2001, 174). Western Armenian embroidery transplanted
to Soviet Armenia by Western Armenian genocide survivors and their descendants did not take
off in the 1940s because needlework was not prioritized as a viable means of employment. It was
not until the 1970s that Western Armenian needlework had a major revival in Soviet Armenia due
to state museums collecting exceptional contemporary lace and embroidered items. However,
these collections conferred prestige, not profit, on the women who produced these crafts. In
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Soviet Armenia, embroidered items were briefly sold in Yerevan’s open-air market, Vernissage,
but disappeared from the market because the pieces were too expensive since items were highly
priced due to how long it took to make exquisite pieces. More intricate embroidered items were
replaced in Vernissage by lower quality pieces that were produced faster with cross-stitch designs
(Sharambeyan, Abrahamian, and Sweezy 2001, 174). Throughout my fieldwork and trips to
exhibition sales and Vernissage, I only noticed traditional Western Armenian embroidery at
exhibition sales and rarely at Vernissage.
To clarify, Western missionaries did not teach Armenian women how to embroider.
Embroidery and lacemaking were indigenous to Western Armenia long before the arrival of
Western missionaries. However, Western missionaries did help Armenian women and children
produce and sell embroidered items. In addition, the Friends of Armenians organization in
London sponsored exhibitions, fairs, and bazaars where handmade lace and embroidered items
(especially Aintab and Marah work) were sold and profits were used to support Armenian
genocide survivors (Yeranouhy Gotting Haidostian, Armenian Relief Cross 1999, 98). A century
later, Syrian Armenian women in Yerevan still create embroidered items, and Western-led NGOs,
such as HDIF, help produce and sell embroidered items, as Western missionaries did before.
Armenian women embroidering to process trauma and earn an income has been documented in
the Armenian genocide, the Lebanese civil war, and the Syrian conflict. Termed “the bread of the
black day,” embroidery provided Armenian women with a means of subsistence in hard times
(Sharambeyan, Levon Abrahamian and Nancy Sweezy 2001, 165). According to the Armenian
Relief Cross, embroidery was used by Armenian women during the Lebanese civil war to help
with unemployment and inactivity. The Armenian Relief Cross provided Armenian women in
Beirut with fabrics, threads, and basic instructions for embroidery. Eventually, the organization
opened a Craft Center and most of the embroidered items produced in the workshop was sold
during and immediately after the Lebanese civil war (Mania Ghazarian, Armenian Relief Cross
1999). The most recent war in Armenia (the Second Karabakh war) has also shifted attention to
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women survivors from Artsakh (the Armenian term for Nagorno-Karabakh Republic) who
suddenly found themselves as the primary breadwinners in their families (as many of their
spouses were killed or unable to work due to combat injuries) and have had to rely on their skills
to earn an income and support their families. Relating to my dissertation project, Syrian
Armenian women have, in some instances, reached out to Artsakhsi survivors and employed
them. For example, Haleb, a Syrian grocery store in Yerevan whose owner I did not interview,
employed Artsakhsi female bakers to help make pakhlava (baklava).
In recent years, Syrian Armenian women who were considered master embroiderers were
able to commission their embroidery to help other women create their dowries. As told to the
organizers of the Smithsonian Folklife Festival, my embroidery instructor from Syrian
Armenians’ Union, and her sister, were considered to be highly skilled in Syria and other Syrian
Armenian women in the community would pay them to create products for their daughters’
dowries, such as handkerchiefs and tablecloths.
It is important to note that embroidery is indigenous to Western Armenia, but Western
missionaries were instrumental in helping female Armenian genocide survivors sell embroidered
products to Western markets. Embroidery during the Armenian genocide and its immediate
aftermath was a form of art therapy after severe trauma, and a means to earn a living. Over a
century later, in the independent Republic of Armenia, descendants of Armenian genocide
survivors who fled to Syria, are now reproducing embroidery as a form of art therapy and
subsistence in Armenia. I felt embroidery classes were therapeutic for me as well, as some of the
classes took place after my assault. These classes were not only valuable ethnographically as
participant observation, but also helped me feel closer to my Western Armenian roots and were
very therapeutic.
A few NGO workers in Armenia feel there is a cross-cultural influence on Armenian
designs. Tom, an American who works for Homeland Development Initiative Foundation
(HDIF), said there are many similarities between Norwegian bunad and Armenian taraz. For
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example, he feels Aintab embroidery looks like designs from Hardanger Som, Norway. As the
representative of Norway in Armenia and former employee of the Norwegian Refugee Council,
he has lived and traveled in both Norway and Armenia and noticed that Armenian taraz and
traditional lace is like embroidery in Norway. Emily, a Norwegian woman who collaborates with
Tom and Teryan Cultural Center, remarked, “There are similarities between textiles, folk arts,
costumes in Armenia and Norway. There are connections between people and sharing common
stories and history,” echoing Tom’s comparisons between Armenian taraz and Norwegian bunad.
He added that this may be because Scandinavian missionaries were active in Western Armenia
(now eastern Turkey) before, during, and after the Armenian genocide. Tom said that
missionaries introduced art therapy to female survivors during the Armenian genocide,
capitalizing on an indigenous craft well known in Western Armenia-- “they [missionaries] wanted
to help them [survivors] keep their hands busy,” referring to art therapy through embroidery and
selling products in Western markets. Tom went on to compare art therapy and embroidery during
the Armenian genocide to handicrafts among local and Syrian Armenian women living in
Armenia today:
Embroidery was a traditional skill in Syria and Turkey pre- and post-genocide. Now,
women can earn money doing embroidery. For example, Siranoush has done quality
embroidery since she was younger, and she had the product the market wanted. Syrian
embroidery and food are new in Armenia. Traditional skills, like carpet weaving, are
dying out and are only performed in museums. Crochet will also die out. Carpet weaving
is a fine art. But carpet weaving songs and stories need to be recorded before they die out.
There are photos of carpet weaving in the diaspora, from family’s pre-genocide. I see a
need to capitalize on Syrian Armenian skills, especially Aintab and its similarities to
Norwegian bunad. But national will is needed to pass skills on, and the Teryan Cultural
Center [in Yerevan] does a good job of this. There is less priority in Armenia placed on
learning carpet weaving versus learning tech skills like coding. But silversmithing may
survive because men will keep it (Tom, HDIF, October 29, 2018).
Tom states that embroidery was indigenous in Western Armenia (now southeastern and eastern
Turkey) and passed down to descendants of Armenian genocide survivors who settled in Syria.
Syrian Armenian women who fled to Armenia due to the Syrian conflict have a unique skill set
that many women in Armenia generally do not have--Western Armenian embroidery, which is a
product that the Armenian market wants. Tom also mentioned other traditional skills, such as
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carpet weaving, and pointed out that these skills are at risk of dying out without preservation. He
indicated that there is a lack of “national will” in Armenia for preserving traditional crafts, and
that more local Armenians are interested in learning tech skills, like coding, than learning carpet
weaving. Tom’s organization, HDIF, partners with Syrian Armenian women (5 master
embroiderers, including Siranoush), and helps to sell their jewelry.
In an earlier interview with Tom, during a preliminary fieldwork trip to Yerevan in July
2017, he explained the different regional varieties of embroidery passed down from Armenian
genocide survivors from Western Armenia to descendants in Syria. According to Tom,
There are 6 or 7 distinct Syrian embroideries--Sivas [Sepasdia in Armenian], Van, Urfa,
Aintab, and Marash. Missionaries taught survivors how to use this craft, and have it been
therapeutic for genocide survivors. I think that lacework is originally from Iran, based on
the styles. The types of embroidery include 1) needlework and 2) beadwork, and Marash
is a third informal type. Lacework is not done in Armenia, only embroidery. Syrian
Armenians have different skills, a different set of experiences. Young women were taught
to do lacework because it was something women did in Syria. Syrian Armenian women
embroider, not crochet, because they are outside of the former USSR. They also make
necklaces. 60% of the product is the story, the pride of products vs. survival (Tom, HDIF,
July 12, 2017).
I observed that embroidery as art therapy is still being used by several Syrian Armenian
organizations in Yerevan to this day, such as Aleppo NGO and Syrian Armenians’ Union.
Embroidery classes are therapeutic for Armenian survivors of the Syrian conflict living in
Armenia, as they were for their parents and grandparents during the Armenian genocide. My own
participation in embroidery classes felt therapeutic in the sense that several classes took place
immediately after my assault in Yerevan. Thursday afternoons in spring 2019 had a routine of
embroidery class followed by therapy. I will share my experiences and participant observation in
embroidery classes below. In the same way that Aleppo NGO’s social-psychological meetings
every Friday evening were cathartic and therapeutic for Syrian Armenian women living in
Yerevan, so were embroidery classes offered by Aleppo NGO and Syrian Armenians’ Union. I
assert that Western Armenian embroidery classes and women-owned small businesses in Yerevan
are multi-functional: they help preserve Western Armenian traditions, provide mental health
support for Syrian Armenian women living in Yerevan, and empower Syrian Armenian women to
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use their existing embroidery skills (primarily used as a hobby or displaying one’s ojid, or dowry,
in Syria) to make and sell their own products in Yerevan.
Several Syrian Armenian women living in Yerevan are considered to be master
embroiderers, and I interviewed 4 master embroiderers: Siranoush, Knar, Hermine, and Talin. All
four women told me how aseghnakordz (needlework, embroidery) was passed down to them by
their mothers and grandmothers who fled to Syria from Western Armenia. Following is an
excerpt from my interview with Siranoush:
Anahid: Where is your family from in Western Armenia and how did you learn how to
do aseghnakordz [needlework, embroidery]?
Siranoush: My family is from Marash. Women made dzerakordz (handmade crafts, such
as embroidery) at home. Every woman learned from home. In 1950, English businessmen
bought dzerakordz from Aleppo and brought it to the UK. After the genocide, aksoren
hedo (after exile), there was no work or homes. Eventually, from 1930-1960, women
started making dzerakordz in Aleppo, like dzadzgots (tablecloths). Women made this in
Aleppo. But that generation [of genocide survivors and their children] dzeratsan (got
old). In Marash, there was a big factory. Women gathered together to embroider and sell
products. People can steal gold, but not what you have learned.
Anahid: How did embroidery change in Syria after the genocide?
Siranoush: In 1915, Aksoren (after exile), there were no schools. But the Syrian
government told us to learn our religion and language. My mother was born in 1951, I
was born in 1975. Everyone knew handmade crafts. My generation, tram shahelu
pokhvetsav [changed from making embroidery as a hobby to an income]. Syrian Arabs
didn’t really have the same needlework. Armenian men were arhesdavorner [craftsmen,
artisans] and khelatsi [intelligent]. Avantagan dzerakordz, ge sorvetsnem dzerakordz
[Traditional handcrafts/embroidery, I teach handcrafts/embroidery].
Anahid: In Yerevan, how have you kept embroidery culture alive?
Siranoush: I am a SAU member. I teach dzerakordz classes. Avantagan dzerakordz, ge
sorvetsnem dzerakordz. I started to work here doing embroidery, made a little salary.
From my conversation with Siranoush, it is evident that traditional embroidery culture was very
prominent, particularly among women, in Western Armenia and was passed down from mother to
daughter. Western missionaries proselytizing in Western Armenia before, during, and after the
Armenian genocide helped female Armenian genocide survivors sell traditional embroidery to
Western markets. Siranoush felt proud of her Marashetsi heritage, noting that, “People can steal
gold, but not what you have learned.” This phrase indirectly refers to gold that was presumptively
buried by Armenians on their property before they were forcibly displaced and massacred. In the
years since, this legend has spread, and current occupants of former Armenian villages and towns
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have attempted to find this buried treasure. To Siranoush, “gold” refers to the Armenian people’s
knowledge, connection to Western Armenian land, and traditional dzerakordz. Armenians were
massacred, deported, looted, but knowledge of this indigenous craft persisted to the present day.
Knar is another Syrian Armenian master embroiderer. She also told me about dzerakordz
being used as a hobby in Syria and how she started her embroidery business in Armenia:
In Syria, I was making dzerakordz as a hobby, I didn’t sell anything, it was just as gifts. I
began learning dzerakordz when I was 9 years old. My mom taught cross-stitching then
traditional needlework, and I became interested in needlework. Marash techniques are
more complicated. I can also do Aintab needlework, I’m Aintabsi. After coming here to
Armenia, I started my business. I was an NGO secretary at first, then after a year, I
decided to pursue my business. My sister helped me. Marash and Aintab styles were
passed down through families. Young women would show off their embroidery skills as
ojid [dowry], for future house decor. After 1915, this tradition changed after survivors
came to Syria. In orphanages, little girls were taught these skills by missionaries because
their parents had been killed or unable to teach them. Missionaries then took the products
to England and America. Every Armenian girl learned this skill. At weddings and bridal
showers, the point was to show off a woman’s dzerakordz for 3-7 days before a wedding.
In 1980, girls didn’t work on their ojid, they were working on school and careers. Few
girls kept this skill, traditional embroidery. There used to be classes of 30 people [before
1980], 18-20 years old, local girls.
Aside from the assumption that traditional Western Armenian embroidery was just a hobby
performed by Syrian Armenian women in Syria, Knar reminds us that embroidery had incredible
symbolic value. It was used to showcase women’s creativity and as part of their ojid, or dowry.
Items such as dzadzgots (tableclothes) were hung in the bride’s house for 3-7 days before the
wedding and other villagers would come and admire her work. Both Knar and Siranoush stated
that embroidery as ojid or a hobby dwindled in the mid to late 1970s-1980s. Hermine, a master
embroiderer and pediatrician in Aleppo, provided some historical context of missionary efforts
and embroidery during the genocide. Hermine said her ancestors were from Urfa and Yetesia in
Western Armenia (now eastern Turkey). Missionaries, according to Hermine, “helped women
genocide survivors with crafts and brought handicrafts to America and Europe, and brought
thread,” indicating that missionaries supplied Armenian women genocide survivors with thread.
One such Danish missionary was Karen Jeppe, who worked in Urfa during the genocide. Called
Karen Jeppe Mayrig (Mama) by Armenians, Hermine described her as “hamesd [humble], didn’t
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collect any money.” An active member of Aleppo NGO, like Knar, Hermine and Knar both
taught embroidery classes and I participated in their Van embroidery class, described below.
Knar, Siranoush, Talin, and Kayane said they learned embroidery from their mothers and
especially their grandmothers. Talin said, “My Medzmama [grandma] taught embroidery. The
majority of [Syrian Armenian] women learned embroidery and kept the customs, Aintabsi
traditions. In Armenia, it is possible to keep these traditions. Local Armenians don’t know the
embroidery, so we need to teach locals.” Kayane, a Syrian Armenian woman living in Yerevan
who is not a master embroiderer, added that her, “grandma’s generation did embroidery at home,
not my mom’s generation.” In Syria, traditional embroidery (using regional variations) was
passed down from mother to daughter but was generally credited to their grandmothers’
generation (genocide survivors). Talin pointed out that local Armenians in Armenia are not
familiar with embroidery, so she feels obligated to teach local Armenians traditional embroidery
from Western Armenia. Tom also noted that local Armenians are not familiar with traditional
Western Armenian embroidery, generally, but do have other handicraft skills, like crocheting and
carpet weaving. I visited two Armenian Relief Society (ARS)/H.O.M. offices in Yerevan, both
dedicated to preserving Western Armenian embroidery. Zepyur, a volunteer at the central location
and an Armenian American, said that ARS/H.O.M., “is an entirely women-run organization. We
teach Western Armenian skills, like needlework and lace (Marash and Aintab) to Syrian
Armenian women.” During my participant observation in 2 embroidery classes focusing on 2
different regional variations--Van and Urfa--I noticed that other interlocutors were Syrian
Armenian and grew up with female relatives teaching them embroidery but were not master
embroiderers themselves. I consider my skill level to be a beginner, and other interlocutors were
amateurs to professional levels. A few of the other interlocutors would sell their embroidery at
exhibition sales, but I did not interview them. Syrian Armenian women participating in these
classes (which were free or affordable on a local salary) did not need these classes to learn how to
make and sell their own products at exhibition sales. Most women already knew how to
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embroider or were familiar with it. Despite my Syrian Armenian American roots in a major
embroidery region, Aintab, I never learned how to do Western Armenian embroidery, so I had the
lowest skill set in both classes. But other participantss enjoyed helping me learn and it enabled
me to establish rapport more easily with them. I viewed these classes as serving more of a
therapeutic and social purpose, focused on preserving Syrian Armenian culture in Yerevan. I did
not notice any local or diasporan Armenians participating in these classes, and recommended
outreach to local and diasporan Armenian groups to increase attendance. After all, descendants of
Western Armenian genocide survivors settled in Yerevan and the Armenian diaspora, not only in
Syria. Ovsanna, a local Armenian employee at GIZ, said that some organizations, like Aleppo
NGO, offer embroidery classes for local Armenian women taught by Syrian Armenian women.
During my fieldwork, I did not notice any such classes, unless the classes I attended were open to
anyone, but only Syrian Armenian women signed up. Allison, a U.S. Embassy employee, added
that there is interest on the part of local Armenians in learning about Western Armenian
embroidery. I think that there is certainly room for greater outreach and collaboration between
local and Syrian Armenian women, as I noticed only Syrian Armenian women participating in
embroidery classes offered by organizations. For example, I was the only non-Syrian diasporan
Armenian participant in the classes I had attended.

8.3.2

Embroidery Classes at Aleppo NGO and Syrian Armenians’ Union

In total, I attended 8 Van embroidery classes taught by Knar, Hermine, and a third
woman named Maryam whom I did not interview, and hosted at Aleppo NGO from March 26May 23, 2019, and 7 Urfa embroidery classes taught by 2 Syrian Armenian sisters I did not
interview and hosted at Syrian Armenians’ Union from July 8-August 5, 2019. I also visited a
second ARS/H.O.M. branch closer to Syrian Armenians’ Union to learn more about Western
Armenian embroidery culture in Yerevan. I paid 10,000AMD (about USD $20) for 8 Van
embroidery classes. The first embroidery class I attended was Van embroidery hosted at Aleppo
NGO. I had developed a routine, attending embroidery class every Thursday afternoon and
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therapy afterward in the evening, as classes continued after my assault. Below is an excerpt from
a class a month after I started:
I like this routine--dzerakordz and therapy. Walking to dzerakordz class, past the gauntlet
of men smoking cigarettes and crowded around in small groups by non-functional taxis
with busted tires, biding their time by smoking and staring. I go to class in my gym
clothes. I didn’t work out, but I know I will reek of cigarettes after because of Mara and
Azaduhi [pseudonyms]. I know I’m going to get fed or offered coffee, gentle criticism,
and advice. I’m growing close to Mara. And this [embroidery] is so frustrating, but it
makes me feel connected to Syria and Aintab (April 25, 2019, Field Notes).
A typical class was about 1.5-2 hours long with a snack in the middle. There were 2 main
instructors, Knar and Maryam, and roughly 6 participants. I had the least amount of experience in
the group, and instructions were given in Western Armenian, which is my third language. This
immersion enabled me to learn Armenian more quickly and build relationships among the Syrian
Armenian community in Yerevan, as well as benefit from the therapeutic nature of embroidery
and connect with a traditional craft I had never learned about before I went to Armenia. Syrian
Armenian women master embroiderers who taught both Western Armenian embroidery classes I
attended (Van and Urfa, named after two towns in Western Armenia, now present-day eastern
and southeasternTurkey) not only taught other Armenian women embroidery skills (which they
could use to make and sell products), but also transmitted and preserved Western Armenian
culture. Van embroidery classes were held in Aleppo NGO, located in the basement of a building
off Northern Avenue, and while not many Syrian Armenian women smoked, several class
participants did. I am not a smoker, and this contributed to my culture stress. Participants looked
out for me, helped me with practicing Western Armenian and seemed to want to practice English
with me. The main critiques I would receive from the instructors were to slow down, focus on
making each stitch immaculate, and to take pride in my work, despite my beginner status. Of the
6 other participants, all were Syrian Armenian women who had some prior exposure to
embroidery passed down from their mothers and grandmothers. I did not notice any local or
diasporan Armenian class participants.
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Figure 8.2 Van embroidery. Photo and product by author, completed after returning from
fieldwork, Van embroidery.

The second embroidery class I attended was Urfa embroidery hosted at Syrian
Armenians’ Union (SAU) and taught by two Syrian Armenian sisters. Like the Van embroidery
classes, I felt very comfortable attending Urfa embroidery classes, although my skill level was
most certainly the lowest. Held specifically in the Syrian Armenian Industrial Zone (SAIZ), a
workspace for Syrian and local Armenian entrepreneurs, I recognized the instructors and several
participants from exhibition sales. They patiently helped me with my Western Armenian, stitches,
and talked about our shared heritage. Other participants seemed pleased that I had Syrian
Armenian roots and asked about my family name in Syria. As Aleppo has a tight-knit Armenian
community, participants informally knew of my relatives, which helped establish rapport and
helped participants figure me out. Several participants, including the instructors, were descended
from the same town in Western Armenia as my ancestors, Aintab. One day in July 2019, I asked
the other participants about passing down these skills to subsequent generations:
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I went to my aseghnakordz class at SAU. I feel so comfortable here, people call me hokis,
yavriges [“honey, dear”], very affectionate. We talked about the importance of passing
down these skills to the next generation, and I said we don’t learn these skills in the U.S.
Lori [pseudonym] said she thought US Armenians weren’t interested, but I explained it’s
because we don’t know about these skills in the first place. Lori is Aintabsi, too, and she
mentioned leaving a book behind in Aleppo documenting embroidery (July 24, 2019,
Field Notes).
In both classes, Van at Aleppo NGO and Urfa at SAU, conversations arose organically about the
lack of awareness among non-Syrian diasporan Armenians, generally, such as me, about
traditional Western Armenian embroidery. Lori, one of the instructors, assumed that this was
because Armenian Americans, for example, were not interested in preserving this aspect of our
heritage. I explained many Armenian Americans simply had never had any prior exposure to
these traditional embroidery skills. As Siranoush and Knar mentioned earlier in this chapter, even
in Syria, embroidery passed down from mother to daughter became less of a hobby and used for
ojid [dowry] in the 1970s/1980s. I suggested to Lori as well as UNHCR to encourage embroidery
outreach to non-Syrian diasporan Armenian organizations, such as Birthright Armenia.

Figure 8.3 Urfa embroidery. Photo and product by author, unfinished Urfa embroidery after
returning from fieldwork.
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I visited a second ARS/H.O.M. office in Yerevan in May 2019 and chatted with the mother of a
young Syrian Armenian woman I had interviewed a few months prior. Again, my Aintabsi roots
helped ARS/H.O.M. volunteers more easily connect with me:
It was a rainy day, and I took a taxi to H.O.M. on Charents 20. I was immediately greeted
by Aline [pseudonym], a warm middle-aged woman. She told me about the organization,
saying it is 100 years old and focuses mostly on raising money to give to soldiers and
families of martyred soldiers (presumptively from Nagorno Karabakh Republic). She
emphasized that the organization is entirely volunteer-based and staffed, and Arpine is
there every day. Furthermore, she said locals can participate in classes and
tsutsahantesner. Most interlocutors are Syrian Armenians and upon hearing that I’m
Aintabsi, pulled out a heavy book on Aintabsi lacework and showed me examples of
lacework that was literally recovered from the death camps and deserts of Deir el Zor. I
bought 4-5 necklaces on a whim and made everyone happy. I also took a selfie with
ladies who warmly greeted me during their art class and invited me to join them in having
lemon tea and cookies. I felt totally motivated today and a sense of belonging. I also
realized I participated in ARS Armenian language classes when I was younger. I should
look into joining H.O.M. in the future. Additionally, I learned that this organization has
pretty deep roots in Aleppo and was transplanted to Yerevan. I’m really interested in
learning how these cultural institutions were transplanted along with the women during
migration to Yerevan (May 21, 2019, Field Notes).
Lori told me a bit about ARS/H.O.M.’s century-plus legacy and current efforts in Armenia to help
support the families of soldiers killed along the Artsakh (Armenian term for Nagorno Karabakh
Republic)/Azerbaijan border, and offer embroidery and art classes to local and Syrian Armenians.
I mentioned that I am Aintabsi, and Lori immediately pulled out a book about Aintabsi
embroidery, particularly lacework, and showed me pictures of lacework recovered from death
camps and the deserts of Deir-el-Zor, Syria. Following our informal chat, I was invited to take
selfies with several women leaving an art class, and Arpine invited me to join them for the rest of
class and have some lemon tea and cookies.

8.4

Part III: Women-Owned Small Businesses and Initiatives

I observed three major categories of women-owned small businesses (WOSBs)

throughout my fieldwork--catering/general cuisine, embroidery, and other (tourism agency,
handmade soaps, dietitian business) in Armenia. During preliminary fieldwork in Istanbul, I also
found that Small Projects Istanbul established a jewelry collection called “Drop Earrings, Not
Bombs,” which helps unemployed Syrian women (mostly Syrian Arab women) make jewelry and
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sell it at the Grand Bazaar. The first category I will discuss is catering/general cuisine, providing
ethnographic examples from Shushan and Seda’s business and storefront at Halebi Shuka (Seda
sells lingerie, Shushan owns a small catering business), Nuritsa, Berjouhi, Karine, and Amina’s
cookie business. The second major category of WOSBs is embroidery (Siranoush, Talin, Knar),
and third major category is other, such as handmade soaps (Sona), dietitian business (Nazani),
and tourism (Arpi with her husband).
Syrian migrant women (Arab, Armenian) often relied on existing knowledge and skills to
open their own small businesses, Middle Eastern cuisine and baking. I noticed this trend not only
in Yerevan, but also in preliminary field sites such as Berlin and Istanbul. In Berlin and Istanbul,
Syrian migrant women made Syrian dinners for tourists and took them on walking tours around
Berlin and Istanbul. Small Projects Istanbul (SPI), an NGO in Istanbul, established a jewelry
collection called “Drop Earrings, Not Bombs,” which is now part of a women’s social enterprise
called Muhra. Small Projects Istanbul also partnered with Urban Adventures, which operates
worldwide, to provide a Syrian meal for tourists, prepared by Syrian women, during the 3.5-hour
tour.
In Yerevan, where I spent much of my fieldwork (13.5 months out of 14.5), I noticed
mostly middle aged Syrian Armenian women (40s-60s) tended to open their own small catering
businesses, as Syrian and Middle Eastern food was still relatively novel in Yerevan. One Syrian
Armenian woman in her late 30s/early 40s, Karine, was grateful for security in Armenia but is
unemployed, so, “I cook at home and sell Syrian baked goods like ishli kufteh. I cook for orders,
but there are not enough orders. A lot of people asked why I came here, there are no jobs here.
Being unemployed is better than being dead.” Karine was able to rely on her cooking skills to
start a small, informal catering business out of her home in Yerevan, but needs more orders. She
did not seem to participate in any vocational training programs. Although she could not find jobs
in Armenia and was asked by others why she came to Armenia when there were little to no jobs
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there, she still feels physically safe in Armenia and would prefer being unemployed to being
dead, ostensibly in Syria.
Over the course of my year in Armenia (2018-2019), I got to know Seda and Shushan,
two sisters who helped each other run their respective businesses, quite well over the course of
dissertation fieldwork. Aside from a formal interview, I would stop by Seda’s lingerie storefront
in Halebi Shuka at least once a month and stop by for a chat and a snack with Seda and her sister,
Shushan, who owns a small catering business and would help Seda watch her store when she was
not working. Seda and Shushan left Syria together a few years prior and proudly told me they had
always worked and owned a family business in Aleppo. In Aleppo, Seda owned a shop, opened in
1980, due to the consumer demand of local Arab women who wanted a Syrian women’s lingerie
shop in Aleppo. Seda declared, “I am able to look at a woman’s chest and tell her bra size. I am
proud I can help women feel comfortable and beautiful.” Now, Seda owns a shop in Halebi
Shuka. Her sister, Shushan, focuses on catering and is a talented cook and baker. The sisters were
prompted to leave Syria after a major dangerous event occurred on July 23, 2012 and came to
Armenia in October 2012 for 1 month to get an Armenian passport, but they wanted to return to
Syria. They thought they would be going back to Syria and were not ready to go to Armenia
permanently, so they only brought $1,000 with them, nothing else. The sisters had worked with
each other before in Syria, where they sold cosmetics, so they were prepared to do something
similar in Armenia. Seda and Shushan help watch each other’s businesses while the original
owner is busy and entertain friends in Seda’s small shop in Halebi Shuka. I recall hot summer
days in Yerevan drinking little cups of Armenian coffee served with delicious pastries baked by
Shushan. Both sisters always warmly welcomed me, and I would sometimes bring my dog,
Manti, for a visit because they missed their dog in Syria and would dote on neighborhood cats.
Whenever I showed up without Manti, they would chide me and ask, Manti oor eh? [Where is
Manti?]. Shushan sells anousheghen [pastries] and offers personal cooking classes, but we did not
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coordinate a time to meet for cooking classes and I could not host because my apartment in
Yerevan did not have a working oven, only a modest stove.
During one of our coffee chats, Seda said this work is very hard (i.e., running a lingerie
shop). In 2015, Seda opened a shop in Halebi Shuka because a friend told her about this
opportunity and shops were empty at the beginning. Attuned to consumer demand and as an
astute businesswoman, Seda noted that Syrian customers missed products from home and wanted
things, but she also said she wanted to get to know deghatsi [local] customers. The sisters spend
money on rent for the storefront in Halebi Shuka, rent for an apartment, and a stove for pastries.
Shushan makes pastries for tsutsahantesner [exhibition sales], and Seda makes dzerakordz
[handicrafts, in this case, earrings and purses with Armenian designs]. Shushan learned how to
make pastries from her mother and studied under Armenian celebrity Chef Setrak Mamoulian and
has a Fransahaygagan [French-Armenian] certificate on torts (cakes) and fourchette training.
Some of the pastries that Shushan makes include atayif, pastegh, and choreg, all Western
Armenian and Middle Eastern pastries and sweets. Seda commented on the differences between
Syrian and local Armenian food and the sisters’ work ethic:
Syrian food is better than local Armenian food. Our family had 4 generations in Syria
and arrived in Syria at the beginning of the genocide. Women learned about abrousd
[livelihood] and aseghnakordz [needlework]. We didn’t cry at all about leaving Syria, we
just miss our work in Syria. We don’t want to sit at home. We feel we are treated well in
Armenia. With work, everyone is equal. Work and outside life is different. We have no
time to chat while working. Deghatsinere trust me now. There is friendship. If locals trust
you, they have confidence in you. I can work, I can get on my feet, and I increased my
business in Armenia. Menk makur g’ashkhadink [We do pure work], magartag [quality],
and this is very important to us.
Seda and Shushan have a strong work and business ethic, and said they only miss their work in
Syria. Seda proudly declared, “I can work, I can get on my feet,” and both sisters got on their feet
in Armenia by opening their own businesses. They have also successfully established rapport
with and developed a strong local customer base in Yerevan, which has helped their businesses.
They have also built socialization into their workdays by inviting friends into their small
storefront in Halebi Shuka and then immediately stopping conversation to address their
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customers’ needs. Both sisters credit Diana from UNHCR for helping to teach them how to run a
business (additional training, as they ran their own businesses in Syria), along with KASA. Seda
has an additional handmade accessories business. Seda and Shushan said they love the UN
workers, like Diana, and credit UNHCR Armenia and the Round Table Foundation with helping
them a lot. Caritas helped Shushan learn about fourchette. Other NGOs that helped them were
Mission Armenia, and Seda added that, “Without them and their push, we would not be here,”
although I suspect that Seda and Shushan would have been fine on their own. However, the
NGOs provided them with more visibility and spaces to sell their products.
Another Syrian Armenian woman trained in fourchette, an active member in SAU, and
active participant in exhibition sales, Berjouhi, discussed why she came to Armenia in 2012 and
how she started her business with her husband. Following is an excerpt from our interview in Fall
2018, after she offered me a homemade French pastry and invited me into her apartment:
Anahid: Can you tell me about your decision to come to Armenia?
Berjouhi: I came to Yerevan in 2012 because there were bombs in Aleppo. We left 2-3
days after the bombs. We brought my youngest daughter and only son, and only brought
a few clothes for my youngest daughter. We originally only wanted to stay in Armenia
for a while. I have 3 children; my oldest daughter was a lawyer but couldn’t finish school
due to the war. I was worried about my children because people were kidnapping
children at the time. A bomb fell by our house, so we left. We moved to Latakia first,
because it was safer, and we traveled by plane.
Anahid: Were you working in Syria?
Berjouhi: No, I was a housewife. My husband had a business. He is now in Syria
checking on the house and the business.
Anahid: What made you decide to start working in Armenia?
Berjouhi: 5 dari ankordz ei [I was unemployed for 5 years]. My husband encouraged me
to start a business. Now, I teach other women the skills I have learned (fourchette
especially) and I am a member of the women’s committee of the Syrian Armenians’
Union. I have to make my cookie boxes myself because I can’t find any in the stores in
Yerevan. My husband helps me by making the cookie boxes, see? [Proudly shows me
various colorful boxes]. I also make an effort to get interviewed and be on national TV to
promote my business. At the beginning, I tried to participate in UN tsutsahantesner,
selling hair bands at first. Both deghatsiner [locals] and Syrian Armenians attend
tsutsahantesner. My husband suggested I work on baked goods.
Anahid: Did you receive any help from NGOs or the government?
Berjouhi: Yes, Red Cross helped with my business. They gave us an oven, blender, and
mixer. I started going to expositions and people began to get to know us. I attended
tasuntatsner [classes, vocational trainings] at the UN and KASA. I studied under Setrak
Mamoulian for 3 years, studying Armenian meals and I can do mixed French and
Armenian cuisine. I now give classes myself and will have my 5th fourchette class soon.
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Anahid: What was your reception by local customers?
Berjouhi: At first, people thought we were odarner [foreigners, non-Armenians] because
our cookies were colorful, and locals don’t use much color. I would give customers
samples and say, “1) Hyurasirel vor hame desnes te inchbes e,” [Help yourself so you
can see how it tastes] and 2) Eat.” I figured out what customers wanted. Now, they are
used to Syrian spices, but before, some locals would mix spices to make food heavier and
more expensive (because they weigh it). It also took 2-3 months to adjust to the Eastern
Armenian dialect. We spoke makur hayeren [pure Armenian, in this sense, not influenced
by Arabic, Turkish, or Russian], and normal tartzav [we got used to it].
Anahid: What is your business like now?
Berjouhi: We are an active couple and know everyone now. It is hard to get a storefront.
My neighbor helped a lot with business in the beginning. Everyone helped. Downstairs
[in the apartment building], there was a khanout [small store] and they also helped me.
Like Seda and Shushan, Berjouhi and her husband carefully studied local consumer demand and
interests. Berjouhi is extremely active in participating in exhibition sales and agreeing to media
interviews and televised segments and attends many workshops and vocational training programs.
In addition, her husband helps run the business side of her business and helps her make colorful
cookie boxes, while she takes care of the baking, catering, and teaching fourchette to other
(mostly Syrian Armenian) women. She credits NGOs and UNHCR with helping her start her
business and said that local Armenians are now used to colors and Syrian spices, inspired by
Syrian Armenians. Although her business focuses mostly on decorative cookies, she is also an
exceptionally talented Middle Eastern and French-style pastry chef and offers catering services.
Amina, a Syrian Arab Armenian woman in her early 30s living in Yerevan, recently
started her own cookie business. Trained as a pharmacist in Syria, she had a good career until the
war, when she moved to Dubai with her husband. Ultimately, the family with their young
daughter moved to Armenia in January 2019 because they felt it was more family-friendly than
Dubai. She could have found a job in a pharmaceutical company in Yerevan but does not speak
Armenian or Russian--she speaks Arabic and English. In addition, she did not want to work long
hours for a pharmaceutical company and wanted to spend more time with her young daughter, “I
want something small now that I can grow. I will be running my business until my daughter gets
older.” Amina’s focus is purely on her daughter and providing for her future, and I could see her
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face light up as she talked about her daughter and her cookie business. We continued our
conversation:
Anahid: What made you decide to pursue this type of business, since you are a
pharmacist by training?
Amina: I was thinking about a different project, then I wanted to start something here, in
Yerevan, like cake decorating. So, I started courses. I dreamed about having my own
bakery. I wanted to work close to home, not catering or home cooking. I wanted
something bigger, now I have my company, Tartist, registered. I am applying for the
Food Safety certificate now. I put my product in stores at the beginning. At the end of
March 2019, my company started. My workshop is at home now. I have a big oven,
mixer, tools/utensils. In 6 months, I am moving to a kitchen in Arapkir. I am currently
renovating the place. I only have someone now, an employee, who sometimes helps with
big orders. My goal is to get a certificate, paid ads, then investing in marketing.
Anahid: Did you get any help from NGOs or other organizations?
Amina: I got help from SAU, like documents for opening a LLC, information about tax
laws. The problem is that all the trainings were in Armenian, which I don’t speak. Caritas
pays for Armenian lessons. I got a loan from the Fund for Armenian Relief, which I used
to buy a big oven, printing costs, and I will return the loan in 2 years.
Anahid: What are some of the challenges you have faced in opening your business?
Amina: I can’t speak Armenian. Communication in Armenian is not impossible, but it is
difficult. These are the main problems. I plan to reach some selling points--like getting a
stream of orders, then have employees officially. A problem is that I minimize customers
with direct contact, due to the language barrier. Sometimes, the customers are not happy
that I am Armenian, but I don’t speak it. But in the market, it’s easier, more accessible,
and I can hire someone with language skills. I have customers who speak English. I only
met one Arabic speaker, from Lebanon.
A dedicated mother and businesswoman, Amina worked hard to establish her company in
Armenia with a unique challenge compared to other Syrian Armenian women I have interviewed-she does not speak Armenian. However, she had a clear business plan and strategy and was able
to renovate a kitchen in Arapkir, a district in Yerevan, which will help her produce more cookies.
Due to her language barrier, she is also faced with the challenge of expanding her customer base
in Armenia and understand vocational trainings offered by NGOs.
Nuritsa started her own sweets and food business in Yerevan and opened a storefront in
Halebi Shuka. I visited her frequently over the course of 2018-2019 during dissertation fieldwork,
particularly during spring and summer 2019. It took a bit longer to get to know Nuritsa, compared
to Seda and Shushan, but eventually we developed a relationship. One day, she invited me to visit
her second store location, in her apartment courtyard or bak, and then invited me to her apartment
for 2 kilos of cherries from a neighbor’s garden. Prior to this visit, we met in her Halebi Shuka
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store for an interview, and she invited me to sit on a small stool. Like many shops in Halebi
Shuka, there was just enough room for the two of us, a small refrigerator stocked with hummus,
muhammarra, sarma (stuffed grape leaves) and pomegranate molasses, and she agreed to an
interview. She opened her shop 2 years ago in Halebi Shuka, and like Seda and Shushan, pays
vartzov [rent], just like renting an apartment. Following is an excerpt from our conversation:
Anahid: How did you start your business in Armenia?
Nuritsa: I started to work, my first work was by Cascade taghamase [district] by
Yerevan’s famous monument/staircase, Cascade] in a dalan [archway to an apartment
courtyard], selling sweets by Polyclinica (a medical center). An older person, a papik
[grandfather] named Gagik, came and asked, “What are you doing?” He bought a box
and came back. He helped me a lot. I started a small table there, ahakin hajakhort
havaketsi [I got a lot of customers]. But the Gulbenkian Street taghabed [district leader]
told me not to sell there [on the street], so I had to move.
Anahid: Did any organizations help you?
Nuritsa: Red Cross and Caritas helped a lot. They gave me a scholarship and
tools/utensils. Anoun arink [We made a name for ourselves] and my business grew. I do
my own work, but made friends at tsutsahantesner [exhibition sales], from here
(Yerevan) or Haleb [Aleppo].
Anahid: Can you tell me about any difficulties that you experienced?
Nuritsa: Yes, I had difficulties, adiga tir [“write that down,” telling me to write it down
in my notepad]. 5-6 people in Armenia are kept under one salary. Here, everyone has to
work.
Anahid: And what are some of the differences between Aleppo and Yerevan?
Nuritsa: There is more endanegan srputyun [family holiness/values] in Aleppo. Here in
Armenia, families follow their sons more, so kids don’t tell their parents anything in
Armenia.
Unlike Amina, Nuritsa speaks fluent Armenian and was able to establish a customer base in
Yerevan, but had difficulties getting started at first. She initially established rapport with an
elderly man in her neighborhood, Gagik, who helped spread the word about her business and was
one of her first customers. Like Berjouhi, Nuritsa is almost always present at tsutsahantesner and
befriended other Syrian Armenian women working at the events. Shy yet warm, she persisted
with meeting local Armenian friends and customers as well.
Aside from embroidery and catering businesses, which are generally popular among
Syrian Armenian women entrepreneurs ages 40-60, although I did interview several younger
Syrian Armenian women entrepreneurs as well (in their late 20s/early 30s), other Syrian
Armenian women entrepreneurs owned various businesses. These businesses included a tourism
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agency, handmade soaps and lotions, and a dietitian business, among others. Sona, a Syrian
Armenian woman in her mid-30s who quickly became my friend and invited me to her apartment
for Armenian holidays since I lived alone in Yerevan, started her handmade soaps and lotions
business in Yerevan recently. Like Amina, her background is in science, specifically chemistry,
and she earned a degree in biochemistry in Syria. Born in Syria to Syrian-born parents and
grandparents originally from Marash and Aintab in Western Armenia (now eastern Turkey), Sona
has lived in Yerevan for 6 years with her 2 children (1 boy age 2, 1 girl age 8) and husband. Her
daughter was 2 when they left Syria and son was born in Yerevan. The family thought they would
live in Armenia temporarily for 2-6 months, like Seda, Shushan, and Berjouhi, so they left
everything in Syria, “where we had a normal life and a house.” Sona explained she decided to
start a handmade soaps and lotions business because her background is in chemistry and she was
already familiar with the training and materials, “I am working with oils and natural products for
1 year already,” since early 2018. Sona added that Caritas and the Red Cross helped her by
organizing expositions and gave her a printer for labeling products.
Nazani, a young Syrian Armenian woman in her late 20s/early 30s, started her own
dietitian business in Yerevan. She came to Yerevan in 2017 and lived in Lebanon for 2 years
prior, but she wanted to go to Dubai to be a registered dietitian:
Anahid: Can you tell me about the challenges you faced with starting your own
business?
Nazani: Well, I am a licensed dietitian, but there are no dietitians in hospitals in
Armenia. In summer 2018, I asked about job vacancies as a lecturer at Hay Busak
University, a medical university, and was a lecturer on biology, health, and healthy
lifestyle to non-Armenian medical students. I had Indian, Iraqi, and Iranian students,
mostly. As for my difficulties, I faced discrimination from the Health Minister. After
leaving Lebanon, I went to the Health Minister with certificates, and he thought they
were Photoshopped! I went to the Lebanese embassy and had to get formal documents. I
asked about job opportunities and the Minister said I had to remove my nose piercing! I
wanted to leave after this, my first week in Armenia after Lebanon.
Anahid: That’s understandable. I have a nose piercing, too. Can you tell me about your
work now?
Nazani: I now have a Facebook page and do online consultations as well. I want to do a
seminar on pregnancy nutrition someday. I am a member of Aleppo NGO and every 3
months; I am invited to give a seminar at their Friday meetings.
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In contrast to middle-aged Syrian Armenian women who reported facing age discrimination in
Armenia, Nazani was discriminated against because she had a nose piercing and was told to
remove it by the Health Minister. Like Amina, Nazani persisted with developing her own
business, doing online consultations, and providing educational outreach to local NGOs and a
medical university. The next section will address Syrian Armenian women entrepreneurs’
professional hopes for the future.
Hopes for the Future.
Although not every Syrian Armenian woman I interviewed started her own business in
Yerevan, the women who did start their own businesses reported wanting to have a storefront
(Berjouhi) and own their own houses (Sona and Nuritsa). Some women talked about expanding
their businesses, to online sales (Sona), a start-up in event management (Adriana), and in general
growing their respective businesses (Nuritsa and Arpi). When asked about hopes for the future,
there were mixed reactions about wanting to stay in Armenia and contribute to its socioeconomic
future, and just being in Armenia for their family. Siranoush said, “I always have hopes for the
future” and felt relieved to be safe in Armenia. Nuritsa said she wants to have her own house in
Armenia and for her kids to come to Armenia. As for the Armenian people, Nuritsa said, “I want
them to have a good future, lav bedutyun, lav abaka [good government, good future].” Arpi
added that she is also very hopeful for the future, “I never want to go back to Syria. I am focusing
on growing our businesses and getting out of maternity leave.” At the time of our interview in
March 2019, Arpi was pregnant with her second daughter. While most women whom I
interviewed felt optimistic about a future in Armenia but were upset with unemployment and not
owning their own homes, others felt pessimistic. Nazani said, “Professionally, there’s no future in
Yerevan. I do want to make some changes in Armenia, for diseases related to food and diet. I feel
at home here [in Armenia], and I’m here for my family, but I’m not sure about the future.” She
was upset with the high smoking rates in Armenia as well as the diet, and felt Middle Eastern
food was healthier than local food.
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8.5

Conclusion

This chapter analyzed feelings of frustration expressed by Syrian Armenian women about

vocational training programs and employment in Armenia. While many Syrian Armenian women
were excited to enter the paid labor force in Armenia, others were disappointed with the foci of
some vocational training programs, such as an emphasis on cosmetology and hairdressing versus
a focus on English and Russian language lessons and computer literacy. This chapter also
discussed two main business types operated by Syrian Armenian women entrepreneurs, which are
Middle Eastern cuisine and Western Armenian embroidery, with a third, less prominent category
listed as “Other.” Following this discussion was a brief history of Western Armenian embroidery,
particularly its importance in the aftermath of the 1915 Armenian genocide as well as today in the
wake of the 2011 Syrian conflict. I also provided a discussion of embroidery classes I participated
in, through Aleppo NGO and Syrian Armenians’ Union. Lastly, this chapter provided several
examples of women-owned small businesses, primarily in Armenia but with anecdotes from
preliminary fieldwork in Istanbul and Berlin.
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CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION AND EPILOGUE
9.1

Painful Belonging and Key Findings

This dissertation has examined how the homemaking of displaced women, in this case,
ethnic Armenian migrant women from Syria living in Armenia, is impacted by migration,
settlement, changing gender dynamics, and by a somewhat tenuously shared ethno-religious
identity with the host state, the Republic of Armenia. Dissertation fieldwork was conducted with
72 research interlocutors primarily in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, as well as preliminary
trips to Berlin and Istanbul. This dissertation is based primarily on the narratives of 32 ethnic
Armenian migrant women from Syria living in Armenia, and 30 state and non-state officials in
Armenia. I have argued that state constructions of home and belonging (informed by state
discourses of repatriation), which rely on collective memory of the Armenian genocide, collide
with Syrian Armenian women’s individual memories of an experiential home crafted in Syria
over the course of five generations since the Armenian genocide. In turn, this collision impacts
NGO socioeconomic integration efforts of Syrian Armenian migrant women in the host
community, the Republic of Armenia.
Collective memories of the 1915 Armenian genocide are instrumentalized by the
Armenian state to create new ethnic Armenian citizens through calls for repatriation and nationbuilding. This ideal citizen-making initiative conflicts with individual Syrian Armenian women’s
fond memories of a social and physical home constructed in Syria. This secondary “home” was
constructed over five generations of descendants of Armenian genocide survivors who had fled to
Syria. This conflict, between socially and physically (through the geopolitical borders of the postSoviet Republic of Armenia) constructed “homeland’ in Armenia and socially and physically
(defined here as physical houses in Syria), is further complicated by the fact that descendants of
Armenian genocide survivors in Syria had to hyper-emphasize their Armenian identity to survive
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in ethno-sectarian Syria, whereas in Soviet Armenia, Armenian ethno-religious identity was
muted.
Belonging based on a shared ethno-religious identity is not always joyous--it can also be
painful. Despite the Armenian state’s repatriation campaigns, which have shifted due to structural
changes in the Ministry of Diaspora (now the Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora
Affairs), as part of what I term a “beckoning state,” my research has found that belonging is
painful and layered with intergenerational trauma.
My primary argument is buttressed by three secondary arguments. The first secondary
argument is that the decisions to choose certain legal statuses upon settling in Armenia were
moralized by some members of the host population, particularly some of the NGO workers that I
also interviewed. Decisions to choose certain legal statuses are moralized by some members of
the host community, including some NGO employees. For example, “good” Syrian Armenians
are those who stay and become citizens. “Bad” Syrian Armenians are those who leave and move
to a third country, while applying for Armenian citizenship. Additionally, “repatriates” is not an
appropriate term to describe the Syrian Armenian women I interviewed, because they are not
returning to the country of birth they fled from (which would be Syria, at least not in the majority
of cases I interviewed). “Repatriation” is a mechanism created by the Armenian state, both during
1940s Soviet Armenia and the present day, as a response to state anxiety about emigration and
real geopolitical instability, particularly with neighboring Azerbaijan. Belonging has expanded
upon a basis on patrilineal membership, although patrilineal descent reckoning is still the status
quo. My research has found that anyone who can belong to the Armenian state, upon "proof" of
documented ethnicity (such as baptismal records) should.
The second secondary argument is that, while overall, Syrian Armenian women were
happy to be in Armenia (mostly due to relief of feeling physically safe from war--at least until
September 2020, after my dissertation fieldwork) with other Armenian Christians, I argue that
they still experienced “painful belonging.” The term I coined, “painful belonging, refers to
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expectations not being met regarding employment, renting an apartment vs. owning their own
homes, some rejection by the host community (evident also during the Nerkaght movement).
Social and physical homes were destroyed in Syria, although a semblance of social homes was
transplanted to the Syrian Armenian community in Armenia largely by its previous members,
who were generally middle to upper class Syrian Armenian women active in Armenian
community life (and charity involvement) in Syria, especially in Aleppo. Home-making practices
were also transplanted, encapsulated in physical spaces like Halebi Shuka and socialpsychological meetings and social events hosted by organizations such as Aleppo NGO. “Home”
is also ironic, in the sense, because home in Syria, over the course of five generations, began with
an extremely painful event, the Armenian genocide, for survivors and their descendants. Syria
was the site of mass killing fields, particularly in the deserts around Deir-el-Zor. In some cases,
intergenerational trauma was also passed down from survivors to their descendants, as was
recounted to me by interlocutors, as well as my own family history recollections. In the same
vein, Syria was also a place of refuge for Armenian genocide survivors and their descendants,
such as my grandfather. During the Armenian genocide, many Armenians were death marched
from Western Armenian towns and villages (in present day southeastern and eastern Turkey) to
the deserts of Syria, where they were generally attacked along the death march route to the mass
killing fields of Deir-el-Zor. Many people escaped along the way, such as some of my ancestors
and those of several interlocutors, were rescued by Arab, Kurdish, or sometimes Turkish families
sympathetic to their plight, or were kidnapped and sold into enslavement and bondage by other
families and Turkish leaders. For example, I have a female ancestor (by marriage), Araxi, who
refused to marry (this was not a consensual arrangement) a local Turkish bey and was
subsequently executed. Summarily, Syria, as far as Syrian Armenians are concerned, needs to be
recognized simultaneously as a site of immense pain and a place of refuge.
Lastly, my third secondary argument is that Syrian Armenian women are not just “bored
housewives” who did not need to work in Syria and had more leisure time, as was recounted to
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me by several local NGO employees. According to my research, approximately half of the
women interviewed (17 out of 32) entered the paid labor force in Armenia and 14 out of the 17
started or continued their own small businesses in Yerevan. In Syria, Armenian women’s
contributions to creating and preserving Armenian identity in post-genocide communities has
been largely omitted from relevant literature. Women played important roles outside of the home,
such as preserving and teaching others about indigenous Western Armenian crafts like
embroidery, social involvement in charity life, schools, and churches, and preserving the Western
Armenian language, which is also an endangered dialect. More attention has been paid to
Armenian male community leaders or Western missionaries’ and Western NGO workers’
contributions to helping Armenian women enter the paid labor force than Syrian Armenian
women’s actual contributions. As mentioned earlier, not every Syrian Armenian woman I
interviewed worked in Syria and faced challenges with learning how to write business plans, get
store fronts, form a customer base, or figure out marketing strategies in Armenia. Other
challenges included age discrimination against middle aged women (40s-60s) in the paid labor
force, and linguistic discrimination towards Western Armenian speakers instead of the standard
Eastern Armenian dialect spoken in the Republic of Armenia. Attempts to help Syrian Armenian
women (especially middle aged, middle to upper class women who did not work in Syria) adjust
to the paid labor force in Armenia through NGOs providing vocational and business skills
development training also varied. Some NGO employees felt that some Syrian Armenian women
complained about trainings and resented the fact they had to work in Armenia, whereas other
Syrian Armenian women were excited to work in Armenia. Some Syrian Armenian women, in
turn, felt they were not being listened to by several NGO employees in terms of the skills they
wanted to learn versus the training they were provided with, such as the desire for English or
Russian language training or computer skills instead of cosmetology and hairdressing lessons.
Armenia’s branding efforts--from labels and legal statuses chosen by Syrian Armenian
women (as well as impositions by the state, such as the “repatriates” brand), to the transformation
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of the Ministry of Diaspora into the Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs, which
is currently led by the former Mayor of Glendale, California, also extends to the entrepreneurship
front. Syrian Armenians in Syria are well-known for their artisanry skills, usually silversmithing
for men and Western Armenian embroidery for women, and customer service skills, the latter of
which contrasts with what many have described as Armenia’s poor customer service skills
reputation. The Syrian Armenian “brand,” rather the preservation of it, as described by one key
gatekeeper and friend, Diana from UNHCR, contributes to the Armenian state’s repatriation
efforts in the sense that ethnic Armenian migrant women from Syria are desirable potential
citizens, not only because they are ethnic Armenians, but because they have the potential to
socioeconomically contribute to Armenia’s development. This magnetism, of the Armenian state
towards the Syrian Armenian “brand,” is encapsulated by exhibition sales/charity fairs, which
were especially promoted by the former Minister of Diaspora Hranush Hakobyan, press releases
and discourse analysis by Armenian state media, including interviews with and state awards given
to Syrian Armenian women entrepreneurs.

9.2

Contributions to Anthropology

My research contributes to anthropologies of the state, belonging, (diasporic return)

migration, collective memory, home, and conflict, including genocide and war. It intervenes in an
anthropology of home by focusing on both the social (Jackson 1995; Hage 1997) and physical
aspects (Janning 2017; Dimova 2010, 2013; Fehevary 2013; Miller 2005, 2008) of home, its pain,
joys, and ironies. My project focuses on the social and physical aspects of home and contributes
the idea of an “ironic home” constructed in post-genocide communities (simultaneously sites of
refuge and mass violence). This project speaks to, but does not focus on, an anthropology of
genocide by showing how a population a century removed from a genocide uses it to interpret
their experience on multiple levels (Hinton and Hinton 2015; Kidron 2015) (migrant and host
communities, state and non-state officials). My dissertation also deals with state constructions of
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ideal citizen formation--one of obligation and devotion to the socially constructed ancestral
homeland, where ethnic descendants (Tsuda 2009) have a role to play to strengthen the state
(Skrentny et. al. 2007), as well as the perceived obligation of ancestral states to diasporic
populations (Tsuda 2009; Joppke 2005). As Tsuda notes, “ethnic descendants are seen by their
respective homeland governments as ‘our people’ who therefore have a right to return to their
ancestral homeland” (Tsuda 2009, 31), which is demonstrated in this dissertation by discourse
analysis of Armenian state and non-state media. Lastly, I problematize “belonging” as only
indicating a positive short or long-term solution to a humanitarian crisis and assert that states are
as manipulative as they are welcoming. Belonging and coming home usually connotes a positive
sentiment (Ilcan 2002), but it can also result in rejection and disillusionment (Constable 1999;
Shami 1998; Laycock 2012, 2016). For example, similar to my observations of the expectations
of many Syrian Armenian women not being met upon settlement in Armenia, as well as shock,
Seteney Shami’s fieldwork with Circassian “returnees” found that the “coming together in the
very location where Circassians expect to find commonality and a naturalized ethnicity, instead
generates an experience of difference, disjuncture, and a sense of rupture--not the portrait of
ethno-nationalism portrayed in scholarly or popular representations” (Shami 1998, 630). The
experiences of “difference, disjuncture, and a sense of rupture” among Syrian Armenians in
Armenia were unexpected by many interlocutors and locals, despite the history of previous
repatriation campaigns to Armenia (including during the Soviet Union). “Painful belonging” is a
phrase I use to describe the expectations of seamless integration that ethnic Armenian women
from Syria have upon migrating to Armenia.
Furthermore, the Armenian state is playing a critical role of setting parameters of
cultural and political belonging. Sociologist Philip Abrams (2006, 122) viewed the state as being,
“neither a thing nor a political reality that stands behind the state system,” such as government
agencies. Instead, he proposed that researchers should, “seriously examine the idea [original
emphasis] of the state, which has been so influential that we should suspend belief [original
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emphasis] in the real existence of the state as a backstage political reality” (Abrams 2006, 122). I
also draw inspiration from Basque anthropologist Begoña Aretxaga, who added to Abrams’ state
as an idea, namely, “to emphasize the notion of a powerful state devoid of content, which then
serves as a screen for a variety of identifications and as a performative mask [Abrams 1988] for a
variety of power discourses and practices” (Aretxaga 2003, 394). The idea of the state in this case
study is encapsulated by the former Armenian Ministry of Diaspora’s (currently Office of the
High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs) calls for diasporan Armenians to not only “return” to a
socially constructed homeland, but to contribute socially, and perhaps more crucially, financially
to its development as well. I argue that Syrian Armenian migrant women are “hailed” by the
Armenian state to return to the socially constructed ancestral homeland, drawn by obligation and
devotion to an Armenian “imagined community” (Anderson 2006). Louis Althusser’s concept of
being “hailed by the state” applies here, in the sense that the Armenian state actively “hails”
migrants of ethnic Armenian descent, which also leads to unintended consequences. Althusser
argued that “ideology” refers to a “representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals in
their real condition of existence” and that ideology interpellates individuals as subjects (Althusser
2006, 100). The phrase, “hailing by the state,” refers to his notion that ideology, “acts or
functions in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the individuals or transforms the
individuals into subjects by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation
[original emphasis] or hailing and can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace
everyday police hailing, ‘Hey, you there!’” (Althusser, 105). His concept, “hailing by the state”
applies to my case study of Syrian Armenian migrant women’s socioeconomic integration and
home-making practices in the Armenian state through Armenian state (and non-state) messages
calling Syrian Armenians to come “home.” Utilizing a model of what I term “beckoning states,” I
draw upon Louis Althusser’s notion of interpellation to analyze the illusion of cohesion (Sharma
and Gupta 2006) through repatriation.
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9.3

Policy Recommendations and Suggestions for Future Research

I encourage the Armenian state and NGOs to view Syrian Armenian women as leaders or

key participants, and to not infantilize them, as was reported by several Syrian Armenian women.
Their experiences are valuable to helping preserve Armenian identity and culture in Syria as well
as Armenia, although they have not received the credit they are due for doing so over the past five
generations. I also encourage Syrian Armenian women to be cognizant of local socioeconomic
struggles--those of NGO workers, customers, and new friends. Both frustrations contributed to
tensions between Syrian Armenian migrant women and local NGO workers, especially, although
in practice, both groups seemed to coalesce. Some NGO workers also expressed the desire for
Syrian Armenian women to learn more about the local Armenian market instead of only targeting
Syrian Armenian customers and desires.
As far as policy recommendations, I encourage the current Office of the High
Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs, particularly the High Commissioner, Zareh Sinanyan, and
Chief of Staff Sara Anjargolian, to develop policy inclusive of local and migrant women’s needs
and contributions. In the wake of the Second Nagorno Karabakh War, for example, Syrian
Armenians, including women, actively contributed to humanitarian distribution efforts during and
immediately after the war, and provided lunches to Armenian soldiers on the front lines. To
bridge the existing perceived tensions between local women and Syrian Armenian migrant
women, there also needs to be more focus groups outside of NGO settings to reach migrant
women not affiliated with organizations like Aleppo NGO or those who attend UNHCR events.
For Syrian Armenian women’s organizations such as Aleppo NGO, H.O.M., and Syrian
Armenian Union’s women’s groups, I recommend that they reach out more to diasporan
Armenian volunteer groups or provide internship opportunities, such as for embroidery, since loss
of cultural heritage is a major concern now in the aftermath of the Second Nagorno Karabakh
War.
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My suggestions for future research are to interview young Syrian Armenians (under the
age of 25), as my research mostly focused on Syrian Armenian women in their mid-20s to early
60s. Sites for possible research would be Vernissage, Yerevan’s public open-air market, Syrian
Armenians’ Union, and exhibition sales, which mostly feature female entrepreneurs but
occasionally host male entrepreneurs, especially silversmiths. I think it would be interesting to
also interview families of Syrian Armenian young men who volunteered to serve in the Second
Nagorno Karabakh War, as well as the men’s decisions to serve after already doing mandatory
military service in Syria. Other suggestions for future research would be to focus specifically on
discourse analysis of Syrian state officials and media sources regarding social constructions of
“return” and “homecoming.”

9.4

Epilogue

In the year since my last interview was conducted in August 2019, Armenia has faced

the interminable Covid-19 pandemic, as has much of the world. Unfortunately, it has also
unexpectedly faced a devastating war with Azerbaijan, which had invaded Artsakh, the Armenian
term for Nagorno Karabakh Republic, on September 27, 2020. Azerbaijan, backed by Syrian
mercenaries hired to behead Armenians for $100/Armenian and bribed $2000 to fight on the
frontlines, Turkish military personnel and weapons, increased U.S. military assistance (by 500%),
and Israeli drones, quickly advanced. 51

52

The war took 44 bloody days to be resolved, and was

resolved unfairly through annexation of indigenous Armenian lands and cultural heritage sites,
running the very probable risk of a cultural genocide. Overnight, friends lost their homes they had
lived in for generations, including one of my friends and Airbnb hosts in his beloved Shushi,
51

Abdulrahim, Raja. “Turkish-Backed Syrian Fighters Join Armenian-Azeri Conflict,” The Wall Street
Journal. October 14, 2010. Turkish-Backed Syrian Fighters Join Armenian-Azeri Conflict - WSJ. Accessed
March 29, 2021.
52

Frantzman, Seth J. “Israeli drones in Azerbaijan raise questions on use in the battlefield,” The Jerusalem
Post. October 1, 2020. Israeli drones in Azerbaijan raise questions on use in the battlefield - The Jerusalem
Post (jpost.com). Accessed March 29, 2021.
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which I visited during preliminary fieldwork in summer 2017. Artsakh lost approximately 60
ancient churches and cultural heritage sites, with no inclination when their caretakers will see
these sites again and in what condition. Previous Azerbaijani occupations of Armenian cultural
heritage sites have ended in the destruction of these sites, not unlike ISIS’ campaign in Syria (for
example, the destruction of the Armenian Genocide Memorial Complex in Deir-el-Zor) or the
Taliban in Afghanistan with the Bamiyan Buddhas.
As of this writing, approximately 90,000 Artsakhsi forced migrants are currently living in
Armenia, many unable to return to Artsakh as 80% of it was lost to Azerbaijan to save Armenian
soldiers, who were outmanned and outgunned by Turkish and Israeli weaponry. Armenia was
already in an impoverished state before the war, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic.
COVID-19 rates have skyrocketed in Armenia since the outbreak of the war, overcrowding
hospitals and stretching medical resources (wounded soldiers and COVID patients). Nikol
Pashinyan’s popularity has dropped since he signed the ceasefire which annexed 80% of Artsakh
and surrounding territories, and Armenia’s 2.5-year democratic revolution is now in question.
Will Syrian Armenian women mobilize and take on a leadership role, which is what state and
NGO workers want? I argue they are already doing so.
The silver lining to this tragedy, and silence from the international community-particularly the United States-- is the realization that Armenians only have each other to rely
upon, including the Armenian diaspora. Syrian Armenian women, as well, were active in the
Artsakh War effort. For example, Talin sold jewelry and proceeds went to the war effort. Other
women I did not interview but befriended, created patriotic cake and cookie designs to raise
funds. A local Syrian Armenian grocery store, “Haleb” [Aleppo] partnered with Artsakhsi women
bakers, who had only recently fled from Artsakh, to help the Haleb grocery store owners make
baklava, and Nuritsa set out a table in front of her store in Halebi Shuka selling baked goods and
raising funds for the war effort. Local and Syrian Armenian women alike, with their sewing skills
and lack of much humanitarian aid, hand wove camouflage nets for soldiers. Aleppo NGO has
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prepared hundreds, if not thousands, of hot, delicious Syrian meals for soldiers serving on the
frontlines. Arpi’s husband and business partner, father of two young children, heroically fought
on the frontlines and fortunately has returned to his family. As has been argued throughout this
dissertation, Syrian Armenian women have proven themselves to be loyal and beneficial to the
Armenian state. I feel their war efforts have cemented Syrian Armenian ties to Armenia now far
more than their initial first few years in Yerevan.
While initially some Syrian Armenian women were shocked at the differences between
life in Syria and life in Armenia concerning working in the paid labor force, many adapted after
several years and a few opened their own businesses. Syrian Armenian women make a “home” in
Armenia socially, physically, and economically, and I have argued the third aspect in this chapter.
However, homemaking is not always successful, and some Syrian Armenian women
entrepreneurs have been more successful than others. The successful entrepreneurs attributed
their success, and establishment of a social and economic home, through a loyal local customer
base. Home is also constructed physically through Halebi Shuka and other Syrian restaurants and
stores in Yerevan. Additionally, the Armenian state and non-governmental organizations
contribute to the ability of Syrian Armenian women to make a “home” in Armenia, through social
and financial resources. In return, Syrian Armenian women prove their “worthiness” to the
Armenian state in that they are not a burden on local Armenians and have also recently
contributed to the war effort. The year this dissertation was completed (2021) also marks 10 years
since the start of the Syrian conflict in March 2011. Push/pull dynamics between beckoning states
discussed in this dissertation (Syria and Armenia) remain to see whether Syrian Armenian
women, as with other displaced Syrians, decide to return to Syria or stay in Armenia.
Furthermore, with the outbreak of the war in September 2020, the memory of the
genocide is stronger than ever and utilized in state discourse by Diaspora High Commissioner
Zareh Sinanyan and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. The former Ministry of Diaspora website
has also been completely rebranded, from a defunct, not user-friendly website to a shiny new
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space (Diaspora - Home (gov.am)). The new website gives equal attention to different Armenian
diaspora communities around the world, with a mini biography for each major community,
including Armenians in Syria. The tab on “Repatriation” also mentions “Military Registration and
Service,” which seems to be a new change from the old website, and the “Programs” tab
emphasizes employment or start-up opportunities for “repatriates” in Armenia. I contend that
while the memory of the genocide certainly played a unifying role in mobilizing for the war effort
in Armenia for Artsakh, there is still tension between NGO workers and beneficiaries. There is
still tension between the two groups due to stress, inaction of UNHCR (perhaps due to top-down
orders), limited resources (severe housing issues), and simply not quite being on the same page-wanting different things. This is important to keep in mind moving forward and having to contend
with a burgeoning humanitarian crisis with no clear end in sight for Artsakh, while also dealing
with previous migration waves, such as Iraqi Armenians and Artsakhsis and Armenians from
Azerbaijan displaced from the first Artsakh war. It is hard to not draw parallels between images
of the Armenian genocide of genocide survivors on death marches in the Syrian desert and
caravans of Armenians fleeing their indigenous lands in Artsakh. Perhaps Syrian Armenian
women can help recently displaced Artsakhsis cope with their situations and help other displaced
women with vocational skills. Hopefully someday soon, displaced Artsakhsis will be able to less
painfully reminisce and return their indigenous lands, in a similar manner as some of my
interlocutors’ and my great-aunt’s nostalgic association of roses with their beloved hometown of
Aleppo, Syria.
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